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 This thesis presents an alternative reading of law as a way to settle 
conflicts and dispense justice through the eyes of the feminine and their ethics of 
care as elaborated by Carol Gilligan. An elective articulation between cultural 
feminism and postmodern ethics has been defended rather than coincidence. It shows 
the aporias of modernity through the reading of postm dernity, especially the 
undeniable exigencies of Levinas’ ethics of alterity and the reading done by Derrida 
of Benjamin’s characterization of law as violence. The challenges of postm dernity 
in those respects remain and then the findings of Gilligan’s different voice are 
articulated to offer a possible Aufhebung . No coincidence is defended but a proper
articulation is defended. This thesis defends a reconceptualisation of justice as a 
feminine virtue within a postmodern paradigm of law nd its rematerialization and 
reflexiveness as well the advancement of Relational Contract Theory and Need-
Oriented Contact Theory. It explores early practices of Consumer Protection Office 
of MPDFT-Brasilia-Brazil which were responding to a transition constitutional 
situation after the redemocratization of the country and were an institutional lost 
paradigm of justice as a feminine virtue. The desired outcome is to identify a
possible framework for justice as care, considering a manifold diagnosed gap in 
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 This work was born of an early and general concern r garding interpersonal 
relationships, the conflicts they raise and the issue  of justice they entail and of an 
equally early but very specific dissatisfaction with the common way they are handled, 
especially in public realms. 
 This was indeed a puzzle so complex and structureless that finding its solution 
appeared hopeless. It had to stay this way for longyears until a basic framework for its 
resolution came about. It happened during the search fo  career improvement still in the 
midst of nappies, baby sleeplessness, unbalanced relationships, many irremediable 
losses, a typical female fear of success and the unr nounceable commitment to the 
domestic, the private and the relational. 
 
“You have given me the freedom that the loner cannot have 
You have made me indestructible because with you I d  not end in myself” 1
 
Relationships and a concern for the Other, for the Otherness of the South, of the 
feminine were the defining characteristics of the research behind this work which 
opposes male and modernist legal theory, which has relentlessly colonised justice as a 
feminine virtue. The main aim of this thesis is to offer an alternative (post-modern and 
feminine) reading of law as a way to dispense justice as care, out of the traditional legal 
remedies for legal disputes through legal proceedings  courts of law.  
 
Julius stopped in front of his friend. “Listen Rupert. 
If there were a perfectly just judge 
I would kiss his feet and 
accept his punishments upon my knees. 
But these are merely words and feelings. 
There is no such being and even the concept of one 
is empty and senseless. I tell you, Rupert, 
it’s an illusion, an illusion.” 
“I don’t believe in a judge”, said Rupert, 
“but I believe in justice. 
And I suspect you do too, 
or you wouldn’t be getting so excited.” 
“No, no, if there is no judge there is no justice, 
And there is no one, I tell you, no one.”2 
                                                
1 Pablo Neruda in Kozyris, 1991: 436. 
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 Then, the main field, in which this thesis belongs and in which it ought to be 
read and understood, is legal theory. The main inquiry of this thesis address a practical 
gap to be feasibly bridged by the theoretical outcomes which this thesis hopefully 
success in furnishing. It should be stressed that the thesis does not turn on its practical 
applicability or the feasibility of the alternative institutional model it outlines, but on the 
way it open up questions located at the border of the theoretical and the practical. The 
last Chapter, nonetheless, summarily describes two European experiences of out-of-
court justice to furnish this thesis with empirical evidence that the alternative method of 
consumer disputes resolution which are outlined in the theoretical chapters can work, 
and that they enhance and improve significantly them chanisms of out-of-court 
consumer dispute resolution which already exist. 
 It should be taken as unquestionable that the empirical model presented in 
Chapter III was not abandoned in Brasilia-Brazil for essentially political reasons but 
that its failure corroborates the fragility of the feminine in patriarchal institutions and, 
more acutely, in male legal sites. Its “failure” is, in fact, most revealing and should be 
understood in its own terms and considered within te methodology most suitable for 
anthropological analysis and, especially, Gilligan’s convincingly analysis of the female 
different voice as a contestation of the conclusion of Kohlberg’s human moral 
development theory. Furthermore, the Brazilian example is not aimed as a model for 
informing EU policy. It intends to stress the features of a practice of law able to 
dispense justice as care. 
 The experience of the Danish Consumer Ombudsman (DCO) is described in 
Chapter VIII in order to reinforce the discussions of Chapters V and VII on the politics 
of soft law in EU consumer law and policy and the role of the “EU Ombudsman as a 
novel source of soft law in EU” (Bonnor:2000) respectively. Chapter VIII shows how 
the DCO is an important paradigm for the creation of an EC consumer protection 
ombudsman. 
   The legal remedies of male legal dogmatics also soon showed their inability to 
encompass human, moral and political dimensions of the encounters among strangers in 
a market as diverse and complex as the EU’s. Furthermor , the EU resolution of the gap 
confronts us with the limits of its “imagination” and calls for another rationality, 
another way to see the old problem and to imagine a s nsible approach, calling forth its 
peculiar adaptability to embrace a redefinition of justice forged in the context of a 
different voice: the cultural feminism of Carol Gilligan and her findings about an ethic 
of care, which stresses the value of relationships and responsibility. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
2 In Wolfe, 1992:361. 
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“The salvation of this human 
world lies nowhere else than in 
the human heart, in human 
meekness, and in human 
responsibility… We are still 
incapable of understanding that 
the only genuine backbone of all 
our actions – if they are to be 
moral – is responsibility. 
Responsibility to something 
higher than my family, my 
country, my firm, my success.”3 
 
 In the context of the thesis’s post-modern and feminine reading of the inabilities 
of modernist and male theory of law, Chapters V andVI deal substantively with key 
aspects of EC consumer law and policy. Chapter V thoroughly discusses the 
constitutional background of a necessary EU justice for consumers. The substance of art 
153 of EC Treaty is analysed in detail. Chapter IV considers art. 153, as a programmatic 
norm, in the context of the history of EC consumer law and police concerning access to 
justice, which shows a favoured framework to adopt jus ice as care for basically two 
reasons. Firstly, because of the chosen out-of-court justice system and secondly, 
because of the language used throughout Commission’ Action Plan, Green Papers, etc, 
whose texts were discussed in their substance and constitutional background. Chapter V 
discusses also the inevitably national resistance or “jealousy” regarding the EU’s ever-
growing powers and, following Weatherill’s known positions, identifies art. 153 as a 
wide enough constitutional basis to establish subsidiarity as duty to act. Chapters IV and 
VI identifies harmonization as something of a lynchpin  in EC market dynamics but 
only as safety net and absolutely unworthy as a politics of added-rights without reliable 
channels to guarantee access to justice. The introducti n of Chapter IV identifies a 
common sense point in consumerism which is about the irrelevancy of consumers’ 
petition of rights or legislation (through harmonization for example) without an office 
as the DCO or the Brazilian MP. Nevertheless, Chapter IV analyses harmonization as 
the normal legal way to protect consumers and Chapter VII brings need-oriented theory 
to inform EC consumer protection. Chapter IV identifies cross border disputes for the 
application of justice as care exactly because they almost inevitably entail differences.  
                                                
3 In Journal for Anthroposophy, number 51, Fall 1990. Vaclav Hazel, Czechoslovakian President and 
writer, in an address to the U. S. Congress, February, 1990 (Taken from a notice board at The Rudolf 
Steiner School of Edinburgh) 
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 Part II is developed under the common sense assumption that consumer law 
occupies the borderline between private and public law and is characterised by a  timid 
development of EU consumer law due to the lack of political will of EU institutions to 
interfere with traders in their ambiguity of defending their own national privileges and 
the freedom and benefits of a common market. 
 The weaker position of consumers is another common sense point that will be 
tackled in this thesis. In truth, it should not play any important role given the parameters 
established especially in Chapter I namely the somewhat problematic formalisation of 
substantive reasons and the ethics of alterity, made feasible through the feminine ethics 
of care. Responsibility for the Other is a much more encompassing moral stand for legal 
practices than any formal protection that might overlook needs. The weaker position of 
the consumer is anyhow an assumption which is totally acknowledged when a powerful 
public authority as the DCO is in charge and defended to be a paradigm for the creation 
of a European consumer ombudsman.   
Given the exposition of Chapter IV, this thesis could have been dedicated to 
improving the existing system. Nevertheless, this tesis’ main object is not “access to 
justice for consumers in the EU” but to provide an lternative (post-modern and 
feminine) reading of the problems of justice that confronts male and modernist legal 
syntaxes. EU access to justice for consumers is just the challenge to any feminine 
endeavour of being pragmatic, realist while inclusive and satisfactory. 
  This thesis could have been elaborated instead throug , for instance, the 
discussions on informalism (Abel) or on the uneasine s of ADR for settling situations 
marked by power imbalances (Laura Nader). However, all that still represents normal 
(in Thomas Kuhn’s theory) parameters of science and l w. Furthermore, the cross-
cultural dimension of the gap cannot be overcome by modernist legal theory whilst 
indicating a post-modern character of the philosophical query on the existence and 
features of its possible solution. 
 A highly relevant experience of settling consumer disputes was recalled and it 
seemed to fit quite well the paradigm proposed by Gilligan. The empirical experience 
described in Chapter III unveils the feminine and postmodern characteristics of the 
project and informs both the outline of a possible EU agency responsible for justice for 
consumers and the analysis of two successful European experiences in out-of-court 
justice.  
 It is certainly time for the feminine, for the South that was feminised through 
silence and domination. 
 
“Meditation, the art of being fully responsible, will have to become the normal training 
for everyone performing a significant function.  
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And when that happens, finally, after aeons of male domination, the age of the feminine 
qualities will be upon us.  
From aggression and competition to receptivity and co-operation –this poor planet and 
its tortured species could do with some loving, nurturing energy.  
It is time, indeed.”4    
 
 The consideration of the feminine raised the issue of separation as the 
fundamental shortcoming of the modernist and male pradigm especially when it is 
applied to legal problems. The feminine suggested th  need to consider the personal, the 
urgency of “contaminating” the public with the uniqueness of the private, the domestic 
and the relational. 
In the thesis I argue for an “elective affinity” and “elective articulation” between 
cultural feminism and post-modern ethics rather than a coincidence. Chapter I shows the 
aporias of modernity through the reading of postmodernity, especially the undeniable 
exigencies of Levinas’ ethics of alterity and Derrida’s reading of Benjamin’s 
characterization of law as violence. The challenges of postmodernity in those respects 
remain and then the findings of Gilligan’s different voice are articulated to offer a 
possible Aufhebung. This work has made it clear; it does not defend a coincidence but a 
proper articulation is undertaken in its two first chapters. 
 
“En lo más profundo del mar se encuentran riquezas incalculables, 
pero si buscas la seguridad, quedate en la orilla”5 
 
A redefinition of justice would have to deal with postmodern irresolution and 
the “banality” of Gilligan’s cultural feminism insert d in daily needs as the first appeal 
of recognizing the Other as human. Then, it was necessary to defend love as 
institutional will, which would require an extensive retraining of legal professionals 
toward a new practice of law. This practice would have to be postmodern in the 
punctuality6 and contextuality of its approaches and outcomes; it would have to be 
feminine in its understanding of responsibility vis-à-vis the Other understood not as 
autonomous and modernist. The relational ethics behind this practice of law defines 
morality not as a set of rules and principles but as one responding to the Other in his 
own terms. The translation of the Other is defended not as a hermeneutical endeavour 
but as an ethical undertaking. The post-modern and the feminine displace the Kantian 
                                                
4 OSHO Times, India-Bombain-Puna.Vol. VIII, 9, September 1, 1995, page 40. 
5Persian poet from the XIII century, in the Spanish Magazine “Cuerpomente” no. 70, February 1998, 
Barcelona: Printer S.A. “In the deepest sea are invaluable richness, but if you search for security stay on 
the shore”.  
6 See footnote 1 of Chapter III. 
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and male unitary and conventional morality of rules, principles and universal categorical 
imperatives in order to install a morality of the self who approaches the Other with care 
and responsibility in relationships. 
Chapter I challenges the male, modernist paradigm which currently informs both 
moral and legal practices. The initial attack appeared unavoidable even when the 
argument progresses towards the recognition of the indispensable role of hard law and 
harmonisation in EU consumer justice as a safety net for justice as care. The 
conviviality between male hard law as safety net and justice as care as practice of law is 
an exigency of the method of inclusion which informs female moral reasoning. 
What follows is an attempt to present another reading of law as a way to settle 
conflicts and dispense justice through the eyes of the feminine and in terms of an ethics 
of care. The intended outcome is a framework to bridge the gap in access to justice for 
consumers in cross-border disputes in EC consumer policy and law. The thesis is 
developed in two parts. Chapter I considers the pitfalls of modernist, male legal theory 
based on three separation theses: of law from morals, l w from justice, and among 
human beings in general. It argues for the necessity of a different voice to promote re-
connection as a feminine way to redress the shortcomings of justice in legal 
proceedings, especially in consumer disputes. Chapter II presents Carol Gilligan’s 
findings as the paradigmatic revolution the feminine could provoke in law. Chapter III 
explores an empirical experience of a feminine justice for consumers surrounded by 
institutional will as love and interesse.  
Part II of the thesis is devoted to examining European conditions as the 
environment for the adoption of a feminine practice of law i.e. justice as a feminine 
virtue. It has five chapters. Chapter IV analyses the gap. Chapter V explores the 
existence of legal basis in EU to embrace a feminine practice of law to settle consumer 
disputes. Chapter VI shows the development of the theme in European consumer policy 
and law until 2001. Chapter VII offers a translation f the empirical experience 
described in Chapter III into the European environme t. Chapter VIII analyses two 
European experiences of out-of-court justice. 
The references at the end of the thesis are quoted in the main text of the thesis 
with the author’s surname, year of publication and page number after the quotation. 
Those citations not included in the references section are detailed in footnotes on each 
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Law and Justice: A Post-Modern Reading of a 
Modern Separation 
 
This thesis elaborates an alternative reading of law as a way to settle conflict and 
dispense justice through the eyes of the feminine and their ethics of care regarding the 
ever legal deficit of justice and the insurmountable reductive and stilling effects of law 
as effects of its male, modernist and patriarchal fr mework. This discussion aims to 
articulate the resolution between the findings of bth postmodernism and Gilligan’s 
ethics of care towards responding the following question: “Which justice for consumers 
in cross-border disputes in the European internal mrket?”  The goal is to justify the 
necessity of such a discussion with its urgent and practical features. Justice for 
consumers and cross-border disputes in a common market seem to be the ideal elements 
of the practical background which is able to justify the theoretical central problem 
object of this thesis.  
The articulation of this resolution represents the positive side of this thesis. By 
contrast, its critical side undertakes a refutation of the modernist male conception and 
practice of law regarding access to justice. This first chapter aims to demonstrate the 
devastating consequences of separation, isolation and autonomy (as liberal and 
modernist values) for a practice of law compromised with justice. Separation is the 
touchstone of a pervasive pattern of rationality that this thesis identifies as modernist 
and masculine. The pervasiveness of this masculine and modernist paradigm is not 
confined only to liberalism, but also to its legal expressions of positivism or legal 
‘naturalism’7, which explains the uselessness of attacking them as examples of the 
modernist legal theory. Instead, it is necessary a conception of justice based upon a 
feminine practice of law, called justice as care which should be able to respond to 
needs, achieve satisfaction and happiness and not simply silence conflicts and stabilise 
expectations. Separation8 describes the problem addressed in this chapter. The re-
                                                
7 In a post-modern reading, the tension between a positivist and a naturalist understanding of law or 
between a conceptual and a normative jurisprudence is deemed to be flawed because despite the 
difference, for instance, regarding the separation hesis, both approaches share the same untouchable 
cornerstone of modernism: “both express faith in the Enlightenment search for a universal method to 
resolve law’s many problems” (Minda, 1995:6). Both, legal positivism and natural law theory, as the 
Enlightenment for Jung, are born of fear (Jackson, 1996:288). A well-founded fear of the Other or fear of 
Justice? (Douzinas&Warrington, 1991&1994) Moreover, conceptual and normative jurisprudence share 
equally the kingdom of the autonomous self and transce dental object, which amounts to the detachment 
of the subject from the object. In this sense, the bearer of rights is dislocated, depersonalised and 
deprivileged as individual, self and Other (Ibid, 20- 3/80). 
8 The separation thesis in law has its history in modern times and its foundation mark in the ideas of the 
Enlightenment, regarding the necessity to contain and organise diversity around the unitary legal order of 
nation-states, thereby endowing those new legal orders with certainty and security, deemed necessary for 
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definition of justice demands the resolution of separation as a legal problem, a human 
phenomenon, a moral failure and a problem for science.9 
This discussion about law and justice is undertaken into the limits of the so-
called moral crisis of law by applying a feminist reading which understands separation 
as a moral failure. For that, one may modify jurisprudence10, thereby enlarging legal 
theory in order to legitimise a practice of law as a feminine virtue. A sort of post-
modern question is put since the separation between law and justice is to be resolved 
through the reinsertion of moral and ethical11 standpoints in a given conception of law 
(Veitch, 1997). Despite positing such a post-modern query,  a very old way to respond 
to it through the findings of women’s moral development theory. The elderly path 
encompasses a much forgotten claim of the value of the eminine for the social equation 
of interpersonal conflicts. 
The present analysis of modernist theories of law aims, deliberately, “to reframe 
and shift the analysis of (…) [justice] away from legal positivism and to supplant it with 
a more meaningfully lived account of diverse and intimate situations” (Arrigo, 
1995a:89). Another goal is to state that it is not the loss of faith in universal rules that 
characterises the moral crisis of law, despite being this also another symptom, but the 
loss of the Other understood in a perspective of care and responsibility in relationships.  
This chapter will be developed in four sections. The first one characterises 
separation as the problem of law or its moral failure concerning Shklar’s argumentation 
against legalism and the findings of the relational contract theory. The second section 
discusses the troublesome relationship between law and justice, the first separation, as a 
consequence of the second separation between law and morals and explores a post-
modern diagnosis and a possible solution. The third section investigates the problems 
that mercy and love suggest when brought into legal spaces. The fourth section 
examines the theme of justice as a matter beyond law under the light of a feminist 
theory, and the ethic of care, defended by Carol Gilligan, as an alternative way for the 
reconciliation of law and justice in dispute resolution. The third and fundamental 
separation thesis, which informs liberal modernist social organisations, will be 
identified as another crack to be mended toward a more emancipatory legal practice of 
justice as a feminine virtue.  
                                                                                                                                    
the development of capitalism. The history of separation recalls a lot of the history of the suppression of 
the feminine from the culture, as the annulment of the order of nature. 
9 See the work of Bortoft (1996) on the theme of separation in science. 
10 Arrigo’s project on experiential feminism and its imaginative discourse is embraced here because her 
project aims at “re-conceptualizing justice and de-centering law” as a central concern of “a feminist 
jurisprudence” and a very much post-modern project (1992:13).  
11 See Finnis (1998:68) about Habermas’ differentiation between the ethical (Wertorientierungen) a d the 
moral (Verpflichtungen) orders (1998:26). Habermas uses this distinction to disqualify Gilligan’s theory 




I-Is There a Problem with Law?  
 
Before tackling the configuration of law as a practice in need of revision, this 
discussion may be placed around two different theoretical backgrounds: the work of 
Shklar on “Legalism” and the general conceptions of the relational contract theory, as 
helpful tools to shape the object of this chapter. 
 
I.1-From Law as Legalism to Law as Legality12 
 
Shklar, when offering suggestions “for alternative ways of thinking about law” 
through criticising legalism, places her discourse into a discussion “about the relations 
of law to morality” (1986:viii). She argues that legalism is the conservative force of law 
that insulates law from morals and from politics. The politics of legalism is toward “law 
as ‘there’, as a discrete entity” (Ibid., 9). The insulation of law from morals, says Shklar, 
has led law to an excessive formalism, especially under the positivist account of law 
(Ibid., 7). This chapter argues that legalism, formalism and the insulation of law from 
morals are problems of law and that they entail a justice failure. Separation as a legal 
problem explains why law, when called upon to settle disputes and dispense “justice”, 
perverts the particularities involved in disputes by imposing its own criteria based on 
the dichotomy of what is legal or illegal.   
 Legalism, as one of the social ethos, defines the way legal institutions are 
structured and how they function. Shklar calls legalism the “operative outlook of the 
legal profession” (Ibid., 8). Without describing indetail that outlook, she considers 
legalism as a conservative practice, “because law is itself a conservatizing ideal and 
institution” (Ibid., 10). Legalism is a morality; “one morality among others; (…) the 
morality of rule following” (Ibid., 2/87). She attributes to legalism a scale of legalistic 
values, naming courts of law and the rules they follow as “its most highly articulate and 
refined expressions” (Ibid., 3). This idea of degrees of legalism justifies her defence of 
legality as a correct understanding and practice of norms or rules which guarantees 
democracy, for instance (Ibid., 117).  
                                                
12 Bankowski aims “to save legality from the attack on legalism and show how a reliance on rules do not 
necessarily lead to the admittedly negative ideology f legalism” (1996a:16); and also to defend legality 
as “(…) a version of legalism (…) [n]ot the negative concept that Judith Shklar (1986) attacked in her 
book on ‘Legalism’ but rather a practical ethical con ept which needs to be defended morally” 
(1991:101/2). However, it appears that the moral defence of legality, made by modernist phallocentric 
rationality, would not save legalism neither legalism could be morally justified through a correct 
understanding of “nomianism”, which is called “legality” and defended by Bankowski (1996a:27). His 
position reminds Shklar’s suggestion upon “degrees of legalism” (1986:22). How could rules save rules? 
One might need a different tool than the master’s tool o dismantle the master’s house. Natural law 
theories also would not help since, as Shklar says, like positivism, they “allow judges [and everyone else] 
to believe that there always is a rule for them to follow” (Ibid., 12). 
 21
The level of human problematic situations, which nowadays law must respond 
to, seems to require a radical departure from the axis of legalism. It would demand a 
more profound manifestation of human rationality in law -which is behind legalism in 
all its forms, including legality- and in favour ofa radically different possibility of the 
institutional practice of justice as a feminine virtue. The modernist and male legality, 
legalism and formalism in law, based on the “predisposition to discover, construct, and 
follow rules (…) [as] the distinguishing mark of European culture”, would refrain to 
allow its female counterpart to speak, not as “kadi justice of China and Islam” but as 
“the inner-worldly ethic of the Orient” (Ibid., 21)13. The refusal of the universalism of 
the western legal culture seems to call for the particularism of Chinese social relations, 
including business and trade, structured among personal networks (Appelbaum, 1998: 
173)14.  
Shklar offers another element when she talks about the “policy of justice” as one 
of the noblest aims of legalism. The policy of justice in legalistic terms involves “the 
independence of the judiciary, the separation of powers, the preservation of fundamental 
rights, or just fairness (…)” (Ibid., 13). The princ ples of equality and impartiality may 
be added to it. This list entails a great deal of formalism in the attainment of justice 
through legalism in any of its degrees. That policy of justice identifies justice with 
adjudication through the judicial application of law: against that this thesis argues. 
 Shklar finishes her book without any definitive con lusion but one sole 
suggestion about the fundamental question on the very nature of what is truly law and 
which involves the insulation of law from non-law, moral and politics. She concludes 
arguing that this discussion pertains to the realm of legalism and that legalism would be 
better understood as a scale with many degrees. She defends it since it has the advantage 
of liberating us to search for what is law. Neverthless, this strategy seems not of use to 
respond to the moral crisis of law demands which requir  a solution to be searched 
outside the stream of legalism and its masculine and modernist rationality.  
 
                                                
13 Rephrasing Shklar, the de-emotionalisation of law as an institutional discourse needs to be softened 
because it is already time for the institutions of law and power to function in accordance with a new ethic, 
able to approach the psychological nakedness in which we stand before one another. The unity of the 
market society, vis-à-vis the diversity it tries to unify under common rules and common economic 
interests, accentuates this nakedness, beyond any possibility of refrain (Shklar, 1986:26-7).  
14 See the work of Appelbaum for his description of the concept of guanxi which “means literally ‘a 
relationship’ between objects, forces, or persons”. He says that guanxi is in the foundations of a problem-
solving strategy in business in China –which is aggre ationist- in opposition to a problem-finding 
characteristic of western legal formalism –which is separatist. See footnote no. 3 about the same 




I.2-The Relational Contract Law Inspiration 
 
After having rejected legality as a possible encompassing view of the separation 
problem whilst accepting legalism’s insulation policy as the fundamental cause of that 
problem, the findings of relational contract theory f Macaulay and Macneil should be 
analysed. 
 Macneil argues against the conception of contract as a pure encounter between 
strangers and isolated parties. He says that “contract between totally isolated, utility-
maximizing individuals is not contract, but war” (In Wheeler&Shaw, 1994:50). Instead, 
he defends that any contractual relationship is deemed to entail relations of co-operation 
between interdependent people and that relational contracts are treated as marriage 
rather than as “discrete relations” between totally isolated parties. These ideas are based 
on the empirical work of Macaulay on contract and dispute resolution in business 
relationships, whose conclusions show that contractual rules are not relevant for 
relational transactions because firstly “the substance of the contract is never finally 
fixed, but always open and mutable” and conflicts are resolved towards the continuation 
of the relationship (In Ibid., 74-5). Furthermore, in a relational environment or caring 
practice of law, “there is little need for rules of recognition to identify the rules” to settle 
eventual disputes (Gottlieb, 1983:604). In Macaulay’s words, “even discrete 
transactions take place within a setting of continuing relationships and interdependence. 
The value of these relationships means that all involved must work to satisfy each other. 
Potential disputes are suppressed, ignored, or compromised in the service of keeping the 
relationship alive” (1985:466). 
 “Relational contract theory offers a challenge to the modern paradigm” 
(Wheeler&Shaw, 1994:67) and comprises the core of most conventional scholarship. It 
demands that one overcomes intellectual barriers of neo-classical habits about 
understanding contract centred exclusively on promise, which obscures relational aspect 
of the real life or contractual relationships (Macneil, 1985:485/525). It has a demolition 
force to destroy the classical positivist understanding or the myth, “that legal sanctions, 
or fear of them constitute the social glue” (Ibid., 509). It challenges the Wizard of Oz 
principle of jurisprudence, under which law operates as a discrete institution guided by 
the illusion of abstracted principles and universal ules (Macaulay, 1985:469/477).  
Charles Fried identifies in relationalism a moral principle that informs the 
dynamics of contractual relationships. He calls it the principle of sharing which make 
the parties in a contract no longer strangers to each other (In Macneil, 1985:519-20). 
The principle of sharing works together with the openness of the contract, whose object 
changes as the commitment and the interdependence between the parties grow. The 
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changes of the circumstances, which surround the contract, transform the content of 
contract, thereby requiring from the parties that tey “lend one another mutual support, 
rather than standing on their rights”  (Gordon, 1985:569).  
The relational contract theory escapes the stream of legalism more effectively 
than the discussion proposed by Shklar and developed by Bankowski. 
 Macaulay and his empirical findings demonstrate the gap between the theory of 
contract and real life of business and argues that “doctrine (…) offers arguments rather 
than answers (…) [and that] litigation remains a game of chance”, thereby impeding the 
parties to work out their own solutions (Ibid., 469-70/76). He calls attention to the 
marginality of legal rules or “state-enforced norms and sanctions in the governance” of 
business contractual practice and in dispute resolution, “altering the foundations of the 
subject” (Gordon, 1985:565). This alteration is rather profound since it touches the 
Kantian, liberal, “classical” foundation of contractual law which is about freedom of 
contract, autonomy of the parties (isolated selves), protection of the free formation of 
contractual intention, among others (Joerges, 1985:610). In this sense, relational 
contract theory, applied to delivering of justice, also challenges legalism and its policy 
of justice, thereby highlighting the contours of the moral crisis of law. These contours 
become crystal-clear in one of the references that S klar uses about “[a]n English judge 
[who] is said to have remarked that some of the most cruel things he had ever seen were 
mere enforcements of rights granted by valid contracts” (In Shklar, 1986:75).  
The relational contract theory seems to be highly compatible with the findings of 
feminist theories, regarding the dissatisfaction or discontentment with the application of 
the principle of equality especially in gender matters. Equality seems to require a 
monosexual culture from where the feminine was suppressed, silenced, and made 
voiceless15.  Relational contract theory could furnish any discourse of law that refuses, 
for instance, the principle of equality as a measure of personal justice, with tools to 
understand the injustice inserted in decisions that apply general rules without 
responding to particularities.  
 Macaulay’s conclusion, on which rest the developments of the relational 
contract theory, demonstrated that business arrangements tend to be performed in a 
quite unlawful, illegal or unorthodox way, in a way that is relevant to the moral crisis of 
law here outlined. Businessmen tend to avoid law and l wyers to resolve their problems. 
“If something comes up (…) you get the other man on the telephone and deal with the 
problem. You don’t read legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever want to do 
                                                
15 Irigaray proposes that instead of equality the feminist movement should fight for equivalence of rights 
since “equality is impossible anyway for many reasons, in part physiological”.  Besides, equality deepns 
the silence and suffering of the feminine, insofar as it disregards the feminine in its specificity (in 
Schwab, 1996:152). 
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business again. One doesn’t run to lawyers if he wants to stay in business because one 
must behave decently” (In Cotterrell, 1992:32) 16 (My emphasis).  
 When one wants “to stay in business”, one decides to keep and preserve a 
relationship. It would not be wise to focus only on the preoccupation of making profit 
because sometimes business is about investing and postponing profit. Therefore, the 
relationship behind any business seems to be the essential point. It has to be preserved 
and then one should not run to lawyers because it is not decent. The raw conclusion at 
that point would be that law is about undermining or destroying relationships because 
one does not behave decently or morally if one takes th  legal position of insisting upon 
rights and contractual rules on reciprocal rights and duties, especially through lawyers. 
Therefore, the language and tools of law cannot favour the continuity of the relationship 
that one wants to preserve. A strong moral position is revealed by refusing law as a 
“non-decent” way of behaviour in business and by the decision itself to keep the 
relationship.  
On the other hand, the initial part of the quotation reveals that the problem must 
be confronted and a solution negotiated, regardless law. Another language will be 
necessary to resolve the problem for both parties beyond or even against legalistic terms 
of contracts and legal proceedings. The resolution of the problem is still pursued and it 
will occur in the realm of good and bad (a moral relm), concerning the convenience of 
the parties, but the parameters for that will be of another nature and colour (an ethical 
one)17. The businessmen, in the case reported here, talking about a problem involving 
their business relationship, would try to find the best compromise to realise the good for 
all of them. The moral connotation of the background of such a conversation is easily 
noticed and one could already suggest that a quality called “just” would permeate any 
agreement settled by the parties in dispute in view of their needs, satisfaction and 
happiness and, more important, the preservation of the relationship. Justice is to be 
achieved through a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Therefore, law and lawyers must 
be avoided in the name of the relationship that requi s decent behaviour. The most 
important lesson of that quotation seems to be that “lawyers’ law” (Ibid.) is 
inconvenient if one wants to preserve a given relationship. 
 
I.3- Yes, There is a Moral Problem with Law  
 
In the limits of this chapter, “law” means a set of institutional rules which 
consists of official or state form of social regulations and includes private contracts, 
social practices and also judicial decisions. 
                                                
16 Cotterrell seems not to do justice to the richness of the findings of Macaulay’s conclusions.  
17 See footnote no. 5. 
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The crisis of law emerges in the debate about the end of the rule of law insofar 
as law and the rule of law express a common ideal, which is essentially about treating 
like cases alike, through a reasoning marked by impartiality and universality. Law and 
the rule of law also share the same set of values: c rtainty and security for social 
relations to evolve in a peaceful, stable and controlled environment. The crisis of law 
and the end of the rule of law could be perceived as the failure of rules, as a universal or 
intersubjective category, to settle disputes, as demonstrated by the refusal of using 
legalistic arguments to overcome contractual or busines  difficulties which were named 
relationship’s problems. To see the end of the ruleof law or the crisis of law in the 
failure of the welfare state or in the replacement of law as autonomy by law as 
responsiveness in a bankrupt welfare state does not enc mpass the entire phenomenon. 
Law and the rule of law are disregarded as preferred ways to establish justice in 
relationships, thereby understanding that the mentioned crisis of law is a moral crisis to 
be overcome through an ethical position which this esis characterises as “care and 
responsibility in relationships”. 
Separation as a legal problem, therefore, could be formulated around rules or 
lawyer’s law. To value law as a neutral arbitrator of disputes seems to be somewhat 
problematic especially when one considers the damages law can inflict on relationships 
or intimate human conviviality, which cannot be easily, if at all, mended. Once a 
conflict is made legal by being brought into the realm of legality, the relationship 
behind it is almost always irreparably broken. Law itself cannot do any good to the 
relationship involved in a dispute. The possibility one can see for mending a 
relationship will be rather the human ability of the adjudicator, arbitrator, conciliator or 
mediator in charge rather than a legal talent. Therefore, it appears that the problem with 
law is that law is pervasive but it is not human. Law is about rules, treating like cases 
alike, certainty and security, equality and impartiality.  
The problem with law has been diagnosed as a present and progressive 
impossibility for law to be conceived as separated from morality and politics. Law is not 
to be respected for its own sake neither for being moral when it is performed in respect 
to formal exigencies, as Fuller suggested in his morality of law. Law has been called to 
play a more sophisticated role in society and in the life of individuals who find 
themselves in position of disputes within relationship . Social and individual peace 
seem to remain outside the boundaries of law despite its pervasiveness and ironically 
due to its demands of generality. For law to embrace all the richness of the particulars in 
relation to one another, it is necessary to build another framework for law, different 
from the modernist one. Moral and political contaminat on in law appears to be 
unavoidable. Real life cannot be grasped by the rigidity, neutrality and universality of 
law. The pervasiveness of law does not take enough account of real life, which 
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undermines law and forces it to be reconceived on different grounds and in different 
terms, for instance, vis-à-vis morality or politics.  
The problem with law puts into question the traditional features of law as 
universal and autonomous, insulated from politics and morality or ethics, to the extent 
that law is led to a condition of self-questioning. Law reflects upon its own identity in 
order to embrace a complementary set of features that would approximate law to justice, 
love, mercy and particularities. In this sense, what one requires from law is that it 
renounces the modern promise of universality and equality in order to tackle the 
challenges of the post-modern condition. The tension between the two opposite sets of 
features (modernist and post-modernist), which law intends or pretends to be attached 
to, is acknowledged but by no means resolved in the realm of legal theory, at least as an 
epistemological problem. The tension is likely to be invalidated as non-legal and to be 
disregarded as a question of a different nature if law is to be understood within legal 
paradigms. The crisis of law is identified precisely when an ethical or moral position 
suspends the legal pattern of discourse and makes th  businessman avoid using 
legalistic reasoning to resolve disputes around a relationship he wants to preserve. The 
law, which sees its own realisation happening if and o ly if one has a certain suspension 
of ethics or morals, collapses into a crisis when the suspension required is of law itself.  
The autonomy18 of law, understood as the insulation of law from different orders 
of the social human organisation (such as morality nd politics) leads law to confront a 
moral failure or crisis. Law faces its own failure, as its autonomy supports a sort of 
amoral coldness of “do not think about it” (Bankowski, 1996:1)19. 
The legalism, which intends to insulate law from ethics, morals, politics or any 
other influence, condemns law to a moral crisis as a tool that decent (moral) people 
must avoid. That moral crisis cannot be alleviated by formalism, which characterises 
law as “a system of perfect clear and consistent rules. (…) Law is treated as a self-
contained and autogenerative system, which needs to be kept distinct from politics 
[morals and ethics] to organize our lives. (…) Rules save the day and evade personal 
                                                
18 It seems necessary to pay some attention to one problem that could be characterised as merely linguistic 
but that has also roots in the recent development of sociolegal studies. It is the difference between 
autonomy and heteronomy in law. Classically law is understood as heteronomous because it regulates 
human behaviour from without. Morality, by its turn, does the same from within and then it is called 
autonomous. Notwithstanding, law has been characterised as autonomous in the sense that “legal 
decisions are to a large extent generated solely from within the law by methods of legal reasoning that 
draw from legal sources and apply practical reasoning in a distinctively legal-professional way” 
(MacCormick, 1996:69).  
19In addition, the moral irresponsibility is also repsented by “I didn’t know” as part of the fragmented 
knowledge characteristic of bureaucratic morals or amoral bureaucracy. Somebody else should know and 
then the possibility to ascribe responsibility at bo h personal and institutional levels seems to becom  a 
bureaucratic organisational task which “parcel[s] out morally significant knowledge among various 
individuals” (Luban et alli, 1992:2352/55-56). Thus, nobody knew, therefore nobody could be ascribed 
responsible. 
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responsibility” (Ibid., 2). In this sense, law is thrown into a moral crisis, which could be 
overcome through the ontological, epistemological and practical reinsertion of ethics.  
The criticism of the first part of this thesis is against a quite strong 
“sanctification of the judicial function” especially in Anglo-American jurisprudence. 
(Kozyris, 1991:427) 20; against the centrality of law at the expense of the complexity of 
relationships21 and justice itself. The moral failure of law is characterised by separation.   
Modernist discussions and especially Anglo-American jurisprudence have deep 
trust in judge’s role and sense of justice as ways to overcome the pitfalls of law. A post-
modern perspective is sceptical about that and reframes the discussion around the 
aporias of justice vis-à-vis law, thereby arguing for the excarnation22 of justice and the 
re-ethicisation of law through the ethics of alterity.  
Thus, the position of justice and law as a difficult couple needs to be 
problematized.  
 
II- Law and Justice: an Impossible Marriage? 
 
The perspective that underpins this discussion and its assumptions is that justice 
as a prisoner of law. The path of ex-carnation has t e aim at giving back to justice its 
own “body” and identity in order to be in a creative relationship with law through the 
incarnation of justice into law but the ex-carnation f justice from the bowels of law, 
not to make justice only a horizon, but a reality with which law would be practically 
engaged. Justice as a horizon is indeed a trap. This section contrasts the understandings 
of modernist and post-modernist readings of the relationship between law and justice, 
                                                
20 The improvement of judicial activity is a large field of concern in jurisprudence. Nevertheless, this
thesis mainly denies that justice can have full expr ssion in proceedings of law. Then, a line is drawn 
here, to refuses Minow’s work concerning the judicial consideration of differences, since she cannot do 
any better than to base her approach on “general commitments”, in order to save it from being called 
relativist and consequently of practical inapplicability in the normal legal science and practice. Minow’s 
clear aim is to improve judicial activity even when she argues with Elizabeth V. Spelman that the 
contextual thinking “requires one to refrain from judging until one has examined all of the relevant 
contexts and looked at the situation from all of the relevant perspectives” (In Orff, 1995:1219). (My 
emphasis) The suspension of judgement is limited, while in a more radical approach this suspension 
would have to be unconditional. Minow’s judge keeps “general commitments” whilst shifting from 
context to context, being more sensible to the particularity of the parties in dispute. Thus, this judge is not 
a post-modernist judge because Minow knows that any judging is based upon a sort of transcendental 
reasoning to the extent that the facts have to be translated into legally relevant terms, or be subsumed 
under legal framework. Moreover, a radical post-modern project “endangers the whole concept of 
judging” (Ibid., 1221).  
21 Throughout the chapter, law and relationship are opposed and it shall be a characteristic of the whole 
thesis, for one of its central arguments is, that law does not create relationships, even marriage, becaus  
the relationship that informs marriage is previous to its formalisation. Following the findings of relational 
contract theory, law is a discrete institution that regulates discrete transactions and not relationshps. Law, 
as an instrument of social pacification and normalisation of human behaviour and human encounters , 
destroys relationships. 
22 “Excarnation” or “ex-carnation” is used as the opposite of “incarnation” in the sense of possessing a 
body. 
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characterised, respectively, as an incarnation and an ex-carnation approach. A post-
modern reading of the problem of law and justice will contest the conception of justice 
as a horizon arguing further that law and justice ar not the same. A modernist 
understanding, by its turn, conceives justice as a threshold or horizon, thereby claiming 
for its separation from or re-insertion in law.  
 
II.1- The Post-Modern Reading of Modern Impossibilities 
 
“What, then, is justice?”, asks Shklar. She answers it, using, firstly, Professor 
Hart’s words, saying that justice is “the most legal of virtues”. Nevertheless, she goes 
further and better yet in the characterisation of justice as a legal virtue, or in the legal 
characterisation of justice in the sense that law bears justice and promotes it through its 
legal way of being. “[Justice] is the sum of legalistic aspirations. (…) Justice is the 
commitment to obeying rules, to respecting rights, to accepting obligations under a 
system of principles. (…) [F]ollowing rules impartially is a virtue. (…) Men who try to 
apply rules impartially, whatever the rules may be,are just. They are the heroes of 
legalism. (…) Justice presupposes an identifiable rule and the disposition to follow it. It 
is a state of mind no less than a policy, and as such it is the thread that ties legalistic 
morals, legal institutions, and legal politics into a single knot. (...) [L]egal equality, 
implying that rules be applied alike to like cases, is only another term for justice as an 
attitude. (…) Impersonality (…) is the necessary concomitant of justice” (Shklar, 
1964:113-123). (My emphasis) 
The quotation above exemplifies a kind of legalistic conception of legal justice 
this thesis challenges and tries to overcome, in response to the diagnosed moral crisis of 
law, insofar as in this context, law reifies justice because law in its historical 
development had reified life. Law has separated justice from life by colonising justice 
(Auerbach, 1983). That separation is performed by the entombment of justice in the 
bowels of law, from whence justice cannot be heard unless it speaks the language of law 
or is spoken by the mouths of law.  
A modernist understanding of justice postulates that formal justice “comes down 
to the correct application of a rule [and] is inconeivable without rules” (Perelman, 
1963:39-41). Modernist discourses of justice identifies this moral virtue with the 
principle of “treating like cases alike” (Hart), or desert (natural law theory) or of 
entitlement (a certain positivism). Against this framework, a post-modern discourse 
about justice vis-à-vis law will abandon the election of principles and will condemn the 
identification of justice with rules. Justice will be, in this way, a response, a personal 
response to the Other; it integrates the discourse of Otherness into the establishment 
discourse. This post-modern approach appears to be irrel vant, if not dangerous, to the 
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principles of equality, impartiality, rule of law and even legal certainty. Nevertheless, 
for a modernist approach, “justice is dangerous (…)because it robs us of predictability 
and security. Justice undoes all the good that law h s done; it transforms legality into 
nihilism” (D’Amato, 1993:536). 
 A post-modernist approach to justice and law in courtr oms would find justice 
in the stories behind the facts subsumed into the framework of law.23 The story is 
violated and made legally relevant when subsumed uner the legalistic provisions 
applicable to it. The story is reduced to a sum informed by precise and clear rules. The 
danger of justice does not only consider what in the story does not fit into law; the 
danger resides in the power of justice or of the story o push the limits of law beyond 
law, to force the latter to embrace the former with plastic arms, without force or 
violence.  
 The image of justice personified as a woman blindfolded fits here. The blindfold 
protects law from irrelevant or even dangerous aspect  of the story, or assures that law 
will make justice only in view of “permissible information” (Curtis&Resnik, 
1987:1760). The blindfold prevents law from seeing the pain it causes or the pain in the 
face of the Other, to which it should respond. 
 The plasticity of law, necessary for the ex-carnation of justice in a post-modern 
approach, requires, as a first fundamental step, the rejection of the formalist vision of 
law and its principles. The critique formulated by a post-modern discourse is however 
wider than a mere critique against formalism since the modernist view brings with it a 
range of problematic issues for the plasticity of law, of any grand theory or meta-
narrative.  
“[As] Roberto Unger observes, ‘those who dismiss formalism as a naive illusion 
… do not know what they are in for; … they fail to understand what the classic liberal 
thinkers saw earlier: the destruction of formalism brings in its wake the ruin of all other 
liberal doctrines of adjudication.’ (…) Formalism, as Unger correctly sees, is not merely 
a linguistic doctrine, but a doctrine that implies, in addition to a theory of language, a 
theory of self, of community, of rationality, of practice, of politics” (In Fish, 1989:5-6). 
Formalism is the logics of separation and is one of the hurdles for the achievement of 
justice in proceedings of law.  
No law beyond law is a tenet of a sort of modernism defended by Ronald 
Dworkin which results in the thesis that law offers always the right answer. A post-
modern view of the tension between law and justice recognises the prison created by 
such ideas and the uselessness of them in a world dminated by a myriad of human 
problems and a diversity of peoples. Grand theory and meta-narrative are the theoretical 
                                                
23 See Conley and O’Barr (1990) on relationships and rules as two different ways to tell stories in 
courtrooms.   
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background of modernist approaches in law and a post-m dern stance works 
consciously to avoid it and to provoke local disturbances. Thus, this section tries to 
formulate the post-modern perspective as parallel as possible to the modernist theory in 
crisis, in order to avoid grand-theorisation. Beyond any modernist reaction to 
positivism, like “Dworkin’s well-respected hermeneutical theory”, the post-modern 
formulation of the justice-law difficult couple reme bers that “law is force” 
(Douzinas&Warrington, 1994a:5-6); that “law without violence (…)[is] simply 
inconceivable” (Sarat, 1992:255). The parallel between a modern and a post-modern 
view of the problem of law and justice emerges in Juarrero-Roqué’s legal reading of 
Holling’s Resilience and Stability of Ecosystems. She identifies a dispute between two 
different models of justice: one called “fail-safe” and its adversary “safe-fail”. She 
highlights a dispute between certainty and resilience, rule of law versus context-
sensitiveness respectively (1991:1745-6).  
The stability and certainty that characterises any legal system, when submitted 
to a discussion of its moral crisis, faces the challenge to equalise resilience, which is 
expressed by the “ability of the system to mutate and evolve when disturbed by the 
environment” (Ibid., 1748). The modernist general characteristic of viewing justice as 
threshold, tributary of the Platonic idealistic rationality, which is also Cartesian, 
evolving through the market rationality, finds itself in a position of extreme mutation. 
Thus, resilience is the new characteristic of a possible model of justice able to respond 
to the needs of the arguments engendered by that market. “Modernity’s insistence on 
deduction as the only legitimizing process finds its counterpart in law in the traditional 
objectivist or formalist approach, according to which law is constituted by a set of ideals 
and principles that are applied to specific cases in the process of adjudication. Legal 
formalism is the consequence of admitting into the realm of reason only phenomena 
devoid of particularity, local diversity, and other indicia of complicated human 
experience” (Ibid., 1757-8). 
The modernist theory of law represented, for instance, by Hart seems somewhat 
unable to respond to the challenges of plasticity and resilience insofar as his positivism 
defends justice as a horizon concretised, essentially, by the respect of the principle of 
treating like cases alike. In addition, the ideal of formal justice in Hart’s positivism is 
also a function of the following rules and relies upon the principle of impartiality 
especially for adjudicative activity (In Kramer, 1999:48-49).  
The natural law theory’s approach to the drama of justice and law, as another modernist 
approach to the issue, will not offer either, any hope for plasticity and resilience as 
desirable features for law. The separation thesis is asserted as a feature of law by almost 
all the branches of legal positivism, from the traditional one, of Austin and Bentham, 
through Kelsen and Hart alike. The consequence is that justice is not a legal 
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responsibility; it is irrational or a horizon unreachable. Justice has to happen in the 
framework of legality, in order to have expression a d be a function of the fair 
application of law, treating like cases alike. At this point, the discussion between 
positivism and the natural law theory gains force only to show that the separation thesis, 
denied by this theory, indeed rests untouchable in its consequences for the life of law, 
because justice goes on as a horizon that now, under legal naturalism, law must express 
or must incarnate. The crisis of law remains unresolved to the extent that, as explicated 
previously, this crisis is not a product of the loss of faith in universals rather of the loss 
of the Other, a consequence of the separation syndrome from which suffer law and 
morals, law and justice and bearer’s of rights alike. The problem seems inherent in the 
state of consciousness produced by modernism, which a post-modern criticism tries to 
overcome. The insertion of the Other in the life of the self promises a resolution for the 
separation syndrome in law, pushing law beyond law,in order to render possible the 
settlement of disputes in an institutional way but without the constraints of legality, 
urging the legal system to be endowed with plasticity and resilience.  
When stepping out of modernist projects for law andjustice resolution, justice 
needs to be apprehended beyond the limits of the idea of fairness, as a material criterion 
or a procedural one that determines or informs the materiality of the outcome, and a 
revised contractualism of pre-modern western societies. In this sense, justice, as the fair 
application of what law says, is, on the one hand, a blind sight informed by pervasive 
bias, which dominates the atmosphere of courtrooms and leads justice to failure. On the 
other hand, it is a drastic reduction of the aspiration l character of justice.  
There is a normal way of thinking about justice, says Shklar (Ibid., 17), and it 
seems that the normal model could be identified with the current positive reasoning 
applied by legal justice in courts, administrative agencies and the scientific-academic 
environment. It excludes any moral discussion, silences any ethical calls and settles 
justice in a technical positive process of applying the rule of law. This paradigm not 
only prevents justice but above all deceives. In order to apply the rule of law, aiming the 
achievement of justice, no other knowledge is required but the one of law itself. To rely 
upon rules is, especially for judges, the best way to avoid facing the ignorance of the 
Other and of oneself. This attitude informs the unproblematic and arrogant 
pervasiveness of law, supported by the modernist appro ch expressed by the 
understanding that there is no law beyond law. 
Justice fails insofar as it remains domesticated and t med by the criteria of law 
and its rationality. Law as father has the specific aim of protecting us “against our own 
irrationality”24 (Rawls, 1972:250), which, instead of being suppressed may be the 
                                                
24 That expression of Rawls is used in order to demonstrate how the liberal-positivistic account of law 
cannot think of law beyond the strict contours and limits of scientific rationality. In this sense, law does 
not happen in the realm of “irrationality” and since the feminine quality bears the irrational as one f its 
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appropriate site for justice to be recovered. That irr tionality is actually an alternate 
rationality whose silence is connected with the domestication of justice. 
The concert between law and justice cannot happen only through the 
effectiveness of rights with the necessary generality and universality that law 
presupposes since law, in practice, is likely to be called justice and therefore it brings 
about the individual and particular. The effectiveness of justice happens in the practice 
of law and requires the encounter of individuals as the site where a conception and a 
practice of justice can be engendered. Law, by and because of its pretension to 
universality, encumbers justice, transforming it into a horizon that informs law (natural 
law theory) or a horizon which happens contingently or only if absolutely in accordance 
with law (legal positivism). 
Levinas’ affirmation that “justice is indeterminacy par excellence” (In 
Diamantides, 1995:209) does not help much in the task of understanding justice 
achieved beyond law, or even against law. This post-modern understanding, whilst 
denying the submission of justice to law, does liberate justice from the power, force and 
violence of law but fails when it reaffirms justice as horizon. Hence it leaves justice 
prey to the domination of law which works also to transform justice into “an ideal value 
of highest rank” (Shklar, 1990:12), very abstract, and therefore incapable of being an 
object of practical deliberation, thereby confirming the antinomies between law as 
regularity, generality, public and scientific discourse, and justice as abnormality, 
singularity/particularity, private and religious discourse. It does not prevent the 
annulment of the antinomies by the process of colonisation and subordination of justice 
by and under the regularity of the rule of law, i.e., by the process of technicalisation of 
justice to fit in the contours of law and its rules. So, more than post-modernism is 
needed. 
Behind law, which pretends to contain justice or be the universal expression of 
justice, one finds a given rationality which supports it. The rationality of the patriarch 
prints itself on the layers of the ego creating the superego which, following the way of 
law, “issues a command and does not ask whether it is possible for people to obey it” 
(Barron, 1993:89). This is the way law controls theselves without knowing them. The 
Other and the relationship that can be established represent the only chance for the 
imaginary to reveal, to project the real and to unveil the illusion, the deceptions and the 
                                                                                                                                    
features, law obeys the male pattern and refuses th female. Law is the way through which we are 
protected against our own irrationality. This thesis has to do with the irrational quality that the typical 
feminine bears in the western culture. In this sense, “our own irrationality”, in Rawls’ words, could mean 
“our feminine rationality”. The father, the patriarch, has, in western culture, the social role of rescuing the 
son from the domination of the mother. In the social re lm, the male rationality excludes everything that 
sounds different and calls it “irrational”. Thus, it could be clearer to talk about another rationality, which 
is quite different from the current one – the one of applying rules and principles to settle disputes. The 
alternative rationality, whose effect on law this thesis seeks to elucidate, will be identified with the quality 
of the feminine, and ethical while concerned with relationships with the Other. 
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falsehood of the isolated and unencumbered self who proclaims “I have the right to 
that”. The ethical resolution of the moral crisis of law silences that sentence and affirms 
the priority of the relationship where the Other has to be recognised and considered.  
 
II.1.1- A Post-Modern Entrenchment Can Reconcile Law and Justice? 
 
Resisting the modernist legal theory, a certain post-modern one intends to 
“reinstate ethical concern at the core of its jurisprudence” and calls into question the 
relations between law and ethics or law and morals (Veitch, 1999:189) . 
The post-modernist discourse that fits this thesis i  the one that refuses the 
identification of law with justice and proposes a desi entification through the 
deconstruction of law, possible through the undeconstructibility of justice.  
“[D]econstruction is necessarily ‘on strike’ against established legal norms as 
part of its refusal to positively describe justice as a set of established moral principles 
[or rules of any kind]. (…) [I]t is only once we accept the uncrossable divide between 
law and justice that deconstruction both exposes and protects in the very deconstruction 
of the identification of law as justice that we can apprehend the full practical 
significance of Derrida’s statement that ‘deconstruction is justice’ ”  (Cornell, 
1992:144-145/154/157). 
Post-modernity is preoccupied with “processes of exclusion and marginalization, 
which produce truth, unanimity, rationality, sameness” (Barron, 1990:141). The 
marginalisation of justice grants truth to law as much as the social, political and cultural 
suppression of the feminine grants sameness of the masculine against which women is 
conformed, judged and condemned.  Deconstruction denounces those processes of 
violence usually unacknowledged as such. They are rathe  masquerading or dressed up 
as rule of law or legitimate application of well-accepted principles as the principle of 
equality, refused by the feminist thought as a valid expression of justice since equality 
“does not allow for a consideration of differences” (Pierce, 1991:66). Deconstruction is 
justice itself and fights its identification with law as justice; “ ‘deconstruction’ as the 
force of justice against law” (Cornell, 1992:158). This fight is against the conservation 
“of law as a self-legitimating machine [and] the perpetuation of the ‘current’ legal 
system” (Ibid., 159). It is the resistance against the “keeping coming” of law in the 
process of taming justice and against the force or potency of law, in Fish’s formulation, 
as a mark of the maleness of law. Deconstruction as justice resists as female 
 “[P]ostmodern jurisprudence insists that morality and justice are not identical 
with legality nor can they be simply reduced to thefollowing of legal principle and 
procedures” (Douzinas&Warrington, 1994:160). Neverth less, the post-modernist 
divide between law and morality and especially betwe n law and justice is of a totally 
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different nature from the positivist separation thesis. The post-modernist divide has a 
moral quality which law misses; it is a diagnosis not a horizon of perfection to which 
law has no compromise. In reality, the post-modernist divide is the truth of the positivist 
separation thesis, thereby pushing law to respond t the call of justice.  
The suitable postmodernism searches for “a more pluralistic, contextual, and 
nonessential explanation of law and legal decisionmaking developed for a multicultural 
society” (Minda, 1995:2)25. It works without any theory, rule or fixed pattern, intends to 
be outwith the system of the rule of law, which determines one fixed pattern of a 
generalised theory of law. It intends also to provoke local disturbance through local 
narratives, marked by diversity and fragmentation, nstead of offering a Grand Theory. 
Post-modernism aspires to equalise law and justice through the call of the Other, 
which is a call for and of justice and refuses to rethink the relations of law and justice 
along conventional modernist lines. This thesis does not intend to develop any theory 
about the relationship between law and justice but to propose a gendered way to 
understand and ease it through a practice of justice as care. Justice needs to speak in its 
own voice, the voice of the Other, the voice of care nd responsibility in relationships. 
The immorality of modernism lies in the abandonment of ethics in law and 
supports the reduction of justice to a horizon, the identification of justice with legality, 
inner morality of law, right answer, treating like cases alike and so on. Justice as a 
feminine virtue, when tamed by law, becomes male, violent, uncaring and appropriately 
wears the blindfold and wields the sword, since it holds potency, force, power and 
violence. 
 The ex-carnation of justice from the bowels of law is founded on the non-
reducibility of the former to any pre-given norms even of a well-established legal 
system. Law and its institutional apparatus face the paradoxical demands of personal 
and social justice and are unable to respond equally. The collapse of justice into law is 
reductive and draws lines which call for verdicts and exclusion. 
Cornell expresses perfectly the suitable methodology t  offer a very localised re-
definition of justice. “I want to suggest that the ‘postmodern’ should be understood as 
an allegory and that, as such, it represents an ethical insistence on the limit to ‘positive’ 
descriptions of the principles of modernity long-elaborated as the ‘last word’ on ‘truth’, 
‘justice’, ‘rightness’, etc” (1992:11). The post-modern as allegory works against “the 
search for new theories and metanarratives to solve law’s problems [and against] (…) 
the attempt to create large-scale, totalizing theories to explain social phenomena ” 
(Minda, 1995:9/224). 
                                                
25 Between two different streams of post-modernism, neo-pragmatism and ironist. The former is not 
suitable, at that point of this discussion, especially n its understanding of theory as “a tool to get the job 
done”. The ironist view is better mainly for they “understand legal theory as a type of theatre” (Minda, 
1995:237). 
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This thesis presupposes a new rationality; it has to come from a totally new 
experience and most probably from a non-scientific26 discourse, since the particular is 
the source of the unique, the abnormal, the unpredictable and is characterised by 
arbitrariness, in the sense that it does not follow a rule. Science is about normality, 
normalisation and normatisation; so is law. Justice is never “normal” since it has to be 
personal. The rationality currently in force entails competition, the enforcement of 
rights and the exercise of justice through the application of law and according to the 
adversarial system of the adjudication services. Heller reminds us that deconstruction is 
not destruction (1992). However, “(…) [it] is an enigmatic approach that glories in its 
own slipperiness for its intellectual cogency and appeal. (…) [I]t is not a philosophy, 
but a theoretical strategy for displacing traditional philosophy: a deconstructionist ‘is a 
bad son demolishing beyond hope of repair the machine of western metaphysics’ ” 
(Hutchinson, 1988: 35). Furthermore, it is useless to destroy theories if one leaves intact 
the rationality which informs them. It is necessary to debunk the rationality that informs 
the suffering and sacrifice of justice and the feminine. Therefore, deconstruction is 
inspiring since it intends to “strike at the deep roots of consciousness that condition and 
shape the psychic, theoretical and practical possibilities and parameters of (…)” human 
conviviality (Ibid., 50). 
 Post-modernity and its deconstructivism as a respon e to Enlightenment try to 
bridge the gap and reinsert the individual and its particularity. “Post-modernity 
definitely presents itself as Antimodernity”27 (In Habermas, 1993:98). Justice and law 
(droit) is, in Derrida’s account, a couple to be divorced or deconstructed through the 
deconstructibility of law and he clearly states that e tries “consistently (…) to 
distinguish [law] from justice” (1992:15). In this enterprise, he is also aware of the 
suffering that can accompany it since one does not have either rules or any clear or 
“definitive criteria” to promote the ex-carnation of justice from law.  
At that point, where the separation between law andjustice is established, a 
possibility exists for law to overcome its moral crisis because there is “‘something 
rotten in law’ (etwas Morsches im Recht)” (In Ibid., 39). Is exactly what Derrida seems 
                                                
26 See footnote no. 3. 
27 Habermas understands modernity as a rebellious move ent against normativity. A movement of 
contestation of tradition and of separation from morality (1993:100). “The (…) requirements of justice 
given by (…) Kant (…) consummates the separation betwe n law and justice (…)” (Kamenka, 1979:21). 
For Kant, Aufklärung means autonomy, isolation, separation. Separation comes from the modernist 
project of autonomy, which frees the reason to shape reality. The subject shapes reality because he can 
shape the rules, discovering or producing them. The Enlightenment project and the Kantian separation are 
well appropriated in the wording of the “Discours Preliminaire sur le Projet de Code Civil”: “Un homme 
qui traite avec un autre homme, doit être attentif e  sage: il doit veiller à son intérêt, prendre les 
informations convenables, et ne pas négliger ce qui est utile. L’office de la loi est de nous protéger contre 
la fraude d’autrui, mais non pas de nous dispenser de faire usage de notre propre raison” (In Lewis, 
1992:146). In this resides this thesis’ arguments against modernity as a movement of separation and for 
the rescue of justice in a project of connection, of re-connection, of remembrance of the original form of 
justice freed from the constraints of law and compromised to a project of human conviviality.  
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to suggest when he identifies the “problematization of law and justice” as a couple with 
the “problematization of the foundation of law, morality and politics” (Ibid., 8). The 
indecency identified in the moral crisis of law is characterised by Benjamin as violence 
present in every contract and inherent in legalistic reasoning. “(…) A total nonviolent 
resolution of conflicts can never lead to a legal contract. When the consciousness of the 
latent presence of violence in a legal institution disappears, the institution falls into 
decay”  (Benjamin, 1989:288).  
The violence that characterises law lives in adjudication processes where 
lawyers, judges and any other officials suppress the dispute from the interested parties 
and they, before such power, are disempowered and become unable to think and act 
autonomously (Cover, 1986:1615), which is ironically the core of modernity. The 
language of law silences the parties, perverts their s nse of justice, violates 
unempathically the stories behind the legal facts. The parties are pushed to the 
inevitability of becoming litigants once they are prevented from the personal exercise of 
resolving their dispute, and thrown into the realm where the adjudicator acts as 
promoter of justice as law, with its virtue of impersonality, impartiality, rationality, 
consistency and predictability (Auerbach, 1983:11/12). “Justice is an experience of the 
impossible. (…) Every time (…) that we placidly apply a good rule to a particular case, 
to a correctly subsumed example, according to a determinant judgement, we can be sure 
that law (…) may find itself accounted for, but certainly not justice. Law (…) is not 
justice” (Derrida, 1992:16).  
Deconstruction as the non-actualisation of justice ne ds a remedy. Furthermore, 
deconstruction offers suspicion and it is a very good start indeed for the criticism of the 
certainty of modernity. Nonetheless, deconstruction aims also to offer an “utopian 
possibility”. One needs to jump from surprise into a real possibility of another justice, 
freed from the constraints of the aporias of deconstruction (Cornell, 1992: 133-
134/156).  
Derrida asks: “what does it mean to establish the truth of justice?” (Derrida, 
1992:12) The answer and the problem are both the Otr, he singularity of a unique 
situation, before the pressure to be reconciled with universal, general, clear and prior 
rules or principles, which urges justice to be done to its singular condition. “This ‘idea 
of justice’ seems to be irreducible (…) in its demand of gift without (…) rules, without 
reason and without rationality. And so we can (…) identify a madness. And perhaps 
another sort of mystique. And deconstruction is mad about this kind of justice, (…) 
which isn’t law” (Ibid., 25).  
So is this thesis.  
The search is both for a paradigmatic shift  and for a sort of plasticity that post-
modernism aspires to understand and propose. That plasticity is necessary since the 
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paradigmatic shift will happen as often as the kaleidoscopic condition of the legal 
subject changes. The paradigmatic shift in legal theory or in law as a fact of life is 
function not of the man or legal subject constituted by law but by the man who 
constitutes law for himself and by himself in his peculiar and multifaceted condition. 
The change needs a fixative to call forth the colours and the shape of the scene. That 
fixative is the Other. 
 
II.2- The Ethics of Alterity: the Other and a Possibility for Bridging Law and 
Morals 
 
 To consider the “ethics of alterity”, this thesis will not analyse texts by 
Emmanuel Levinas as its first representative, nor texts mainly devoted to considering 
his works because the aim here is to use alterity to understand the problems for justice 
as law vis-à-vis the separation between law and morals. The Other will be presented as 
an ethical problem to be equated with the demands of justice vis-à-vis the legalist 
landmarks of the modernist legal theory and its emphasis on the rule of law, justice as 
law, and law as rules. Derrida (1992), Veitch (1997a&1998), Goodrich (1993) and 
Douzinas&Warrrington (1991, 1994&1994a) will illuminate what follows. 
  Justice made law, or justice achieved through the application of the rule of law is 
to be challenged in an attempt at freeing justice entangled in the traps of law, which is 
seen as both a good and a bad thing for law. One question immediately has to be 
acknowledged: to what extent can justice be grasped b yond the limits of law, 
especially when the task is about resolving disputes, a very much legal enterprise? 
Justice, to be understood beyond the rule of law, requi es that one could unveil or re-
establish the relationship between law and morality in order to recall an essential ethical 
question which could shape justice away from the limits of an a-moral law.  
Justice, as a post-modern theme, touches the limits of what can be expressed and 
promises already to be turned into an impossible nevertheless obligatory task, object of 
a great desire and longing. It revolves around “deferring the undeferrable”, “conceiving 
a justice that cannot but must be conceived”, “saying what cannot be said” and 
“listening to what cannot be heard” (Veitch, 1997:97).  
The suitable post-modernism would connect justice with the unavoidable 
encounter between the Other and the self. It advocates the displacement of the 
autonomous, universal, unencumbered self in favour of a contextual and relational self, 
and establishes the Other as the moral screen on which justice can be enacted. How to 
judge particular persons or facts without knowing them, without establishing a 
relationship with them? The only way available for the formal rationality of law to settle 
disputes is to apply general, clear and prior rules with the inevitable consequence of the 
miscarriage of justice, which, as said, can only be revealed in the encounter of 
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particulars, when they are fully considered as such. Moreover, the legality of such 
colonised justice is about personal de-responsilization, or “do not think about it”, whilst 
one dreams about a world where “justice is not a matter of our seeing that something 
conforms to a pre-given order, but that it accords with the idea we make of ourselves 
(…)” (Carty, 1990:28).  
Thus, the ethics of alterity is extremely attractive since, behind the criticism 
against law’s appropriation of justice, resides a necessity to dismantle a rationality 
discovered and installed by modernity and elaborated essentially by Kant. Besides, 
Levinas seems inspiring as he is recognised as “the major 20th century philosopher who 
introduces a post-rational ethics as a first philosophy that is not dependent upon 
cognitive claims and does not lead to totalising systematisation” 
(Douzinas&Warrington, 1991:118). “Levinas articulates the primacy of the ethical –that 
is, the primacy of the interhuman relationship, ‘anirreducible structure upon which all 
the other structures rest.” (Critchley, 1999:9) Like the ethical response, the justice 
response “is indeterminate, something to be done rather than something said. (…) In 
every act of judging there is a moment of saying and  moment of doing and justice 
cannot be identified exclusively with what is said” (Douzinas&Warrington, 
1991:123/135). 
To Lévinas the insertion of the Other entails an ethical discourse. “Derrida sees 
in Levinas a deconstructive attempt to displace ethics and think it anew by locating its 
condition of possibility in the relation of the Other, the Autrui, the singular other” 
(Critchley, 1999:18). Ethics in Levinas is certainly something different than a set of 
rules about how to behave or how to resolve a moral dilemma; it is rather a position 
before the face of the Other. “Moral consciousness is not an experience of values but an 
access to an exterior being” (Ibid., 255). 
The post-modern theme rests in the impossible, and it could be identified as the 
re-unification of law and morals through and toward  comprehension, beyond rules and 
law, of what justice is. The separation of law from morality has engendered a split into 
the understanding of justice in “an institutional-legal and an individual-moral pole” 
(Douzinas&Warrington, 1994a:406).  In this vein, the duty to apply the rule of law in a 
court of law justifies and explains the assertion that justice “is not used in a general 
sense as the antonym of ‘injustice’ but in the techni al sense of the administration of 
justice in the course of legal proceedings in courts of law”  (Douzinas&Warrington, 
1991:147). The clarity of these words would be enough for a well-established 
understanding that justice cannot be achieved through legal proceedings in a court of 
law and that justice as a moral virtue is not the aim of the due process of law. 
Nonetheless, the separation between justice as institutional and as individual leaves a 
gap which is twofold: first, the moral and political aspiration of law to be the instrument 
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for realisation of justice in a Rechtsstaat; second, the expression in the face of the Other 
who holds his own unachieved or denied justice and faces (confronts) me, faces 
(confronts) law and obliges me and law to respond t him, to be responsible, more than 
merely responsive. The Other, as a concrete entity considered as the object of justice, 
refuses law as a legitimate way of knowing him and responding to him through the 
principles of universality, equality and impartiality.  
What makes the universalisation of the singular impossible is the Other which is 
not equal but strange, foreign, different, alien.28 The self and the Other do not melt into 
each other and then the conflict is likely to arise. The self to melt into or with the Other 
has to let go of his own “I”, his individuality, his deas, himself; he has to be empty. The 
resolution of the conflict, without listening to the specificity of the Other, cannot 
perform justice either. Justice is a theme brought about by the Other: its alterity 
challenges the law that tries to equate the differences by generalising them. The Other 
stresses the internal fight between law and justice by bringing about an ethical question 
of responsibility. The theme of separation between morality and law is central for the 
dislocation of justice from the bowels of law,29 especially for dispute resolution, insofar 
as within law the differences are silenced in the name of equality and generality and 
conflicts misplaced to fit into the definitions of law about the legal. Litigation through 
law, lawyers and lawyers’ law, deepens the conflict by removing it from the parties 
involved, by rephrasing its terms and imposing its own logic; therefore, the meaning of 
justice, infinitely problematised by the Other as an outsider, is lost whilst justice is 
equated with technical issues in experts’ language.30  One tends to “forget the violent 
nature and unjust character of much legal action” (Ibid.,116). Post-modern legal theory, 
through the ethics of alterity, however, makes the violence of law increasingly clearer 
and then perceptible.  
The Other imposes the different, the unknown, the incommensurable and the 
unaccountable vis-à-vis the regularity of law, which normalises and normatises. The 
Other is the impossibility for the rule to be applied because the Other is the uncertainty 
                                                
28 According to Veitch, the insertion of an ethic of alterity in the established judicial adjudication of 
disputes through proceedings of law, entails three problems: the understanding of justice as dependent on 
particulars, the decision of how the Other needs the law, or which are the needs of the Other, and thir ly, 
the information about the Other, that are necessary for judging (1999:190/92/93/95/97). 
29 Will law resist an imaginative exercise deemed to encompass the challenges that the Other seems to 
impose? Identifying justice with the accomplishment of those challenges, one asks: how can law be 
understood in order to be reconciled with justice? P rhaps it is not the case at all and then one should ask 
about the meaning of a post-modern ethics and justice able “to resist the totalising influence of politics 
and law” (In Veitch, 1997:102).  Douzinas&Warrington ask: “”[How] can we move from this ethic of 
responsibility to the law?” (1994a:146)  
30 Veitch develops a criticism against the post-modernist justice understood as responsibility for the 
Other, “momentary, fleeting without any ‘principle, value or code’”. He mentions the danger of having 
one’s conflict adjudicated by a post-modernist judge judging or listening without criteria which is 
necessary in order to decide questions of justice (1997:108 & 1998:220).   
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that cannot be grasped by the rules, which limit and tame justice.31 “Justice is an 
experience of the impossible (…) [I]t requires us to calculate with the incalculable” 
(Derrida, 1992:16)32. The Other is the incalculable with which justice has to deal and 
law cannot do without reducing it to the known and public terms of the rules to be 
applied in the name of certainty and security.  
Veitch asks for criteria in his criticism against Derrida’s formulation on the 
impossibility of justice in view of the singularity of the Other, as the central concern for 
the task of grasping what justice, which is not law, is. To displace the singularity which 
makes justice impossible but yet desirable, Veitch seems to propose “negotiations 
around the construction of commonality”, as an attempt to know the Other and to make 
justice, which is desirable and irresistible, ossible and correct, if one reads Veitch 
properly (1998:226)33. Nonetheless, against Veitch, the correctness of justice without a 
concept, a criterion and, above all, without law seems to be possible, in order to be, like 
the post-modern ethics, “left only with responsibility. Indeed with a responsibility for 
the responsibility created by the suffering face of my neighbour” 
(Douzinas&Warrington, 1991:124). Furthermore, Veitch’s commonality collapses 
easily into universality when forced to respond to the safeguards of the liberal principles 
of the due process of law. 
The correctness of justice as the just application of a just rule is an aporia, 
defends Derrida. The aporia resides not in justice i self but in the rule, in the fact that 
rules, which have to be universal, clear, and laid down previously, must be applied. This 
is law, which is not justice, and then what is justice? “If I were content to apply a just 
rule, without a spirit of justice and without in some way inventing the rule and the 
example for each case, I might be protected by law, my action corresponding to 
objective law, but I would not be just. I would act, Kant would say, in conformity with 
Duty, but not through duty or out of respect for the law. (…) How are we to reconcile 
the act of justice that must always concern singularity, individuals, irreplaceable groups 
                                                
31Through establishing the requirement of criteria for justice to be concretised, Veitch contests the quality 
of justice as impossibility and stresses that justice and the question of information are not equivalent, in 
the sense that justice cannot be suspended, or given up due to the ignorance of the adjudicator who cannot 
grasp the singularity and subsume it into the legal terms (1998:220). It is true and it justifies the 
understanding of justice as conquest to happen out-of-court in opposition to a delivered justice, dispensed 
in courts of law or even alternative dispute resoluti n schemes which impose a decision, binding or not. 
Moreover, institutional will would avoid the shame of delivered justice, which s not justice but 
proceedings of law in courts of law. 
32 The impossibility of justice only makes sense vis-à-vis, on the one hand, the necessity of criteria for the 
fulfilment of the rule of law and the Other and hisdemands for justice, on the other hand. The Other’s 
particularity imposes and requires a singular, personal and contextual justice. The philosophical 
impossibility of justice so posited is just a reflection of the uncontested legal background. The challenge 
is to go beyond the sterile philosophical questioning, which in truth conceals a positivist conception of 
justice in the limits of law, to embrace a liberating practice for legal justice to happen beyond law.
33 Despite the uneasiness between justice and law, it is necessary to endure and work for “a post-modern 
ethics (…) not condemned to cynicism or passivity” (Douzinas&Warington ,1991:117). 
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and lives, the other and myself as other, in a unique situation, with rule, norm, value or 
the imperative of justice which necessarily have a general form, even if this generality 
prescribes a singular application in each case? (…) For a decision to be just and 
responsible, it must, in its proper moment if there is one, be both regulated and without 
regulation: it must conserve the law and also destroy i  or suspend it enough to have to 
reinvent it in each case, re-justify it, at least reinvent it in the reaffirmation and the new 
and free confirmation of its principle” (In ibid., 138/144). Derrida’s words, whilst 
offering a way to reconcile law and justice, put an enormous challenge for the logos of 
law, since its scientificism autonomously seeks and imposes security and certainty.  
The question that returns unanswered is about the relationship between law and 
justice whereas the place of ethics, not any ethics, but the ethics of the particular, the 
strange, the unique, in law remains undecidable. Th place for a male morality in law 
seems nevertheless resolved. Any doubt about that place dissipates after hearing courts’ 
paraphrases and epithets like these: “self-made moral dilemmas are deserving of no 
sympathy”. Ethics is secondary, its demands are valid only if formally legislated and it 
is for the court and not the individual to resolve according to the law any conflict 
between legality and morality. Courts’ pronouncements or sentences establish ethical 
standards by declaring the law applicable to the case. What remains is the pain of the 
cut performed (the separation, Urteil = sentence) by judicial sentences or verdicts, the 
cut in the life, the destruction of relationships or p ssible prospective ones, the pain on 
the face of the Other, unseen, not legally comprehended. The outsider remains and 
reminds us that justice stayed outside. The outsider, holding his own unachieved and yet 
desired justice, challenges law and the closure of the legal system. 
The ethics of alterity Is important for this discussion because it unveils the traps 
of law where justice is made hostage. The Other and his singularity, to which justice 
intends to respond, denounce law, unveil the fact that law is not justice. The face of the 
Other is an important threshold that law, by managig to keep itself apart, refuses to 
look at since it will show the real moral, ethical ompromise behind the legal promise of 
resolving disputes.  More generally, the ethics of alterity challenges the ontological and 
epistemological assumptions of traditional philosophy and their application in morals 
and jurisprudence. The whole modernist language of law is inappropriate to respond to 
the claims of the ethics of alterity. 
The ethics of alterity debunks the traditional modernist way of questioning and 
makes its theories inadequate. The question of “who?”, that the principle of treating like 
cases alike imposes in order to identify who are alike or different, becomes nonsense 
before the demands of the Other and his ethics of alterity since the Other asks: “Where”, 
“Where are you now?”, “Where do you stand?” (Douzinas&Warrington, 1994:164). 
The ethics of alterity is essentially situational and demands a relational answer to its 
 42
dilemmas. These questions require a fine perception of what is around one and 
consequently need an acknowledgement of the relations one establishes with his 
surroundings. The Other demands that I accept my responsibility without any mediating 
concept or respect to law or to any transcendental a d external principle. The call of the 
Other on me places my responsibility within the context that the encounter with the 
Other installs. 
“Kantian formalism (…) ends up in the blatant assertion that formal legality 
equals justice and identifies justice with the administration of justice. We need to 
reintroduce ethics in law but traditional moral philosophy has proved insufficient. At 
this turning-point, the ethics of Levinas can provide the initial inspiration for imagining 
an Other Justice” (Ibid., 167). 
The requirements of the Other and his ethics of alterity appear to demand a 
number of shifts in various levels of legal theory but the separation thesis in its three 
forms seems to be the greatest target of the Other’s campaign/reclamation project. 
Most probably, law, left alone with law and its “all-encompassing edifice”, 
would not make the justice of the particular its own justice. The limitations and 
difficulties for law are remarkable and it should be etter explained through the analysis 
of the problems law faces in dealing with mercy andlove, two concepts that, before the 
challenges of the ethics of alterity, could offer a possibility for law to make the justice 
of the particular its own justice. 
 
III-Feelings and Emotions as Exigencies of the Ethics of Alterity: a Threshold for 
Law? Mercy and Love as Legal Impossibilities 
 
The discussion focuses now on mercy and love in legal reasoning for two aims. 
Firstly, to add two important themes to the ethics of alterity for the reconciliation of law 
and morality, insofar as love and mercy can entail ethical questions which cannot be 
overcome within the limits of legal proceedings. Secondly, because both are important 
test-cases that highlight the incompatibility between modernist legal theories and the 
aim to free justice from the traps of law, thereby showing more clearly the necessity of a 
third term for a post-modern thought to overcome thmodernist transcendental 
understanding of justice.  
The autonomy of morality established by the enlightened reason and its 
emergent rationality was necessary for the separation of law from morals. Moreover, 
this separation was necessary to de-ideologise and de-emotionalise the legal discourse 
removing emotion and feelings from the purposive discourse of law (Shklar, 1986:26). 
Furthermore, it will lead to the understanding that the moral crisis of law is indeed 
profoundly ethical and connected not to the loss of faith in universals but to the loss of 
the Other as one of the most important manifestations of the separation syndrome.  
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III.1- Mercy and Legal Justice  
 
 Mercy is a moral theme that, especially in the contours of legal discussions, 
produces contradictions and paradoxes. Mercy as a mor l virtue presents difficulties to a 
Kantian morality of duty and rules and to a legalistic conception of justice alike.34  
Those problems in both legal and moral realms are due to the fact that mercy is a moral 
virtue, which requires a mediative consideration of particulars. Mercy addresses a 
particular situation that asks for an exception from the general rule in the name of love, 
compassion or justice.   
 Mercy will not be a problem or engender any paradox or contradiction if one 
understands justice as a moral virtue to be grasped beyond the limits of law and 
legality.35 Justice that is connected with the consideration of the particularities under 
conflict invites mercy. It is in the realm of legal proceedings and law, concerned with 
universals, where both mercy and justice encounter contravention. Then, the question 
for us is about equating mercy with law or legal justice and not mercy with justice, 
which is not law.   
The traditional understanding of mercy, following the characterisation offered 
by Murphy (1990), refers to it as an autonomous moral vi tue, which cannot be reduced 
to another moral virtue like justice; it has the power of tempering justice, maybe even 
melting with it but not being reduced to it; it transcends any moral or legal obligation, 
being understood as a free gift, a manifestation of grace, love or compassion, and it is 
not a response to any claim of right, duty or obligation; it is due to a sort of nobility 
from the one who alleviates other’s burden (166). 
The traditional view of mercy leads to a paradox when one tries to meet the 
requirements of a morality of duties and rules or lega  standards. Mercy seems capable 
of only acting as a temper for justice and, at the same time, imposing a departure from 
justice. It is even possible that mercy leads to injustice, exercised out of mere 
sentimentality, which is likely to be dangerous for morality and law alike. Centring this 
discussion on law, mercy, as a free gift that comes from a special manifestation of 
nobility intending to light the burden of the offender, who before the legality of law 
should suffer the retribution (punishment) of his own deeds, is not a virtue but a vice. 
The difficulty grows unbearable if one thinks that mercy, as a free gift, could not be an 
act of discretion of a judge who does not have any relationship with the victim, neither 
                                                
34The paradoxes of mercy in legal discourse comes from the separation expressed by the following 
division of labour and power: “(…) [S]ince Chief Justice Coke’s great confrontation with James I, 
common lawyers have held that while the king may be the fountainhead of justice, he is not, as king, the 
best dispenser of it. The king’s personal prerogative is mercy; justice is a matter of being learned in the 
law, not as an esoteric secret science (…)” (Tay, 1979:82-3).   
35 See Teitel on transitional justice (2000:217). 
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with the offender and has not suffered with the wrong the latter perpetrated. Thus, 
mercy in the legalistic justice, as a free gift of legal proceedings, requires that it comes 
from the victim if one wants to minimalise the level of appropriation of the conflict. 
In a context where one assumes that justice is a moral virtue related to 
particularities and also a practice that aims to respond to the needs of the Other while 
settling a dispute, the questions like the one put by Murphy and others rest meaningless.  
The question “how can God be both just and merciful?” loses its meaning or 
does not lead to any paradox if one thinks of justice away from a morality of duties and 
rules and from legal proceedings in courts of law. If God does justice for the moment as 
when he gives water to the thirsty Ishmael, who wasdying in the desert, whom He 
knows will, in the future, kill innocent people and make Israel suffer, then this justice is 
the one that responds to the needs of the Other in a given situation 
(Douzinas&Warrington, 1991:117-8/145). Nonetheless, one could say that God’s justice 
in this case reveals a problem of the male rationalty, which is the incapacity of 
contextualising dilemmas and decisions. He was merciful in His justice and what brings 
this sort of justice into problems is not the injustice that comes from saving the life of a 
person who will kill many innocent ones and make an entire people suffer. The point 
that makes mercy sound unjust in that Biblical passage is that the merciful solution 
proved itself at odds with a rule or principle of justice such as desert, entitlement, 
equality and impartiality (treating like case alike). The merciful act of giving water to a 
prospective enemy betrayals an abstract rule that says that one should not save the life 
of someone who is going to kill innocent people.    
If one looks at the problem from a different perspectiv  or through a different 
rationality, one may say that, even when a merciful solution follows a rule, which is 
about doing justice for the moment in that Biblical story, it fails in responding to the 
whole context of the problem and a second gap in the merciful act of God, as in any 
legal judgement, is that the giver does not establish any relationship with the receiver. 
In the case of legal judgement, this relationship is impossible since the judge “sits as 
representative of the rule of law, not as representative of his own feelings” 
(Murphy&Hampton, 1990:174).    
Mercy is totally different from justice and can lead to injustice, exactly because 
mercy requires or permits that justice be set aside, says Murphy. One can observe here 
again that the justice mentioned is the legal one, which leads to the paradox expressed 
in the fact that mercy is either itself justice or it is a vice. Mercy leads to injustice when 
one refers to justice as the enforceability of rules. Mercy as free gift fits entirely into 
justice without reason, rules, fixed criteria, but compromised with the needs of the 
parties involved in the dispute and not of the isolated Other.  
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In fact, Murphy struggles with a conception of justice without being able to see 
justice as a moral virtue beyond the limits of law. Nonetheless, he identifies justice as a 
capacity of seeing the particularity of each indiviual and situation when he says that 
judges who cannot give the right importance to “individual response are not lacking in 
mercy; they lack a sense of justice” (Ibid., 172). The myopia of his vision becomes 
apparent when he tries to respond to the criticism that challenges the importance of 
particularity as a demand for justice before the understanding of justice as blind. His 
response returns to the legalist position when he says that the blindness of justice should 
be limited to the points which had no relevance to the dispute to be settled. Thus, the 
logic or rationality of the legal proceedings is recalled and from its pseudo-
sophistication, he calls “overrestricted and simplistic conception of justice”, the one that 
cannot appreciate all the problems involved in “retributive justice and the role of the 
judiciary in implementing” it (Ibidem). Once one is able to recognise that justice is not 
law and to re-install justice in an ethical environment, all sophistication becomes 
unnecessary.  
Thus far, mercy and legal justice were considered in the realm of criminal law. 
In private law, says Murphy, mercy paradoxes do not occur since there is possibility of 
agreement between the parties and mercy can be shown without tension or 
contradiction. However, this argument seems flawed b cause mercy is likely to entail 
problems irrespective of the nature of the legal proceedings, and the possibility of an 
agreement between the parties. The agreement can be mad  against the law, for 
instance, and, in that case, the court, called to ra ify the agreement, will reject it on 
legalistic grounds. Then the mercy that expresses an unlawful private agreement is 
certainly in tension or contradiction with law. The s cond point of tension is the same 
that is perceived for criminal law, insofar as the judge, applying the law, will have to do 
it in the limits of the res deducta, and has also to respect the rule of law.  
One example is the private agreement involving consumer rights before the 
criminal prosecutor in charge of consumer protection, which is a pure private matter in 
accordance with Brazilian law. The law prohibits that those agreements contain any sort 
of renunciation of any consumer rights. That prohibition prevents any agreement to 
happen. In the great majority of the situations, the consumers are prepared to renounce 
part of their rights to secure any sort of compensation. Mercy in this case is prohibited, 
despite the willingness of the parties. A solution obviously lies away from law or even 
against law.  
The chivalry example given by Murphy as a case of mercy in private law is 
clearly mistaken since the rules of chivalry do not rely on any adjudicatory enforcement. 
Mercy, in the chivalric code, is justice to be shown at the discretion of the knight before 
whom mercy is claimed. Private law disputes, as objects of adjudication, do not belong 
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any longer to the parties; justice is reduced to what law says and mercy is surely in 
tension with this sort of justice and with law. In this sense, Murphy is wrong saying that 
in criminal law, the judge cannot show mercy on the grounds of his personal feelings 
but in private law, it is not at all problematic. It is clear that it is a problem in any 
branch of law where the rule of law has to be observed by officials, especially 
adjudicators (Ibid., 179).  Mercy in private law used by the parties through agreement, 
in order to avoid adjudication, is, on the one hand, desirable and welcome, says Murphy 
(Ibid., 176-177).  On the other, nonetheless, it prevents law from being clarified. 
Anyhow, who cares about that? Boys do; it is definitely a boys’ game. Girls are 
interested in something else. 
Another example which corroborates that mercy is a virtue at odds with any kind 
of law refers to the impossibility of showing mercy under the principle of equality. It is, 
according to Murphy, the second paradox of mercy. The principle of equality is a legal 
exigency for justice in the limits of law. In order for mercy to be elevated to a legal 
category in harmony with legal justice it needs to adhere to the principle of equality 
which requires that mercy is to be shown to all persons in similar conditions, or always 
when a given reason “C” is present. Notwithstanding, t is clear that the principle of 
equality is against the very nature of mercy as a free gift shown without any claim of 
right or desert to it. Furthermore, mercy operates gainst the criteria of universality.  
Mercy as a moral virtue of legal systems or states sounds impossible, because 
both are supposed to follow the rule of law and to be rational in doing legal justice. 
Mercy as a free gift, or an act of compassion and love supported by personal feelings 
about particulars, leads to injustice trying to perform or temper justice (=law). The 
paradoxes of mercy exist only when mercy is forced to conform to a morality of rules 
and duties or the logic of the modern juridical thinking or legal order. The common 
understanding of  “mercy as a quality the exercise of which is peculiar to a judge, one 
who has authority to punish” is likely to be rejected since therein lies the source of the 
paradoxes. They disappear when mercy does not collapse into legal justice but is 
understood as a free gift at hand only for the parties directly involved in a dispute 
(Twambley, 1975:84 & Smart, 1969). The paradox of mercy, formulated in terms under 
which mercy collapsing into justice (legal justice), performs injustice reveals the 
dramatic reality of law contradicting justice. 
The resolution of the paradox seems to be in the following words: “Mercy, 
properly understood, has no essential connection with punishment. It is not the 
prerogative of a judge: on the contrary, a judge has no right to be merciful. In accepting 
his office a judge places himself under an obligation to impose just sentences and to 
treat like cases alike” (Twambley:1975, 85). Judges must apply the law following 
criteria, principles and rules, which make the office transparent and accessible for 
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democratic control and critique. The quality of mercy as free gift installs a paradox, 
when placed in the wrong hands: in the judge’s legal hands, or when submitted under 
the control of the language of rights.  
The paradoxes of mercy come from placing a category that belongs to the ethics 
of love and charity into the ethics of rights or legal justice (Card, 1972:182). The 
resolution of the paradoxes of mercy demands only the recognition that mercy is a free 
gift. Mercy as a legal principle or rule would require another name, since it would have 
another nature. A judge could use it, then it would not be mercy any longer, but just a 
mechanic tool of law as “made justice” dispenser or conventional justice. 
In a different vein, Simmonds relates mercy to judgement and tries to show how 
it does not transcend the abstract and formal claims of law, but is totally compatible 
with law, legality and judgement. Simmonds is against the solution offered by Murphy, 
which is about detaching mercy from the realm of judgements or legal proceedings, in 
order to resolve the paradoxes. Rather, his arguments are built against what he calls 
juridical idealism, which has been destructive to legal theory and its development. He 
insists that mercy is not at odds with judgement and juridical thinking. Judgement, in a 
Kantian tradition, involves subsuming a particular c se under general rules and presents 
mercy as an antinomian category for law and legalistic justice, since the former is 
related to particularity and the latter to universals. Simmonds interprets the idea of 
particularity as wholly abstract and idealistic to be rejected by the juridical thinking, 
which must express “the necessary rootedness of juridical institutions in the practices, 
judgements and prejudices of daily life, and we must shift juridical categories of 
thought from the centre of our moral reflections to a more subordinate position” 
(1993:59).  
Following his own advice, Simmonds rejects the possibility of particulars that 
could not be apprehended by the categories of human thought. The particularity void 
should be avoided as an expression of human intelligence, which should subordinate all 
that is around it to what human thought can classify. Thus, his conclusion appears to be 
that since it is possible to subsume anything under categories of human thought, any 
particular will fit into general rules and universals of juridical thinking.   
In order to make mercy compatible with legal or juridical thinking, one has to 
subordinate the particulars to universal categories. Veitch, in his claim for criteria in 
making justice from particulars, takes Simmonds’ argument against idealistic particulars 
and builds an argument about “the construction of [the existence of particulars] as a 
matter of relations between relative abstracts. (…) [A]ny particular can exist only within 
a context of relative abstracts, and it is particular only for a specified context rather than 
particular in itself” (1998:227). Thus, by manipulating the context, in the sense of 
attributing meaning to particulars in a given context, particulars cannot be unknowable 
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before the law. Law delimits the context and the description as well. Particulars then are 
accessible, knowable and deemed to be subsumed under gen ral categories. The 
outcome is the removal of the ignorance and creation of a secure set of information, 
which includes also criteria, values, rules and standards, according to what justice is 
dispensed (Ibid., 228).  The argument seems to turn back to legalistic justice through 
which particulars, as mysteries, are standardised by rules, standards and criteria in the 
name of justice. 
Veitch uses two examples to defend a conception to enclose and overcome the 
idea of particularity. He aims to conceive something wider, as required by the juridical 
thinking. He talks then about “commonality”. He see “commonality” as the motto or 
guidance principle in the examples of Pierre before Davoût, in War and Peace and 
George Orwell before a Fascist, whom he had to shoot but could not do so due to the 
shocking picture of this man “holding up his trousers with both hands”. Davoût had the 
legal obligation to shoot Pierre (suspected of being a Russian spy) but could not do so 
because he realised that “they were both children of humanity”.  Orwell’s story is about 
another encounter in war times between the author, a sniper in the Spanish Civil War, 
and a man, “an opposing soldier running along, trying to hold his trousers up with both 
hands. Orwell’s description follows: ‘I did not shoot because of that detail about the 
trousers. I had come here to shoot at ‘Fascists’; but a man holding up his trousers isn’t a 
‘Fascist’; he is visibly a fellow-creature, similar to yourself, and you don’t feel like 
shooting him’ (…). (…) [We] seem to be confronted not with an appeal to the 
particular, but to the level of generality: ‘a fellow creature, similar to yourself’; a 
commonality, in other words, not a singularity. (…) [The] other is unknown as the 
other, yet is perceived as the same and his life is saved” (Ibid., 230).  
One cannot deny the strength of the argument around the conception of 
commonality applied to these two examples. Nevertheless, how will law take into 
account “commonality” as a legal category, authorised to determine acts of legal justice, 
or mercy as legalistic justice? How can it be possible for a judge who has to judge in 
accordance with the rule of law, keeping at home, or outside the court, his personal 
feelings or his own humanity, which would be able to make him feel sympathy to the 
commonality brought before him? Which criteria would this judge apply to adjudicate 
from his perception of commonality?  In which sense, “commonality” has advantages to 
legal thinking over “particularity”? These questions seem to unveil the incompatibility 
between modern legal discourse of criteria and principles and post-modern demands of 
particulars for justice. In addition, the category f commonality, if not embedded in a 
contextual consideration, is turned into universality, thereby betraying the project of 
justice for particulars. 
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Christodoulidis offers another attempt to tackle threlationship between mercy 
and legal justice. His effort is based upon the uneve  co-existence between mercy and 
legal justice which is due to the problem of particularity. The same assumption of 
justice as law’s justice is present again. Simmonds’ rejection of the particularity as 
much too abstract is considered “wonderfully instructive” however it is contested. 
Christodoulidis refuses the particularity void by claiming that it should be perceived as 
a “complexity deficit; (…) the deficit, that is, between the (infinite) possible 
understandings of a particular and its legal determination” (1998:8).  
The argumentation developed by Christodoulidis supports this discussion when 
he refuses Simmonds’s “reliance on juridical reason as central to  (ethical) judgement” 
thereby pointing out the violence that such a position does to the particularity by 
constraining it within the categories of modern human thought or juridical thinking.  
His refutation rests on the fact that the criteria which informes a legal approach 
to commonality would be given only a posteriori, contrary to the well-known 
requirement of legal validity, which establishes that norms and criteria should “pre-exist 
their application” (Ibid., 9). Thus, the commonality cannot avoid merciful judgements 
being issued at the expense of law. Since law is what law is (reductive), particulars are 
“reduced to roles and rules” as a function of what an exclusionary language of law does 
to its subjects and objects, which in the realm of law need to be subsumed under general 
and pre-existent norms, roles and rules. Having refused the possibility of particulars to 
be apprehended by the exclusionary language of law, which facilitates the 
accommodation of expectations towards stability and predictibity of legal systems 
through giving solution for disputes, while ends the debate entrenching the reason for 
action or judgement, against which any argumentation is forbidden, Christodoulidis 
suggests that “respect for the particular and the exercise of mercy can only meaningfully 
find a home in the reflexive, in the realm of a radic lly antinomian critique of law’s 
justice” (Ibid., 10). 
The objection against commonality in Christodoulidis’ terms could be 
summarised, as the suppression of commonality itself by the generalisation process of 
legal thinking, which entails abstract categories. The appropriateness of judgement and 
action in law must yield security for the system and requires that reductions to role and 
rule be performed by an exclusionary language of law. Certainty and security in legal 
action and judgement aim to regulate “ ‘encounters’ between strangers”, providing 
“actualisation/suppression” of particulars when subsumed under general categories 
(Ibid., 15/16). Christodoulidis concludes that “[i]nstitutionalisation thus abstracts into 
an impersonal context that allows specifically lega attributions of expectations, ones 
that are normatively co-expected. (…) And it is precis ly here that the particularity of 
the affective encounter is suppressed, why it is that upon entering the realm of law the 
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lawyer finds nothing there to call by name. (…) Finally, the law is there to give us a 
certain stability of expectations. (…) [It] reduces uncertainties by furnishing certain 
expectations with ‘normativity’ (Ibid., 17). 
Thus, the paradox of mercy is re-installed by delineating clearly the view that 
mercy cannot be shown in the realm of justice as law without performing a vice, an act 
of injustice. Mercy requires the access to particulars in their own terms, but law as a 
normative institutional order cannot address particularities. It works by reducing facts as 
particulars to roles and rules. Then mercy is to be shown in the realm of ethics where 
exclusionary reasons do not work and reflexivity can be performed. Law and ethics or 
morals are to be kept in different and well-delimited spaces. Mercy as part of legal 
thought and the subordinate place of juridical thinking in “our ethical reflections”, 
alluded by Simmonds, are unwarranted assumptions, say  Christodoulidis (In Ibid., 20). 
Moreover, mercy seems not to be the virtue which can m ke law realise away 
from ideologies and abstractions that “the human person is precious and unique” (In 
Ibid., 21). The ethics of alterity and its capacity to contextualise the subject through the 
call of the Other inspire a “reclamation project” for the uniqueness and preciousness of 
the human person. Notwithstanding, law, in the modern rationality, due to the reductive 
character of its needs for criteria, seems to requi f rther improvement to be a useful 
tool for Others’ searching of justice. 
Let us try then another virtue called love to see how far law can cope with it in a 
legal project of concretising justice for the particular, the singular, the Other in his own 
terms. Can law engender a legal practice capable of r flecting the needs of the Other as 
a genuine demand of justice?  
 
III.2 – Love and Legal Justice  
 
Whereas the discussion about mercy could be restricted in its semantic 
environment since it could be defined, a definition f love has baffled poets and 
psychiatrists alike. The term “mercy” refers to a well-accepted definition despite the 
suggestion to use a different name when mercy is taken s a rule, principle or legal term. 
Thus, the discussion around mercy assumes its nature nd examines the conditions 
which make mercy at one with legal justice. Love, however, is polemic par excellence. 
Everybody talks about love but nobody has been able, so far, to reduce all that love 
encompasses in a single definition. Love expresses it lf through many intimate and 
social forms; it is not characterised by one unique attitude or posture. Love can be 
identified with many and also contradictory attitudes, therefore its definition amounts to 
impossibility. Yet, this definition is highly desirable and intuitively anticipated for even 
a very immature child, able to express love and hate, antipathy and sympathy.  
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Whilst mercy seems to be amenable enough to be grasped in one precise 
behaviour, love entails innumerable possibilities through which it can be expressed. 
This state of affairs has made love one of the most explored themes in western culture, 
especially in the Christian one. Whereas mercy expresses itself mainly in the moral 
realm of human conviviality, love enters many realms of human life and then expands 
the moral or ethical environment of its expression. Mercy can be seen as a manifestation 
of love but love cannot be fully contained in an act of mercy. While mercy is about 
giving and forgiving, love is also about receiving.  Whereas mercy is about setting free 
or lightening the load, love can establish strong connections and compromises between 
people, entailing burdens not easily resolved or dissolved.  
What is love? Many pages and a great part of human history revolve around the 
word and, as much as justice or truth, love is highly desired but indefinable. Nobody is 
able to define love in order to end the discussion but everybody is able to claim the 
tortures and pleasures of it. While mercy can be a concession, which does not require 
any relational consequence, love is commonly seen as relational, and involving 
emotions, which one could oppose to reason. Thus, love as relational and emotional 
seems to be beyond the influence of reason or even in a quite strong fight with the 
rational way of apprehending life. That fight is everywhere; love lacks definition but 
rationality cannot surrender and leave love for love nly. Love is to be understood under 
rational categories. Consequently, love is everywhere, scaping, being caught, and 
suddenly running away again. Everywhere is a place for motions; they cannot be kept 
for special moments of privacy. Emotions are everywhere and reason watches and 
wonders: are they love? 
Emotionality and rationality, law and morals: couples to be disconnected. This is 
the task of modernity.  
Post-modernity calls attention to the gap where most of the modernist and 
romantic deeds were and are performed. From this gap arises the tension that keeps the 
modernist consciousness running. The post-modernist radical refutation or 
deconstruction negates the gap by recalling emotionality in the rationality and claiming 
the re-ethicisation of law, through facing the suffering on the face of the Other. Law can 
no longer claim to regulate our lives by reducing it to facts. Law must prepare itself to 
welcome emotions and their unpredictability: a post-modernist challenge.  
Love for the romantics is approached in the gap betwe n rationality and 
emotionality, and always in tension. Although love permeates our society and our lives, 
it is unapproachable despite much rational effort, since the screen where it can be seen 
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is the face of the Other, whose particularity frightens.36 Nevertheless, love promises to 
re-unite what modernity separated: emotionality andrationality, law and morals. 
What is love? “[O]ne cannot ‘know what love ‘is’ unless one understands the 
‘practice of loving’ within western culture and perhaps one cannot know what love ‘is’ 
until one loves and is loved. [It] presents itself (…) as an emotion that cannot be uttered 
or expressed by words” (Raes, 1998:27). Emotions are everywhere and love is more 
than romantic love between human adults of different or same sex. And the mistaken 
movement toward the romantic love is to refuse it as emotion, trying to qualify it as 
rational in order to possess love, and avoid its incommensurable quality.  To refuse love 
as emotion and qualify it as just, calling it “just love”, (as does Paul Tillich (1954)), or 
to refuse love as romantic, qualifying it reasonable love, as do the feminists (as Petersen 
contends (1998:23)), seem errors too grave to countena ce. These formulations of love 
are not acceptable here because both, love as emotion and the romantic love, happen in 
the modernist gap. In order to save love from the resolution in this gap, the suggestion is 
that love may be seen as will37 not as feeling or emotion. This proposal will place love 
in the realm of human abilities or skills, which are object of conscious and purposive 
development. The engagement in a project of learning how to love, in the same way one 
trains oneself to drive, to become a Doctor, to speak a foreign language, will dissolve 
the gap aforementioned. Moreover, that gap must be dissolved in order to relax the 
tension that sustains the continuity of rational illusions, which encloses heteronomous 
law, insulated from ethics and from relationships because it regulates conflicts from 
without, and, because of this, it seriously disregads human life. Then love is not a 
question of sympathy or antipathy but a question of effort, of human purposive will. 
Love is approached as an object of human will and not of feelings and emotion, 
enabling us to consider love as institutional will. Love will not be connected with 
passion but rather with interesse.38  
Love does not allow general and finished definitions since it appeals to the 
fragmentary nature of singular and unpredictable reationships. Law is about general 
and clearly defined rules. How would love be, if at all, at one and at ease with law and 
legalistic justice? The antonomian situation between law and love is even more 
profound when one thinks about romantic love which s “radically personal and 
particularistic; (…) an intimate bound between signif cant others”, intrinsically 
                                                
36 It frightens so much that one needs to “upgrade” particularity to commonality: a more apposite 
category for legal thinking. 
37 Institutional will is another element of this thesis and the framework it intends to develop. Chapter VII 
will discuss it in more detail.  
38 The term in German is used in order to particularise it  meaning here which is grasped by the two 
following quotations: “Scheneller als erwartet fand ich die Zeit und das Interesse, die beiden mir 
gesandten Manuskripte zu lesen” (Letter written by Gadamer, in Bernstein, 1983:261). “Wirkliche 
Selbsterkenntnis wird dem Menschen nur zuteil, wenn r liebevolles Interesse entwickelt für die andere” 
(Rudolf Steiner in Trilogos D, no. 3). 
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spontaneous and emotional; it “implies involvement, (…) partiality”, uncertainty, 
unreasonability and unpredictability (Raes, 1998:29). Law, by its turn, is impartial, 
requires detachment, separation, is rational, calculative and cool, and pretends to 
regulate and facilitate conviviality and interaction among strangers. “Love is 
unconventional, unjust, and challenges all of morality. (…) [L]ove relationships are 
irresponsible and hot. Love is described as a mental ill ess (‘une folie à deux’), aroused 
by a poison and enslaving the subject. Love is unlawfulness” (Ibidem).  
Thus, romantic love has no place in a legal project of turning love into a 
possibility for juridical thought, and also defies any attempt of the will to discover what 
love is. For this present project of exploring the compatibility between law and love, 
love is the capacity to perceive the Other (any Other) and to respond to his needs in his 
own terms. It means that the I, who loves and is then able to look at the Other’s face and 
to perceive him in his particularities, has to empty himself, has to surrender all his 
concepts, rules, understandings and morality. The appro ch of the Other cannot happen 
from the I’s warmth, anxiety, or desire to understand the Other; it requires, in truth, an 
ability that depends on a certain sort of objective enthusiasm acquired after much 
training and human effort. This interpretation of lve emerges from the eastern lesson 
that is here defended as a means of rescuing love fr m the modernist gap and tension 
between emotion and reason.  “What enables us to hold b th [autonomous and 
heteronomous life] together? My suggestion is love. For love demands (…) that you 
respond to the other in a way that is not dependent on your (…) [desire] but on what the 
other wants and needs” (Bankowski, 1996b:32). 
Gilligan’s exposition of Kohlberg’s reversibility principle is helpful to 
illuminate this present understanding of love corroborated by the words above quoted. 
She reminds us that in trying to put oneself in Other’s position, to understand Other’s 
circumstances and reasons, one has to put off one’s shoes, not to hurt the Other. It 
means that trying to grasp what the Other feels and nee s, one must put aside one’s own 
conceptions and understandings. Lessons from the East tell us that the mind, trained in 
judging, will not love. The mind, which mixes up things, is influenced by its own 
desires and needs, will call love sex, charity, friendship, mercy, and a mistaken 
compassion based on its own ideas and conceptions about the Other’s needs. In order to 
love one needs meditation, the art of non-judgement, the art of emptying oneself. This is 
the eastern lesson of an Indian man, named “Master” by his disciples: “To me love is a 
by-product of a meditative mind. Meditation (…) is not a simply technique. You cannot 
learn it. (…) It is a growth. It is a growth into silence, into emptiness, into the art of 
being a witness, of living without judgement. (…) Meditation is the art of becoming a 
hollow bamboo. (…) What I mean by meditation is a st te of being where a person is 
sufficient unto himself. (…) Love flows through (…) [him].  (…) [He] (…) does not 
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love,  (…) because [he] (…) is himself love. (…) [H]e is a hollow bamboo through 
which love flows” (Rajneesh, 1986: 12/156-160). 
 Love could be the space for reason and desire to be in peace, beyond the gap 
where reason and desire (emotion) fight, where eros and agapè cannot find a resolution 
in earthly terms. Love is about dissolving this tension since love does not belong to any 
of them (reason or desire, ros or agapè). Love requires to be re-installed in its right 
place. The eastern recipe requires as ingredients silence, emptiness, non-judging before 
the Other.  
Can love find a place within law? “Modern love [or romantic love] (…) is in 
itself already a bundle of tensions and contradictions. Confronted with law they result in 
contradictory forms of life. Love melts together, law divides. Love is ‘the art of fusion’, 
law is ‘the art of separation” (Raes, 1998:32/38). Accepting love as a principle of 
reunion and fusion, how could one think about love as a bridge (or a melting force) able 
to overcome the separation of law and morals? Thus, one must try with a cool 
experience of love. 
Love, as an ability to embrace the Other in his authenticity, needs and 
aspirations, is profoundly ethical and exercises an ethics of alterity with its 
preoccupation with the particularity of the Other. In this sense, the difficulties explored 
in the insertion of an ethics of alterity in law would appear in the same discussion about 
love. Thus, one needs a more comprehensive category able to encompass the 
achievements of love through an ethics of alterity. Could the incompatibility between 
law and love be overcome in the equation between love and justice, the one that is not 
law? Romantic love must be disregarded by this discus ion. Another conception of love 
has to emerge for a more encompassing view of the exigencies of an ethics of alterity 
and the unavoidable re-ethicisation of law.  
After overcoming romantic love, how does one go beyond law to find justice as 
a feminine category more able to encompass love?  
“Law cannot ‘express’ love, but law needs not do that. (…) However, (…) love 
and law need one important corrective; in both (…), interhuman respect is a basic value. 
Legal respect is impersonal (…)” (Ibid., 48/49). One can read “love” for “respect” and 
the challenge of the Other goes on untouchable. Within legality uniqueness, context, 
idiosyncrasies and particulars represent the ontological impossibility for law to give full 
account of the Other and respond, beyond its legal principles, to the demands of a 
justice of the singular. What is the value of impersonal respect? To be effective, respect 
must acknowledge specific methods of demonstration. Impersonal respect cannot do so.  
While love is about responding or taking responsibility, law is about evading 
responsibility through “not thinking about this”, “I did not know” or “It is nothing to do 
with me”. Law is rules and these rules appropriate mystery and facilitate evasion of 
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responsibility.  Before law, the Other becomes invisible and what is under judgement is 
a case, with facts and principles of law, rules, under which the case should be 
subsumed. Law silences the Other who says: “I’m here. I’m important” (Bankowski, 
1996f:6-7).  
“Once in the system of law, I apply rules. Love and need stand outside” (Ibid., 
10). The love, which considers the Other in his own terms, will need a totally different 
relationship with rules and the possibility of creative application which could allow 
them to be bent or breached or even avoided in dispute resolution. Love which 
considers each particularity as one and unique will be unpredictable at a point that it 
will challenge the predictability of law and rules which “takes away the magic of the 
world (…) the mysterious force of love” (Ibid., 11).  
 “[Detmold] says that it is only particulars of the particular case that give us 
reasons for actions. Not the universal rules that we derive from them” (Ibid., 17). Thus, 
one has to listen to the Other to arrive to the solution that meets his necessities. How to 
listen to the Other, how to understand the Other’s needs, how to know what to do? 
Bankowski gives us a possible answer in a very inspired way through the analysis of the 
Biblical passage of the Good Samaritan in Matthew 25:34-35: “The Samaritan sees not 
just the beggar, but in that beggar he sees the Divine. And it is because of that he knows 
what to o.” (Ibidem). (My emphasis) Nonetheless, the Divine does not allow room to be 
associate with the general rule but with the truth of that particular. When love reveals 
the Other to the I, the I knows what to do. How far is law prepared to embrace a very 
unpredictable system of discovery to settle disputes? How flexible or plastic is law in 
allowing the application of rules to happen in an uncertain environment, in accordance 
with the quality or amount of love each one is able to perform? How patient is law to 
allow room for thinking things through and through? The attempt undertaken by 
Bankowski to conciliating rules and love remains problematic since love, as 
Christodoulidis says, does not reduce particulars to rules and roles; it does not facilitate 
the decision by operating through “‘stilling’ factors”. In love, “[t]here [is] (…) no 
avoiding the particular encounter; no avoiding reflexive risk”, by “thinking things 
through” (Christodoulidis, 1998:17-18). 
Christodoulidis (as with mercy) tries to re-instate  separation between love and 
law by stressing that the love/law distinction resembles the difference between 
reductiveness and reflexiveness. Whereas love operates within the reflexive horizon, 
law acts within the reductive one. Law reduces and love thinks things through. 
Christodoulidis characterises the reflexiviness of love by saying that: “if [love] ceases to 
question itself it will stagnate and cancel itself out” (1998b:1). This enterprise is 
welcome but with caution since his characterisation of love sounds very romantic. He 
maintains that love is reflexive because love thinks things through, which sounds 
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appropriate for this thesis’ own understanding of love as a capacity to see and embrace 
the Other in his own terms. Love entails a reflexiv attitude which would be about 
thinking things through. Only the reflexive love offers the possibility of seeing the 
Divine in the Other.   
The romantic contamination, difficult to be avoided in western culture, emerges 
when he says: “Love exists only in the ‘not yet’, (‘Die Liebe existiert nur im noch 
nicht’), one can never have loved enough. Love lies in that promise of future fulfilment, 
its actual fulfilment signals its end. (…) [L]ove thrives on change, its existence 
overtime is dynamic, it requires ‘die Formen zu wechseln und immer etwas Neues zu 
verzehren’ ” (Ibid., 4). This romantic contamination means that love entails uncertainty, 
many shifts and the horizon of reflexiviness makes community life unbearably insecure, 
thereby turning it into an anxious place, he says. Reflexiveness can make life in 
community impossible to be categorised into general and clear rules, since “what comes 
next”, after seeing the beggar and identifying the Divine in him, is absolutely 
unpredictable. This scenario belongs to the realm of love where the Other dictates what 
comes next, and through love, the I happily surrenders. However, in order to see the 
Divine, the I has to think about it, or better, has to care about it. The anxiety is easily 
overcome in the process of seeing, listening, understanding and responding to the Other, 
to the Divine, through love. Nevertheless, if one lacks the courage or skills for that, the 
reduction and the security of law should be kept. 
The reunion that love can promote has to happen within the justice, which is not 
law and can require for its realisation that one step  away from law, in order to care for 
and properly respond to the Other in his needs. Whereas law reduces through 
separation, love, aiming to re-connect, to re-conciliate, illuminates the promising 
tension between law and ethics, particular and universal, autonomy and heteronomy. 
That tension seeks resolution which requires one to overcome the romantic gap, mercy 
paradoxes and the separation between love and rules. Legal theory must acknowledge 
that its categories and structure can no longer give full account of what law has to 
respond to in order to be rescued from its moral crisis. Separation requires rules and 
separateness cannot be the measure of justice but of rules and law, which entraps justice 
and renders impossible for it to consider the uniqueness of Other’s needs and truth. 
Togetherness requires understanding, willingness to see, to hear and care for the Other 
in his terms; it requires love. Thus, let us end with separation and let us be allowed to 
explore the path of togetherness, responsibility and care in relationships. “To be just 
means to recognize the other as other (…). Justice says: That is another person, who is 
other than I (…). Justice, therefore, ‘consists in living one with another’; the just man 
has to deal with the other” (Pieper, 1942:28/30). 
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IV-Is There Anything Beyond Law? The Feminist Effort in the Path of Care 
Toward Justice  
 
Law is not about particularities, the here-now, butabout a pre-given system, 
about the past. Law does not look at individuals, or hears what they say, but answers 
their request according to the pre-established legal system and sends them away. Justice 
as a principle, which permeates individualities andtheir encounters, is not an object of 
cognition and therefore is likely to be called irrational (Cahn, 1949:11). Law is about 
principles and therefore it cannot address individual, concrete human beings. Justice 
shaped by law is blind, is impartial, impersonal and the justice, which can see, has been 
relegated to the confines of human intuition and dreams. Law imposes its own 
rationality which perverts particularities and their justice. 
Law and justice is then a couple in a joyless marriage. Justice as a moral virtue 
cannot be achieved or even exercised within the limits of law. The fundamental reason 
for this state of affairs lies in the separation of law from morals which became clear 
through modernist rationality thereby intending to establish conditions for the 
organisation of social and political life and endowing the nation-state with legitimacy, 
necessary for the regulation of public and private life. The conditions for a legitimate 
legality were established by the separation between law and morals, which at the end of 
the day represents “the pre-eminence of ‘security’ over ‘justice’ ” (Gurvitch, 1973:239). 
This immense movement of humanity towards complex forms of living together 
recognises a crucial moment in this separation which is ethical, legal, human, 
ontological and epistemological. This movement is recognised as a revolution. After the 
second separation, the discussion analyses the third separation thesis in order to give 
contours to the question from which this section start : “Is there anything beyond law?”  
This section will discuss separation as a human phenom non and its effects on 
law and justice problem in three subsections. The first will situate the suffering of the 
feminine in patriarchal culture as the suffering of justice in legal orders, by exposing 
briefly the ideas of Arrigo’s imaginative discourse. The second one discusses the 
feminist reading of the third separation thesis andits consequences in the context of 
legal theory, drawing from the work of West. The third will introduce a feminine project 
to respond to the challenge to legal theory offered by the imagined or imaginary space 






IV.1- The Feminine Problem as the “Sacrifice” of Justice39   
 
One of the current formulations of a feminist account of law considers that law 
is male in the sense that it oppresses women and expresses only male interests and the 
male way of shaping life. Another feature of that understanding is that any attempt to 
overcome the chauvinist law has to happen through a well-founded claim on rights. If 
the positive law does not offer that possibility, politics is the alternative in order to 
secure an amendment of the law and thereby make it just in order to include women’s 
rights. This approach is called “publicist” for it sees women and their rationality only 
within social systems, where they try to conquer space in male culture through law and 
rights, i.e., with male tools. This is publicist since women have to go outside (away 
from herself) and alienate herself from her very nature, which, anyway, is hidden, 
unknown, unspeakable, prohibited and dangerous, in order to canvass for some attention 
and space to express their truth.  
Notwithstanding, the feminist account of the feminine has discovered a private 
way to talk about differences, about new-old ways of eeing reality, of understanding 
moral issues and finally of resolving problems. That discourse could become very 
attractive for the whole realm of law, politics, science, education, church and so on, 
since they are all about resolving disputes. However, this approach becomes 
problematic since in reality, the male rationality is not honestly involved in resolving 
problems but in discovering them and dealing with them in order to justify positions and 
privileges. In this respect, Mackinnon’s words reverberate: “male academics have been 
able to afford to talk in ways that mean nothing, so also women (…)” (Mackinnon, 
1987:2-3).  
Another problem with a discourse that proclaims a new approach concerning 
moral issues is the pretension of moral unity that underpins the positive order of law, 
institutional life and their male nature. The unitary view of morality will show that the 
search for the feminine cannot fruitfully happen within a male framework. Furthermore, 
one has to bear in mind that empirical data would be rare since the feminine quality 
                                                
39Irigaray uses the term “sacrifice” in a very inspired way when she says that the founding sacrifice, 
which is in the grounds of the Judeo-Christian culture, is the sacrifice of the mother, a basic arquetype of 
the suffering of the feminine, of women, and of justice to this thesis. The inspiration of Irigaray certainly 
recalls the Christian charge on Eve as the one responsible for the human expulsion from the Paradise. Th  
Christian portrait of Virgin Mary, who gives birth to Jesus without a human normal sexual intercourse, 
shows the sacrifice of the feminine. Whitford sheds light on the consequences of this state of affairs. She 
points out that the feminine is not recognised in the cultural imaginary and it implies a serious lack of 
creative intercourse at the level of the cultural imaginary and the cultural symbolic. Moreover, its 
consequences can reach levels of unconsciousness of difficult control or patrol. It means that no matter 
how innovative or emancipatory a theory could be, it would be likely to repeat and perpetuate “the 
founding obliteration (…) [and] the gesture of silencing and repression” (In Schwab, 1998:168). Whitford 
also points out that Irigaray sees that the female h s the especial function in the symbolic of representing 
that which is outside the discourse (Ibidem). 
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does not have any concrete manifestation in social life. Therefore, the so-called 
feminine quality, intuition and non-strictly-scientific recourses would be used in order 
to corroborate a possible project of a new rationality. Life would be re-interpreted by 
what Arrigo calls “experiential feminism”.  
The feminism of difference aims at a sort of reconstitution of the issue of 
woman to respond to the ontological questions such as: “what is a woman?” “what is 
the feminine?”40 Differences, multiples and particulars do not have  comfortable place 
in traditional legal synthaxis, neither in its principles of generality and universality nor 
in its practice of equating justice with the rule of law. Moreover, a full 
acknowledgement of the female voice would transform the practice of life and law in a 
phallocentric culture. This transformation presents a perceptible danger on many levels. 
To whom could it be of any interest at all? The disconnection of men from women and 
of women from themselves, as psychological phenomena, have profound social and 
institutional effects. To facilitate a re-connection and a re-association would provoke a 
drastic revolution in the established way of thinking, of valuing facts, of weighting 
circumstances, of applying rules (whether it would be the case at all) for resolving 
problems and settling disputes. “The different voice is (…) a relational voice: a voice 
that insists on staying in connection and most centrally in connection with women, so 
that psychological separations which have long been justified in the name of autonomy, 
selfhood, and freedom no longer appear as the sin  qua non of human development but 
as a human problem” (Gilligan, 1996:xii). 
Separation is the problem and connection is the feminine response to moral 
issues. The feminine framework for moral questions a d application of law in concrete 
cases brings different ways for us to live peacefully together. The female voice 
articulates a new paradigm to settle disputes and ese access to justice. In this respect, 
the female would look for keeping relationships and considering particularities within 
conflict situations, by engaging with care and responsibility rather than searching for a 
general rule to be applied in order to achieve objectivity and detachment. 
The invisibility of the feminine in social, political and legal environments 
requires a search for it. Moreover, it is the search for justice as a feminine quality and it 
is an imaginative endeavour to imagine, to discover and ultimately to create another 
                                                
40 The basic inquiry is about the possibility of an imagined institutionalised feminine justice since th
current understanding is that law institutionalises things is through universality not particularity, which 
excludes women since the feminine is more easily ident fied with the particular. In this sense, Irigaray 
had already diagnosed the exclusion of women from western philosophy, thought and society exactly 
under the argument that women do not follow the male r tionality of universals. “When women attempt 
to speak in their own name, to speak as women, to speak their truth, as one might say, this is rejected in 
the name of truth; truth it is said, has a universal ch racter, and women cannot speak for the universal”  
(Whitford, M., 1991:102).  First of all, the immediate response is that everything in this project is meant 
to be, in principle, institutionalised insofar as lw and its practice will be the way through which justice 
can be achieved, despite the modernist separation between law and justice.     
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way of life, of human conviviality, of justice, of dispute resolution that would promote 
connection instead of Urteil or Teilung, division, separation. The inspirations of the 
imaginative discourse and the experiential feminism formulated by Arrigo are tools to 
be analysed.41  
 
IV.1.1- Arrigo’s Imaginative Discourse and Experiential Feminism 
 
Firstly, Arrigo’s target is the patriarchal code of justice as law based on rights 
and informed by procedure. She appeals to “an uncultivated feminine discourse [based 
upon] experience, gatherings, counsciousness-raising and interpersonal truth”. She 
argues that in constituting “an unadulterated code f f minine justice (…) [one needs] a 
return to imaginative discourse” (Arrigo, 1992:13). 
She proposes also a language, grammar or system of signs to inform the 
uncultivated feminine discourse and calls that “experiential feminism”. This language 
warns women and justice about the traps of male and legal culture. This grammar also 
offers tools to overcome the deep cultural habits that drive us to resist the truth of 
findings such as those of the relational contract theory and Gilligan’s work. Arrigo aims 
at a radical re-elaboration of justice and law, through de-bunking the patriarchal 
language of law. She claims that the face of the Other “holds salient meanings for the 
re-formulation of justice (…). (…) [T]he project of experiential feminism, in its re-
conceptualization of juridical truth, entails a dismantling of prevailing phallocratic 
symbols: the courtroom, the legal method, the reason ble man standard, burdens of 
proof, a demand for factual evidence, case precedent and so on” (Ibid., 23/25). 
Arrigo denounces the invisibility of the feminine. “[T]he intrapsychic and 
intersubjective dimensions of feminine desire are denied affirmative codification in the 
domain of legal ‘male speak’. (…) Put another way, the postmodern (…) feminist point 
of view is typically relegated to the realm of linguistic banality and, when applied to 
legal dogmatics or jurisprudence, intellectual absurdity. (…) [E]xperiential feminism 
identifies the imagination as the locus of establishing an écriture feminine (…) (an 
uncultivated discourse for and about women) (…)[; it] seeks to displace the metaphors 
of ‘rules’, ‘facts’, ‘proofs’, ‘burdens’, ‘evidences’, etc., as constituents of juridical 
(patriarchal) truth. (…) The work of experiential feminism in its rendering of a feminist 
jurisprudence is to de-center law and reconceptualize justice. This language working 
must be grounded in reflexive, concernful, imaginative discourse so that the feminine in 
                                                
41 See Edward Murray (1986), as a source of inspiration for Arrigo and as a discourse on the power of 
imagination in moral reasoning. Murray opposes the imaginative thinking to the logical one, which does 
not supply the requirements of human condition, and identifies the former as the process “of 
individuation, of personal becoming”, as the Einbuild ngskraft, or “the unity-building power within the 
person” (26/62).  
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consciousness can announce the unadulterated experinc s of women” (Arrigo, 
1995a:23/28/31-32). Experiential feminism, through imaginative discourse, finds the 
culture where the feminine quality could be imagined, made up, tried out and translated 
into reality. The object of a “relanguaging” is the r discovering of myth, metaphor, 
symbol and their significance as elements of storytelling. Justice can be recovered 
exactly where the feminine is hidden. 
The basic tenet of imaginative discourse in the realm of a male language is that 
culture grows out of the way in which people imagine their life and therefore life is 
lived in the way it has been already imagined. Thus, in ofar as the male culture is the 
way for male life to be created and lived, a supposed female culture can explore the 
same process which consists of getting distance from the current imagination, by 
starting to challenge it, even repudiate it. Feminine discourse yet must create another 
imagined life. In this respect, the imaginative discourse could be understood as an 
ontological hermeneutics which consists of a method for “recounting the experience [as] 
an authentic movement toward ‘transcending what has been given to us’ (…)” as 
product of imagination, in order to imagine and construct something not only better than 
what has been given to us but something essentially different. The imaginative 
discourse, in that sense, entails necessarily a cretive process to the extent that 
something existential can be created, on the one had. On the other, it brings about 
metaphors, myths, symbols which “resituate our experiences in ambiguity, multiplicity, 
uncertainty, and contradiction. As Murray concludes, ‘[it is] a lie that tells the truth, a 
confusion that clarifies, a detour that puts one directly on the road, a blindness that 
enables one to see all the better’ ” (In Arrigo, 1995a:100)42. 
A classical example of how a lie can reveal the truth, in the story of Little Red 
Riding Hood, which is about a girl who decides to visit her grandmother and gets 
entrapped by the bad wolf. He swallows the girl in her grandmother’s house where he 
had swallowed the old woman before.  
Many symbols in this story unveil the concealed trappings of the phallocentric 
reality. Firstly, the red cap symbolises menstruation and indicates that the isolation, the 
silence and the trap of the feminine occur by the time they are bound to acquire sexual 
maturity.43 The girl who visits the grandmother, the old woman; it shows the way 
knowledge is transferred: from the old to the new, specially among women. That visit 
exemplifies what happens to girls and their femininity when they have to cross the 
forest, to grow and to become women. The walk through a forest symbolises, as well, 
                                                
42 There are plenty of images in fairy-tales about silenced women: Penelope, Philomena (Rowe, 1986:57) 
and Antigone to mention the Greek ones. The Spinnerinnen in the German tradition (Bottigheimer, 
1986:118). And a collection in the Grimm’s fairy-tales like, to quote one, the Sleeping Beauty.  
43 One could say that the trap occurs when a girl becom s a woman and can exercise her three traditional 
knowledges: of sexual passion, of healing, and of the wisdom to spin tales (Rowe, 1986:59). 
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the process of growing which ends in the belly of the bad wolf where the old granny is 
already and toward where Little Red Cap has driven h rself. The process of walking 
through the forest means the process of growing through inner and imaginative realities. 
Traditionally, the forest in fairy tales represents the psyche. Male society is represented 
by the wolf who meaningfully does not kill the grandmother nor the girl but only 
swallows them; the feminine entrapped by the male rtionality is not dead, but painfully 
hidden and colonised. In this sense, the feminine can be recovered and it will be by a 
chaser, who knows the grandmother, the forest and the bad wolf. Looking at the wolf 
sleeping, the chaser guesses what had happened to the old woman and he opens the 
wolf’s belly to find the granny and her granddaughter. The feminine is not in the forest 
nor in her own house but in the belly of the wolf which means that the feminine is not in 
the social concrete life nor even at home, but has been swallowed by the masculine in 
the culture. The recovery of the feminine has to be done nonetheless by somebody who 
knows the culture, the feminine, the masculine and bove all the home of the feminine. 
Besides, he is the one who chases, enquiries, wonders and imagines activities very 
much connected with the female quality.  
Another interesting story that shows the use of similar images is Antigone and 
her fight with Creon, understood as a fight between male and female legal and moral 
reasonings, a fight between law and justice. It is suffice to recall that Creon exercises 
legal justice on Antigone’s brother (an enemy of the polis) and prohibits his burial. 
Antigone disobeys his command, thereby answering the higher call to justice, and 
buries her bother. Creon threatens her with entombing her alive. It is similar to the 
image of the grandmother and the granddaughter alive in the belly of the wolf. They are 
not dead but if the chaser takes too long to rescue them, they will not survive. The same 
situation exists concerning justice in the belly of law. The male culture entombed the 
feminine quality in the kitchen, where it is alive but without expression. When it has to 
say something, it does so through the code of the living room where the patriarch rules. 
Justice, in the same way, is alive between the lines of law, suffocated, silent, without 
any expression but the one law permits. 
 This story is an example of an imaginative representation of the situation of the 
feminine vis-à-vis the male culture and, above all, the possibility of the feminine being 
rescued. Besides, telling a tale about women or for w men can be a valuable way to 
break imposed silences (Rowe, 1986:53). It can be a way of delineating the nature of the 
feminine and a model for justice, which is also in the belly of the bad wolf, to be 
concretised. This model of justice, as living experience and the product of the 
experimental feminism, “applauds personal diversity, esteems cultural heterogeneity, 
experiences situations contextually, acknowledges individual/collective competency and 
fallibility, encourages communal participation, and invites imaginative discourse. In 
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short, the juridical transformation constituted by experiential feminism is a spiritual 
revalidation of one’s freedom to imagine the world in all its possibilities –an invitation 
to touch the transcendent [and the very core of human quality] in all of us” (Ibid. 107). 
The feminine method as the method of justice requirs magination, an imaginative 
practical reasoning in the endeavours of weaving, spinning and fantasising a different 
way of peace making, “of stretching (…) imagination to identify and understand the 
perspectives of others” (Bartlett, 1990:390). The feminine quality is the perfect 
conditions to allow this kind of justice to be potentialised, experienced, transformed, 
constructed, pursued, created and recreated. 
 Imaginative discourse furnishes empathic legal attitudes, while offering a 
language of metaphor, symbol and myth, through which spoken narratives are 
transformed into lived action (Arrigo, 1992:26). “Experiential feminism is the process 
whereby one authors one’s life. (…)[It] is an invitat on to us all to unpack the meanings 
of our community’s metaphors, symbols, and myths. Moreover, it is the project of 
reconstituting, through our imagination, those encha ting images that more intimately 
reveal the feminine in consciousness, and to incorporate these significations into the 
culture of one’s community through storytelling and ritual. This process leads to a 
reconceptualized and more authentic understanding of justice (…). [I]t readies the way 
for styles of existence that are as different from ne another as possible. These styles, 
through imagination, bring with them multiple meanings (…) and a variety of other 
experiences that defy the singularity of law’s normalizing claim to truth” (Ibid., 103-
104). Experiential feminism is the process whereby one can visualise imaginatively the 
suffering of the Other in the making or promotion of justice. One can imagine that law 
could “moderate, among all men and women, links of association (…) organized around 
more or less physical, affective or spiritual feelings … A structure, or structures of 
identification, of spiritualization, of links of relationships and communication between 
living persons” (Irigaray in Schwab, 1996:175). 
This discussion demands a closer look at the feminist endeavour to overcome 
separation as an ethical obligation in order to resto  morals and justice as legal 
possibilities. Moreover, separation is another name for the silence of the feminine and 
of justice imposed by their entombment, by the enclosure in the woods, in a high tower, 
in a glass coffin or in the belly of the bad wolf. 
 
IV.2- The Third Separation Thesis and its Meaning for Legal Theory: A Feminist 
Path 
 
West (1988) identifies the separation thesis as the source of liberal political 
thought, which organises the great majority of western societies. The separation thesis 
to which West refers is formulated as the realisation of a single human being that is 
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alone, different and separated from other human beings. She believes that this 
separation is the source of all the splits with which we try to deal in life and in theory. 
The history of separation between self and Other is very similar to the history of  
“modernity’s (de)linking of legality and morality” (Douzinas&Warrington, 1994a:137), 
and to the exclusion of the feminine from the phallocentric culture. The history of the 
withdrawal of the feminine from the social scene explains the separation thesis as a 
masculine strategy of the culture which informs thedominant male pattern of social, 
legal and moral organisation in western societies.  
 West connects the social realisation of the separation thesis with the liberal 
project through which law guarantees freedom. Human organisation, as separation is 
installed, cannot dispense with law, rules, and principles. Separation denies and silences 
women’s experiences whereas coherence of law confirms male dominance (Roach, 
1992). Separation promises freedom, but entails vulnerability in a feminine perspective. 
However, from a male perspective isolation is condition of security, argues Gilligan. 
Moreover, it demands rules, law and the rule of law. And law as separated reflects the 
fundamental separation between self and Other and cnot reconcile them.  On the 
contrary, it deepens the gap in the name of autonomy, purity of morality, individuation, 
privacy, etc. Law saves the self from the dangers of the encounter, of the Other, of the 
encounter with the Other. Law regulates the separation by imposing itself as a set of 
rules necessary for the re-connection, always desired but never achieved.   
 Feminist theories characterise the feminine way as the way toward connection, 
intimacy and relationship when working on the separation thesis. This diagnosis is 
celebrated as a positive feature of the feminine quality by the so-called cultural feminist 
whereas the radical feminists see in this characterisation the source of women’s 
subjugation and powerlessness. Cultural feminism is the branch chosen by this thesis to 
bridge the modernist divides and separation. Its cri icism against the male regime of the 
Rule of Law establishes a way toward a different coceptualisation of law and justice. 
 West takes both branches of feminist legal theory and formulates what she calls 
“reconstructive jurisprudence” which is about unveiling “how women –that is, people 
who value intimacy, fear separation, dread invasion, and crave individuation- have fared 
under a legal system which fails to value intimacy, fails to protect against separation, 
refuses to define invasion as a harm, and refuses to acknowledge the aspirations of 
women for individuation and physical privacy” (West, 1988:61). Feminist legal thought 
has the challenge of debunking a legal system which destroys intimacy for fear of it, 
promotes separation as the condition for the stability of the system, silences the 
feminine voice, the voice of justice, the call of the Other.  
Reconstructive jurisprudence shows “what it means for the Rule of Law to 
exclude women and women’s values” (Ibid., 64). Moreover, the incompatibility 
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between women’s values and the Rule of Law situates exactly around the separation 
thesis because the defence of legal values by the mal odernist legal regime occurs 
against intimacy and connectedness which entail the dislocation of the autonomous 
subject in favour of a more relational and contextual approach especially in dispute 
resolution. Security and certainty as values of the Rule of Law will not facilitate a 
possible harmonisation with women’s values as intimacy, connectedness, love and care 
for the Other.  
 The goal of reconstructive feminist jurisprudence, says West, “is to render 
feminist reform rational. We must change the fact that, from a mainstream point of 
view, arguments for feminist legal reform efforts are (or appear to be) invariably 
irrational. The moral questions feminist reforms pose are always incommensurable with 
dominant moral and legal categories. Let me put it this way: given present moral 
categories, women’s issues are crazy issues” (Ibid., 68-69). However, the feminist effort 
should be, especially in legal theory, exactly because of its craziness, which is named 
irrational. This irrationality is a feature of the feminine discomfort before the 
phallocentric rationality in force.  
In the feminine path toward rescuing justice, the variety of craziness amounts to 
a great diversity, among which one could mention the effort to reach a more 
“individualised justice” through the practice of legal storytelling. “[T]elling stories can 
move us to care”, which approximates legal practice within a feminine morality of care 
and consequently to a morality which could make lawa more appropriate tool for 
justice (Massaro, 1989:2105). 
Moreover, this movement represents a genuine feminist craziness or 
“irrationality”, expressed as a rebellion against rules, universal categories, abstraction 
and in favour of a more contextual, caring and empathic approach toward the legal-
human. Fundamental to any feminist theory seems to be the development of something 
which reflects, respects, reproduces the feminine experience and is based upon it. 
Moreover, the craziness for the Other, for relationships, for justice, which is not law, is 
connected to the feminine and its craziness.  
“Empathy”, in Henderson’s words, entails: “1. capacity to perceive others as 
having one’s own goals, interests and affects; 2. imaginative experience of the situation 
of another; and 3. the distress response that accompanies this experiencing –which may 
(but not must) lead to action to ease the pain of an ther” (In ibid., 2101). “[T]he debt to 
the other cannot be answered by a rational law, by a ruler’s decree” (Hirvoneen, 
1997:243). Empathy asks for craziness, disruptions, emotions, irrationality, illogicality, 
ethical sensibility, the darkness of the culture or of the polis, which is the feminine itself 
and also the place where the feminine was entombed, confined, tamed, repressed, made 
unable and anaemic (Ibid., 244).  
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West recalls the feminine ethical sensibility, which she nominates 
“intersubjective sensitivity to the needs of others” (In Minda, 1995:133). That 
sensitivity is ethical and based upon feminine experiences with nurturance.44 
Notwithstanding, the path of the feminist craziness in law has its problems. 
“Law (…) cannot empathize with everyone equally” (Ibid., 109), since law is about 
exclusion, rules, and above all separation. This craziness of feminine togetherness is 
irrational for human beings educated in separation. Law as a human institution could 
not be different, and it would be deemed “unempathetic” since separation and exclusion 
are its main features.  Empathy and legal storytelling, as feminist craziness, find 
themselves in a very difficult situation before the modernist organisation of legal 
institutions based upon classical principles of equality, impartiality and universality. 
The aporias that inform the substance of justice in Derrida’s analysis are consequences 
of the contested modernist understanding of justice as proceedings of law well 
perceived by Derrida but badly equated in the characte isation of justice. Therefore, 
despite the points of similarity between post-modernism and feminist craziness, 
especially the fight against universality, grand-theory, and the abstract idea of justice, 
this thesis pushes feminism further to overcome conformity to a certain post-modernism 
expressed by the ideas of Levinas and Derrida and, above all, to recover an erased form 
of thought and practice of life (Minda, 1995:248). Moreover, this recovery demands a 
radical change in lawyers’ law, profoundly marked by the modernist male way of 
thinking and problem-resolution especially moral ones.  This change is ancillary to the 
reality that lawyers’ law is more than technicality; i  expresses indeed a way of thinking, 
of resolving problems of life, a quality of soul.45  
The ethics of alterity, through the eyes of a feminist jurisprudence, paints law’s 
impossibilities and limitations, named complexity deficit, with even darker colours. The 
discussions on mercy and love in law are very instructive to corroborate the 
understanding that law does not offer conditions for justice to happen in terms of 
merciful or loving judgements, and to indicate the path through which justice, which is 
not law, can be achieved in dispute resolution. 
                                                
44 “Feminists assert that ‘women’ know that there is a nonlingual domestic world of human needs that 
compel fulfillment –‘a world of bodies, of babies, of babies sucking milk, of babies’ shit, of babies’ 
sleeplessness, of children, of children’s needs, of children’s appetite- lurking beneath’ the objective world 
of men” (Minda, 1995:133). The quotation sounds very round and fulfilling. However, one anxiety 
persists: whether and to where this understanding can lead law? The craziness in feminism is hence a 
function of its defence of ahistorical functionalist categories as reproduction, mothering and nurturance as 
model or inspiration for theoretical criticism and social practices as well. The craziness becomes acute 
when confronted with male modernist theories and practices which “exclude from citizenship persons 
identified with the body and feeling rather than with rationality” (Smiley, 1991:1580/85). In the same 
vein, the craziness dares to imagine a non-contractual society guided by the paradigm of mother and 
children (Held, 1987:114). The morality claimed by the feminist craziness is the one for “people in love”.   
45 “[L]earning to think like a lawyer can affect one’s soul” (Powers Jr., 1991:993). 
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That path cannot be forged in the limits of a legal theory that is based upon the 
separation from the Other, the separation of law from morality, of law from justice and 
that privileges security at the expense of justice. Quite the contrary, that path will 
require a turn in the considerations of morality, especially the ones about moral 
development.  
Thus, what follows intends to introduce the theme of the next chapter, with a 
view to consolidate the understanding of separation as problem, while indicating the 
path of care as the path of the excarnation of justice from law.    
 
IV.3- The Path of Care: Healing Separation Toward Justice  
 
Gilligan’s findings articulate a female moral reasoning, differently from the 
male one defined by Kohlberg’s moral theory. Her wok identifies a counter-ethic called 
the feminine morality, which offers an alternative for legal dispute resolution to the 
reductive approach of law and its individualist and separatist mode of reasoning. “At 
first glance the usefulness of the concept of altruism in describing the legal system is 
highly problematic. A very common view alike in the lay world and within the legal 
profession is that law is unequivocally the domain of individualism (…). Private legal 
justice supposedly consists in the respect for rights, never in the performance of 
altruistic duty. The state acts through private lawonly to protect rights, not to enforce 
morality” (Kennedy, 1976:1718-19). Relational contrac  law claims that rights and 
legalistic arguments are not moral; not decent. The morality of law is law and another 
morality, a feminine one, expressed by care for Others and responsibility in relationship, 
may indicate how it could make sense in law. Can law impose altruism, care, love, 
mercy or justice in the terms of the Other, since law is about applying rules and not 
morality? To what extent is this question a real one? Can law offer an opportunity for 
real justice to be achieved, justice for the Other in his own terms, a sort of justice 
informed by a feminine ethics, the ethics of care? Or, all that is resolved by the 
unwarranted assumption of being love an unenforceable claim?  
The path of excarnation requires a morality that challenges any morality of 
principles, rules and norms, which informs law, and lso seems to require a model able 
to dismantle the adversarial background of adjudication. It turns toward a conception of 
justice as a construction, a conquest in order to overcome “a marked orientation toward 
the past” in the adjudicative practices and to insert the search for justice in the here-now 
of given particularities (In Cotterrell, 1992:211). Above all, the morality required must 
establish conditions to overcome the unenforceability of love as the only moral value 
able to respond to the Other, as holder of particularities, in his own terms. 
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Adjudication as a path to achieve justice will not do because the judicial 
environment of rules or standards application will reduce substantive issues in order to 
equate them with finished-stories, thereby violating particularities. These stories are to 
be told and understood with legal universal pre-established concepts, ideas and 
paradigms. It means that no substantive justice can disregard the form, no matter legally 
or personally established, in an adjudicative model of dispensing justice. In this sense, 
legal discussions around formal and substantive justice as a framework to equate law 
and justice do not help much. A single example can explain how substantive justice 
relies upon the anchorage of formal parameters in order to be adjudicated.   
Based on the assumption that tenants are the weakest parties in rent contracts, 
Brazilian law adopted rules to regulate these contractual relationships to protect tenants. 
Substantive justice was then achieved by looking at the particularity of the parties 
involved in contractual relationships at the expense of a more formalistic principle of 
equality. The law established privileges in favour f one of the sides of contractual 
relationships.  Nevertheless, the substantive justice needed the rule to establish what 
kind of protection would be appropriate. In the Brazili n example, tenants were deemed 
to be weaker than landlords and the law determined th  privileges they are entitled to in 
order to balance the substantive difference vis-à-vis the position of a landlord. However, 
the economic reality of the country with high interests and great opportunities for very 
attractive profitable financial “investments”, caused various families, especially rich 
people, to sell their homes to invest the money in financial markets and to rent new 
places to live.  Thus, in settling disputes, judges, following substantive justice to protect 
the weaker party in relationships of rent, have to follow rules that determined which of 
the parties was the weakest one. If the judge dared to look at the face of the parties to 
discover their truth, thereby leaving the rules aside, she would find herself in a most 
strange state of despondency, enforcing substantive pr nciples and getting it wrong by 
protecting those who do not need it at expense of th se who do. By applying the 
substantive rule, the protection was deferred to rich and powerful tenants, rich people 
with lots of money invested in financial markets at the expense of landlords, in this 
case, people that were renting out their only property, going to live in simpler spaces, in 
order to make some extra money to afford their basic liv ng. Then, the substantive 
justice, anchored to formal rules or principles, can be flawed, ineffective and simply 
unjust. 
Therefore, substantive and formal justice cannot be understood, in the limits of 
this thesis, as two opposite sorts of justices, but two different laws, two different modes 
of adjudication. The practice of adjudication, which s based upon the adversarial mode 
of finding truth to apply rules and/or standards, has to deal with challenges like the 
antithetical character of procedures and routines to truth. Truth, thus, is antithetical to 
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peace, and law, by its turn, antithetical to life, particulars, encounters, and relationships. 
If one has lawyers, judges, rules, and law in betwen parties, how can one express his 
own truth and justice? The path of excarnation of justice by care and responsibility in 
relationship will be another way to engender justice, most probably by suspending rules, 
legalistic arguments and lawyer’s law and enlarge law to embrace love as enforceable. 
The willingness to listen and talk toward an understanding which can encompass or take 
into account everyone’s needs may emerge.  
Since community links are progressively removed from today’s technological 
market society, to awaken a different morality able to strengthen human relationships, 
even the ones the market can provide become urgent. Furthermore, at the end of the day, 
the market and its individualism it engenders are not points on which one has to 
concentrate one’s attack in order to overcome the moral crisis of law. Rather, through 
market’s aspirations, one can transform its practices and forge a different morality, a 
different way to equate diversity, a different possibility for dispute resolution in a more 
nourishing human environment. Care, in a market enviro ment, works not for 
individual rights but for individuation of particular situations and subjects, not for 
bearers of rights but for Other’s opportunity to express his own justice.  
 In “Caring for Justice” (1997), West argues for the centrality of the notion of 
care for legal justice. Like Minow, she intends to improve judicial adjudication and 
argues for the integration of care in judicial practice of justice dispensation. She builds 
her arguments on the path breaking work of Carol Gilligan but does not acknowledge 
the aporias of legal justice as a manifestation of male morality. She aims at a synthesis 
of care and rights but her argument loses force because it does not dissect the suffering 
of justice in the framework of the morality of rights. West works broadly to synthesise 
both perspectives without success and loses sight of t e difficulties of care as a female 
value silenced in male politics of equality, imparti li y, coherence, security, certainty 
and rule of law.46  
The path of care is not itself a synthesis that equates legality, or a morality of 
rights and rules, with the ethics of alterity, but is an alternative to the male rationality 
that pervades law. A different voice can voice the Other in his own terms and makes 
love perfectly enforceable. The conciliation or synthesis between law and justice does 
not happen in a compromise arranged in the modernist gap, where emotion and reason 
fight without resolution. The path of care should avoid the gap not by calling reason that 
which is emotion but by acknowledging the emotion as a valid way to be in life, tackle 
problems, and resolve disputes in a different way, through a different voice. 
                                                
46 West’s inspiration about the separation thesis does n t lead to a very emancipatory formulation in her
“Caring for Justice” (1997). In this sense, it appears that she fails to respond to Mary Frug’s criterion 
which demands that a feminist analysis must change o e’s consciousness (1992:53).  
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 The ethics of care has a special aim to simplify the sophistication of male 
rationality especially around law or in legal theory because it understands that the more 
sophisticated the juridical thinking the more serious becomes the problem of access to 
justice, since justice is bound to collapse into a discussion about legal proceedings and 
legal adjudication (Auerbach, 1983:140). The secular indeterminacy of justice is not a 
challenge for judges, lawyers and litigants to undertake a shared understanding of 
justice in courtrooms, where the rule of law, understood as justice, reduces everything 
to roles and rules, silences the Other’s justice, isolates disputants and destroys 
relationships. Legal theory cannot resolve that in i s own premises and procedures. The 
path of care and responsibility in relationships promises a resolution that preserves 
relationships; it promises a moment of moral sanity in disputes resolution by 
challenging the individualist mode of moral and legal reasoning, undertaken by isolated 
adjudicators and disputants and autonomous bearers of rights, who represent the status 
quo. 
 Through the path of care in dispute resolution, one would be able to perceive 
that, in the end, justice is a task that belongs to each one particularly, singularly and 
personally. “Arendt put it in the following way: ‘in the last analysis…our decisions 
about right and wrong depend upon our choice of company, with whom we wish to 
spend our lives.’ (…) In sum, it is not a set of universal rules that makes justice 
possible, but a way of life that makes it possible for us to want to be just. It is for this 
reason that I stress personal justice” (Jackson, 1986:24). The path of care is about 
personal justice; is about weaving a net of ethical st ndpoints in favour of the Other in 
relationships.  
 The task of rescuing justice from the traps of lawis of paramount importance 
and beyond the possibilities of legal theory alone. I  addition, the debate in the arena of 
moral development theory sounds interesting and especially the feminist branch of that 
debate needs to be explored and articulated within a discussion about legal justice 
criticised for its faith in “ideals of neutrality and objectivity unacceptably indifferent to 
the concrete specifics of lived reality” (In Christodoulidis, 1995:186). 
 Axel Honneth (1995) helpfully unveils the radical challenge offered to moral 
theories elaborated in the modernist and Kantian trdition, such as Habermas’ discourse 
ethics47 or also Kohlberg’s moral development theory, posed by “the asymmetrical 
experience of obligation, rooted in a phenomenology f care” (Critchley, 1999: 267). 
                                                
47 The author is well aware of Habermas’ efforts to overcome Kant’s individualist moral theory, by trying 
to elaborate the social aspects of morals as shared forms of life. The author argues that Habermas 
endeavours to revise Kant and bases his conception of justice upon a premise which includes equality, 
reciprocity and symmetry as principles that inform “a procedure for moral argumentation (…) to resolve 
conflicts between rival moral claims.” Honneth argues further that the framework of discourse ethics 
needs to be complemented by the ethics of care (Critchley, 1999: 295). 
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This supports this thesis about the important consequences of the path of care to the 
modernist ways of law.  
 Honneth shows how asymmetry, particularity and concrete, non-totalisable 
relation to the Other, as post-modernist values inscribed in Levinas’ ethical conception 
and in Derrida’s recent works, fit well into the ethics of care. This thesis argues is that 
relationship, as the basic conception of Gilligan’s ethics of care, is needed in Levinas’ 
ethics especially regarding practices of law. 
 The important point in the ethics of care is the asymmetrical character of the 
moral standpoint of any relationship with the Other, while challenging, in a radical way, 
the principles of equality and universality common t  all theories bred in the Kantian 
tradition.  
Gilligan’s ethics of care is very much against the universalism of modernist and 
Kantian frameworks and it has surely credentials to embrace the post-modernist ethical 
turn through using moral theory as a medium of post-modern criticism (Honneth, 
1995:289). It argues for the centrality of the unforgettable particularity of concrete 
persons for the making of justice, thereby challenging equality as a valid principle for 
the achievement of justice, or justice as care, and proposing that moral responsibility for 
the concrete Other is essentially asymmetrical. Derrida draws a line between justice as 
“the infinite, incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign to symmetry, heterogeneous 
and heterotropic (…) [and] justice as law or right, legitimacy or legality, stabilizable 
and statutory, calculable, a system of regulated an coded prescriptions” (Derrida, 
1992:310). Care, as an everlasting moral obligation, refuses justice as law in order to 
make a claim for justice as asymmetry. Care challenges legal theories to respond to the 
call of the Other, to look at the suffering in the face of the Other, if law is to overcome 
its moral decay. Again it is appropriate to posit that the master’s tool is not of use here 
and one must to look beyond the limits of legal theory for help. 
 The path of care will respond to the concrete Other, left outside of the legal 
discourse, of legal proceedings, isolated and unconsidered in his aspiration of achieving 
justice in his own terms.  
 
 Conclusion  
 
This chapter challenged the modernist rationality, which has colonised justice in 
the realm of law, based on the morality and politics of separation. In that sense, this 
thesis disrespects the division of labour which establishes that lawyers are supposed 
only to discuss the rule of law and law as a pre-given set of rules used in courts and/or 
administrative agencies. The enigmas of justice are left for other fields of knowledge. In 
the legal profession one talks about law, and when justice is the subject, one refers to it 
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as what law says, or the ability of following rules or applying them impartially and 
equally. Justice in the kingdom of law, in legal site /syntaxes, is law itself. However, 
this chapter has also looked through the veils of law, lifted them up to see what else one 
can do with law and still beyond it toward the human condition and human conviviality, 
and has found the very feminine quality of justice. 
 Can law have a feminine face and be the organising principle of our everyday 
life? If so, which face would it be?  
The moral crisis of law, as a product of the positivis  separation thesis, demands 
a return to morality and a practice of “re-imagining moral theory and making justice the 
proper and main concern of legal action” (Douzinas&Warrington, 1994a:3-5). Law, as 
exclusively understood as rules, is ethically impoverished and the moral crisis of law 
demands the re-inscription of morality in law. Which morality? Which ethic? The 



































CHAPTER II  
 
Gilligan’s Paradigmatic Revolution-An 
        Inspiration for the Life of Law 
 
 The present chapter analyses Gilligan’s findings a one way toward 
reconciliation between law and justice after having established separation as the  source 
of the moral crisis of law which was defined as the conflict between law and justice. It 
aims to unveil a new paradigm to compound the praxis of justice as a feminine virtue48.   
 The main hypothesis is: the moral crisis of law is the consequence of the 
pervasive male pattern of rationality and social organisation based on separation. The 
separation of law from justice and law from morals, while reflecting a kind of structural 
issue, has a special effect on the relationship between law and justice in the practice of 
law.49 The culture of separation provokes suppression, domination, and the silencing of 
a voice that speaks differently.  
This chapter might face some terminology problems when discussing Gilligan’s 
ideas. She claims a radical difference between “theet ics of justice” or “morality of 
rights” and “the ethics of care”. This thesis will try to identify justice, which has to be 
freed from the traps of law, with Gilligan’s ethics of care. The ethics of justice, 
described by Gilligan, is characterised as the foundation of the normal practices of law 
and as a morality of rights and rules. This terminology unveils the modernist non-
problematic relationship between justice and law. Since it seems unwise to change 
Gilligan's categories, it is better to use “morality of rights” in opposition to “morality of 
care”. “Justice” will designate the synthesis between the two moralities expressed in a 
                                                
48 Gilligan’s work on women’s moral theory has had immense influence and 
repercussions, in both academic and lay environments. She was named Ms. Magazine’s 
“Woman of the Year” in 1984 and over 1100 citations f her work were marked in the 
Social Citation Index and Science Citation Index from 1986 until early in 1991 (Tronto, 
1993:77). Currently, however, the academic value of the work seems to be diminishing. 
For instance, Gilligan’s most important work, In a Different Voice: Psychological 
Theory and Women’s Development is classified in Thin’s Bookshop as “Popular 
Psychology”. Concerning the moral discussion, her wo k, some critics say, does not 
belong to the centrality of the issue, they regard her discussion as being placed in the 
fringes of the official conversation on the matter. Notwithstanding, one must 
acknowledge that revolution is a movement promoted by the margins toward disrupting 
the centre. Moreover, Hooks claims that the marginality of the feminine furnishes 
women with an opportunity to develop a very peculiar w y of seeing reality and also of 
acting on it through its sense of wholeness of the privilege sight from the outside 
inwards (In Michelman, 1988:1529). 
49 See Kristeva’s words about the separation of the sex s and its Christian cultural background and legal 
structure (1986:141). 
 74
feminine practice of law able to guarantee effective access to a dispute settlement 
scheme based on care. 
 The aim of this second chapter is to forge a solution for the problem of 
separation diagnosed previously. The paradigmatic shift that Gilligan’s findings entail 
remedies the limitations of the ethics of alterity and offers a necessary articulation to 
create an institutional practice of justice as care.  
At present, the feminine quality has no concrete social representation. It is 
placed firmly as a lesser form of male. Benhabib says: “Woman is simply what men are 
not (…). She is simply what he happens not to be. Her identity is defined by a lack – the 
lack of autonomy, the lack of independence, the lack of the phallus. (…) It is the very 
constitution of the sphere of the discourse which bans the female from history to the 
realm of nature, from light of the public to the interior of the household, from the 
civilizing effect of culture to the repetitious burden of nurture and reproduction” 
(1994:85-86).  
MacKinnon’s words are magisterial: “Men’s physiology defines most sports, 
their needs define auto and health insurance coverage, their socially designed 
biographies define workplace expectations and succesful career patterns, their 
perspectives and concerns define quality in scholarship, their experiences and 
obsessions define merit, their objectification of life defines art, their military service 
defines citizenship, their presence defines the family, their inability to get along with 
each other –their wars and their rulership - define history, their image defines god, and 
their genitals define sex”  (1987:36). 
Women’s reclamation project reclaims not only rights for women as an excluded 
social category, but also feminine or womanly virtues in order to blur the contours, to 
stress the tension between male and female, private and public, morals and law, justice 
and law and to propose a much needed reconciliation.  
Gilligan’s findings illuminate the following question: which is the female 
power? What is a feminine quality? What is the different rationality, which is behind 
justice which is not law? How would a feminine quality exercise power?  
 
I- Gilligan: a Response to Lawrence Kohlberg 
 
 Gilligan elaborated her theory when working with Kohlberg upon moral 




                                                
50 See Jackson (1995) for details on Piaget’s theory. 
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I.1- Kohlberg’s Stages of “Normal” Moral Development 
 
Kohlberg identified six stages of moral development divided in three levels 
which correspond in broad terms to Piaget’s stages. Each level is divided by two stages. 
The first level is called pre-conventional, the second conventional and the third post-
conventional. In the pre-conventional level, the rules are external to the subject and the 
behaviour is commanded by rules and by means of reward or punishment. The second 
level is characterised by socially shared rules, which are applied by an authority. In the 
post-conventional level, the social rules are different from personal standards of moral 
behaviour. The acceptance of social rules emerges from an understanding of general 
principles and universal ethics which support rules and are respected by rules, not from 
a blind obedience to authority nor any application of the reward/punish principle. 
 Each of the three levels is sub-divided into two stages, hierarchically organised. 
In the first stage of the first level, the egocentrism, as the site of moral behaviour, 
determines that rules are to be obeyed because of the consequences for the self, without 
considering Others. In the second stage, the self acknowledges Others in terms of 
personal and concrete individualistic reciprocity; rules are observed only when the 
immediate interest of the self is involved. 
 The first stage of the conventional level is characterised by the Golden Rule 
which prescribes that one should treat Others as one would like to be treated. The moral 
behaviour is then shaped by Others’ appreciation.  I  the second stage, the moral 
behaviour is seen in a wider perspective through which the self relates his behaviour 
with the maintenance of the whole social system within which he lives. Rules are 
observed not because of fear, neither because of respect to authority, nor by 
appreciation of Others, but in name of the maintenance of the whole system which 
benefits the self. Therefore, a notion of duty is predominant. 
 The contractual legalistic orientation colours the first stage of the post-
conventional level; rights of individuals and not duties owed to society are the focus of 
the moral development. The important point in that st ge is that the rights of individuals 
are abstractly considered. They are autonomous and thus independent of any previous 
social rule or agreement. Their concretisation in social relationship requires rational 
effort from subjects interested in formulating specific rules and agreement about those 
abstract rights. The last stage is based upon a universal-ethical principle orientation. In 
the sixth stage, the moral agent is absolutely autonomous and he rules his moral action 
by a set of ethical principles self-chosen and in accordance with his own particular 
consciousness which is not to be shaped by any social rule or contingent circumstance. 
It results in a very abstract conception of morality. The moral self then has evolved from 
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acting out of fear of punishment to the final stage where he acts from an abstract set of 
moral principles. 
 Kohlberg’s most important study for this thesis is about a sample of 84 boys 
aged 10,13 and 16. He studied them in six different times over a period of 20 years. 
Girls were not included in the study in order to avoid a variable which would require 
“doubling sample” (Kohlberg, 1981:294-295). The boys where asked to resolve moral 
dilemmas such as the one of Heinz, whose wife is dying. A druggist has the drug, which 
could save her life. However, the drug was too expensiv  and Heinz could not afford it. 
The dilemma is whether Heinz should steal the drug. Boys’ answers were classified in 
order to identify the moral development stage to which the answer belonged and to 
confirm the sequence of development. The most advanced stage in the moral 
development would be characterised by that life takes precedence over property, 
concluding that Heinz should steal the drug to save a human life. 
 Gilligan reacts to Kohlberg’s research on moral development theory which 
considered only boys. She formulates her own women’s moral development theory as a 
response to an entire tradition of chauvinism in psychology, starting with Freud, and in 
moral philosophy alike, where women are understood as morally deficient and 
philosophically disabled.  
 In Kohlberg’s moral scale, only a few achieve fulldevelopment: a great majority 
seem to stop in the conventional stage. Women barely reach stage three, which is about 
“maintaining bonds of trust with others”. Level four is reached by women who manage 
to have experience with power and responsibility in secondary social institutions. 
Conformists reside in stage three, and stage four is the place for contractualists (Kerber, 
1986:311). On that point, Gilligan pins her women’s moral development theory, thereby 
acknowledging “a dissonance between psychological theory and women’s experience” 
(Ibid., 325). Nevertheless, Gilligan’s main purpose is not to show a gender difference in 
Kohlberg’s moral theory or even in general but to articulate two different moral voices 
which eventually can be gendered. She concludes that “t e study of women’s moral 
thinking changes the definition of the moral domain” (Ibid., 328) and requires “a 
different strategy of research” (Gilligan, 1983:40). 
 Gilligan emerges from an impartialist tradition inmoral philosophy, which 
informs Kohlberg’s theory of “rational principles, impartiality, universality and 
generality on rules and codes of ethics” (Blum, 1994:3). Her reaction, following the 
inspiration of Noddings and Murdoch, points to another moral language, which evokes 
conceptions related to the female agency of “care, empathy, compassion, emotional 
understanding, responsiveness to needs (…) [and] loving attention to particular 
individuals”  (Ibid., 5/13). 
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I.2- Gilligan’s Stages of a Different Moral Development 
 
Following Kohlberg’s stages, she also establishes tree levels of development, 
calling them pre-conventional, conventional and post-c nventional, and dividing each 
of them into two stages.  
 In the pre-conventional level, stage one is characte ised by self-survival. In the 
transitional stage two, the self-survival is understood as selfish and it represents a step 
toward the construction of responsibility. The conve tional level is the realm of the 
Other, the goodness and responsibility.  In stage thr e, the central concern is to please 
and care for Others and equate it with self-sacrifice. Stage four represents a transitional 
period where selflessness is confronted with a necessity for truth in relationships. The 
post-conventional level represents the morality of n n-violence and the achievement of 
truth. In the initial stage, the relationships bring about the real opportunity for the 
subject to equate care for Others and for self, in order to dissipate the tension generated 
in the earlier stage. The last stage is characterised by care as the self-chosen principle 
heading to the condemnation of hurting Others (Kittay&Meyers, 1987:7/8).   
Gilligan and Murphy articulate another stage in thepostconventional level of 
moral reasoning called postconventional contextual (PCC) which corresponds to 
Kohlberg’s postconventional formal stage (PCF). Whereas the latter is reached by 
bright subjects in Kohlberg’s theory, the former is a sign of female moral maturity, 
while in Kohlberg’s scale it is interpreted as regression. The PCC level is characterised 
by “it depends” whereby one seeks to include as many variables as possible in one 
reasoning, adapting it to the peculiarities of the concrete situation. 
 Gilligan, working basically with women, elaborates wo different moralities, one 
of rights, based on rules, fairness, equality, and reciprocity and a second one of care, 
based on the concern not to hurt, on responsibility and relationships. The former is 
considered as male and the latter female.  
Kohlberg replies by placing Gilligan’s findings in the margins of the moral 
theory field. He argues that his theory defends a moral standpoint which involves 
features such as impartiality, universality, reversibility and prescriptively and moral 
judgement as “metaethical assumptions of universalism (against relativism), 
cognitivism (against emotivism), and prescriptivism (against naturalistic descriptivism)” 
(Kohlberg, 1982:524/527).  
 Gilligan, however, understands the moral subject as profoundly particularised 
and situated in concrete relationships where the self takes into account Others’ needs 
and his own, and is informed by care, love, compassion and responsibility. Kohlberg’s 
moral self is autonomous in a Kantian sense and legislates rationally, in loneliness, his 
own principles and abstract rules which he obeys from a inner feeling of the 
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righteousness of such an action, responding in his agency directly to the principle or 
rule, which should be universally applied to anyone in the same situation.  
  
II-Gilligan by Herself 
 
What follows is the feminism of difference51 represented by Luce Irigaray 
among the French and Gilligan in the Anglo-American context. Irigary unveils the 
phallic theme of positive masculine language, through centring her discourse in 
language mechanism and establishing a psycholinguistic treatment of female discourse. 
By contrast, Gilligan develops a pragmatic moral account of the feminine. 
In a paper published in 1994, Gilligan situates the suffering or sacrifice of the 
feminine in its process of  “getting civilized”. Gilligan inspects and dissects the 
psychological dissociation that supports a human disconnection, experienced, by men, 
as separation from women and, by women, as separation from themselves. In general 
terms, she identifies separation, dissociation and disconnection, at the heart of 
patriarchal culture, as a male requirement and the psychological price for women 
entering patriarchy and civilisation (18). 
Gilligan criticises male rationality and the culture of separation, which ironically 
intends to take male morality “as the basis for theories of (…) ‘social perspective-
taking’, [and which] refers to the ability to take the point of view of other people” (19). 
The ethics of alterity is a good example of how male r tionality, whilst identifying the 
problems of separation, cannot heal the pain of the isolated and untouchable Other. 
Thus, male rationality is the framework within whic the ethics of alterity identifies the 
Other as impossibility. Therefore, the inspiration of the ethics of alterity is valuable but 
its benefits are very limited because of the dynamic of separation thereby one must learn 
“how to achieve and maintain a separate self”, as a condition of freedom and respect 
(21). The feminine remedy is reconnection or re-insertion of the Other through an ethic 
of care. 
Gilligan started to hear a “different voice” and con luded that the feminine 
remedies or reasons “experience the other interpersonally”, and “respond to the feelings 





                                                
51 The strategy of the difference, radical or publicist approach in feminist thought challenges the 
sameness, cultural and privatist approach.  
52 The feminine does not respond to Others with its own feelings but with the feelings of the Others. This 
is the formula of the feminine reversibility principle.  
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II.1- In a Different Voice and Related Studies 
 
In a Different Voice was first published in 1982. It responds to the conclusions 
of the psychological theory of moral development, uder the aegis of Kohlberg.  
 The book aforementioned outlines what people think about morality and about 
themselves. Through listening to people, women and men, girls and boys, the author 
started to hear two different ways of seeing moral p oblems and of resolving them. The 
book explores the interplay between experience, or real life, and thought as an abstract 
way of elaborating and understanding life and its dlemmas. It inquires about the way 
one listens to oneself and to Others and about the stories “we tell about ourselves” 
(Gilligan, 1996:2). Two different perspectives and “different notions of what is of value 
in life” arise, and she associates one with men and another one with women (Ibid., 5).  
Nevertheless, the book clearly describes a different voice not in terms of gender 
specificity or difference but in terms of theme.  
 The book consists of analyses of three different sets of empirical data: the 
college study, the abortion study, and the rights and responsibility study. The first one 
looks into identity and moral development in early adult years. The second study 
explores the interplay between real conflicts in life and abstract ways of thinking about 
problems and the choices available for their resolution. The third study reconsiders the 
hypotheses “(…) concerning different modes of thinking about morality and their 
relation to different views of self  (…)” (Ibid., 3), defined by criteria such as age, social 
class, occupation and level of formal education, by taking male and female samples in 
different moments of the life cycle. 
She starts from Freud’s chauvinist account of differences between men and 
women, which considers that the latter “show less sense of justice” than the former 
mainly because women are unable to resolve the Oedipus complex (In Ibid., 7). 
Gilligan refuses to stop where Freud did and follows Chodorow’s work about 
mothering in order to understand separation in the process of differentiation from the 
mother, which has to happen more abruptly for boys than it usually happens for girls. 
Separation from the mother is the condition for boys to construct masculinity. Girls, 
however, can maintain connection with their mothers without normally compromising 
their sexuality. In Freudian terms or in a male standardised science and society, a failure 
to separate is understood as a failure to develop. What Gilligan inherits from Chodorow 
is the positive construction of what was, until then, understood as a failure. To bolster 
the argument, the author takes the findings from Jean Piaget and Georg Herbert Mead 
about children’s games in middle childhood.  
In a paper of 1979, Gilligan uses the data and conclusions of J. Lever which 
explain better Piaget’s and Head’s findings. Lever observed children’s play and 
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concluded, as Piaget did, that boys’ games last longer than girls’ because when disputes 
arise boys seem to enjoy resolving them as much as t ey enjoy the game itself. Boys 
tend to spend a lot of time discussing, setting up and applying rules. Girls’ inability to 
deal with rules appears as the reason for the comparative brevity of their games. 
Gilligan explains that, for Piaget, “(…) boys [become] increasingly fascinated with the 
legal elaboration of rules and the development of fair procedures for adjudicating 
conflicts (…). However, presumably as a result, he concluded that the legal sense which 
he considered essential to moral development ‘is far less developed in little girls than in 
boys’ (…)” (Gilligan, 1996:10). 
The psychic-social analysis of the differences in boys and girls’ play reflects the 
differences in their upbringing, and reveals that: 1-Masculinity is defined through 
separation from the mother and that femininity does not require the same sort of 
process. “[M]ale gender identity is threatened by intimacy while female (…) by 
separation. Thus, males tend to have difficulties with relationships, while female (…) 
with individuation.” (Ibid., 8)  2- Boys play competitive games more often and their 
games last longer than girls’ do. 3- Boys play toward n establishment of sets of rules 
and procedures to adjudicate conflicts while girls play in a more pragmatic way toward 
the continuation of the relationships, sacrificing the game if necessary. 4- Boys tend to 
prefer more public and larger spaces and groups to play in, while girls usually play in 
private spaces and in smaller groups. 
 Gilligan asks 11 year-olds to resolve “the dilemma of Heinz” to give bones to 
the different voice she is searching for. 
Heinz’ wife is dying from cancer. In his town, a pharmacist had discovered a 
drug that could save his wife’s life. However, Heinz cannot afford to pay it. He tries 
without success to borrow what he needs to buy the drug. Therefore, Heinz considers 
whether he should steal the drug. From the answers of boys and girls to the question 
“should Heinz steal the drug?”, Gilligan hears two different voices being voiced by 
boys and girls.  
Jake responded that Heinz should steal the drug and Amy said he should not do 
so. 
Gilligan analyses these two answers and their reasoning and notices that whereas 
the boy, Jake, thinks in a very formal and logical w y and constructs the dilemma as a 
math equation, Amy, the girl, “failing to see the dilemma as a self-contained problem in 
moral logic” (Ibid, 29), considers the solution in a context of communication, 
relationship and avoiding violent conflict resolution. The author sees “two very 
different moral problems -Jake [sees] a conflict betwe n life and property that can be 
resolved by logical deduction, Amy a fracture of human relationship that must be 
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mended with its own thread” (Ibid., 31). Jake focuses on conflict of rights and Amy on 
failure of response. 
Jake and Amy represent two different strategies for resolving a dilemma 
associated respectively with ladder and web. “Jake’s world is governed by rules, 
principles, hierarchy, and the logic of justification. (…) His method of resolving the 
conflict is to look for abstract rules that determine which interest is more important. (…) 
Jake’s response (…) sees people as isolated individuals competing with each other. (…) 
Amy’s world is one of relationship, interdependence, cooperation, and the ethic of care. 
For her the moral crux in the Heinz’s hypothetical is the druggist detachment from 
Heinz’s wife’s needs. (…) Unlike Jake, who sees respon ibility as negative (refraining 
from injuring others), Amy sees responsibility as positive (responding to the needs of 
others)” (Spiegelman: 1988:247-8).  
In dealing with “issues of exclusion and priority created by choice”, Gilligan 
concludes that while the boy “thinks about what goes first, (…) [the girl] focuses on 
who is left out” (Gilligan, 1996:33). 
According to Gilligan’s assessment of “self-description” boys tend to describe 
themselves in relation to a world that is outside them and that “ defines his character, his 
position, and the quality of his life” (Ibid., 35). Girls tend to define themselves with 
reference to a sense of connection with this world, as well as with Others and herself.  
Through analysing stories produced by men and women, Gilligan concludes that 
men perceive danger in connection, and women in separation. Gilligan uses a picture of 
two acrobats on the trapeze performing high in the air without a safety net. 22% percent 
of the women under observation added the net while only 6% of men did so 
(Gilligan&Polak, 1982:166).  The conclusion which came about was: “While women 
(…) try to change rules in order to preserve relationships, men, in abiding by these 
rules, depict relationships as easily replaced” (Ibid., 44).  
In the college study, Gilligan queries women and men concerning their concept 
of morality and self, by putting the following question: “If you had to say what morality 
meant to you, how would you sum it up?” (Ibid., 64) The common thread of her 
findings is that women tend to understand the preoccupation with not hurting anyone as 
moral duty.  
The college study demonstrates a great difference between women and men’s 
answers, as women’s solutions were founded, most of the time, on feelings of empathy 
and compassion. Whereas women attempt to transform the dilemma in real-life 
situations, men tend to abstract them in order to find in them a principle or rule which 
could be relied on to produce a solution not only i the present, but in the future as well. 
 In the college study, Gilligan discovered two moralities, one she called the 
female morality of responsibility. The other she term d morality of rights which 
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identifies morality with a prescription to achieve fairness in one’s relationships with 
Others: respecting the right of Others, one also protects oneself from interference; if one 
respects Others, then one must be entitled to be respected. She identifies the reciprocity 
principle guiding the moral resolution of problems in relationship with Others and the 
contractual way of regulating those matters as well. The female approach, by contrast, 
identifies moral behaviour with taking care of what the Other thinks and considering it 
important.  
The abortion study offered Gilligan the parameters for her scale of wmen’s 
moral development. The first conclusion is about the evolution of moral resolution from 
a morality of self-sacrifice toward a morality of responsibility for choice. As previously 
noted, Gilligan classifies that evolution as a sign of maturity in women’s moral 
development. Whereas, in the first stage, self-sacrifice was the way for women in the 
abortion conflict-choice situation to remain “moral”, in the following stage the women 
strive for responsibility toward Others involved in the conflict and toward themselves as 
well.  
The second point revealed through the abortion study is that many women 
discover that life is not only “black and white”, and that in situations like abortion and 
euthanasia, for instance, people are indeed confronted with grays with which they have 
to deal. “Criticizing those who emphasize ‘individual rights’ over ‘issues of 
responsibility’, one woman defines the dilemma of abortion as entailing feelings and 
thus resisting the imposition of  ‘a stated hierarchy of beliefs’: ‘Sometimes those 
hierarchies are good, as long as you look at them by themselves, but they fall apart 
when you try to impose them on your decisions. They are not organized somehow to 
deal with real life decisions, and it doesn’t allow much room for responsibility” (Ibid., 
126).   
The resolutions were built in the path of non-violenc  and of care for self and 
Others alike. “Care then becomes a universal injunctio , a self-chosen ethic which, 
freed from its conventional interpretation, leads to a recasting of the dilemma in a way 
that allows the assumption of responsibility for choi e” (Ibid., 90). Gilligan calls that 
solution morality of responsibility. The abortion study also makes clear a conflict 
between femininity and adulthood to the extent thatif one responds positively to the 
patterns of adulthood and its exigencies one has to forget what femininity means. To 
become adult in a world of men entails, for many women, loss of access to compassion, 
love, care for Others, and for self and sensitivity. Soon, women realise that power and 
care do not seem to go together. It is the phenomenn of “getting civilized”. 
 Gilligan quotes the example of a female lawyer who faced a dilemma in her 
work having found a document that could help her adversary. The dilemma is clear 
between the real truth and the formal truth. The former will benefit the adversary and 
 83
concretise a care and love approach. On the other hand, the latter will make her loyal to 
her contractual duties of defending her client. She decided “to adhere to the system” 
(Ibid., 135) at the cost of her own integrity as a moral person, understood in the terms of 
a female morality of care and love. 
 The morality of rights, when equated with an ethic of care and love, makes 
moral solutions extremely hard in cases apparently ver simple and entails opposition to 
the characteristically zero-sum game of procedural legal justice, that leaves no room for 
love, dialogue and web. Thus, there is a moment in the women’s moral development 
when the morality of right imposes itself, for social l fe is structured upon it. Moreover, 
the psychological environment where girls are colonised, or made softer, or brought up, 
is pervasively male, leaving no room, at first glance, for reconciliation and/or dialogue. 
 Gilligan begins to recognise a voice that acknowledges the separation, the 
conflict which arises from the impossibility of assimilating an ethic of rights to one of 
responsibility, by the time women reach early adulthood and the challenge of facing 
professional life and individual life as a socially responsible person. As a consequence 
of the tension between them, Gilligan diagnoses that the impossibility of reconciliation 
yields a sort of passivity and the self-image of being “as ‘a little round jelly bean, sort of 
wandering around, picking up snow here and there, never really sinking with the weight 
of the snow’ ” (Ibid., 143). 
 Care is the practice that informs women’s reasoning a d allows them to escape 
the “jelly or belly (of the bad wolf) condition” or the straightjacket of passivity. When 
morality is identified as a question of care, it gains an ethical weight and relevance for 
many aspect of human life. “‘The moral way to make decisions is by considering as 
much as you possibly can, as much as you know’ (…)” as one of the women of the 
college study sums up one of the aspects of the “method of inclusion” (Ibid., 147). 
Furthermore, the choice will nevertheless always imply responsibility. “When the 
concern with care extends from an injunction not to hurt others to an ideal of 
responsibility in social relationships, women begin to see their understanding of 
relationships as a source of moral strength” (Ibid., 149). 
Gilligan considers the issues of identity connected with moral standpoints, in the 
rights and responsibility study, by asking: “How would you describe yourself to 
yourself?”  She stresses that the women observed were highly successful. Despite that, 
Gilligan concludes that they describe themselves as the relationships they were in. Self-
description appears as relationship description. In ge eral, they did not mention their 
careers as the most important feature of themselves. These women described their 
identities “(…) in the connection of future mother, p esent wife, adopted child or past 
lover”.  That fact is emphasised by Gilligan as very symmetrically paralleling women’s 
moral reasoning as related to caring, as “(…) givin to, helping out, being kind, not 
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hurting (…)”  (Ibid., 159). Moreover, the role of relationship in the experience of men 
and women differs fundamentally. For men, relationship  are placed in a frame of 
individuation and separation as a way to empower th self and to safeguard one’s space 
for self-expression. Women, by contrast, understand relationships within attachment 
and connection where one defines oneself and elaborates one’s moral standpoint. These 
two different ways of resolving conflicts between intimacy and identity demonstrate 
two different moralities. Separation is justified by an ethic of rights through fairness and 
equality which entail a balanced consideration of self and Other. Alternatively, 
attachment is based on a morality of care and responsibility which relies upon the 
understanding of equity, the careful consideration of every single circumstance of a 
given situation, which recognises that needs might differ as people do. Furthermore, 
relationships, as much as care, are constitutive of the relational self or subject in 
Gilligan’s moral theory. 
 Gilligan reconsiders the example of the lawyer to point up that in adulthood, 
where the pervasive male morality or the unavoidable Law of Father reigns, women are 
often troubled. Care and abnegation, the agape, have to be rethought in the context of 
including the self where one takes the risk of being selfish when one decides for oneself 
in a conflict between love and work and love and duty. Women resolve the conflict 
between a morality of rights and a morality of care in adulthood when they renounce the 
selfless posture to consider their own needs vis-à-vis Others. For men, the possible 
reconciliation entails an understanding of the differences between self and Other which 
gives to the principle of equality a more legalistic interpretation. Nonetheless, a man has 
said in the college study: “People have real emotional needs to be attached to something 
and equality doesn’t give you attachment. Equality fractures society and places on every 
person the burden of standing on his own two feet” (Ibid., 167).  
An apposite example on the relational self, which will be repeated in other 
contexts, is about two four-year-olds, a boy and a girl, who wanted to play different 
games. He wanted to play pirates and she wanted to play next-door neighbours. The 
solution for the impasse was given by the girl, who said: “Okay, (…) then you can be 
the pirate that lives next door”.  
Giligan’s analysis of that example is so illuminatig that it is worth quoting at 
length. “By comparing the inclusive solution of combining the games with the fair 
solution of taking turns and playing each game for an equal period, one can see not only 
how the two approaches yield different ways of solving a problem in relationships but 
also how each solution affects both the identity of the game and the experience of the 
relationship.  The fair solution, taking turns, leav s the identity of each game intact. It 
provides an opportunity for each child to experience the Other’s imaginative world and 
regulates the exchanges by imposing a rule based on the premise of equal respect. The 
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inclusive solution, in contrast, transforms both games: the neighbour game is changed 
by the presence of the pirate living next door; the pirate game is changed by bringing 
the pirate into neighbourhood. Each child not only enters the other’s imaginative world 
but also transforms that world by his or her presence. (…) Whereas the fair solution 
protects identity and ensures equality within the context of a relationship, the inclusive 
solution transforms identity through the experience of a relationship. Thus, different 
strategies for resolving conflicts convey different ways of imagining the self, and these 
different forms of self-definition suggest different ways of perceiving connection with 
others” (Gilligan, 1988:9) (My emphasis).  
In the Emma Willard School’s study, of 1980, Gilligan, through interviewing 
girls, discovers “listening” as a recurrent matter addressed by them. They showed a 
keen ability to perceive situations where someone was not able to listen to. Silence and 
voice appear as paths where relationships can be checked and the reality of one’s self 
vis-à-vis the Other is affirmed. Refusal to listen is, indeed, a dehumanising behaviour 
that shows an inability for caring. Dialogue, whilst risking disagreement, is essential to 
adolescent, moral development and self-construction and promotes the possibility of 
reweaving connections and, above all, of recognising true and false relationships. 
The aforementioned study points up the peculiar association between fairness 
and listening. It is peculiar because fairness is commonly understood in relation to 
normal legal and moral reasoning and carries a strong sense of pertaining to the public 
realm of rules and rights. Listening, in its turn, is a conception which evokes a sense of 
close, interpersonal and private relationship, and, i  this sense, it is connected with 
needs. Fairness for the girls is the opportunity to lis en or to be listened to. Doing so, the 
girls convert listening into a profoundly moral issue and fairness into an interpersonal 
phenomenon. “[T]he imperative to hear or respond comes to form the core of the girls’ 
concepts of fairness, (…)”  (Bernstein&Gilligan, 1990:147) . 
Such alchemy is, however, problematic as girls explicitly state that a fair 
solution is often complicated by the demands of listening. To be sensitive to everyone 
involved in a conflict situation will increase the level of uncertainty of deciding upon a 
fair solution. Once the imperative to listen is thecornerstone of the girls’ struggle to 
achieve fairness, the moral dilemma turns into a psychological problem where the clue 
for minimising the uncertainty pointed out is to focus the process of decision in a wide 
process of listening where the self and Other are acknowledged and considered as such. 
The girls’ fight is for being connected in relationship, which is understood as a 
“channel to discovery, an avenue to knowledge” (Ibid., 28). The separation and 
loneliness that the male culture attributes to the destiny of being human do not serve 
women, but rather condemn them to silence, anger, madness, selflessness and serfdom. 
The poor resolution of the fight in girls’ and women’s life is the transformation of real 
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relationships, which could feed them in their hunger for discovery, knowledge and 
growth, into ideal ones, which keep them in the passivity reserved for good women to 
perform in private and public realms alike. At that point, the loss of a voice is 
consummated; the voice is buried deep inside the girls' souls while they grow to 
maturity, meeting the grandmother in the belly of the bad wolf.  
 
II.2- Two Moral Orientations 
 
A better systematisation of the two moralities articulated by Gilligan is available 
in a paper she wrote with Attanucci entitled “Two Moral Orientations: Gender 
Differences and Similarities” (1988a). The parallel between the two moralities was so 
constructed: “A justice [or rights] perspective draws attention to problems of inequality 
and oppression and holds up an ideal of reciprocal rights and equal respect for 
individuals. A care perspective draws attention to problems of detachment or 
abandonment and holds up an ideal of attention and response to need” (1988a:224-225). 
A concern not to treat Others unfairly would fit inthe rights category, whereas a 
preoccupation with not turning away from Others in need would characterise the care 
one. In the care conception, “the moral problem arises from conflicting responsibilities 
rather than from competing rights and requires for its esolution a mode of thinking that 
is contextual and narrative rather than formal and bstract. This conception of morality 
as concerned with the activity of care centers moral development around the 
understanding of responsibility and relationships, ju t as the conception of morality as 
fairness ties moral development to the understanding of rights and rules” (Gilligan, 
1996:19). 
Whereas the morality of rights emphasises the isolation or autonomy of the self 
and gives rise to an ethic of rules and principles, the morality of care is founded on the 
primacy of relationships, attachment and response to needs in a particular situation. 
Methodologically speaking, a morality of rights requires an analytic logic and finds its 
standpoints through analysing hypothetical dilemmas and constructing rules, whereas an 
ethic of responsibility is sustained by a contextual understanding of relationships where 
the drama of the conflict arises and finds its resolution as a fact of real life. 
A tension between the two moralities is diagnosed concerning the moral position 
itself and the understanding of the self vis-à-vis relationships. Separation and 
detachment as conditions to construct any principle of quality within the morality of 
rights are themselves moral problems in the care pespective. Similarly, the particular 
consideration of one’s needs, as prerequisite in a responsive morality, is forbidden in the 
morality of rights. Furthermore, in the care orientation, attachment is not viewed as a 
residue of early childhood, but defines the human condition and establishes that equality 
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is not always the sufficient condition to overcome inequality (Gillian&Wiggins, 
1988:119-120). 
Gilligan and Attanucci explore the possibility of a “bi-focal” category expressed 
by a Care-Justice (or Care-Rights) perspective which is identified as a tendency 
observed in both men and women using simultaneously the two different moralities 
(1988a:233). They developed further this idea in another paper entitled Reply to 
Vasudev, and explained that just as the sexes are not opposite, rights and care are also in 
a different relationship with each other. In this sen e, one could talk about caring rights 
and inappropriate or wrong care, what suggests that a possible interplay between them 
is likely to be verified.  
They focus on a third category called “Care-Justice”, which has a 
complementary function regarding the two fundamental categories of Care and Justice. 
The third category maintains that both perspectives ar  to be found in the repertoire of 
human social and moral organisation. The Care-Rights ca egory appears as a response 
to Kohlberg’s marginalisation of the morality of care to regulate personal conflicts. Care 
holds a privatistic aspect while the rights approach  serves the public domain of the 
social, political and legal organisation or institutional life. Nonetheless, the formulation 
of the two moralities offers the opportunity of enlarging the possibilities for moral 
reasoning, creating two interchangeable systems on bei g moral and conducting 
institutional and legal life. 
 
III- Gilligan’s Paradigmatic Shift 
 
Gilligan has been declared the radical “deconstructe ” of moral philosophy and 
moral development theory, more particularly, because she challenges in a very essential 
way the normality of the equation between the human, the male and the female. Gilligan 
calls into question the age-old foundations of Christian-western society that live on in 
post-modern times.  The implications for law may be inspiring insofar as she suggests 
that a language of rights and duties can be challenged by a language of human needs 
and moral responsibility as caring for Others. Gilligan’s work suggests a new 
framework for moral philosophy, legal theory, theory of the moral and knowing 
subject53, methodology, epistemology and for the wholeness of s cial sciences. 
Moreover, her exposure of the absence of women from moral theory offers an 
“alternative conception of scientific analysis” (Hekman, 1995:3/5). So, what follows is 
a presentation of the paradigmatic shift Gilligan’s work entails. 
  
                                                
53 It refers to one who knows, the subject of knowledge or the epistemic subject in Benhabib’s 
formulation (1990:206-208). 
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III.1- The Relational Self 
 
The fundamental point in Gilligan’s theory on women’s moral development 
theory is the creation of a duality which intends to challenge the traditional, unitary, 
Kantian and universalistic moral. The subject of the moral action is multi-faceted and 
contextually determined, profoundly different from the autonomous Kantian moral 
subject who searches for ultimate and absolute truths to be intersubjectively verified. 
The moral Kantian subject is also an epistemic one, who knows from the same 
autonomous position. Gilligan’s moral subject is, as well, an epistemic one, contextually 
determined and preoccupied with particularities inserted in relationships.  
The relational subject of science will methodologically treat its source, matters 
and especially findings in an interpretative way in order to make science a body of 
knowledge able to influence human life. In Gilligan’s work it is “(…) impossible to 
separate questions of substance from questions of method (…)” (Ibid., 8). She 
prescribes human connection instead of formal agreement as the language that responds 
to the challenges of human survival in an aggressiv market society. Her morality of 
care and its relational self indicate a breach of the justice/autonomous self conception as 
the principle under which all morality, legal reasoning and science should be developed. 
The relational self is the one who listens first, and argues in the endeavour to 
understand, to transform, and eventually to advance and equate dissonant positions or 
ideas. The process of listening and responding is opposed to the application of rules and 
principles which “function to separate us from each other” (Noddings, 1986:5). 
 
III.1.1- Affective Imagination as an Epistemological Tool of the Relational Self 
 
The relational self never speaks from the veil of ignorance, since under its 
conditions the Other disappears (Benhabib, 1994:90). The veil of ignorance is 
characterised by mutual disinterest, whilst the moral and political actions and decisions 
of the relational self derive from a profound attachment and bonding with Others and 
their circumstances. The reversibility principle that Gilligan hears in the female voice 
cannot function under a veil of ignorance. Women’s reversibility principle consists of 
the ability to put oneself into Other’s situation, and assume Other’s way of 
understanding that specific situation. Gilligan calls it “affective imagination”: “the 
ability to enter into and understand through taking o  and experiencing the feelings of 
Others” in their own terms (Gilligan&Wiggins, 1988:120). Affective imagination as a 
moral ability is also a tool for knowledge.  
The affective imagination, by using the reversibility principle, requires more 
than the ability for empathy. In truth, this principle, in the female voice, as showed by 
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Gilligan, requires a capacity of self suppression, i.e., the capacity to see the Other 
without one’s pre-conceptions, prejudices, without personal feelings. This is required 
for one to be able to receive the Other, hear and respond to him in his own terms.  
“I need to apprehend the Other’s reality not as I would feel it in their shoes but 
as they feel it (…). This is close to what María Lugones calls ‘playful world travel’, 
through which one can learn to love cross-culturally nd cross-racially. It involves being 
able to go into the world of another quite different from our own without trying to 
conquer or destroy it (men’s idea of play) (…)” (Hoagland, 1992:249). 
 
III.2- The Methodological Advancement 
 
 The paradigmatic shift is based upon the creation and empowerment of a moral 
self that is relational and equates morality with particulars, in opposition to an 
autonomous self. 
 The paradigmatic shift that Gilligan seems to suggest happens also in the way 
she methodologically constructs her theory. Gilligan says: “There is no data 
independent of theory, no observations not made from a perspective. Data alone do not 
tell us anything; they do not speak, but are interpreted by people” (1986:328). 
Furthermore, she says, when defending herself about making assumptions not 
confirmed by her data: “The (…) question is what constitutes data and what data are 
sufficient to support the claims I have made. To claim that there is a voice different 
from those which psychologists have represented, I need only one example –one voice 
whose coherence is not recognized within existing iterpretive schemes” (Kerber, 
1986:328) (My emphasis). 
 Gilligan participates in a changing paradigm of scien es, where “all scientific 
knowledge (…) [aims] at becoming common sense. Commn sense is characterized by 
collapsing cause and intention, (…) is practical and pragmatic, it is self-evident and 
transparent, as well as superficial, but for this reason also capable of capturing 
complexity (…), and (…) it is rhetorical and metaphorical ‘it does not teach, it 
persuades’ ” (Petersen, 1994: 28/9).  
 Hekman delineates Gilligan’s method as follows: first, the central position of 
narratives at the costs of empirical and objective data. Second, the impartiality and 
distance of the researcher is abandoned in favour of a relational method which 
approximates researcher and object. Third, the relation l method is hermeneutical in the 
sense that the results are interpretative and are marked by the researcher’s own 
experience and truth. Fourth, the new method is political and engaged. The 
methodological paradigmatic shift consists of  “a move from an objectivist method to a 
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relational one, from the search for factual data to the collection of stories, from a 
detached, ‘scientific’ approach to a committed (…) one” (Hekman, 1995:21). 
Furthermore, Gilligan’s paradigmatic proposes a re-enchantment of life in its 
social aspect. When Gilligan clearly challenges the autonomous self, disenchanted by 
the new conceptions established by modernity, she somehow elicits a return to a 
conception of an enchanted human life, no longer dominated by nature, (as were the 
Greeks), but by a relational self able to displace  conception of justice limited by law, 
rules, rights, principles of equality and impartiali y and egotistic understandings of 
reciprocity and reversibility. The relational self sees beyond the veil of ignorance 
through the enchanted power of relationships and their constraints of caring, nurturing 
and responsibility in a context of almost pure particularity. 
  
III.3- Challenging the Public/Private Dichotomy 
 
 Gilligan is also a catalyst in another revolution n culture about the discussion of 
what the public has to do with the private and the personal in as much as the personal 
and private have become objects of public and impersonal regulation and production 
(Nicholson, 1983:526). Gilligan turns away from a publicist discussion of women’s 
issues and places the private along with the public, thereby reinforcing the conviction 
that the classical opposition between public and private is in decline. It is a revolution in 
the understanding of what is of value in life.  
Gilligan introduces the private feminine thought into a very much public 
discussion of moral standpoints or moral development, moving toward an imaginative 
practice, which could provoke the debunking of the patriarchy through “undoing men’s 
disconnection from women and women’s dissociation fr m themselves” (1994:31). She 
provokes a revolution just introducing women in their own terms into an exclusively 
male realm.  
The paradigmatic shift proposed by Gilligan offers the challenge and the 
possibility of the mutual conviviality between the two selves –the autonomous and the 
relational-, insofar as the male and the female, th public and the private also need to 
come to terms. The re-enchantment of the world happens by the re-insertion of the 
private, the domestic, the personal, the particular, and their implications of care in the 
public realm of social human life, from where they are absent as standards of goodness.  
The re-insertion that Gilligan suggests has the power to blur the limits that 
oppositions, such as public/private, draw in human co sciousness. “When incorporated 
into legal discourse they induce beliefs that existing social arrangements are just, 
natural, inevitable, legitimate, thereby denying our capacity of conceiving of new forms 
of human relations and to challenge existing forms of domination. (…) The solution is 
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to transcend the public/private divide, transforming both family and market, and 
simultaneously transcending the male/female dichotomy (…)” (Rose, 1990:63/4). 
For Derrida, in Seidman’s and Scott’s words, the binary oppositions that 
underpin western thought, in an effort “to establish foundations”, must be deconstructed 
since they are “arbitrary, unstable, (…) reversible [and] conceal a will to power” 
(1995:4/8-9 & 1995:286). 
A paradigmatic shift is indicated insofar as the relational self acts in and upon 
the public with the tools he collects privately. The relational self walks against the 
stream by transforming the public into private when the movement is about the 
publicisation of the private. He speaks the language of the particular, of the private in a 
contextual framework and stresses its form and its content. Once one accepts the 
relational self as a valid paradigm, the political, moral, legal and epistemic conditions 
are established for many different voices to come together in a conversation about 
anything. The autonomous subject no longer holds the privileged place of ruling the 
public life, especially in a historical moment when the public invaded the private and 
reached a point where the counter movement of the private that regulates the public is 
unavoidable. 
 The public invasion into the private brought to the latter the language of rights 
especially in the public way of being feminist. The claim for rights is the avenue 
through which women’s liberation has grown. That movement promoted the language 
of rights in relationships. This thesis urges the opposite: the realisation that persons are 
much more than their rights and that one should try to forget about rights in solving 
disputes in a public realm of impersonal relationship .  
 
III.4- Caring is a Relational Moral Value – The Relational Self is Feminine 
 
Gilligan’s theory re-installs a very special moral quality to the conception of 
care. Care for Others in relationships as morally relevant creates an alternative for 
understanding moral attitudes, and affects law in a very interesting way. Re-connection, 
in order to overcome the problems of separation, entails a caring approach and makes 
the whole enterprise moral. The caring approach requi s contextual knowledge and an 
attitude of comprehension of the Other and his needs at odds with a language of rights 
and rules. Moreover, it entails the insertion of the Other in a relationship which gives to 
him the condition of being considered, heard and cared in his own terms. Care eases the 
erasure of the Other made by a morality of rights and makes possible the total 
conveyance of self and Other, impossible in the ethics of alterity. 
Gilligan enlarged the conception of moral theory, by adding anew trend/ 
different voice to it and thus she made woman present in ethics with a model of an 
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alternative moral epistemology which can be articulated as  “a very different way of 
identifying and appreciating the forms of intelligenc  which define responsible moral 
consideration; (…) deployed in shared processes of discovery, expression, 
interpretation, and adjustment between persons (…).  [It means] attention to the 
particular; a way of constructing morally relevant u derstandings which is ‘contextual 
and narrative’; a picture of deliberation as a site of expression and communication” 
(Walker, 1992:166). That alternative moral knowledg is an understanding which can 
be characterised as “a collection of perceptive, imaginative, appreciative, and expressive 
skills and capacities which put and keep us in unimpeded contact with the realities of 
ourselves and specific others” (Ibid., 170). Therefo , morality is no longer understood 
only within the kingdom of the self. It entails an i quiry about self and Other in 
relationships.  
By enlarging moral theory, Gilligan also demonstrated he resilience of moral 
systems when it follows a feminine inspiration. Female resilience, when faced with the 
loss of relationships, in trying to save and keep them as a moral duty, enables the 
system to perform a fail-safe mechanism. Again, one se s the great intimacy between 
content and method, substance and form. The moral substance of female morality is also 
its moral form or the way it performs its own reality. 
In sum, Gilligan succeeded in offering women, in the words of Virginia Woolf, 
a way of “finding new words and creating new methods” for their liberation, for the 
sake of the whole humanity and their own (Kerber at alli, 1986:509). Gilligan described 
“care and justice as two moral perspectives that organize both thinking and feelings and 
empower the self to take different kinds of action in public as well as private life” (Ibid., 
527). Gilligan had the courage to call into question the publicization of the private and 
to stress the value of the private, claiming that te public needs now to suffer a deep 
privatization through a feminine voice in the name of “the future of life on this planet” 
(Ibid., 532). 
 
IV- Problems in What Gilligan Suggests 
 
 Gilligan’s book In a Different Voice provoked discussion and controversy. 
Nonetheless, in Benhabib words, the controversy wasnon-acrimonious, due to the 
intrinsic elegance of Gilligan’s style and conclusions. Once more, content and 
methodology were deeply interwoven (Benhabib, 1992:178). 
 Gilligan’s findings stimulated a vast response, however one could systematise all 
the criticism under two general headings related to the feminist discussion and the moral 
theory respectively: essentialism and moral relativism. In addition to those two main 
themes, one could still consider criticism against Gilligan’s methods of surveying her 
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data and interpreting it: an epistemic one about the rigid dualism in which Gilligan’s 
findings are presented, which caused problems of practical translation of her 
conclusions; and a political one regarding the liberal features of her theory, which is 
built upon a self who cares, a somewhat choosing self. N vertheless, Gilligan’s ethic of 
care does not occupy itself with the construction of a self. It rather deconstructs the 
modernist self who is unable to respond to the Other. H r morality of care is not a 
morality of the self but a morality of the Other. Finally, one must address a general 
criticism against the wideness of the ethics of care especially regarding its apparently 
inapplicability to strangers. This is, nevertheless, a false limitation and Gilligan’s 
“method of inclusion” is powerful enough to allow her findings to be extended in order 
to include strangers in the web of care. Gilligan theorises for the public that highlights 
the virtue of the private. 
   
IV.1-Gilligan as an Essentialist 
 
 It has been said that Gilligan’s thesis undermines women’s agency despite her 
intention to give colours of dignity to a supposed f male essential characteristic of 
nurturing, when putting a feminine tendency to care t the top of a hierarchy of moral 
values (Hoagland, 1992:246). That criticism comes from the understanding that the 
exclusion of women from political and social expression, or the female absence and 
silence in the public realm, is represented by the domestic feminine site where women 
are treated as property.  
Gilligan’s findings about a different voice, as a female voice of nurturing and 
caring for others different from the one marked by competition and isolation, 
characteristic of male discourse, has been critically associated with the famous Sears 
case,54 as the inspiration that justified a judgement against women. In this case, “judges 
used feminist theorists’ [-historians Alice Kessler-Harris and Rosalind Rosenberg-] 
expert testimony [-on opposites sides] about gender differences and their ‘separate 
spheres’ ideology to justify sex-based disparity that kept women in lower paying, non-
commission sales jobs” (Bender, 1990:5). The Sears lawyers used the testimony of 
Rosalind Rosenberg to corroborate their thesis that women are different from men. The 
former are more nurturing and disinterested in competitive jobs like the best-paid 
commission sales jobs. The judge accepted this argument and declared legally 
acceptable Sears’ practice of keeping women in non-commission sales jobs. The 
criticism, nevertheless, loses sight of the real problem that the Sears case exemplifies. 
The problem seems to be in the way the judicial practice of law or justice hears or does 
                                                
54 It refers to Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) v. Sears, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). 
Chapter I discusses this case. The best article about this case was written by Ruth Milkman: “Women’s 
history and the Sears case”, Feminist Studies 12 (Summer 1986). 
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not hear, ignores and considers arguments and storie . Scott considers: “In cross-
examination, Kessler-Harris’ multiple interpretations were found to be contradictory 
and confusing, although the judge praised Rosenberg for her coherence and lucidity” 
(1995:291). The unitary voice and linear reasoning is privileged in the dispensing of 
justice that is profoundly male and attentive only to the coherence of the arguments 
used. Rosenberg used this linear reasoning in her testimony, made in favour of Sears 
which is praised by judges, and supported by the judicial style of reading realities. 
Consequently, the criticism that says that the cultura  feminism of difference 
(like Gilligan’s) is not emanciptory and leads to ess ntialism has to acknowledge that 
the theory demands a previous reformulation of the rationality in force. The 
appropriation of feminine truths by male rationality betrays the sincerity of the insertion 
of the feminine into social life. The use of Gilligan’s findings by Sears defence and its 
acceptance by the court, which accrues to the defeat of many women interested in a 
commission sale’s job, shows how morally sick the rationality against which Gilligan 
speaks is. The cultural feminism of difference and especially Gilligan’s version imposes 
a reformulation of western rationality which informs the re-definition of justice.  
It has been said that the essentialism of the ethics of care “ignores the 
significance of political obligation” (Bartlett, 1992:85) or appears to “perpetuate (…) 
the status quo, affirms the established division of labour, and forecloses on the 
possibility of a radical transformation” (Houston&Diller, 1993:374). The care tendency 
is inherent to the private and the domestic, and, when used in any level of any 
relationship, it leads women to a position of inferiority and submission, by making them 
incapable of fighting for their rights and for political and social survival and expression. 
Furthermore, Gilligan’s different voice is not liberating; it legitimises and perpetuates 
women’s inferiority, says Tronto (In Hekman, 1995:23). 
Tronto’s criticism does not acknowledge that Gilligan’s argument speaks about 
a “different voice” not about the voice of all women. Tronto also does not perceive how 
the private, domestic, quality of the ethics of care can work in public realms, as a way to 
support women’s rights.  
Gilligan’s feminism belongs to the privatistic branch of feminist theory as a 
reaction to the inability of publicist women’s liberation to inquire upon the nature of the 
feminine. Gilligan’s findings, concerning a different moral voice based in a specific way 
of being feminine, offer a new avenue through which women’s liberation reconciles 
public and private conquests. The reinsertion of a privatistic image of women with 
dignity in the public realm permeates and transforms it into an order where care can be 
another valid way to inform relationships between strangers.  Moreover, essentialism is 
another way for women to survive and put forth the search for the feminine. 
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“[T]here is always the danger in any struggle for liberation that the oppressed 
class will accept too much of the dominant picture and thereby forfeit its soul and lose 
the real depth of the contribution it could make to a new society” (Hardwig, 1984:449). 
Gilligan calls attention to this danger in the path of the public branch of feminist 
movements and proposes another framework for impersonal and/or public relationships. 
The semantics of care, whilst recalling the familial environment, aspires to public 
encounters among strangers and aims at establishing a discourse of friendship which 
could enable attention and responsibility for the Other in his own terms. Can everyone 
be my friend? Can I care for the Other whom I have never met before? Negative 
answers justify the establishment of a discourse of rights and rules to perform justice. 
The morality of care offers positive answers to those questions as a moral duty in an 
ethic of responsibility in relationships, based on the practice of affective imagination. 
There is no stranger that cannot be a friend through such practice55. The morality of care 
through the practice of affective imagination can expand Gilligan’s “method of 
inclusion”, as an approach of solving problems when valuing relationships, and 
demanding institutional will to publicise the private aspects of the ethics of care 
(Houston, 1993:113) and to perform a post-modernist “idea and practice of justice that 
is not linked to that of consensus”, equality or impartiality (Lyotard, 1995:37). 
Besides, the criticism of essentialism comes from the post-modernist reading of 
feminist questions. The association between feminis and post-modernism is 
considered a liaison dangereuse, says Hutchinson. “ (…) [S]ome maintain that feminists 
‘cannot afford not to be essentialist’” because they say that a non-essentialist position 
will weaken the political position of feminism in ac demic and legal milieus where the 
dominant patriarchy dictates the articulation of forces. Gilligan’s awareness of that 
danger results in her elaboration of a theory that responds to Kolhberg’s essentialist 
male biased moral theory. The refusal of the postmodernist inspiration can incorrectly 
make Gilligan’s theory an “exemplar of modernist feminist inquiry and critique”. 
Gilligan is rather a strong voice against the separation project sustained by an isolated 
self that characterises modernity. Gilligan does not pr duce a metanarrative; instead, 
she presents a compelling argument against the male “archimedian or ahistorical 
standpoint from which (…) [one] understands the human ind, knowledge, society and 
history” (Seidman, 1995:5). 
Gilligan’s position obviously presents difficulties for a postmodernist approach, 
despite their common adversary, namely the abstract, universal, male and modernist 
rationality. The resolution of those impasses is offered by the enormous amount of 
“localised disturbance” that Gilligan’s different voice can provoke when inserted in a 
project that should be qualified as “deconstrutivis”. The potential for opposition of her 
                                                
55 See footnote 1 of Chapter VIII. 
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theory in western traditional philosophy does not allow space for an essential, universal, 
ahistoric, transcendental, impersonal, abstract or disembodied self. Her theory offers a 
real possibility for the Other to decentre/deconstruct the self. Her theory has the aim of 
deconstructing the male rationality for the acknowledgement of the Other in general and 
not only the Otherness of women.  
 
IV.2- Gilligan and Moral Relativism  
 
The philosophical criticism sees in Gilligan’s moral theory a serious threat to 
morals as such since she sails very close to moral rel tivism. The proximity to 
relativism comes from Gilligan’s coherentist conception of truth and method, expressed 
in her understanding and practice of constructing her theory on women’s moral 
development, which considers that theories constitute the evidence they examine. The 
resolution of that sort of coherentist approach employs a very different methodology. 
That methodology was born of the criticism and refutation of the classical empiricism 
applied in behaviourist psychology. Moreover, that alternative methodology can be 
identified as contextual relativism.   
  Gilligan develops a morality of virtues which cannot be accommodated with any 
attempt of universalisation. The decision in abstract upon what is good and bad cannot 
be possible in a morality of care, insofar as autonomous thinking is not a possible 
female way of moral reasoning.56 The apparent relativism is not about the same values 
in a given dilemma, but the way to discover in that situation what is of value.  
Gilligan consciously avoids any kind of Aristotelian or communitarian ethics. 
She represents a very powerful voice defending a new moral language altogether and its 
harmonisation with the language of rights. To achieve this, Gilligan argues for a 
asymmetrical moral theory based upon an intrinsic arti ulation between the languages 
present in the earlier years of childhood where separation and connection define the 
social-sexual role for a person.  
Gilligan’s paradigmatic revolution comes from the fringes, the margins of moral 
theory. It challenges the normal science of universalism and autonomy and unveils an 
alternative in the feminine, in the private, in the p rsonal, without rejecting the tension 
between the different and the old.   
Gilligan challenges the western male desire for a unitary conception of truth and 
morals, and suggests a dualism or pluralistic model, (not a relativist one) wherein the 
articulation between the moralities offers conditions for a new practice. That resolution 
seems not to fit in a purely theoretical approach, since it requires a competent 
                                                
56 Ironically, says Baier (1987:50), Gilligan in a way proves Kant right about it not being possible for 
women to think autonomously. 
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articulation of different practices, in as many fields of social-human life as possible. In 
fact, Gilligan does not appear to succeed in her att mpts to establish a theoretical basis 
to harmonise two apparently incompatible moral voices. Therefore, the problem of 
dualism remains unresolved and its resolution demands more than a mere moral 
hermeneutics towards a practice of reflexiveness and rematerialization. The practice of 
achieving legal justice demands a methodological approach (reflexive and procedural) 
in order to overcome an unwelcome moral relativism and to insert effectively the 
feminine into the masculine, the private into the public. Let us explore Gilligan’s 
potential contribution to law. 
 
V- Gilligan and the Law 
 
Law is not to be applicable in all human relationship . Quite the contrary, law 
selects very specific sorts of relationships that are of legal interest: law defines law. 
Furthermore, the publicisation of life means exactly that law is widening its field of 
application and simultaneously shaping morality when law becomes the language of 
personal relationships, thereby suggesting urgently that the language of the personal 
should urgently shape the public. Then, let care encompass law and claim for a critical 
consideration of the transformation of the limits and functions of the private vis-à-vis 
the public. Moreover, such encompassing process entails a task hitherto neglected by 
legal theory.  
 Humanity is left in the crossroad of life where moral and law have a long 
conversation to try to fix boundaries between them, where justice and law are not the 
same. How can Gilligan’s morality of responsibility encompass law and transform it for 
the challenges of that sort of justice in concrete life? “Gilligan’s work offers valuable 
tools to use in rebuilding the house of law –altering its structure, content, and practice. 
In using these tools, we must not forget –in fact we ought to celebrate- their basis in 
gender differences and women’s gender culture” (Bender, 1990:36). 
Separation is placed in the development of the modernist conceptions of reason, 
state, civil society, division of power, and scienc. Law was required to leave the realm 
of morality and gain wider grounds to legitimate th social organisation of the modern 
state and the division between the private and the public spheres of life. The emergence 
of the state could not be accommodated within the limits of a so-called historical 
conception of justice, which was in the foundations f a legal thought solely applied to 
private transactions.   
Law separates from morality in order to perform its regulatory function and 
modern law had to acknowledge two different realms of ocial life, the private and the 
public. This thesis re-thinks law in order to elect the ideal conditions for access to 
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justice, in which justice is to be achieved beyond the reductive effects of law and tries to 
re-define the tense co-existence between public and private social human and legal life. 
It proposes the re-emergence of the private when one deals with public issues in the 
same way women talk in the kitchen, in the private way, as a possibility to respond to 
the Other in his own terms, since the findings of the ethics of alterity regarding the 
Other are awaiting a legal response through the path of care.  
 
V.1- The Challenge of the Other – A Possibility for Law Through Care 
 
The morality of care brings to law a possibility to realise justice in the Other’s 
terms by understanding the role of care and responsibility in relationships, through 
affective imagination and the method of inclusion, which can make the Other 
accessible.  
The morality of care elaborates a conception of justice that challenges the 
traditional idea of justice as an ideal aim of fairness and righteousness, expressed in 
bringing the scales into balance again. Furthermore, justice becomes a poor virtue if the 
aim is to right the wrong because, in many situations in life and law, the wrong is 
unexpungible, ineradicable. Justice, in those cases, would have a very different quality 
and demand a particular approach. The path of care dislocates justice from the 
constraints of legal rules and contracts and understand justice as the capacity of 
equating the various needs and aspirations in a relationship which faces conflict; justice 
is identified with the solution of a dilemma that considers all the particularities in a 
relationship regardless what rules, rights or legalistic arguments say. Justice is not only 
personal, but it has a public connotation in Gilligan’s theory when she discovers the 
“web” as a female way to articulate solutions for cnflicts. The web requires that the 
terms of a solution enclose as much as possible, pouring out from the limits of the 
personal basic relationship, to create many more oth r connections. This web consists of 
persons, relationships and arguments. In this way, justice gains a warmth not present in 
rules, rights or law and becomes inclusive, comprehensive, and not reductive like law. 
Justice does not isolate, but rather involves everybod  in a unified effort to understand 
and overcome differences. 
Law makes the Other just a bearer of rights and can not build and maintain 
relationships because they are not legal preoccupations in themselves and do not reduce 
behaviours to roles and rules.  
The relevant loss for the moral crisis of law is the loss of the Other as such 
which is expressed by the imposition upon him of lega  sameness. Sameness was the 
abstract response to handle the challenge of the Otr.  To keep the Other as Other in 
his particularity requires a plasticity beyond law.  
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A feminist moral theory, which stresses a different feminine voice, must 
acknowledge the difficulties of such a voice when finding a comfortable place in legal 
syntaxes. Gilligan’s theory, then, comes to law with the bias that was the first 
motivation for her own work, a bias that has coloured all the history of philosophy and 
moral theory alike. “Jean Piaget wrote: ‘The most superficial observation is sufficient to 
show that (…) the legal sense is far less developed in little girls than in boys’” (Kerber 
et al., 1986:310).  
After having overcome equality subtle difficulties persist because fairness 
remains as another legal principle. Fairness is not care, because fairness requires a level 
of abstraction that prevents care. The relational self as the subject of a contextual 
understanding of the conflict will be in a position f hearing the Other and responding 
to him in his own terms. Contextuality, within whic responsibility to Others and self 
brings about morality and justice and inserts them into the realm of law, tames law and 
dyes justice with the colours of life. 
The individualist self in the path of care is not opp sed to the altruist one, but to 
the relational one, which is not accepted in law and its legal proceedings, as Conley and 
O’Barr report. They mention the example of Mrs. Rawls hom “the judge described 
(…) as a crazy old lady whom the law could not help. Her difficulties with the court had 
to do with the fact that she was unable to structure her problems according to the 
template of law. Her logic was not that of law. She could not separate the hedge, the 
property line, and the concept of ownership from the complexities of social relations, 
unneighbourly neighbours, and twenty years of bad feelings ” (1998:76).  
To take a relational litigant into full account, the authors suggest, would demand 
that the judge would be prepared to listen and ask for all the details of the relationship, 
trying not to apply law in case of violation of rights or breaching of rules, but to 
acknowledge the here-now to consider the past and to look to the future in order to 
mend the web, the net and relationships. The judge would have to be a relational self 
trained in Gilligan’s “method of inclusion” and affective imagination. This kind of 
justice is justice as care according to Gilligan and her appreciation of female ways of 
resolving disputes.  
Can law be contextual and caring for the particular?  Can law be caring without 
taking rights in its stilling and reductive effects? Is law able to consider relationships? If 
so, then the autonomy may be displaced in the name of justice as care: friendship over 
certainty, love over security, solidarity over the rule of law, singular feelings and 
emotions over generality, decency over legality. This displacement is similar to the one 
made by the businessman when refused law and legalistic arguments in order to 
preserve a relationship that was of value for him.  
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The ethics of alterity unveils the tension and changes the equation between self 
and the Other. Once the self looks at the eyes of the Other he is caught up by the Other, 
he is made responsible for the Other. This look reveals the Otherness and it obligates 
more than any law. In fact, the law reduces responsibilities and obligations, stills 
expectations and defeats the Other and the relationship through  connecting 
responsibilities with elements outside the relationship 
Finally, morality of care offers to law, as rational, objective and principled, the 
challenge to become irrational, subjective and particular, which is, doubtless, a problem 
beyond any legal or moral theory. The resolution of the apparent incompatibility is left 
for the realm of practice, which is understood as access to justice or the life of law. 
Difficulties in equating law and the morality of care seem to explain the separation 
between law and justice as a moral virtue whose resolution requires a practical stance.  
 
V.2- Responsibility as the Demand of the Other  
 
 Derrida argues that justice exists beyond law, as something wider, bigger than 
law. He considers justice not deconstructible in itself whereas the deconstruction of law 
is possible through justice. “He concludes that even though deconstruction [of law 
through justice] may seem like a move to irresponsibility, it actually entails an increase 
in responsibility” (In Hekman, 1995:140-141). Responsibility is another challenge 
Gilligan puts to legal discussion. The concept of responsibility developed by female 
morality is fundamental if law is to encompass a morality of care, thereby 
deconstructing a morality of rights through justice, as a practice. Moreover, the legal 
understanding of responsibility needs further improvement along with Gilligan’s 
findings. 
 Responsibility, for Gilligan, is the essence of moral decision and can hold two 
different meanings depending on the sort of morality one is inserted into and the self-
image one has of oneself. Thus, responsibility can be either “commitment to 
obligations”, in a morality of rights or “responsiveness in relationships” in the ethics of 
care. Responsibility in a care approach is at odds with legal concepts which entail 
always an “ascription” or “imputation” on a detached and isolated self. It is also 
contrary to responsibility in the morality of rights, which entails contractual reciprocity, 
clearly at odds with any understanding of love and care.   
 
V.2.1- Responsibility Without Relationship 
 
Ricoeur, when analysing the contemporary concept of responsibility, registers 
that it carries an idea of obligation to compensate or to suffer a punishment. 
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Nevertheless, this concept has suffered a profound e largement following the 
complexity of the technological society. The legal rules of contract or statutes are now 
replaced for an objective concept of responsibility, i.e., responsibility without causation, 
without agent, without guilt. Responsibility exists only because damage has been 
provoked. This enlargement of the concept of responibility has been so meaningful that 
Ricouer identifies in it a quality of principle, already elaborated as so by Levinas and 
Hans Jonas (2000:11). The reality of acting under th  protection of insurance is the new 
face of responsibility: it is the responsibility without self neither Other, just an insurance 
policy that covers a number of pre-determined events. Despite the infinite possibilities 
of events to be covered by an insurance policy, it will not however cover cases which 
fall outside its provisions. Thus, the satisfaction of one’s needs which emerge from an 
ascribed or imputable event is still conditioned by contractual rules, privately (contract) 
or publicly established. The necessity to respond t needs, whether directed provoked or 
not, has, paradoxically, created new strategies to avoid responsibility or duty to respond. 
The contemporary understanding of responsibility has been developed into a growing 
sophistication towards impersonal responses. It is one more commodity available in the 
market. Responsibility in the global market, contrary to what Ricoeur seems to suggest, 
is still conceived in the realm of ascription and imputability but it happens now in an 
impersonal way. The transference of responsibility, as a comfortable commodity of the 
market, does not respond to needs because it does not listen, it does not even ask for 
them, just objectively checks the facts, the damage and reads policies. Since causality is 
diffuse, responsibility can no longer be based upon it a d insurance policies are suitable 
for that.  It assures certainty, a praised legal value, and limits, re-directs and 
impersonalises responsibility, sometimes very much broadened by law, in its endeavour 
to set up the protection of weak parties to a contract. Ricoeur offers a diagnosis on a 
current demoralisation of imputation and ascription i  contemporary legal 
responsibility. Accordingly, the current movement seems to deepen the moral decay of 
law. Gilligan offers a view to give legal and moral practice to responsibility as a 
principle. It is a moral exercise of legal responsibility beyond the letter of rules and 
contracts in the name of the continuity of relationships and in response to needs of the 
Other.  
 
V.2.2- Responsibility in the Female Path of Moral Development x The Male Legal 
Version 
 
Gilligan says: “The essence of moral decision is the exercise of choice and the 
willingness to accept responsibility for that choice” (Gilligan, 1996:67). Gilligan claims 
that the path of responsibility and care is the path of moral development and 
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psychological maturity for women.  Women’s responsibility is an evolving process that 
follows a pace of moral development intrinsically connected with self-discovery. The 
rise of responsibility does not happen in an external relationship despite being caused by 
one. Responsibility is an inner feeling brought by the sense of Otherness; it is 
profoundly moral and deeply feminine. To develop a sense or feeling of responsibility is 
an inner challenge for women in their moral development: to gain the sense of 
Otherness, capacity of responding, without losing oeself. It is a kind of awareness that 
is a permanent background to moral, social and legal behaviours, and it is solely due to 
the epistemic condition of the moral subject who has choice, and knows the terms of 
choice; who is the decision-maker in a given situaton.  
Thus, that responsibility, which exists without external cause and requires only 
the hypothetical possibility of choice, supports a notion of indiscriminate care, or care 
for all.  
The legal conception of responsibility is, by contras , entirely male, and has a 
more external quality that is attributable due to disconnected, separated and isolated 
selves. A contract or an external relationship is required for a background for 
responsibility to arise. It is connected with liability and the ability to repair a damage 
caused by a fact ascribed to its subject. Thus, responsibility is the consequence of a 
causal chain or causal agency where fact and the damage caused can be logically and 
temporally connected by a causal relation. Concerning objective responsibility, one can 
surely observe its “ladder effect” associated with the male quality of legal and moral 
reasoning, in contrast to the female “web” tendency, which reasons in the name of the 
continuing of relationships. Consequently, it establishes an asymmetrical resolution of 
obligations and imputability of responsibilities. Then, responsibility for Gilligan refutes 
the symmetric feature of the principle of justice identified with the principle of 
equality.57 Responsibility, in a care perspective, is a inner mo al feeling different from 
the responsibility that comes from a formally conceived, prior system of rules, rights 
and “(…) ‘self-chosen principles’, removed from the r lational contexts which give 
them life and meaning” (Gilligan&Wiggins, 1988:134). 
The discussion about responsibility in legal dogmatic is pinned upon the 
necessity of introducing a psychological element into the causal chain constructed by 
fact and damage. The psychological element is called d sire and the discussion is 
whether its presence is required for the causal ascription of responsibility for injury or 
damage. In a positivist account, the voluntary elemnt is necessary for the motivation to 
act, but is not necessarily the desire to provoke damage or injury to justify the ascription 
of responsibility. In the case where injury is incurred by omission, the discussion 
                                                
57 See Honneth (1995) about the asymmetric character of he ethics of care and the position of Habermas’ 
discourse ethics theory.  
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becomes acute, since the point in omission is the lack of desire to act. Nonetheless, 
omission can hide a desire to damage and become the resp ctive behaviour causally 
ascribable. The point is relevant to the idea of irresponsibility connected to the idea of 
lack of capacity or opportunity, which occurs when the subject cannot determine his 
behaviour for lack of information or mental capacity to decide autonomously. This is 
the case of young people and psychopaths who cannot sh w voluntariness and 
intentionality when acting and provoking damage thereafter. In a positivist account, the 
psychological element is not crucial, it is only important to verify whether the person 
had the “normal capacities for doing what the law requires and opportunity to exercise 
them” (Mackie, 1977:185). Hart refuses the psychological element as the determinant 
aspect for the ascription of responsibility in the s nse that it is “only what an agent 
voluntarily does that can in itself deserve punishment. He sees both legal penalties and 
the excusing conditions attached to them as parts of a compromise between the 
protection of society and the freedom of individuals, as element in ‘a method of social 
control which maximizes individual freedom within coercive framework of law’ ” (In 
Ibidem). Young children and psychopaths cannot be punished, insofar as they cannot 
determine their behaviour with a clear comprehension of reality and consequent 
punishment. In a morality of care and responsibility n relationship, the same hypothesis 
will have another explanation, as those persons cannot respond to demands of 
responsibility because they cannot establish relationships. The moral quality in a 
morality of care is determined by the capacity of being in a relationship with the Other, 
acknowledging his Otherness.  Then, for Gilligan responsibility asks for a moral 
element, which consists in the relationship with the Other, leaving without justification 
the question whether the agent had real choice or ability to act differently in order to 
determine his responsibility for damage caused by his action or omission. Another 
aspect added by the morality of care for the theme of responsibility is that a caring 
position for Others dispenses with the causal element or causal chain between the 
imputable action and damage caused by it. In this re ides the asymmetrical 
responsibility in contrast with the reciprocal or symmetric one. 
 
V.2.3- Responsibility in the Moralities of Rights and of Care 
 
Responsibility, then, in the morality of rights, deriv s from a set of conditions 
previous and external to responsibility itself. This set is the condition for the 
responsibility to become legally enforceable. In a morality of rights, one is moral as 
long as he responds to his commitments, legal obligations, or is able to respect a 
universally stated hierarchy of values.  
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Gilligan says: “considering responsibility to be ‘attached to morality’, [Emily] 
sees responsibility as setting up ‘a chain of expectations, and if you interrupt that, you 
interrupt a whole process not only for yourself butfor all those around you” (Ibid., 142).  
Therefore, the conception of responsibility evolves towards becoming internal 
vis-à-vis a particular relationship and it has its origin in the epistemic position of a 
moral subject who knows the choices and makes decisions. 
 Responsibility in a male conception entails discusion about guilt, conscious or 
not, vis-à-vis a damage or a commitment which rests without repair or unfulfilled. In the 
female conception, damage and/or commitment are not necessary to create a moral 
responsibility, which solely arises from the fact of one being in a position of choice 
which entails consciousness about the situation, even before any damage or 
commitment occurs. This conception of responsibility, firstly, leads toward the silence 
of a conflictual language of individual rights. Secondly, it pushes one to pursue by 
oneself one’s own measure of justice. Consequently, it is at the core of any pacific 
dispute resolution which reinforces bonds of care, respect and love for self and Others 
and strengths relationships. 
  Female responsibility requires a moment of individuation without separation. 
The relational condition of the self is warranted by the “method of inclusion” and 
affective imagination. The re-ethicisation of law through the concept of responsibility in 
the morality of care and the method of inclusion careconcile law and justice in a way 
that enables justice to be achieved in its compromise with the crying of the Other and 
with the support of law. 
Gilligan’s different voice promises a transformation in the conception of law 
through an emancipatory practice of justice in law. The ethic of care, identified in the 
moral development of women, has a transformative significance for law and social life 
alike, to the extent that it liberates a silenced voice. This voice dispenses with rules and 
rights in solving disputes and considers “the specific needs of all the parties, as 
articulated from those parties’ own perspectives, and by attending to particularized 
contexts rather than abstract rights and universalizable rules (…)” (Bender, 1990:37).     
 
VI- Gilligan and the Life of Law: Access to Justice as Care 
 
 This section aims, in Gilligan’s own words, “to explore whether women’s 
experience illuminates the (…) nonviolent strategies for resolving conflicts” (Gilligan, 
1996:47). The move that the morality of care suggests is from law to life, from male to 
human, inserting the female different voice and justice as a feminine practice into the 
social practices of the culture. 
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  Gilligan offers to law an understanding of separation as a human issue and a 
legal question to be equated in private, social and institutional public life alike. The 
moral quality of responsibility in relationship reclaims space for a female voice that 
feels responsible as a way to be human and moral. The legal qualification or ascription 
of responsibility in male terms is a mathematical and mechanic activity, which provokes 
isolation and separation. The self becomes moral through female responsibility in 
relationships when he is able to look at his own Otherness and see the Otherness of 
Others to shape his responses. The focus of female responsible action is at odds with 
“do not think about it” that characterises law because demands to think through and 
through.  
The environment of negative responsibility, expressed by the attitude of 
refraining from injuring Others, needs to be disempowered by a pedagogical strategy 
which may highlight a different and valuable way to deal with legal responsibility. This 
pedagogy is about teaching love, interesse and care as moral and institutional practices. 
In law, the pedagogical project has two moments: first in law schools and then in 
settlement of disputes. 
Gilligan’s moral theory needs a practice able to harmonise the moralities of 
rights and care. The practice would reveal the conditio s for such a theory to bring the 
feminine, the private, love and care into the public realm. The practice would resolve 
the tension between rights and care, rights and love whereas the human contigence of 
the separation from the mother, from the feminine, would be also overcome through re-
connection and responsibility. Simultaneously, one could mend the fracture in the 
separation of law from morals and the disconnection of law from justice.  
 To acknowledge and resolve the men’s separation frm women and the 
alienation of women from themselves is to challenge untouchable patterns of social 
organisation, incontestable legal practices and dominant forms of rationality.  
The responses of two 11-year-olds, Jake and Amy, to the Heinz dilemma clearly 
show the model of rights based on a male moral standpoi t and another model based on 
a female one. The question was “should Heinz steal the drug?” Jake said that Heinz 
should steal the drug adding that perhaps he will find a judge able to understand his 
reasons and maybe Heinz would not even be convicted and if so, the sentence would not 
be severe. Under the veil of ignorance, says Kohlberg, the most rational thing to do is to 
steal the drug. 
Amy, however, sees the moral problem from a totally different viewpoint. She 
tries to find a way through which Heinz avoids stealing the drug by talking to the 
pharmacist, who, as a reasonable human being, would be able to understand Heinz’s 
reasons and give him the medicine his wife needs for free or allow him to pay for it 
later. “Amy (…) thought that talking was a good way to solve entrenched and difficult 
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problems (…) [and thus] opened up the possibility of arriving at something new, a 
solution that was not imagined when the conversation began” (Gilligan, 1994:29-30). 
Spiegelman elaborates the differences between Jack’s ladder and Amy’s web in 
the following way: the former praises rights, condemns interference with rights of 
others and inequality. It understands human interacion as atomistic and competitive, 
and relies upon rules, principles and hierarchies. It privileges adjudication as the method 
to resolve disputes. It aims at knowledge and stimulates the development of adversarial 
skills, analytic and critical abilities and scepticism. It teaches through formal 
discussions, hypotheticals with given facts and debates; the student is a detached 
observer. Logic is the mode of thought, and the reasoning process is self-contained and 
vertical. The role attributed to emotion is negative and excluded from rational discourse. 
It focuses on abstractions, on evaluation through ranking based on comparative master. 
Its hidden agenda is one of individualism, amorality, professionalism and cynicism, and 
the role of scholarship is to arrive at “the” truth. 
Amy’s web is quite different: it praises care and con ern whilst condemning 
indifference to Others and detachment. It understands human interaction as 
interconnected and co-operative and relies upon responsibility in relationships. It 
privileges negotiation and mediation as the method of resolving disputes. It aims at 
understanding through the development of co-operative skills, synthetic and integrative 
abilities, and reflective values. It teaches through simulations, clinics, conversations and 
reflections; the student is an involved participant. Experience is the mode of thought 
and the reasoning process is interactive and latera. The role attributed to emotion is 
positive and assists in interpretation. It focuses on context, on evaluation through 
conveyance degree of competence. The hidden agenda is one of community, personal 
responsibility and trust and the role of scholarship is to communicate ideas (Gilligan, 
1988:250). 
When Amy sees the moral dilemma as a problem of communication and tries to 
see a possibility for a relational background to be built, it reminds us the non-existent 
net that 22% of women put in the scene with the acrobats on the trapeze flying high in 
the air. The net is the relational background and brings about the possibility of dialogue, 
communication and mutual discovery because a relationship is likely to be established 
and must be cared for.  
Jake’s position does not consider the dialogue as an alternative and is clearly 
based upon the understanding that Heinz would not be convicted if and only if there 
were a general rule previously established and endowe  with authority to be applied to 
his case. The particular case has to be subsumed into the general law, following a 
principle which regulates the whole legal judicial system.  
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Amy expresses a feminine perspective of the problem and obviously distrusts 
both judicial systems and judges who can see Heinz only through the rules of law. 
Heinz and the judge, as legal subjects, have no self to be transformed by a given 
situation and are not in relationship since the law impedes the encounter.  
 Legal practice could use the morality of care in no -adversarial alternative forms 
of dispute resolution. Mediation and conciliation emerge primarily as a reaction against 
the adversarial system identified as male, patriarchal, competitive, based on rights, 
principled, objective and rational. The alternative ways of dispute resolution uphold a 
great potential to concretise the promises of a femal  orality of care and responsibility. 
 Dialogue is fundamental in these practices, just as Gilligan proposes the 
reconciliation of the two moralities through dialogue. “Through their dialogue, (…), 
these languages address the moral problem of how we can live at once as separate 
individuals and in continuing relationship with one another. This dialectic of separation 
and attachment informs an understanding of moral maturity that encompasses both 
relationships of equality, sustained by the logic of justice [or rights], and relationships 
of interdependence, relying on an ethic of care” (Gilligan, 1983:48). 
 Jackson (1995) discusses a model of relational, consequentialist and holistic 
adjudication which “may take account rights if [they] are defined (as some would do) in 
relational terms.” On the other hand he envisages a rules or rights-based adjudication 
which “may take account of relations, consequences and need when the rules so 
provide” (319) (My emphasis). Unfortunately, the practice h  suggests is far too poor 
for what a morality of care inserted in the legal realm can concretely offer. The 
emphases show, the interplay between the two moralities is based upon the existence of 
authoritative rules or norms, and their application s not a question of discretion or 
relational adjudication, rather it is obligatory. The Relational Justice would base care on 
a “sense of duty, or obligation”, which sounds very different from the care based upon 
responsibility of Gilligan’s moral theory (Schulter, 1994:21). Duty and obligation are 
intimately connected with the contractarian idea of relationship in a morality of rights. 
They suggest the separation and isolation of the subjects involved as their background.  
Furthermore, that model needs external authorisation because the resolution of the 
conflict belongs to somebody not involved in it.  
The presence of a third person, non-interested, power-holding and exercising his 
duty to tell Others what is right or wrong, is the first obstacle to a practice of law that 
encompasses a morality of relationships and has dialogue as its centre. The process 
itself of settling disputes in the realm of law is based on procedural norms, vital for any 
adjudication, relational or not, which limit the wide process of listening and dialogue 
that a resolution of disputes, that takes into account relationships, entails. Procedural 
rules exist exactly to limit proofs and dialogue or listening procedures in the process of 
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settling disputes. Besides, the dialogue and listening procedures established happen only 
around the iure question, which again is extremely limiting.  
Moreover, listening in a feminine way is wide par excellence and follows the 
“method of inclusion”, whereby everything counts, everyone is cared for. A feminine 
decision may cause difficulties because the female process of decision-making can be 
permeated by many “I don’t knows” to be equated by affective imagination. That phrase 
does not indicate ignorance, rather too much knowing or eagerness to know as widely as 
possible the circumstances of a situation in order to weigh as precisely as possible all 
facets of it. It also arises from a fear of judging and hurting if an important circumstance 
is missed out from the reasoning.  
 The autonomous subject in law is dead because his needs in face of a dispute 
have to be tailored to the right proportions to be possibly subsumed into the patterns of 
law and they are violated by the law’s own closed logics. In addition, the satisfaction of 
one entails the dissatisfaction of the opponent. The relational self in a morality of care 
requires a feminine, and win-win process of dispute settlement. She challenges the 
“seller-buyer model” of human social interaction and encounter informed by an ethics 
of rights. The model the relational self imposes is closer to the mothering or friendship 
one, in which affective imagination is the thread with which one stitches together the 
fragments of a chopped humankind (Held, 1993:71-73).  
The morality of care equated with law brings about the transformation of the 
public nature of rules, destined to regulate social pacification, by introducing a more 
domestic and private perspective.  
 The transformation of the public is the counter-movement of the publicisation of 
the private by the law and, especially, by the destruction of household practices by 
market practices which, together with individualism and bureaucracy, destroy private 
life. Thus, the feminine wisdom confined in the domestic is held in abeyance, waiting 
for an opportunity for its expression in public life in order to make the public private, 
personal. 
The male way of fighting injustice has “(…) become more important than 
people who were to be served. (…) Justice not grounded in the care and friendship of 
particular persons too easily becomes abstract. The monologue of dictators and lawyers 
replaces the dialogue of friends. Principles replace persons. Justice, losing touch with 
humanity, becomes unjust. (…) Justice that abandons care self-destructs. If justice 
becomes a devotion to the ideal of justice in and of itself, rather than caring for 
particular persons, it becomes a tool of oppression” (Bartlett, 1992:86-87). Justice as a 
feminine moral and legal category will talk from the margins, as a marginal language of 
care, from the domestic, the private into the centre, the social, the public, carrying along 
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the principles of caring and responsibility in relationships, where lawyers and judges 
have no place, where friends talk toward care, loveand peace. 
 The validity of a policy that could try to harmonise law and a caring perspective, 
as understood by Gilligan, rests in the question about the reality of a project in a society 
where people are not encouraged to deep relationships, where isolation and 
individualism are values that money and power allow. A feasible question would be: 
what is the place of such a system when the parties in conflict are marked by a profound 
inequality, as in the relationship between buyer and seller in a market without 
boundaries? Institutional will is the condition of practical possibility of such a system 
and will be discussed in the next chapter. 








































The Practical Life of Legal 
            Justice as a Feminine Virtue 
 
 The current chapter concludes part one and aims to elaborate the conditions for 
the possibility of legal justice as a feminine virtue. This task complements the 
advancements of chapter one and two. The former diagnosed a moral crisis of law in 
accordance with male modernist legal theory, due to the effects of separation as a legal 
and male process. Because of the shortcomings of modernist legal theory, especially 
acute in consumer law of common markets as the EU, chapter two turned to the findings 
of the female moral development theory as a promising field through which the difficult 
relationship between justice and law as a problem of separation could be overcome. 
This chapter intends also to offer an empirical example for the building of the 
framework for access to justice for consumers in the EU.  
 The important point about justice in this context is he difficulty to dissociate, 
especially in small claims, legal and ethical aspects of a dispute. The two last chapters 
claimed that this difficulty characterises this dispute as relational. Furthermore, its 
resolution seems to demand a relational framework for the sort of justice to be applied.  
This thesis challenges formal adjudication as the suitable form of justice to be 
adopted and defends a justice informed by care and responsibility in relationships and 
before the Other or justice as a feminine virtue. The critique rests upon the fact that any 
kind of adjudication (by a judge or arbitrator) will require a claim of rights (Fuller, 
1978:369). In other words, adjudication entails a morality of rights opposed to a 
morality of care, a feminine moral way to resolve dil mmas and conflicts in life and in 
law, discussed in the second chapter. Moreover, adjudication demands conventional 
rationality with which morality of care seems to dispense. This morality is formulated in 
the realms of the female moral development which is considered deficient by male 
parameters of excellence in moral and legal reasoning. The rational administration of 
justice, following the Weberian advice, must exclude arguments of love and personal 
feelings of sympathy or antipathy as a basic criterion for the legitimacy of official 
enterprises as such (in Rheinstein, 1969:351). Thus, on the Weberian parameters, a 
morality of care lacks rational legitimacy. 
This thesis differs from the work of certain American feminist legal theory that 
tries to integrate empathic accounts in both language of courts and legal proceedings. 
This thesis defends the necessity to create official forums of legal justice as avenues for 
a different practice or for justice as a feminine virtue. To some extent this thesis 
recognises the need of categorical abstract legal princi les for the achievement of 
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certainty but refuses to call it justice especially when strong moral demands call for 
attention in consumer small claims which were born from uncountable facilities and 
attractions of an integrated market. Certainty and security are surely important but the 
market, which aspires to prosperity, cannot forget confidence, satisfaction and 
happiness. The judicial apparatus of courts of law,s the expression of male modernist 
legal thought, fails to provide consumer confidence, satisfaction and happiness while 
searching for security and certainty. Then, rational criteria for legitimacy of official 
undertakings seem at risk of being challenged by irrational criteria as satisfaction and 
happiness. One has in mind “hard easy cases” or even “ nuisance cases” (Yngvesson, 
1989:1700) to which the established judicial environment of justice dispensation is too 
expensive, time consuming and unable to hear personal stories and consider 
particularities without remaking them by following abstract criteria for the sake of 
certainty and security. Thus, the official practice of justice as care would sustain the 
post-modern qualities of being fragmented, decenterd and diffused. These attributes 
seem to be required by the challenge of respecting d versity in an integrated market. 
Moreover, they could not be harmonised with justice as legal proceedings in courts of 
law while informality or informalism should co-exist with effectiveness. This thesis 
aims to overcome the contradiction of modern legal theory which is “the contradiction 
between its two basic purposes, the purpose to preserv  order and the purpose to do 
justice” (Santos, 1995:105). That formulation suggests that justice is a task that entails 
the post-modern qualities aforementioned and deserv to be called “punctual”58 which 
reminds, in many ways, the characterisation of the feminine moral development in 
Gilligan’s formulation. This chapter will be developed with the view to the 
transformation of this assumed contradiction into a tension that could be useful for the 
tasks of law in plural societies or at least in integrated markets.  
The outcome proposed is that the feminine framework f r justice should find a 
point of harmonious conviviality with male patterns of law and borrow from the latter 
legitimacy support. The construal of justice would overcome the necessity of order and 
realise the aspirations of love and care as a feminine enterprise (Burnside, 1994:43). For 
that, this thesis follows the advice of Carol Smart (1989:164) in the direction that one 
should challenge law’s power to define and disqualify instead of seeking a programme 
of reformulation of law, which is Marta Minow’s intention. One cannot dispense with 
law and one recognises its power. One challenges the power of law which defines the 
normal and the norm and disqualifies what rests at the margins by establishing 
                                                
58 “Punctual” is used by postmodern literature and it is drawn from the works of Douzinas&Warrington. 
Its use entails both temporal and spatial dimensions f an approach which is not early or late and, 
especially, does not entail a grand narrative in modernist ways. The verb “punctuate” stresses the 
spatiality of a punctual approach like what a “point” does to the paper on which it is placed.  
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conditions for legitimising a feminine practice of legal justice, deemed to be reputed 
irrational and deviant.  
The aim is to overcome the binarism of male and femal  paradigms and propose 
conditions to nourish a tension necessary for the conviviality of and co-operation 
between them. Besides, these convivialities (the one between law and justice, between 
the morality of rights and the morality of care, or still the male legal reality and the 
female aspiration of justice) require a greater effort than the mere mixture of male 
principles as, for instance, the equality one and a female approach of care. It means that 
it will not satisfy the mere juxtaposition of equality which establishes that everyone in 
the same conditions should receive the same treatment and care which demands that no 
one should be hurt. The application of both principles can suggest difficulties in regard 
to the need to respond to particularities not covered by equality but a central exigency 
for care. Whilst care emphasises the relational aspect  of a dispute towards the 
continuity of the relationship, equality discusses the application of law which warrants 
that like cases are treated alike, in an abstract, universal, hierarchical and principled 
way. In this sense, the feminine enterprise in law counts with the possibilities of the 
imaginative thinking to redefine law’s power in the name of different values to be 
enforced by different attitudes and also redefine “hopeless disputes”, so considered by 
the male legal approach –which is adversarial and against empathy or personal feelings 
in legal matters-, in such a way that they might be worthy of a solution (Davis&Bader, 
1985:84). Empathy “can lead to revolutions in habitual legal thinking and 
transformation of legal problems” (Henderson, 1987:15 7).  
 Furthermore, what is at stake is the power of formalism in the struggle of liberal 
theories to survive the post-modern attack. The empirical discussion in this chapter 
challenges formalism and puts forth a view of justice based on care, through 
challenging the power of law to normatise and marginalize and using its power to 
legitimate to a feminine practice of legal justice.  The argument against formalism and 
simultaneously for justice as care unveils a fear of a world without principles, based on 
particularities, misguided by personal preferences and at risk of authoritarism (Fish, 
1989:5,6,10). Then, the theme of legitimacy becomes important in this context since 
this thesis defends public engagement for the application of a feminine practice of legal 
justice, which goes beyond the limits of simple ADR system, in conflict resolution for 
consumers in integrated markets.  It may be prudent to warn that the empirical character 
of this chapter is rather restricted and that one labours still in the normative stream of 
thought working hypotheses and offering potential explanations due to the fact that the 
feminine is socially and culturally anaemic. It means that the voiceless feminine, its 
silence and absence from concrete expression in the western legal, political and social 
worlds, have severe limitations. The experience to be explained in the following section 
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had a short duration and was overcome by the formalist or legalist trend of the male 
pattern of law.  Thus, the empirical data responds to anthropological requirements. 
 This chapter will expose the conditions through which legality59 could possibly 
allow empathic handling of disputes or the achievement of justice as care, as a feminine 
virtue. Formalism is the most important adversary of justice as care. Furthermore, the 
feminine reasoning is known as an emotional mode of argumentation or coalescent 
argumentation to which the male organisation of law is impermeable and does not allow 
spheres of relevance and reasonableness (Watson, 1996:99). The tension that seems 
insurmountable is exactly the force that can possibly sustain a new armoury of a new 
legal practice of justice which one calls feminine or compromised with care and 
responsibility in relationships and before the pain of the Other. The paradigms are not to 
be related to each other in competition neither to co-operated with one another but to 
co-exist in order to create a tension that can lend l gitimacy to the mentioned new 
practice.  In this sense, the problem seems to reside in the way justice operates, in its 
structure and not so much in its content60. Chapter one showed that substantive justice 
results in formal justice which cancels out the eventual advancements of the former. 
This fact informs the background of the framework upon which this thesis works which 
is engaged to a mode or practice that allows justice to be made by the parties with 
purposive institutional engagement characterised as c re, interesse, or love as 
institutional will. This point raises considerations about the public character of the 
present discussion on private justice for particular individuals in a private, emotional 
and empathic way and reaffirms the post-modern scepticism regarding public values but 
refusing the also post-modern denigration of institutionalised structures of power and 
law (Collins, 1993:309).  
 The practice suggested is to identify the punctual, fr gmented, particular and 
elevate it to the category of public institutional interesse in order to legitimise the action 
of promoting peace between particular parties to a dispute by considering and applying 
their own reasons (Woodman, 1997:156). 
 This chapter will be developed in three sections. Section one describes the 
empirical data about a feminine practice of law. Section two discusses the legitimacy 
problem of justice as care. The last one offers a model to be used in the second part of 
                                                
59 Formality is understood as a component of legality or its pure expression (Henderson, 1987 and Unger, 
1976). Unger says: “ A system of rules is formal insofar as it allows its interpreters to justify their 
decisions by reference to the rules themselves and to the presence or absence of facts stated by the rules” 
(In Henderson, 1987:1588). About the incompatibility between legality and mercy and love, see chapter 
one applicable also to the considerations about empathy in legal reasoning.  
60 It is known that the choice of the system for dispute resolution advances certain related values (Menkel-
Meadow, 1985:490).  Accordingly, settlement more than adjudication can attend the personal needs of 
particular parties. It is worth mentioning the effort f Wilhelmsson and his theory of need-rational 
principles in modern contract law, which will be hinted at below and in chapter seven. The critical 
position against courts reveals that they do not act essentially to resolve disputes but to “give meaning to 
public values” (In Ibid., 498).  
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the thesis which considers the gap in access to jusice for consumers in the EU and 
formulates a framework to bridge it.  
 
I- An Institutional Practice of Justice as a Feminine Virtue 
 
 This section intends to describe an institutional practice of justice in the 
feminine ways. However, it is recommended to review the concept of  legal justice as a 
feminine virtue or legal justice as care, a task done in a much greater length in chapter 
two. 
 
I.1- Legal Justice as Care  
 
 Two examples seem to be of help to clarify in a synthetic way the feminine way 
to deal with disputes. Firstly, the example quoted in chapter two on a dispute between a 
boy and a girl about the game they wanted to play. He wanted to play “pirate” and she 
“the next door neighbour”. The solution came from the girl’s suggestion to play “the 
next door neighbour is a pirate”. The solution seems to attend everyone’s 
needs/expectations and somewhat upgrades the dispute giving a solution which changes 
its terms while resolving it. The game proposed as solution is no longer the boy’s game 
either the girl’s. However, both theoretically have the opportunity to play they own 
choice in a third different possibility. Two remarkble points deserve to be highlighted: 
the capacity to hear and consequently to respond in the terms of the needs 
communicated and the creativity in arranging a solution that responds to both needs, by 
creating a third harmonious solution.  
 A second example described a dispute between two persons in a library about 
whether the window behind them should be open or not. The discussion is overcome by 
the interference of the librarian, by coincidence a woman, who asks each the disputants 
what each one wanted and why. The one who wanted to open the window argued that 
the room needed fresh air. The other wanted a closed window because the draught was 
unpleasant. The librarian then resolves the dispute opening the window in the next room 
letting fresh air in and avoiding a draught in the room where they were (In L. Cardoso 
de Oliveira, 1996:77). 
 The examples highlight one of the most important feminine moral abilities. 
Gilligan defines it as a fundamental characteristic of the justice as care: the ability to 
hear and to respond in the terms of the Other. Gilligan, when paying attention to the 
post-modern object of worry: the Other, offers a rel possibility to access him in his 
own terms and calls that ability a female moral one. The Other is clearly inaccessible for 
one who does not have the capacity to hear. In order to respond one must hear. To 
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postulate the inaccessibility of the Other as an ethical condition and not as an 
ontological one is the genius of Levinas and of the post-modern effort to advance his 
ideas. Gilligan, then, shows how the ethical isolated condition of the Other is not more 
than the consequence of a specific gender inability, namely, a male cultural imposition 
which has very deep roots and wide consequences in the western industrial society.  
 The capacity to respond in the Other’s terms is connected with the call for 
responsibility before the pain of the Other. Gilligan contextualises this response in an 
interpretative context: the relationship. The response is to happen in a relationship and 
the web it creates, while trying to mend the ruptures eventually done by the process of 
disputing. The solution or the response beyond the settlement intends to strengthen the 
relationship between the parties.  
 Then the second component is the moral quality to hear and respond with 
responsibility to preserving the relationship which Gilligan calls “care”. However, one 
must understand that the quality of care is substantially different from the care which 
sets somebody free from responsibility in case of behaviour that causes damage. Care 
obliges the self to act until the Other rests satisfactorily responded. Care is much more 
than “I did everything I could do in that situation”. Care obliges the self to do as much 
as necessary to satisfy the Other, to integrate the O r again in the web of relationship 
that rests damaged by the event of a dispute. Care is not the capacity to respond in view 
of the self’s abilities or possibilities but in view of the Other’s necessities.  
The third component is the ability to hear and then to respond. It calls forth 
Gilligan’s principle of reversibility as a very inspired evolution of the version defended 
by Kohlberg in his explanation of male moral development. This principle in Gilligan’s 
formulation requires that, in order to put oneself in Other’s place, one must to put off 
his own shoes. This formulation characterises justice as a feminine virtue and entails the 
complete abandonment of the traditional logical-lega  process of subsuming a given 
situation into a formal, abstract and previous set of norms or rules. Consequently, an 
empathic translation of the Other’s needs into the possibilities of the legal system is a 
very much feminine virtue and its integration in the male system of law is postulated by 
this thesis. It needs to count on “love as institutional will” which chapter one described. 
The responsibility for caring should be characterised as an institutional duty. The 
process of dispute settlement should be oriented by the principles of care and the 
institutional activity would, at once, implement and stimulate the parties to exercise the 
ability to hear and respond in the Other’s own terms; with responsibility beyond one’s 
restricted possibility in order to reach the Other; and through empathic listening in order 
to respond promptly to the needs and not to rights. Love as institutional will so applied 
also entails that love is a practice that one can te ch, learn and, above all, that can be 
imposed by the force of law. Love as institutional interesse and institutional practice is 
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the link that care establishes for the healing of the separation that maculates personal, 
legal and institutional relationships.   
Finally, a last methodological component must be added for justice as a 
feminine virtue to sustain its own power and neutralise the danger of ideological 
contamination by the male dominant environment. It is the method of imaginative 
thinking implemented by the experiential feminism exposed by Arrigo.61 This method 
constrains the institutional movement to go beyond routines, rules and pre-established 
standards and patterns in order to push forth the achievement of answers able to 
consider, equalise, harmonise and respond to needs an  not to rights. Rights would 
function in the whole scene as mere reference and plastic guidelines for the exercise of 
imagination necessary for the configuration of possible solutions. Rights work by 
establishing possible limits for compromise, requests and negotiation. 
 
I.2- An Experience in Consumer Protection Through the Office of the Public 
Prosecutor in Brasilia-Brazil (MPDFT) as a Practice of Justice as a Feminine 
Virtue 
 
 The exposition of the experience of consumer protection by the Public 
Prosecutor in Brasilia-Brazil needs to be systematised in four sub-sections in order to 
facilitate the comprehension of the practice this tesis identifies as a manifestation of 
justice as a feminine virtue.  
 
I.2.1-The Brazilian General Political Background 
 
 The Brazilian Constitution now in force dates from 1988 and was enacted to 
respond to civil society’s aspirations to a democrati  political environment after more 
than 20 years of authoritarian military rule brought to power by a military coup in 1964 
that had deposed a social-democrat President.  
 The drafting of the mentioned Constitution went through a very hard legislative 
process because of the necessity to respond to an uncountable number of civil 
aspirations, bred during a long transitional period from the military regime to civilian 
democratic one, started in 1974. Thus, the Brazilian new Constitution is know by  “an 
exercise in transient constitutionalism for a transitional society”62. 
 The present effort does not require an overview of the Brazilian Constitution. 
However, it seems necessary to understand the meaning of the transitional character of 
                                                
61 See Chapter I. 
62 See Rosenn, 1990 and Osiel, 1995. 
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Brazilian political background in 1988 and the reallocations of power promoted by the 
new constitutional order especially regarding the office of the Public Prosecutor.  
 The transitional character of Brazilian society, in the description offered by 
Teitel (1997/2000), can be identified by the fact that the new constitutional order 
followed a long period of repressive rule and was deemed to remove the old legality and 
replace it with a democratic one. Nevertheless, thi process was not smooth and quick. 
It rather demanded a period through which the new order has to deal with old problems. 
Thus, a transitional pattern of justice functioned as an instrument for political and legal 
transformation. The old legality lacked legitimacy and the new one was not yet formally 
established or did not offer sufficient means to deal with the persistent or remaining 
past. This situation promoted emancipator practices of justice and law while raising 
important dilemmas for the public bodies responsible for the defence of the rule of law. 
The emergence of a paradigm shift in the conception of justice in transitional justice put 
forth the necessity of new reallocations of power to create competence for the exercise 
of the possible new practices of justice. Teitel characterises the idea of justice in 
transitional societies as “compromise” in view of “the tension between idealized 
conceptions of the rule of law and the contingencies of the extraordinary political 
context” (1997:2016/21).  
The transitional order needed to respond to problems created in the repressive 
period whilst the elaboration of a new constitutional order had a basically forward-
looking characteristic (Ibid., 2057). Justice gained then a very pragmatic aspect and the 
challenge was to respond to needs created in the past with tools constructed to attend the 
future democratic society. In Brazilian constitutional order, this tension was acutely 
present. The solution came through reallocations of power and the understanding that it 
was necessary that old institutions implemented newand wider powers. For at least 
during the transitional period, a legal order, which would be more relational, contextual 
and responsive,  should be able to respond to concrete demands of justice.   
An institution with such an endeavour would prevent a practice of justice, which 
could collapse law and morality or law and politics too quickly. However, it could, at 
the same time, promote the moral contamination of law and the public recognition of 
new collective understandings of truth without opening the rule of recognition 
established for the transitional period. In the Brazili n institutional scene, the Ministère 
Public (MP) appeared to be the body destined to play such role. 
 In the Brazilian new Constitution the basic reallocations of power were about 
weakening the Executive in benefit of the Legislative and the Federal order in favour of 
local orders. The Judiciary was also strengthened through basically the creation of many 
new judicial remedies especially against public institutions and to protect diffuse or 
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individual-homogeneous interests. However, the most substantial change came with the 
reallocation of power to the Parquet or Ministère Public. 
 
I.2.2-The Position of the Ministère Public63 in the General Political Framework 
 
 The political and constitutional position of the Parquet during the authoritarian 
military rule was progressively changed from auxiliary body of the Judiciary to a body 
administratively and politically strongly subordinated to the Executive with the duty of 
criminal prosecution and surveillance of the application of the law by the Judiciary.  
 The new Constitution endowed the institution with f nancial and organisational 
autonomy, and determined also that its members should act autonomously, without 
hierarchy, in their understanding of the law and in the persecution of justice. The 
responsibilities and powers of the institution were accordingly accrued with its new 
configuration as a political body of the civil society before any state or civil power. 
Soon, the MP started to be the receptor of all public and private complaints repressed 
during the authoritarian period. The judicial function of the institution persisted but it 
was of less importance than the new role as a political agency in the action of the 
Parquet in areas like: consumer rights, urban order, healt, education, environment, 
public property, community conflicts, street children, racial inequality, women and 
Indians rights, foundations, organisations with social interests and control of the police 
force’s activity.  Consequently, the institution, despite lack of clarity in the Constitution, 
was quickly considered the fourth power of the Brazili n society and environment and 
consumer matters were the main areas where the activity of the Parquet created a 
reliable avenue to embrace uncountable civil complaints repressed in the authoritarian 
period.  
 The first impulse came with the Brazilian National Environment Policy Act 
(Law no. 6938/1981). However, this law did not authorise the public prosecutor to 
claim redress on behalf of individuals. The new impulse in this direction came with the 
famous Brazilian Law of the Civil Public Action (Law no. 7347/1985), source of 
inspiration for the Swiss law. “The real break with this individualistic system took 
place, however, with the enactment of the Federal Constitution in 1988, and approval of 
the Consumer Protection Code in 1990” (Benjamin, 1992:143-145).  
 The Parquet started to act in accordance with the feeling of justice, thereby 
responding concretely to civil aspiration of justice in areas such as environment and 
consumer protection before the enactment of the Consumer Code in 1990. These 
activities had basically the support of a very wide and general prescription of the 
                                                
63 Ministère Public or the Public Prosecutor Office will be used as “MP” or “Parquet”.  
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Constitution in its article 5, item XXXII, which affirms that the State will promote 
consumer protection. 
 The general constitutional prescription and the legal vacuum of almost two years 
confirmed a practice already started after the Enviro ment Law of 1981. The 
Constitution brought the independence to the Parquet to execute the public duties of 
promoting justice for consumers with more effectiveness. This practice indeed 
overlapped the period of the Consumer Code despite its xt which restricted the public 
defence of consumer interests by public means or authorities only to public, collective, 
diffuse and individual-homogenous rights with public relevance.  
 It is interesting to add that the members of the Brazilian Parquet are known as 
“independent, professional and extremely competent (...). Unlike in Europe, (…) [they 
have] played an extremely aggressive part in protecting the environment, consumers, 
and other diffuse or collective interests or rights”  (Ibid., 153).  
 
I.2.3- Care in the Consumer Protection in the Ministére Public in Brasilia 
 
 The ethnographic field for the identification of the practice of legal justice as a 
feminine virtue is the MP in Brasilia-DF-Brazil (MPDF), defending consumer rights. Its 
activities were chosen insofar as they offered a possible way to insert in law a practice 
of justice guided by care and responsibility in relationships.  
 This thesis do not analyse the disputes themselves and their resolution but an 
institutional behaviour that seems to contain the caracteristics of justice as care. 
 The method used to support the present analysis is anthropological and consists 
of interviewing the two prosecutors involved in the first phase of the consumer 
protection office and four others recently in charge but under a more legalist or male 
orientation. It was also interviewed the person in charge of the new body created to 
substitute the MP in its practice of justice as care.  
 The work for the protection of consumers through the MP in Brasilia started 
together with the protection of the environment with the enactment of the specific Law 
in 1981. There was already a pre-constitutional transitional milieu in political and legal 
terms. The military regime was still the power but the democratisation process with the 
re-organisation of civil society had started by then. The recourses of that Law did not 
cover the redress of individual consumer claims. The Law of Civil Public Action of 
1985 put the challenge to differentiate the two protections (consumer and environment 
matters) by then under the same Public Prosecutor Office. The spirit of the new 
Constitution was already very strong and even before its promulgation in October 1988, 
the consumer protection in the MP gained autonomy and individuality. The practice of 
justice as care was in force between then until 1992, two years after the enactment of 
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the Consumer Code of 1990 and that was a period when t  Brazilian Public 
Prosecutors in general had a clear picture in their minds of what their official names 
mean: “Promoters of Justice”. This consciousness was bred by the transitional character 
of justice then in force, i.e., old repressive order still in force and new order already in 
the spirit of civil society but not yet fully effective and by the constitutional background 
which was extraordinarily rich and also full of legal vacuums which were demanding 
legislative complement. Civil activity was required to respond to uncountable small 
and/or serious injustices even before the enactment of the new legality. 
 In the interest of confidentiality, the Public Prosecutors will be called Mr. A., 
Mr. R., Mr. L., Mr. M., Mr. G. and Mr. T., and the person responsible for the new body 
created after the male overtake of the Office will be called Mrs. L.S..  
 The interviews had a set of questions at the very b ginning which were deemed 
to identify certain practices in consumer protection which could be called justice as 
care. The questionnaire was sent to each person interviewed before the interview, except 
in the case of Mrs. L.S.. However, the conversations were a lot richer than the questions 
indicate at a first glance and especially the commentaries were very much 
particularised. The questionnaire was important only to indicate a common method and 
area of investigation in all interviews. The variety of answers however showed a 
coherent framework where justice as care was firstly inserted and then banned in the 
name of legality and security in the public task of c nsumer protection by the MP.  
 The present section will be divided in three subsections in order to group the 
interviews by different moments of the justice promoted for consumers by the MP in 
Brasilia-DF-Brazil (MPDF) and to individualise the experience of a body not endowed 
with the power of the former.  
 
I.2.3.1- Interviews and Some Analysis of the Practice 
 
Mr. A.: “Role of the MP responsible for consumer protection was essential, even before 
the Consumer Code and also after it, because of the resistance of the business, of 
paramount importance to create a culture of the defence of consumers through 
conferences and above all through settlement of dispute , while guaranteeing a high 
level of parties satisfaction.”  
 
“The MPDF had abandoned a practice of law that was changing drastically the 




“We were making a different justice, a justice of god sense, trying to promote peace in 
private conflicts and at the same time in the social tissue.” 
 
“The case of the dissatisfaction of a tourist and a package holiday: The MPDF had no 
competence to promote the settlement but we found a way to “publicise” the case 
calling before us the public board responsible to regulate tourism (EMBRATUR) 
together with the enterprise and the consumer. The cas was resolved indirectly because 
the enterprise could understand the inappropriateness of its behaviour and felt 
compelled to redress the consumer. The EMBRATUR could transform the case into 
public advice to all enterprises involved in the business. The consumer was obviously 
satisfied and in future cases we were making the settlement based on the official 
position of the EMBRATUR. A formal sentence would not promote at all this level of 
effectiveness, neither privately nor publicly.” 
 
“The process of settlement had the effect of approximating the parties while reminding 
them of the advantages for both that an amicable agr ement could be achieved for the 
case at stake and for the future of their lives as consumers and traders.” 
 
“The audience of conciliation was indeed an opportunity for making friends, to spread a 
culture of respect and acceptance of others conditis and to teach the parties societies 
aspirations in terms of good consumer relationships and humanly profitable 
encounters.”  
 
“The practice of settlement taught us to relax the parties and to dissolve any 
misunderstanding so far planted in their views of their dispute. Almost any commentary 
was accepted towards the dispelling the bad mood regarding the dispute. After this, 
normally the conversation was more profitable in terms of conciliation and re-
establishment of their relationship.” 
 
“We accepted any kind of complaint because our goal was to pacify the social tissue 
through responding to people problems. Sometimes th situation was not clearly a 
consumption relationship nevertheless, we were engaged in the process of finding a way 
to help parties.” 
 
“The motivation for our work was coming from a high level of enthusiasm that was 
reaffirmed each time a fruitful encounter between parties happened under our 
conduction. The sad thing came with our marginalization in the name of more formal 
application of the law.” 
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“We were not asking much more on public/private, individual/collective aspects of the 
disputes. The tourist case shows that. We were welcoming any kind of disputes. Better 
saying that the more particular, private, individual the better for us. We could always 
find the public or collective behind any dispute to justify our interference that was at 
last much more to attend particular parties involved b cause we were sure that the social 
tissue would also benefit from the peace that could be re-established between them.” 
 
“We understood that our work would not only pacify people and the social tissue but 
also that it was healing personal conflicts. Furthermore, we were convinced that a 
sentence, does not matter how precise it could be, would have promoted separation and 
division among parties while our work was healing the problems created by the event of 
a dispute.” 
 
“I never knew how the audience should be conducted before starting it. I always let the 
parties tell me the right approach to help them helping themselves. It was always very 
exciting.” 
 
“Parties were brought before the MP with a great trust that that man/institution could 
help them to find a solution for their problem.” 
 
Mr. R.: “Our work in the defence of consumers was towards the conciliation of the 
parties in order to avoid the recourse to the judiciary apparatus which was not efficient 
enough, above all the satisfaction and pacification of parties were our most important 
objectives.”  
 
“In our work maybe we were working as parents embracing the parties and maybe 
giving more than what was formally permitted differently than a judge who for the 
parties is more like a God that gives only what is strictly said by law.” 
 
“In the process of disputes resolution, the parties had freedom to build their personal 
justice and the State, through the MP, offers an opportunity for the parties to exercise a 
humanised law different from formal law. The MP is not behind law or Codes, he is 
together with the parties trying to settle their dispute in terms of their own view and 
needs, having in mind what is reasonable.” 
 
“The ‘God-MP’ closes his doors to the people and put himself in the position of Judges. 
Judges are necessary but like God, more than one for one case is not a good idea. We 
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defend the MP action, as a picture, more a father figure that keeps his doors open and 
embraces the parties and their aspiration to justice.” 
 
“I always used to start an audience saying: “We are not enemies. We have not even met 
each other before. Then it is an opportunity to meet each other and above all to become 
friends, to learn each other’s needs and limitations t  fulfil them.” 
 
I.2.3.2-The Male Overtake 
 
Mr. M.: “The use of the Judiciary is a wonderful tool to force agreement. Without the 
threatening of the formal procedure in a court of law, the force of the MP is relative or 
almost nothing. The judicial procedure gives credibility to our work.” 
 
“The role of the MP is to create the culture of the Civil Public Action to attend 
collective, public or individual-homogenous rights with public dimension and to change 
the attitude of the Judiciary instigating or forcing it to accept the new advancements of 
formal law.” 
 
“I was the one who introduced the culture of the Civil Public Action in the MPDF. I 
refused to make conciliation of individual rights saying that we do not hold competence 
to deal with individual rights. It was a riot, a mutiny. The confusion was of great 
proportions and I won against the argument that I was trying to transform the Office 
into a laboratory given the insecurity of the judicial dispensation of justice. I was 
convinced that our duty was and is to provoke the Judiciary power to apply the law in 
suitcases involving collective and public rights.” 
 
“The MP’s action is eminently punitive.” 
 
Mr. G.: “Nowadays our action is punitive. In the past, it was different. We have in a 
more accentuated way the preoccupation to attend the letter of law. The MP is the 
defender of the citizen within the strict limits of law.” 
 
“The legitimacy of the MP is due to the fact that he is searching for justice through the 
correct application of  law.” 
 
Mr. T.: “The first line of action of the defence ofconsumers through the settlement of 
disputes involving individual rights was highly non-productive.” 
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“The action of the MP defending consumers is punitive.”  
 
Mr. L.: “I started thinking that the MP should trust the Judiciary and propose as many 
Civil Public Actions as possible to resolve collective problems of consumer nature. 
However, today the reality changed my vision and I am more for conciliation than 
litigation. I know that adjudication does not resolve the problem and I avoid a law suit 
as much as possible.”  
 
“The difference between public and private, collective and individual has relevance for 
judicial litigation. But I came to know that the most important thing is to attend the 
particularity of a case and then I act informally contrarily to my first position for a 




Mrs. L.S.: “I gave a social direction to consumer protection by implementing the 
politics towards the formation of a political and social consciousness of the population.”  
 
“Before me the body was eminently punitive and that w s due to the omission of the 
body toward more conciliation talking to traders. In case of failure to resolve an 
individual dispute, the body was using the media to expose the problems caused by 
traders behaviour denounced in disputes.” 
 
“I promoted an approximation with the MP and that gve more credibility (a legal one) 
to the body.” 
 
“The conciliation of private or individual disputes always gave the opportunity to 
discuss the problem in public or collective level and also national level. The Code 
permitted us to fine traders and, when the individual complaint opened the access to 
tackle a wider dimension of the problem, the fine was always a powerful measure to 
press for both conciliation in private disputes and change of professionals’ behaviour. 
The support of the MP (legal and also moral for the past action of the body) was of 




The anaemic condition of the feminine in culture justifies the normative 
contours eventually present in the following expositi n. The empirical character of the 
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data above explored shows a certain fragility that is common in the feminine expression 
in the culture, as argued in chapter two. Gilligan's findings have also a methodological 
value since they contest the empirical exigency of universality of the modernist and 
male mind to stress the value of a different human voice. Her method of argumentation 
is powerful enough to show how the publicisation of the feminine moral reasoning is 
possible. Gilligan’s claims are at once substantive and methodological and argue for the 
value of the different since it can suggest a great deal of creativity and moral 
willingness to resolve human moral dilemmas and maybe legal problems in a different 
way. In Gilligan’s groundbreaking work, normative and empirical aspects are almost 
inseparable and deeply interwoven. Consequently, it is important to undertake a brief 
normative consideration about the data exposed above. On the one hand, the intention is 
to clarify how, the feminine voice was responding to needs, stressing the public duty for 
caring about personal situations and promoting respon es based on responsibility in 
order to preserve relationships. On the other hand, it intends to show how the male 
reaction argued with principles and legality against a practice of care.  
The interviews showed the polycentricity of consumer problems brought to 
knowledge and action of the MP who needed a kind of “managerial intuition”. Contrary 
to the way adjudication deals with a conflict, a female rationality and moral disposition 
to respect and approach the polycentric character of the conflict with managerial 
imagination, intuition, and willingness demanded from the action of the MP to 
accommodate the form of law to the problem and not to adapt the problem to rigid and 
preconceived law. Moral enthusiasm and sense of duty towards promoting a reasonable 
solution to disputes were diagnosed; they worked as internal legitimating factors of the 
practice.  
The counter-argument identified by the male reaction is about the populist and 
arbitrary character of the dispute’ settlement because firstly it was against law since the 
MP had no competence to protect private individual rights. The Constitution did not 
establish this limitation in the general disposition about the public duty to promote 
consumer protection. Nevertheless, the male reading of the legality and argumentation 
forced violently the feminine practice of justice into illegality. Secondly, the MP could 
not act as a mediating institution between private persons to implement a public policy. 
The scene, where this MP must act, should be only legal proceedings in courts of law 
because MP’s role was “basically punitive”.  This mediating struture, says a more leftist 
male position, would rather promote a disorganisation of collective reaction against 
injustices perpetrated by public and private agents, while impeding the development of 
communitarian feelings. That position was already called conservative. Above all, the 
feminine sort of justice here exposed justifies the analysis made by Arno on 
informalism which does not transform disputes into banalities, neither “seek[s] to avoid 
 126
the complexity of conflict cases but rather attempt(s) to deal with the total relationships 
and total social personalities, thereby admitting the unique nature of every case” 
(1979:44). 
In reality, the MP stimulates self-help, against the normal practice of lumping 
unpleasant resolutions of consumer contracts and avoiding adversarial procedures in 
courts to resolve small claims that normally would rest without attention, through 
promoting mediation and peaceful settlement of consumer conflicts. This work has the 
educative character of mediation through adjusting traders behaviour regarding law and 
feelings about adequate standards of consumer protection. It also shapes a moral-legal 
order which is contested by legalist and principled male understanding of the public 
duty of promoting consumer protection.  What could be taken as a promising practice 
towards the elaboration of “a new or altered image of legality”, compounded with 
“ways of infusing legal regulation with moral meaning”, was simply put into 
marginality as illegal practice (Cotterrell, 1992: 205/215). 
Furthermore, this exemplifies Gilligan’s characterisat on of the male morality of 
rights as occupied with “problems of inequality and oppression and hold[ing] up an 
ideal of reciprocal rights and equal respect for individuals, [whilst a] care perspective 
draws attention to problems of detachment or abandonment and holds up an ideal of 
attention and response to need” (In Jackson, 1995:318). 
The consumer protection, which was promoted in accordance with the main 
characteristics of justice as care, was provided in a period of legal vacuum regarding 
substantive and procedural law. In this sense, the analysed MP’s activity did not 
resemble the active judge promoting the equalisation of the parties. Contrarily, the 
action was towards understanding their differences and to allow them to find their way 
to reach peace and a reasonable agreement for them in their terms, having formal law as 
a reference of the reasonable. The law was used, especially after the enactment of the 
Consumer Code in 1990, to set up limits for the possibilities of moral or quasi-legal 
settlement of consumer disputes. The moral quality was not coming only from the 
nature of the agreements but above all from the attitude of the MP promoting care and 
responsibility between the parties to a dispute andcting informed by the same 
parameters of listening to needs and responding to them in their own terms.  
The male legalist attack against justice as care seemed to define that the regime 
of the rule of law is contrary to the practice of relational justice or justice as care. This 





II-The Question of Legitimacy as Parties Trust in Justice as a Feminine Virtue 
 
 The promotion of justice as a feminine virtue was based on a very peculiar 
reading and interpretation of the Constitutional duties in the practice exposed above. 
General dispositions of the Brazilian Constitution, such as Article 5, item XXXII, which 
determines that the public power should promote consumer protection, was used as the 
authorisation to accept any kind of complaint in order to deliver the widest amount of 
assistance and help to the biggest number of people possible. The male reading of the 
legality took Article 127 and saw there legal reason t  provoke a “mutiny” against the 
“banalisation” of the MP action in consumer protection. The disputes involving 
individual rights should not be the object of ministerial action. Another public body 
should take over this duty. Defenders of the “paternalist” form of action were vesting 
individual cases with public or collective interests in order to justify ministerial action 
but the first aim was to respond to individual problems and urgent needs brought before 
the authority. The male overtake reputed that illegal and non-productive and promote 
the creation of another body not connected to the MP which should pursuit in courts the 
application of law in public, collective or inalienable individual-homogenous rights.  
Nevertheless, justice as care certainly was behind t e general understanding that 
Article 5, XXXII, had lifted consumer relationships to the condition of public matter. In 
this sense, the intervention of the body was justifiable. After the 1988 Constitution, MP 
intervention in judicial disputes involving consumer r lationships became obligatory for 
better protection of consumers. 
 Law, through constitutional rules, seemed to support in a way both positions 
and the victory of male conventional readings imposed itself as a question of Gewalt, of 
force. It is equivalent to saying also that the force of male argumentation was based in 
its legitimacy lent by the past, by the intersubjective validity of its positions and, then, 
in the appearance of consensus that its argument seemed to reveal. The feminine 
practice had on its side a great deal of intuition of the just and the good, the sense of 
mission, the moral enthusiasm in promoting peace and encounter between parties in 
conflict. It is remarkable the absence of Gewalt of the feminine position, its 
vulnerability before one single voice (Mr. L.) that was able to canvass a great deal of 
support in his solitary mutiny, transforming it into a riot that forced the withdrawal of 
all representatives of the different justice. 
One must shed light on the legitimacy of the feminine position by responding to 
the question: “which is the discourse able to legitima e the promotion of justice as a 
feminine virtue?” The victory of male law’s Gewalt should not withdraw the legitimacy 
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of using the feminine practice of MP as a model to bridge the gap tackled in the 
following part two.  
The male counterattack based its legitimacy on a traditional Weberian 
framework in which the delivery of justice should be ased on rational, objective 
parameters and avoid emotional and subjective feelings. Law gives them and the 
judiciary applies them. The MP provokes the judicial m chinery asking for sentences in 
the limits of legal authorisation. Legitimacy is, in this sense, a function of a normative 
prerequisite of rational patterns of legality. However, the male position also used more 
modern criteria of legitimacy to justify its institutional adequacy or to find forums of 
consensus in the institutional community of the MP as a whole. The consensus criterion 
of legitimacy of male discourse is a strong Habermasian conception and seems to call 
for a moral justification for the decision to take a more legalistic and formalist reading 
of law. The consensus argument is not placed in the process of resolving disputes but in 
the institutional fight for recognition of a given style of action (rational/irrational), a 
form of speech (rules/relationship), or a different sort of voice or rationality (male or 
female following Gilligan’s findings). 
The male argumentation drove the service into a bureaucracy with clear routines 
justified by the fear of authoritarism and paternalism, without legal basis. The female 
response was against the computerisation of MP action or its transformation in “a 
laboratory of experience” or rather a game in the taste of boys. The game was to guess 
which would be the Judge’s decision. The consequence was to deny the opportunity to 
parties to settle themselves their disputes through their own understanding of justice. 
The theme is very wide and one must draw here a line in order to mention just 
the criteria which was heard in the male justification of its force. The aim is, indeed, to 
survey conditions of validity and practical feasibility of justice as a feminine virtue by 
having in mind the practical example exposed above. To this, this thesis turns now. 
 
II.1- Parties Satisfaction and Happiness as Contours of Legitimacy of Justice as a 
Feminine Virtue in Parquet’s Action 
 
 Firstly, the MPDFT in its promotion of consumer protection is the ethnographic 
field of this thesis and it offers, instead of disputes, a feminine institutional approach to 
be analysed. It is necessary to understand that consensus, as a criterion of legitimacy, is 
of difficult acceptance even when one examines disputes64. The consensus of parties 
around a specific outcome for their dispute would be a factor of legitimacy of the 
outcome that respected the limits of law only in case of symmetric relationships. 
                                                
64 Lyotard says, commenting Habermas: “Consensus has become an outmoded and suspect value (…). 
We must (…) arrive at an idea and practice of justice hat is not linked to that of consensus” (In Benhabib, 
1991: 205).  
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Besides, the discussion of the legitimacy of a practice in an institutional environment 
demands not a political criterion such as of consensus but a moral one. Furthermore, it 
is inserted in the special relationship between official agents who act morally or with 
great moral enthusiasm and parties that are helped and instructed on the ways to be 
morally careful in the search for an outcome for their disputes through listening and 
being heard. The legitimacy question is highly dependent on declared needs if one 
assumes that people involved in the process of settlement are able to hear and to 
respond with care and responsibility, criteria that enable one to gain legitimacy in 
asymmetric relationships. The process of listening a d responding turns into a very 
delicate undertaking that seems to ask for criteria o  rules, better identified by personal 
fulfilment by authorities of a list of particular personal skills (like empathy showed in 
two different ways by Mr. A and Mr. R.) necessary for a feminine practice of justice. 
This seems to be a promised avenue to equalise the theme of legitimacy in a male way: 
setting a list of general and abstract requisites to be met by officials responsible to 
conduct the process. Nevertheless, this thesis argues for more internal and unstable 
criteria of legitimacy: the achievement of personal satisfaction and happiness by parties 
and officials alike, by disarming the adversarial atmosphere of unilateral victory and 
reaffirming the value of relationships. Then, trust become the core of the legitimisation 
process of institutional practices at parties’ eyes even lacking legitimacy at institution’s 
eyes as an actor that judges the practice and can force it into the marginality of 
illegality. Legitimacy and trust seems to be a continuum between the dispute itself and 
the institutional practice of settlement which aims to function as a regulative criteria to 
overcome the ambiguity that the feminine morality can be accused by male abstract and 
mathematical ways of reasoning (Blegvad, 1997). 
 This ambiguity comes from the fact that legitimacy in a feminine moral frame is 
not about the application of norms but it is the ability of hearing and responding in the 
Other’s terms towards the attainment of satisfaction and happiness. Feminine legitimacy 
cannot be checked by the rightness of the application of any normative set of 
instruction, legitimate or not, since feminine moral practice is based on mending webs 
of relationship through care and responsibility and the practice of empathic and 
inclusive hearing. 
 
II.1.1- Reflexive Law: Help for the Empathic Institutional Practice of Justice as 
Care? 
  
 The arguably unstable character of empathy (Henderson, 1987:1649) would be 
overcome by the potential for “legal reflexivity” that the process of settling dispute 
through the ethics of care could entail. It happens through the creation of specific rules 
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and routines for concrete cases and particular featur s of parties that alters the practice 
of justice “from being a mere function of the market, or of the courts of law or other 
legal agencies, to being a process sensitive to the needs of the disputing parties. These 
reflexive features (…) are necessary for (…) the emergence [of the process of disputes 
settlement] as an autonomous legal subculture while creating the framework within 
which it can legitimize itself” (Banakar, 1998:349).  
The reflexive practice of law eases the reductive character of law and its 
“stilling” effect; it makes law reflexive like love; it is the capacity to think things 
through. The punctual proceduralisation aims at creating rules to warrant the reflexive 
condition of love in the empathic institutional handli g of a particular dispute 
considering needs, happiness and satisfaction of parties.  
Reflexiveness of law facilitates justice as care since it is “content free”. It 
happens through the absence of material rationality. “[I ] does not, for example, decide 
what is in the consumer’s interest: it confines itself to defining who is competent to 
express such interest and to safeguarding their repres ntation” (Wilhelmsson, 1992:62). 
The parties will be competent to decide the content of the outcome of their disputes 
towards satisfaction and happiness. 
Reflexive law gives to parties an opportunity to influence and participate in the 
process of norm formation which is the outcome itself of their dispute. The punctuality 
of the process warrants the possibility to think things through, a necessity in justice for 
asymmetric relationships (Ibid., 63/71). 
Wilhemsson quotes the Nordic Ombudsman who negotiates with business 
representatives as an example of reflexive rationalty, which was observed also in MP 
practices of settling consumer disputes. The author qu tes Teubner in order to warn us 
that reflexive law has an emancipatory and a conservative side. The former, says 
Teubner, is expressed by the capacity of an institution to respond to human needs.65 The 
emancipatory side is the capacity to open the closeness of law for a practice of open 
justice, easing the reductive character of the former (Ibid., 63/70). 
Wilhelmsson offers us the conception of “learning law” to be exercised by 
consumer authorities when they discover in their practice new patterns of law able to 
respond to human needs or more punctually to parties’ happiness and satisfaction. He 
proposes the legitimacy of this practice through the action of public authorities. In 
addition, this thesis proposes the adoption of private or feminine methods of conducting 
learning process in settling disputes by public practices, institutions and authorities. 
This learning is about what is “love”, how to love, how to hear and respond to the Other 
in his own terms with responsibility regarding the relationship. 
                                                
65 Teubner “stresses responsiveness to human needs as central normative criterion for judging social 
institutions” (Wilhelmsson, 1992:70). It has nothing to do with justice as care.  
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Through reflexiveness and empathy, justice as a feminine virtue, like law does, 
in Cotterrell’s words, can free itself from the sources that could challenge its legitimacy. 
The sources are the institutional organisation of the MP itself, or the constitutional 
background or any grand narrative represented by male rational requirements that 
prevent the process from being punctual, contextual, asymmetric, particular and not 
consensual. The death of general criteria for truth asks for the legitimisation of local 
discourses and particular voices. It could be argued as well whether the death of 
transcending criteria of truth would not be the end of legitimacy requirements. The 
challenge however, seems to be the legitimacy of les petits récits and of any free 
expression of personal parameters of satisfaction and happiness in a given concrete 
dispute (Benhabib, 1992:225).  
 There is a very wide source of inspiration in anthropological works about the 
problem of understanding and translation of needs, parties’ satisfaction and happiness 
mainly in adjudicative dispute resolution. The work f L. Cardoso de Oliveira in his still 
unpublished PhD thesis66 is exemplary and an excellent revision of the field. He 
proposes the analogy between problems of legitimacy and understanding and suggests 
that to identify legitimacy with parties’ satisfaction and happiness is problematic, since 
these criteria are too accidental. The warning seem more relevant for the case of 
adjudication where needs, satisfaction or happiness have to be determined by a third 
impartial judge who does not have any reliable normative criteria for that. However, this 
is not the case in the process of conciliation where justice is not delivered but self-made 
by parties under a strong institutional engagement of a very trustworthy and relational 
authority, competent and legitimate to understand the rule-oriented narrative but with no 
power to adjudicate.  
 The other work worthy of mentioning is the research of Conley and O’Barr, a 
lawyer and an anthropologist respectively, that seemed to be inspired by Gilligan’s 
findings67. They heard in courts of law two different voices, storytelling strategies and 
judge’s ability to hear and respond: a relational voice and a rule oriented one. The 
former was identified as a feminine way of expression and moral standing and the later 
a male logic one. The judge’s ability to express law in a relational or rule-oriented 
voice, despite the fact that they prefer normally to use the rule-oriented one, would 
legitimise and guarantee success to relational litigants68. By contrast, he would fail 
                                                
66 Many thanks to Prof. L. Cardoso de Oliveira for having allowed access to his work, thesis and many 
other publications which are worthy of more attentio  than the limits of this thesis allow.  
67 They say: “the parallels between our observations a d the work of Gilligan … are significant” (In 
Cahn, 1992: 1713 and Conley and O’Barr, 1990: 79).  
68 Conley and O’Barr define relational litigants as peo le who expect “the law to be interested in the 
whole range of their personal and social problems. Judges often excoriate such people for ‘wasting the 
court’s time, and their own lawyers sometimes label th m ‘illogical’, ‘stupid’ or even ‘crazy’. (…) By 
contrast, rule-oriented litigants interpret disputes in terms of rules and principles that apply irrespective of 
social status” (1990:60/58). 
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under the rule of a rule-oriented judge, more easily found in courts of law. Justice as 
care would nevertheless constraint this ideological process promoting the free 
expression of any voice or the expansion of “unconstrained storytelling” and the 
possibility of reciprocal listening. Justice as care would have the power of lightening the 
insulation of law and legal systems not only from morals and politics but above all from 
the larger culture (1990:177/176).  The empathic nature of the settlement process is 
again a point upon which the legitimacy of justice as care based on parties’ satisfaction 
and happiness would rest.  
The next section will discuss whether the male rational grand narrative could 
represent a source of legitimacy for justice as a feminine virtue beyond the “immanent 
appeal to the self-legitimation of ‘small narratives’ and the establishment of categories 
for the organisation of perceptions that could preclude the creativity and freedom of the 
process” (Ibid., 229 and Cahn, 1992:1709).  
  
III- The Tension between Demands of Legitimacy and its Promises 
 
 For Levinas, legitimacy for judging is impossible b cause any judgement is 
marked by a deficit of information on and access to the Other’s reality and face. The 
Other as inaccessible makes legitimacy for judging dependent on normative patterns 
derived from formal-rational pre-established criteria which cannot be applied to the 
Other. Ethics of care, through dissolving the inaccessibility of the Other as a moral 
responsibility which is well-responded to by the feminine, very much absent from the 
culture, re-installs the demand of legitimacy. However, legitimacy here is a moral 
exigency not a formal-legal one; it is fulfilled by a moral attitude which differs from the 
normal male morality of rights. The feminine ethics offers as well the conversation with 
the Other not as a way to achieve general peace, consensus or the creation of a 
“discursively organised social rationality” but the opportunity to equalise justice with 
care, needs and responsibility in a relationship with the Other. (Docherty, 1993:25). The 
ethics of care dissolves Levinas' paradox about the activity of judging which is a need in 
any specific case because the Other “summons me, calls for me, begs for me” despite 
the lack of legitimacy of such an endeavour (In ibid., 16). The ethics of care reproves 
judging and offers care as a pattern for justice as a feminine virtue.  
 The emancipatory conception of reflexive law can also be facilitated by  
building this tension. Reflexive law needs a materil rationality; it is the precondition of 
reflexive justice, says Wilhelmsson. “The material and reflexive elements support each 
other” (Wilhelmsson, 1992: 67). How is it possible without transforming parties’ needs 
into material, normative and fix rationality? The aim is to keep them punctual and 
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reflexive, not reduced to legal patterns and/or to establish the re-materialization of law 
by re-inserting moral patterns in law.   
 The tension explored here comes from negating the separation between the 
normative criteria of legitimacy and the moral ones or from the establishment that 
legitimacy as a moral standard can be or should be supported by a normative democratic 
criterion expressed by legality. The normative and the feminine criteria of legitimacy 
could be understood as a continuum rather a dichotomy that must persist. This is 
possible in view of the peculiarities of feminine moral patterns which argue for hearing 
and responding as means of mending the web of relationships. In this sense, the 
discussion on legitimacy is of a very different quality when one thinks about 
legitimising a practice of justice as care.  
The legitimisation of feminine moral patterns, or the rematerialization of law 
through care offers us the possibility to refuse a criticism that was to a certain extent in 
the position of the male overtake diagnosed in MP consumer protection. That criticism 
says that the remoralization of law “promotes the cange in the legal structure to suit the 
needs of situative administrative action and substitutes the deficits of political 
legitimation” promoting authoritarian administrative systems (Maus, 1988:152). It does 
not apply to justice as care, because the door to court proceedings is never closed. The 
guarantee against situationism and authoritarianism is a normative engagement in the 
practice of justice as care where the access to the O r is mediated by the ability to 
hear and respond in his own terms. An “opportunistic treatment of values” is prevented 
through the feminine remoralization of law that attends to particular needs expressed in 
a process conducted by the ability to hear and respond without any transcending 
criterion of truth. The normative support, nonetheless, must not reproduce or re-install 
such criterion. Its position regarding feminine practices is of tension because no statute 
would be able to enumerate legitimate needs to be obs rved in any process of promoting 
justice as care. The tension between female and male paradigms would be translated in 
the tension between a practice that renders homage to particularities and a normative 
apparatus that would keep a possibility of revision n case the practice shows itself 
contrary to personal interests within the scope of law. On the one hand, the practice will 
keep the clue to free oneself from the trappings of the closeness of normative systems. 
On the other, normative patterns that guarantee a possibility of revision of such 
practices will provide a remedy when satisfaction and happiness were not achieved or 
properly observed, reducing them to the patterns elect d by law and substituting the 
moral legitimacy by the normative one as the price for the failure of care in achieving 
agreement in dispute resolution (Christensen, 1995:240).  
The discussion of tension intends to bypass the binarism discussed so far. In this 
sense, the question of legitimacy demands the abandonment of order without law, 
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justice without law, feminine without masculine, sati faction and happiness without 
normative autonomous legality, soft law without hard law. It appears necessary, 
especially for the case of integrated market with a remarkable level of diversity, that 
these dichotomy start to be elaborated as continuums able to propose effective changes 
in law. This is maybe different from the inspiration L. Nader (1984) had drawn from 
Auerbach’s work (1983) about being justice with law a feasible promise as the 
following necessary stage of a development that star ed in Auerbach’s formulation from 
justice without law passing through law without justice. This thesis is not evolutionary 
but suggests a possibility to be fought for through the re-integration of the feminine in 
the culture and in the institutional legitimate life of western human society, before the 
well-admitted failure of established legal institutions to provide justice.  
 Feminine insertion in law humanises cruel market’s reality to which litigation is 
an enemy; an idea that maybe explains the fact that li igation for consumers in cross 
border disputes in the EU is almost impossible. Theinconsistency of litigation in a 
vigorous market regime pretends to legitimate the “lumping it” imposed to consumers. 
Thus, the possibility of a justice that strengths relationships seems to dissolve the 
inappropriateness of litigation in a market regime especially in the EU and to create a 
possibility for the market to respond positively to i s moral responsibility vis-à-vis 
consumers.  
 Furthermore, the co-existence between personal criteria of legitimacy of 
empathic feminine process of justice promotion and masculine rational-legality could be 
elaborated in three different moments of the tension regime. Firstly, the possibility of 
the official promotion of justice as care should integrate legal statute and routine. 
Secondly, the tension would also be healthy if a normative legality of substantive and 
instrumental rules could be provided to regulate disputes in which feminine justice fails 
in the sole judgement of the parties and their aspir tion to satisfaction and happiness. 
Thus, the fear of a world without principles seems to be resolved with a safety net. It 
recalls the example quoted in chapter two of the saf ty net added by women to a scene 
where trapezists were flying high in the air. One can go as high as possible in his 
aspiration for relational resolution of one’s disputes, the net of legality will stand just 
there in case of failure, in case of a fall despite th  fact that the net will not be 
comfortable but will prevent a tragic outcome. Moreov r, the tension is in the fact that 
the net of legality is part of the scene of justice as care but not in the flying itself or in 
the process of dispute resolution through hearing, being heard and responding towards 
satisfaction and happiness. The net, standing in between the trapezists, will disturb their 
piece of art, of encounter, of understanding and harmonisation of particular aspirations 
to satisfaction and happiness. Nevertheless, the tension has also a third function which 
is to offer a regulative idea to direct and limit sa i faction and happiness. However, law 
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in this case should have a “minimalist” position. I this sense, as the rule of law freezes 
judge’s empathic decisions, law should not do that to the public authority with 
competence to conduct settlement of disputes throug j stice as care (Massaro, 
1989:2110-11). 
 The tension proposed is indeed a luxury in terms of legal system that maybe 
only affluent societies and markets like the European one can afford or rather have the 
duty to promote, thereby recognising the richness of human possibilities in overcoming 
differences and resolving problems. Moreover, the tension recognises the limitation of 
unitary Kantian morality and modernist legality and legitimacy. In order to embrace the 
tension as suggested political maturity, material pros erity and institutional availability 
are required and are certainly to hand for EU, as it will be demonstrated in part two of 
this thesis. 
 The tension proposed has also the value of avoiding the human irresponsibility 
and the moral failure in a feminine sense of “ducking of moral choice via refuge in 
legality”. Furthermore, it prevents the market from being regulated by pure private 
means and soft law. These are the two sides of the gap object of the next part and 
chapters: legalism in national courts of law or private settlement of disputes through soft 
law. The insertion of the feminine in legality through a reliable public and European 
institution can secure a feasible moralisation of law and an empathic institutional action. 
Moreover, it “also reminds us of our common humanity and responsibility to one 
another” beyond diversity brought together by a common market (Henderson, 
1987:1653). 
 The tension goes beyond the fears of post-modernism regarding grand narrative; 
it inflicts utopia as practice, and transforms the normative legal apparatus in a safety net. 
The feminine as utopia is also in the tension proposed as the “ practical-moral 
imperative (…) without [which] such a regulative [moral] principle of hope, not only 
morality but also radical transformation is unthinkable” (Benhabib, 1992:229). 
Moreover, the future of law is also uncertain and threatened by stiffness without the 
moral aspiration of having rights forgotten in the name of care or having the former 
transformed into the latter. This transformation would be a task for love, interesse or 
care as institutional will before the willingness of the parties to settle their disputes 
without substantive or procedural rules in the realm of the official duty of dispensing 
justice. Normally, legal systems exist to transform care into rights, i.e., to embrace a 
demand for rights when care had failed. The tension here proposed resides in the 
inversion of this process at its outset in the sense that rights are suspended for care to be 
achieved. The feminine moral understanding is that encounter cannot happen in rights 
but only in care or in relationships very much threatened by the force of law not 





















































Understanding the gap 
 
I - Bridging Parts I and II 
 
 The first part of the thesis was dedicated to building a redefinition of legal 
justice. This was done through the study of the problems with the relationship between 
law and justice as a post-modern question. Feminist legal thought was also a source 
from which a great deal of inspiration was drawn. It was argued that law and justice 
entail a sort of power relationship, which has been resolved in the frames of modernist 
legal theory, which comprises the understanding of justice as mere application of law. 
The rule of law is the measure of justice as much as m le parameters are the measure of 
humanity.  
 Having postulated the difference between law and justice and demonstrated the 
impossibility for normal legal theory to offer a more favourable window through which 
law could be seen differently, a new paradigm was embraced to support a special 
quality of justice required by consumers’ disputes. This paradigm was taken from the 
moral debate between Lawrence Kohlberg and Carol Gilligan, which took place in 
Harvard-USA during the early eighties. This debate is upon two different models of 
moral development: one characteristic of male human beings and a second one, 
discovered by Gilligan when trying to contest Kohlberg’s male approach, shown more 
by female ones. These two different moralities correspond to two different models used 
to resolve moral conflicts, which suggest two rival ways of settling disputes in legal 
arenas. A concrete experience of the feminine model was explored in chapter three in 
order to corroborate a new paradigm for the legal settlement of disputes, which 
corresponds to the contra-model developed by Gilligan. 
 The following question applies: why use consumer law for a special sort of 
justice? 
Firstly, the feminine model of justice is a response to a very precise necessity 
and the theoretical formulation of such a model is a translation of a practice previously 
experienced in the settlement of consumers’ dispute. Therefore, the theory reflects a 
certain practice and responds to a very concrete nec ssity expressed by the special 
nature of relationships of consumption and, consequently, disputes involving 
consumers. Moreover, EC law, apart from reopening old and already settled questions, 
such as those concerning citizenship and sovereignty, accentuates in the most radical 
way the contradictions and peculiarities of the role f the consumerist approach in 
contemporary society. It turns the banality of consumption into the generator, the motor, 
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and the fuel of the most ambitious project of cross-border co-operation and social 
mobility known in mankind’s history. The fundamental human rights and the political 
conquests of citizenship are tantamount to the rights of consumers in a number of ways. 
To disregard that fact is to take the risk of working towards the withering away of a 
unique experience in the political history of the peo les of Europe.  
 In addition, cross-border disputes are the first immediate consequence of the 
flourishing of the internal market. They offer the opportunity to test the model of justice 
for consumers in its most radical form: the encounter with strangers, with the stranger,69 
not only with a foreign person, but another language, another way of being, of 
reasoning, of feeling, of cooking, of mothering, of healing, of collecting the trash, of 
approaching otherness: in other words, banality has been turned into the sacred, 
unapproachable, untouchable, and still unforgettable: it cannot be renounced or 
disregarded.  
 The present thesis, while discussing the relationship between law and justice, 
will place the special sort of justice required forc nsumers’ disputes in an out-of-court 
site, taking the fourfold reasons exposed by the current literature about the civil justice 
crisis: courts “are too expensive; too time consuming; too intimidating and too 
unpredictable in their delivery of justice.” (Lowe, 1993:66) Another common argument 
in favour of a special sort of justice for consumers is the reduced value of their 
complaints. Without denying the truth of that diagnosis, and to the extent to which 
courts are indeed too intimidating, they should be avoided for the settlement of 
consumers’ disputes given, in reality, the essential fe ture of consumers themselves, 
which is called here “relational”. The consumer is a relational partner, irrespective of 
being individually or collectively considered. Indeed, this relational quality pervades the 
whole consumption relationship, assuming that any businessperson runs his/her 
business with the goal of continuity, expansion andsuccess.  
The weak condition of the consumer vis-à-vis the position of the merchant does 
not play a special role here, since disputes involving consumer rights are special cases 
to be used for a justice informed by an ethic of care understood as opposed to a justice 
informed by the ethics of rights. Instead of rights, justice for consumers will search for 
sensible solutions that attend to needs, happiness and atisfaction rather than legal rights 
or legal decisions.  
The plight of consumers goes beyond mere economic weakness and it leads to a 
more comprehensive phenomenon when one looks into the legal systems, especially the 
European one, in order to identify the options for c nsumers in disputes against 
merchants or professionals.  
                                                
69 In Portuguese when one goes abroad, one says that “one goes to the stranger”. 
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The redefinition of justice proposed goes beyond the mere understanding of 
access to justice as a legal right to embrace the idea of justice as a moral exercise that 
law must support. It may be considered the place of law and the important social 
political conquests of the enlightenment such as the principles of rule of law, equality, 
impartiality, legal certainty and the like, since this thesis works to demonstrate their 
relative and reduced usefulness for justice for consumers especially in cross-border 
disputes. Moreover, given that there is little doubt about the necessity of the 
establishment of redress mechanisms for consumers in cross-border disputes and that 
access to justice is part of the economic and political integration of Europe (Weatherill, 
1994:69), especially after the establishment of the single currency, being also ancillary 
to the four freedoms of the European Community, (Fallon, 1992:259) one has to ask: 
“which justice?”.  
The feminine justice developed in the first part of the thesis, and which will be 
translated and adapted to the European reality, is not a pure reproduction and defence of 
the ADR system and its methods of the settlement of disputes. Surely, the justice 
informed by the ethics of care resembles mediation and, in some respects, the 
ombudsman system. Nevertheless, mediation needs to be endowed with authority, and 
the Ombudsman is a kind of adjudication, who suppresses the freedom of the parties to 
settle by themselves their disputes, and frustrates th  encounter between strangers and 
the profound pedagogical meaning of such opportunity. In turn, feminine justice does 
not embrace the purely informal solutions where lawyers and formalities are forgotten 
and adjudication can take place without those common elements of any proceedings of 
law, since it is unlikely that the relationship invol ed and its relational feature will be 
protected. Feminine justice argues against the ability of adjudication, which is based on 
the rule of law and the principles of equality, impartiality, and legal certainty, to care for 
the relationship involved in a legal dispute, since th  practice of adjudication entails the 
formal-abstract model of legal reasoning used by the morality of rights. 
 At this point, having argued that consumers need a special quality of justice, it 
appears convenient to try to answer a couple of questions as such: why focus on EC law 
and cross-border disputes? 
 EC law is used because of the uniqueness of the European experience of 
economic, monetary and political integration. This integration represents a great 
challenge in promoting togetherness and respecting diversity. Justice as an experience 
of the encounter of strangers could not have a better background. Cross-border disputes 
are chosen here for they actualise the challenge of the EU order: to promote 
togetherness while respecting diversity.  
 This chapter will be developed in three sections. The first defines the gap to be 
bridged, setting up firstly four landmarks for the discussion of the present chapter. The 
 140
main question will be: “which gap in the EC consumer policy concerning cross-border 
disputes?”70 The second section will be devoted to the analysis of the Private 
International Law regarding cross-border consumer disputes that do not involve tort 
liability. It will also include a modest consideration upon the Rome and Brussels 
Conventions and Regulation 44/200171 and the gap in the light of the Europeanisation of 
private law and PIL and the findings of two studies prepared for the Commission of the 
European Union on the costs of judicial disputes for consumers in the internal market. 
The third section will analyse the out-of-court project as expression of the gap. 
  
II- Defining the Problem 
 
It is necessary to discuss the general ideas that compound the theoretical 
background of our discussion on consumer protection in general and in the EC legal and 
political environment. It will, hopefully, strengthen the frames of the discussion as a 
whole. Besides, it may be prudent to warn the reader that these considerations are 
deemed to be repeated throughout the rest of the thesis, especially the discussion upon 
the gap, the object of the current chapter. Another prudent warning refers to the sketchy 
nature of these considerations since each one of them could entail in itself a lengthy 
discussion. They are solely landmarks of the general configuration of the object of the 
European part of the thesis.  
The gap in EC consumer law and policy regarding access to justice for 
consumers is informed by a peculiar problematic correlation of four pillars, namely: the 
centrality of consumer issues in the consolidation and expansion of European economic 
integration and therefore in EC law; the inability of law to shape consumers’ 
transactions; the inappropriateness of national solutions for the internal market problem 
regarding access to justice for consumers; and the somewhat problematic position of 
courts to settle consumer disputes.  
  
II.1- The Centrality of Consumer Issues for the European Legal and Political 
Armoury 
 
The first pillar of the discussion is the centrality of consumer issues in European 
integration and its troublesome nature, which is due to its erratic, patchy and incomplete 
development. Consumer protection is “(…) probably the most central issue (…) of 
European market integration.” (Weatherill, 1997:1) This seems to be so because 
“[c]onsumer law relates to the quality of life.” (Reich, in Stuyck, 2000:370) This is said 
                                                
70 This sentence does not have a verb based upon the well-known title of Alastair MacIntyre’s book: 
“Whose justice? Which rationality?” 
71 OJ L 12/1, 16/1/2001. 
 141
because the politics of European economic integration, whilst bringing forth the market 
without boundaries, has to take account of the role of the individual. The argument is 
that the individual that emerges as a responsibility of the internal market is a consumer. 
The imposition of the consumer as the subject of the market brings forth a quite special 
transformation in the quality of consumer law. Consumer law has been developed 
worldwide away from the frames of the private law of c ntracts to enter the realm of 
public-social policies72. This entails, on the one hand, that the frames for a special sort 
of justice adapted to consumer needs will demand a transformation in the public way of 
dealing with private problems. On the other hand, the public safeguards will probably 
demand a retention of very specific tenets of private relationships as a counter 
movement of the publicization of private matters.73  Thus, as seen in the second chapter, 
the private seems to grow and demand space in the public realm whilst provoking a 
transformation of the latter by the adoption of patterns of the former. 
 Regarding EC consumer law and policy, the theme of the “gap” is manifold, 
especially because the development of consumer law and policy in EC law has 
happened in an indirect way: consumer protection was not an aim of the founding 
fathers of the European Economic Community. The EEC Treaty did not contain explicit 
provision for the adoption of any kind of legislation or policy in favour of consumers. 
Nevertheless, EC consumer law and policy did not wai until Maastricht to start its life 
in EC law; it developed before Maastricht and was bed on the political will and 
necessity to establish a “level playing field” also for consumers, as economic integration 
became increasingly consolidated.  The regulatory gap was, nevertheless, always 
present insofar as the Treaty until Maastricht did not offer any constitutional base for 
derived legislation and policy. Articles 94, 308 and, after the Single European Act, 
Article 95 were the legal base for the formulation of EC consumer law and policy.    
In addition, more remarkable is the solution offered by the European law case, 
on the abandonment of the rhetoric of consumer rights to the benefit of the consumer 
choice policy as a way to fill the legal vacuum. The consumer benefits from economic 
                                                
72 Away from Weatherill’s argument, consumer policies ncreasingly demand a forum of social policy, 
especially in the realm of foodstuff regulation, weak ning or even leaving behind the “scepticism about 
whether the EC should even have a consumer policy at all.” (Weatherill, 1997:4)  “Within the field of 
civil law itself, consumer legislation is a prime example of the (…) intrusion of mandatory rules into the 
once free territory of the law of contracts, thus re ulting in a reduction of the freedom of private parties to 
contract.” (Erauw, 1990:71)  Besides, the indirect growth of EC consumer law and policy seems to be a 
thing of the past. Moreover, one could affirm that nowadays it has achieved a central place in the genral 
frames of EC law and policy despite the claimed constitutional gap or “absence of any explicit base in the 
Treaty” to push forth a coherent EC consumer policy and law. (Ibid., 12) “Environmental protection and 
consumer protection are new concerns which were of little political importance when the original Treaty 
was drafted. They have now become so important that no politician or government can afford to ignore 
them.” (Edward, 1987:19-20) Indeed, the truth is that consumer policy has been seen as the “kleine 
Schwester” of environment policy. However, the relevance of EC consumer law is increasingly asserted 
and it “seems to have outgrown its ‘Schneewittchenrolle’ (…)”. (Stuyck, 2000:367) 
73 It does not mean soft law, against which the following chapter argues. 
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integration insofar as the choice in consumption enlarges with the effectiveness of the 
internal market. The Treaty is an instrument of the Market and the Court is the guardian 
of the Treaty and of the consolidation and flourishing of the internal market, which 
guarantees the enhancement of consumer choice. The free movement of goods and 
services throughout the Market must not be obstructed by restrictive national policy 
unless mandatory requirements are at stake. The Cassis de Dijon and Dassonville 
doctrines, judicially elaborated, in different directions, are examples of the way the 
European Court has bridged the legal gap in EC consumer law. The protection of 
consumers is effective through clear information by efficient labelling and advertising, 
for instance. Consequently, the well-informed and educated consumer does not need 
protection; he has benefited from the expansion of the market and the lack of formal 
legal base seems not to be a problem. Consequently, EC consumer law and policy has 
been developed in a patchy way against the background f the absence of constitutional 
basis for that. 
The European Court of Justice has been acting which t e framework of EC 
legality in order to outline a possible EC consumer policy and law, by dismantling the 
language of consumer rights and inaugurating the realm of consumer choice, in 
response to the silence of the Treaties and secondary legislation. Weatherill has been 
very precise in characterising the actions of the Court to promote awareness on the role 
of consumers in the evolution of the internal market. He understands the evolution of 
EC consumer law and policy, promoted by the Court, from being based on the informed 
consumer (Cassis de Dijon and Dassonville formulas) to the stage when the market 
needs the confident consumer to continue its growth. The Amsterdam European Council 
in June 1997 stressed the vital role of the confidet consumer for the continuity and 
“viability of a cross-border market.” (Weatherill, 1999:714) Thus, the question of access 
to justice, already crucial for EC consumer law and policy, becomes extremely urgent 
insofar as the European Court whilst filling up the regulatory gap by establishing 
consumer choice in the absence of consumer rights, establishes the situation where 
informed consumers need no protection and no justice. “Consumer rights have, it seems, 
been overridden by consumer choice.” (Reich, 1992:25) It is to be wondered whether 
the definition of consumer by Community Law has “been inspired by the idea that the 
advent of the Internal Market renders protection unecessary.” (Reich, 1995:293) In 
truth, the language of rights filling up the legal gap offers “choice” as a substitute for 





II.2- The Purposeless of Consumer Legislation 
 
A second background idea regarding consumer protecti n in general refers to a 
very interesting fact that consumer legislation seems to lack serious purpose or 
intention. One calls it “symbolic legislation”. It refers to the one that “appear[s] to help 
consumers, in order to legitimise the current political and economic system while 
simultaneously failing to alter significantly the power and economic relations between 
merchants and consumers”. (Whitford, 1981:1018) This severe critique is applied to the 
erratic and patchy growth and development of EC consumer law and policy in case no 
purposive action is performed in the crucial area of ccess to justice for consumers, in 
coming years. Without effective access to justice, the sophisticated armoury of 
substantive rules will not produce any effect either on righting or preventing the wrong. 
The only way to remove this criticism against consumer legislation or policy is to set up 
effective mechanisms for the realisation of legal justice.  Another aspect of this 
argument is the peculiar “limited ability of law to affect consumer transactions”.  
(Ibidem) This aspect will permeate the very special quality of justice that consumers’ 
disputes require, and called here justice as care or as a feminine virtue. Besides, the 
symbolic nature of consumer legislation is to be ovrcome by “hybrid remedies” which 
consist of, for instance, “the availability of informal dispute settlement mechanisms” 
and a strong role for public authorities. (Ibid., 1043)  
  
II.3- Consumer Protection as a Moral Responsibility of the Market  
 
The third pillar of this present framework is the increasing ineffectiveness and 
inappropriateness of national solutions for consumer protection in a market economy in 
general and especially in cross-border disputes. Firstly, one must consider how 
extremely cumbersome, erratic and time consuming the process of transposition of 
directives to national orders is. Apart form the difficulties about harmonising legal 
concepts at both substantive and procedural levels, one must consider the long period of 
time usually required for the transposition. For instance, the Directive on Unfair Terms 
in Consumer Contracts of 1993 was implemented in the UK on 1st October 1999, 
replacing an earlier version of 1st July 1995. (Ervine, 2000:2) Transposition is necessary 
because of the verticality of directives, which impedes their binding effects among 
private individuals 
 Nonetheless, the Francovich principle, on the one hand, teaches that national 
courts must apply national law observing Community law, namely, directives, which 
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are clear enough not to depend upon further national me sures or interpretation. On the 
other hand, it lays down the liability of the member state that causes damage by failing 
to implement a directive, which does not sound realistic in the case of small consumer 
claims. 
The national transposition of directives in practice means “that the effectiveness 
of Community law is almost entirely dependent on the quality of the legal solutions 
adopted in the national context.” (Curtin&Mortelmans, 1994:432) 
The gap in this respect is due to the fierce defence of national legal orders, 
which impedes a proper legal response at the Community level to problems arising from 
the establishment of the internal market, with extrmely prejudicial effects on the 
functioning, unity and growth of the common market.   
 
II.4- The Role of Courts 
 
The fourth pillar regards the role of courts concering the empowerment of 
consumers. The absence of effective access to justice has also been said to be a very 
important cause of the impoverishment of the socially and economically weaker party in 
a legal dispute especially when it involves a consumer. (Da Veiga, 1992:270) Besides, 
this impoverishment is much wider than its mere economic expression and it includes 
important aspects of the human integrity of any person. The consumer in court 
proceedings is not only economically handicapped; his inability to deal with this 
normally very formal environment and the inadequacy of his means to behave in the 
scene are manifold, especially when the dispute is of little economic importance. The 
presence of a lawyer is likely to be needed. Furthermore, the theme of access to justice, 
especially for consumers, embraces many aspects of social conviviality to a point that it 
may be wondered whether it “peut imposer une inflexion dans les principes généraux de 
l’access à la justice”. (Ibidem) The argument goes further to propose a quite substantial 
inflection of principles of law to empower the person behind the consumer and 
deconstruct the cruel reality that “all is market and everyone is a consumer.” 
(Rawlings&Willet, 1994:3) 
 Having accepted the crucial necessity of tackling diverse aspects of EU 
consumer law and policy, like access to justice, th general discussion thereupon is 
likely to happen in the realm of the syntax of rights, through the language or morality of 
rights. Therefore, the gap to be bridged has ultimately a procedural nature and 
consumers’ disputes in the EU demand a special kind of justice. 
 Furthermore, it is helpful to look at the relevance of courts in international 
disputes. Empirical studies have demonstrated, on the one hand, their general 
importance especially in matters related to non-economic disputes, but on the other, its 
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“rather marginal role (…) in complex and –in terms of money- important disputes.” 
(Von Freyhold et alli, 1996)  The big money tries to avoid the interference of impartial 
third parties, like judges, acutely in cross-border litigation, preferring to reach 
settlement through alternative ways. “Some business branches such as the banking, 
insurance, and maritime industries evade the courts by self-regulation.” (Ibid., 277)  
The case of consumers in cross border disputes seems to be related to the 
problematic role of courts and to the necessity that one establishes “a complex legal-
cultural environment around the judicial process”. (Ibid., 280) This complexity means 
that justice for consumers has to happen outside courts since they are deemed to apply 
well-established general principles of law,  by subsuming the particularity of a case into 
general rules. In this sense, the first part of this esis defined a moral gap of law that 
courts, as courts of law or agents of proceedings of law, express. Diversity collapses 
into generality in any “fair” application of law and a great deal of individual and 
personal needs are deemed to be equalised with a general formula, or subsumed into a 
legal provision or, ultimately, to be ignored. Thus, the framework for access to justice 
for consumers in cross-border disputes in the EC internal market will formulate in order 
to respond to this first general gap –understood as ancillary to the specificity of 
consumer’s relationships- and to the very specific European procedural gap.   
 Thus, there are two different gaps: first, a general moral gap regarding the 
ineffectiveness or incapability of adjudicators to respond to needs, satisfaction, 
happiness and particularities involved in consumers’ di putes by means of fair 
application of legal principles, rules or codes of c nduct abstractly enacted. The moral 
gap of law grows since the market does not offer institutional spaces where individuals 
are more than consumers.  The moral gap of law is a function of access to justice in the 
frames of the language of rights. Courts as a place where individuals are mere bearers of 
rights establish a gap called moral.  
The second configuration of the gap regards the concrete difficulties in the EU 
for a consumer to be heard before a judge in order to resolve a dispute, quite often of 
low economic significance, originating from a cross-border purchase. These difficulties 
amount to a real impossibility and a denial of justice in the sense of recognition and 
enforceability of rights, as discussed in the next section. Access to justice for consumers 
in the internal market has already been understood as a “perennial problem in consumer 
protection” in the internal market. (Weatherill, 1994:43)  
The Commission has been very careful in tackling consumer protection because 
of the problems regarding the subsidiarity principle. Nevertheless, there is a very 
inspiring reading of subsidiarity which enumerates three dimensions thereof. Apart from 
the competence and the institutional dimensions of ubsidiarity, Micklitz offers a third 
dimension in which the individual has to be considere . This third dimension calls on 
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the Community to accept the responsibility of promoting “a minimum social 
integration” (at the level of the market) as the price of economic integration. (1993:511) 
This social integration, following Micklitz’s argument, seems to be facilitated by the 
role of the consumer in the internal market. Access to justice for consumers in the 
internal market, in its double gap, is the vein through which a new avenue can be forged 
for social integration and redemption of the social debt of the market. The aim is a 
market where one denies “[t]he preference for economic right over a human right in its 
fullest sense”, and the identification of consumers’ rights merely with its economic 
expression, the consideration of which is warranted by consumer choice and 
information. (Schilling, 1994:247)  
Thus, the argument to be defended in the next section is that the second gap 
cannot be bridged by the rules of private international law (PIL), because, firstly, it does 
not sound morally appropriate that the market generates the problem and let the solution 
to be dealt with by national orders following the rules of PIL. Secondly, because of the 
overwhelming dimension of the practical problems that PIL puts for a consumer 
involved in cross-border disputes. Furthermore, “both the Sutherland Report and the 
Green Paper on Consumer Guarantee share a common sceptici m about the efficacy of 
the rules of private international law in building consumer confidence”. (Weatherill, 
1994:46) The question of the next section is: Would exclusive reliance on rules of PIL 
to determine which court has jurisdiction and which law it will apply to resolve a 
consumer dispute provide the ‘high level of protection’ required by Article 153 of the 
Treaty on European Union? 
 
III – The gap under the rules of Private International Law (PIL) – The Provisions 
on Consumer Contracts of the Brussels and Rome Conventions and Council 
Regulation 44/2001 
  
The gap regarding justice for consumers in cross-border disputes is usually 
denied since the Community legal order provides twoEuropean Conventions, which, 
added to the armoury of PIL, help to decide both the law applicable to trans-border 
disputes in private matters and the competent court t  settle them. They are the Rome 
Convention74 of 19 June 1980, on the law applicable to contractual obligations, and the 
Brussels Convention75 of 27 September 1968, on jurisdiction and the enforcement of 
judgements in civil and commercial matters, converted into the Council Regulation 
44/2001.76 
                                                
74 OJ L 266/1, 09/10/1980. 
75 OJ C 189/1, 30/10/1978. 
76 See footnote no. 3. 
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 One can see an incontestable gap in the legal framework of EC law regarding the 
settlement of consumers cross-border disputes. This entails a great deal of intimidating 
factors such as cultural and language diversity, phsical distance and disproportionate 
financial costs. Moreover, the low redress usually sought by consumers does not justify 
the legal effort. Therefore the demand that is upon the consumer is disproportionate, 
consequently unjust, and amounts to a denial of justice. A simple cross-border purchase 
of a durable product can entail a number of problems which might discourage a more 
thoughtful consumer. These problems can arise from n t having technical assistance in 
the country of the residence of the purchaser, to very complicated legal questions on 
which law would be applicable in case of dispute and to which court the claim should 
be addressed, to whom to talk in case of problems, since language diversity is likely to 
be an issue, how to return the goods and obtain the ec ssary redress, inter alia. These 
alone are able to discourage cross-border purchases, compromising to a great extent the 
free movement of goods and services, for example in the case of financial services 
across frontiers and e-commerce.  
 The rules of PIL establish the law applicable to a dispute and the court 
competent to decide the case. PIL is important in the realm of the EU because the 
dispensation of legal justice remains a national duty given that political integration 
keeps the organisation of the judicial system in the hands of national sovereignty. In this 
sense, “once problems and disputes arise, the idea of the internal market just vanishes to 
make space for the reemergence of (…) [fifteen] andeven more judicial systems, 
jealous of their sovereignty.” (Goyens, 1992:90-1) 
 PIL was born out of the coupling of national sovereignty jealousy and necessity 
“to protect the fulfilment of the obligations of cross-border contracts (…). (…) Thus, 
private international law is understandable as an attempt of legal science to avoid gaps 
in legal regulation, but in practice it contributes little to resolving the insecurity problem 
of cross-border legal relations.” (Gessner, 1996:19/2 ) This is said regarding the 
situation of access to justice for traders in the int rnational scene. However, it is even 
truer regarding the situation of consumers in cross-border disputes in EU, where PIL 
leaves serious problems, such as the high cost of security in identifying both the law 
applicable and the competent court to settle the dispute. In fact, it means denial of 
justice and, in practice, great insecurity and a hurdle for the expansion and consolidation 
of the internal market. “Indeed, one of the elements which places consumers in a weaker 
position than professionals is the complexity of the law itself. This complexity is a 
deterrent for the consumer seeking proper redress as well as a matter which makes the 
struggle for such redress more expensive.” (Lewis, 1992:145) The critique against the 
adoption of the rules of PIL has not been overcome by the recent Europeanisation of the 
Brussels Convention, since that security for the settlement of consumer cross-border 
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disputes actually promotes adversarial justice. Theinadequacy of the adversarial spirit 
of proceedings of law, especially for consumer disputes, configures the gap.  
The analysis of the texts of the Rome Convention and Regulation 44/2001 
concerning consumer’s contracts serves to understand the degree of complexity of the 
rules of PIL in consumer cross-border disputes, and the proportions of the gap. A line is 
drawn here in order to exclude tort liability, to stay only with contract liability, in the 
hope of demonstrating fully the extension of the procedural gap in EU consumer law on 
cross-border disputes. Another restriction will be regarding the capacity of associations 
to cross frontiers in order to sue. In sum, this discussion will approach only the case for 
individual consumers without denying the gap on consumer representation in cross-
border disputes in EU, even after the Directive on c sumer injunctions.77 
 
III.1 – The Rome Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations78 - 
The Case for Consumers 
  
In cases of a claim with a foreign element, the first question that arises is to 
determine the law applicable. Thus, the Rome Convention is the source of help if the 
claim involves member states which have signed and r tified the Convention, otherwise 
one has to observe the national rules of PIL of the legal orders involved.  
The legal determination of the law applicable to a cross-border dispute will 
demand a search as to whether the countries involved are signatories to the international 
Convention and whether it has already entered in force therein.  Most probably the party 
will need to contact the consular representation of the countries under question since 
normally the literature available is never updated, nor comprehensive enough. This is 
invariably time-consuming. In the case of the Rome Convention, which involves the 
member states of the EU, each time a new accession happens, as with Finland, Sweden 
and Austria, new terms are negotiated and then a new round of deposit and ratification 
might be necessary. Consequently, it is highly prudent to make sure the convention 
regulating the conflict of rules applicable is in force in the specific country whose law 
seems to be the one applicable to the case.79  
                                                
77 OJ L 166/51, 11/6/98. 
78 This refers to the consolidated version of the 1980 Rome Convention, published in OJ C 27/36, 
26/1/98. 
79 The words by Mr. Mario Monti, Commissioner of the European Commission, responding to a question 
on the Brussels Convention on 11/10/96, as published in the OJ C 83/36, of 14.3.97 can be applied to the 
Rome Convention. He sais that Austria, Finland and Sweden are obliged to accede to the Brussels 
Convention under the Article 4(2) of their Act of Accession to the EU Treaties. He continues saying: “An 
accession convention could be signed before the end of the year [1996] after which the fifteen Member 
States will have to start the ratification procedures provided for by their constitutions. It is planned that 
such a convention will enter into force on the first day of the third month after the date on which two 
signatory States, (…), have deposited their instruments of ratification. Belgium has not yet ratified the 
1989 accession convention.” He also said that the Commission was taking the necessary proceedings 
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The preamble of the Rome Convention says that it was el borated “to establish 
uniform rules concerning the law applicable to contractual obligations”, aiming at 
security for contractual relationships. Thus, it makes clear the rules for choosing the 
appropriate law applicable to a contract with a foreign element in it.  
Regarding consumer protection we must mainly analyse Articles 3, 4, 5,7 and 
paragraph 5 of Article 9.  
Article 3 establishes the main characteristic of the Convention which is about 
freedom of choice. This means that the parties to a c ntract may freely choose the law 
that will govern it. The article permits depeçage or severability, which is the possibility 
that the contract can be governed by different laws regarding different obligations 
within it. The choice must be asserted with “reasonble” certainty, which creates a 
problem, because it seems that it does not need to be written or clearly established, 
remaining always, or especially in cases of dispute, to the judge to say whether choices 
are made reasonably certain way. Another peculiarity is hat the Convention permits the 
parties to a contract to change their choice of the law applicable to it if it does not 
maculate the validity of the contract and does not “adversely affect the rights of third 
parties”. The freedom of choice enshrined in the Convention cannot however derogate 
“mandatory rules”. Furthermore, the validity of the choice will depend on the 
observance of the capacity criteria for being party to a contract, formal and material 
validity of the choice. The rules that determine thlaw applicable to these aspects are 
enshrined in Articles 11, 9 and 8 respectively. 
Nevertheless, the choice might be absent, or not be reasonably certain or not 
valid. In these cases, article 4 might be applicable despite the fact that its text mentions 
just the hypothesis on which the law applicable to the contract had not been chosen. To 
exclude the other two hypotheses for the application of Article 4 does not sound in 
keeping with the whole spirit of the Convention. The general criterion is “the law of the 
country with which [the contract] is most closely connected.” The problems with the 
application of this rule have been severe. Firstly, the same first paragraph establishes the 
possibility that different parts of the contract can be governed by different laws. 
Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 offer “presumptions” which, in accordance with paragraph 5 
“shall be disregarded if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is 
more closely connected with another country.” The presumption in paragraph 2 is “that 
the contract is most closely connected to the country where the party who is to effect the 
                                                                                                                                    
under the provisions of Article 10 of the EU Treaty in order to remedy this situation of that Honourable 
Member. Stone (1998) says that in Oct 1997 the Brussels Convention was in force in Belgium in its 1989 
version and that the 1996 version was not in force in any of the Member States. The Lugano Convention 
can supplement any eventual gap but it was not in force in Belgium and in Greece in 1998. The 
Commission states in the COM (1999) 348 that “[t]he Brussels Convention, as amended following the 
accession negotiations with Austria, Finland and Sweden, has not yet entered into force for all Member 
States as only a minority of them have ratified it.” 
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performance which is characteristic of the contract has, at the time of conclusion of the 
contract, his habitual residence, or, in case of a body corporate or unincorporate, its 
central administration.”  However, in the same paragraph, one reads that “if the contract 
is entered into force in the course of the party’s rade or profession”, then the most 
closely connected country shall be the one “in which the principal place of business is 
situated or, (…) the country in which the place of business other than the principal, 
under the terms of the contract, influences its performance, is situated.”  
Paragraph 3 regulates the hypothesis on immovable property by presuming that 
“the contract is most closely connected with the country where the immovable property 
is situated.” 
Paragraph 4 establishes that a contract for the carriage of goods does not fall 
within the presumption of paragraph 2. The contract is most closely connected to the 
country in which the carrier has, at the time the contract is concluded, his principal 
place of business, if that country is also the place of the loading, or “of discharge or the 
principal place of business of the consignor is situated”. The paragraph does not offer 
another presumption in case none of the coincidences enshrined in it rest verified. 
Paragraph 5 introduces the concept of “characteristic performance” to establish 
that paragraph 2 does not apply if it is not possible to determine which is the 
characteristic performance of a contract. It also says that “the presumptions in paragraph 
2, 3 and 4 shall be disregarded if it appears from the circumstances as a whole that the 
contract is more closely connected with another country.” 
Article 5 regulates “certain consumer contracts” and thanks its provisions the 
Rome Convention is considered consumer-friendly. Nevertheless, the advantages of this 
Article benefit a very low number of cases. It does not cover all the situations where one 
can identify a consumption relationship with a foreign element in it.  
The first paragraph establishes that the Article applies to a contract whose object 
“is the supply of goods or services to a person (‘the consumer’) for a purpose which can 
be regarded as being outside his trade or profession, or a contract for the provision of 
credit for that object.” The paragraph adopts, in large terms, the definition of consumer 
from the Brussels Convention and this definition sets the first landmark for the 
characterisation of a contract as a consumer contract. The party to a consumer contract 
has to act outside his trade or profession but, at first glance, could be a legal person.80 
There have been countless problems with this concept in the  jurisprudence of the 
courts81 because of the potential exclusion of many situations, for instance, a lawyer 
                                                
80 The Article 2, first indent, of the Directive 87/102, OJ L 42/48, last amended by Directive 98/7, OJ L 
101/17, on consumer credit excludes the possibility of being consumers legal persons. In the same vein 
the Directive on doorstep contracts, 85/557, OJ L371/ 1. 
81 The following cases deserve attention for details bout the problems that this definition of consumer 
can provoke: C-361/89, Di Pinto, [1991] ECR I-1189, C-89/91, Hutton [1993] ECR I-139, C-45/96, 
Dietzinger, [1998] ECR I-119, C-99/96, Judgment of April 27, 1999, not yet published. 
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buying a personal laptop for his personal use. Thisprovision is related to Article 13 of 
the Brussels Convention, which is also elaborated around a pure normative rather than 
empirical concept of “consumer”, and confirmed by the jurisprudence of the European 
Court when interpreting that Convention. Article 15 of the Regulation 44/2001 repeats 
it. Reich argues for the urgency of a concept of consumer in the terms suggested by 
Wilhelmsson’s writings, which propose that “Community law still has to develop a 
‘need’ concept in contract law (…)”. (Reich, 1995:292) Besides, the settlement of civil 
disputes, especially consumer disputes, demands the elaboration of a practice of justice 
able to attend to needs, satisfaction and happiness. Moreover, the definition of 
“consumer” should undergo enlargement to embrace the conception established by the 
Directive on e-commerce. This differentiates, in its Article 2, “consumer” from the 
“recipient of the service”, who can be the legal or natural person acting for professional 
purposes or not.82 
Paragraph 2 invalidates the choice of law in consumer contracts that prejudice 
the consumer vis-à-vis more protective and mandatory rules of the country where he has 
his habitual residence, in three hypotheses:  
“-if in that country [of the consumer habitual residence] the conclusion of the 
contract was preceded by a specific invitation addressed to him by advertising, and he 
had taken in that country all the steps necessary on his part for the conclusion of the 
contract, or 
-if the other party or his agent received the consumer’s order in that country, or 
-if the contract is for the sale of goods and the consumer travelled from that 
country to another country and there gave his order, provided that the consumer’s 
journey was arranged by the seller for the purpose of inducing the consumer to buy.” 
Paragraph 3 makes sure that if the contract is a consumer contract in the terms of 
paragraph 1 and 2 then the law applicable is the law of the country where the consumer 
has his habitual residence. 
Paragraph 4 excludes from the scope of Article 5 the contracts of carriage and 
“for the supply of services where the services are to be supplied to the consumer 
exclusively in a country other than that in which he has his habitual residence.” 
Paragraph 5, notwithstanding the provisions of paragr ph 4, establishes that 
Article 5 “shall apply to a contract which, for an i clusive price, provides for a 
combination of travel and accommodation.” 
The most important characteristic of the Rome Convention on consumer 
contracts, enshrined first in the Brussels Convention, s that only protects the passive 
consumer. The active consumer, who shops around and throughout the internal market 
in order to explore its advantages, is unfortunately xcluded from the protective 
                                                
82 OJ l 178/9, 17/7/2000. 
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provisions of both Conventions. In the case of the active consumer in cross-border 
disputes, the general rules are applicable and, certainly, it will require access to a 
foreign legal order. Regulation 44/2001 and the Direct ve on certain aspects of e-
commerce changed this situation in order to extent protection to the quasi-active 
consumer. 
To sum up, the Rome Convention permits the free choice f the law applicable 
to a consumer contract but establishes as well that such choice may not prevent the 
consumer from enjoying any protection from mandatory rules he might afford from the 
application of the law in his country of residence.  In the case where no law has been 
chosen, the law applicable will be the one from theresidence of the consumer. 
Nevertheless, those favourable provisions must not be applied in any case out of only 
four limited hypotheses established by the Convention. First, when the contract 
originates from an invitation from abroad received in his country of residence or from 
an advertisement in his country of residence and all the steps to the completion of the 
purchase is performed in his country of residence. S cond, the consumer order is 
received by the supplier or his agent in the consumer country of residence. Third, the 
contract is concluded abroad having the transport of the consumer to that country from 
his own residence provided by the seller with the aim t persuading the purchaser. This 
is called the Little Red Riding Hood clause. Fourth, the contract of package tour which 
provides a combination of travel and accommodation for an inclusive price. 
Article 7 is also important for the case of consumer contracts since it privileges 
the application of mandatory rules of another country with which the situation has a 
close connection whatever the rules applicable to the contract. The decision to apply 
mandatory rules to the disadvantage of whatever rule applicable to the contract has 
however to be decided regarding “their nature and purpose and (…) the consequences of 
their application or non-application”. Judicial discretion will play a major role in this 
matter. Paragraph 2 reaffirms the absolute primacy of the application of mandatory rules 
of the law of the forum irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract. In 
this hypothesis, however, one could challenge this ab olute rule when the law 
applicable to the contract is more favourable to the consumer. The mandatory rules will, 
following the application of paragraph 2 of Article 7, prejudice the consumer. In order 
to avoid this unpleasant consequence, one has to read paragraph 2 with the caveat of the 
second part of paragraph 1. 
Furthermore, the decision whether a rule is mandatory or not and whether it will 
protect more than the law applicable to the contract is a complex matter left for the 
court. A legal professional will not be able to offer a secure opinion or advice on this 
and forum shopping is useless and unlikely to happen due to the unpredictability of the 
decision of a judge on this matter. However, the mandatory rules of the habitual 
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residence is deemed to provide minimum rather than m ximum protection, which gives 
the opportunity to postulate the priority of the law of choice in case it gives more 
protection than the mandatory rules do. On the other and, there is also the 
interpretation that the scope of this provision is not the maximisation of consumer 
protection but rather the mere preservation of mandatory rules. This excludes the 
possibility of cumulative application of rules “on a pick-and-choose basis” and amounts 
that the application of mandatory rules could hypothetically exclude the application of a 
law of choice more favourable to the consumer. (Kaye, 1993:212) 
Finally, paragraph 5 of Article 9 determines that the formal validity of consumer 
contracts “is governed by the law of the country in which the consumer has his habitual 
residence.”  
Among financial services, insurance contracts are excluded from the scope of 
the Convention and it is necessary to search for the law applicable in the appropriate 
Directive and its transposition into the national legal orders. Consumer credit not 
connected to the purchase falls outside the provision of Article 5 as much as any 
financial service contracted under the provisions of paragraph 4(b) of that article. 
Another important sector of consumer contracts excluded from the protection of Article 
5 is contracts involving immovable property rights. This excludes the case of the rent of 
a holiday home. The law applicable will be the law of the country where the property is 
located.  
This partial analysis of the Rome Convention has offered a sketch of an 
international convention based on 3 pillars: -the autonomy of the parties to choose the 
law to govern the contract; -closest connection of the contract determines the law 
applicable in the absence of the parties’ choice; -the primacy of mandatory rules over 
any choice of law. Two more pillars could be added. One concerns “the principle and 
mechanism of uniform interpretation (…) [and applicat on] of the Convention as 
between different Contracting States” (Ibid., 3) and the other is the precedence of 
Community law over the Convention enshrined in its Article 20. 
The real benefit of the consumer protection enshrined i  Article 5 of the Rome 
Convention is indeed very narrow, as one of the participants in the negotiation of the 
Convention has remarked: “the conditions for the opration of the consumer protection 
rules in the Convention are narrowly drawn and the result is that Article 5 is likely to 
apply to a relatively small proportion of international contracts entered into by EEC 
consumers (…).” (Morse, 1992:11) 
 The above rather superficial analysis of the 1980 Rome Convention’s provision 
on consumer contracts shows the considerable complexity of finding the law applicable 
to a dispute with a foreign element in it. The complexity goes beyond the common 
sense of a lay person, challenging even the professi nal skills of lawyers and other staff 
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from consumer organisations.83 Notwithstanding, it is not the end of the task if the 
purpose is to seek redress through legal proceedings in courts of law. The next step is to 
find a competent court to judge the case since the law applicable does not indicate 
necessarily that the court of the country of the law applicable will have jurisdiction over 
the case. It can happen that the competent court and he law applicable will not have the 
same nationality.   Therefore, the rules of the 1968 Brussels Convention applicable to 
consumer contracts, transformed into the Council Regulation no. 44/2001, ought to be 
analysed.   
 
III.2 – The Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters Converted into the Council 
Regulation no. 44/2001 – The Case for Consumers 
 
 The Brussels Convention and the Regulation are endowe  with more complexity 
than The Rome Convention is. Therefore, only the provisions of Section 4 require 
analysis since they govern consumer contracts with foreign elements in them. It can 
already be anticipated that, like the Rome Convention, due to the very restricted terms 
of what is considered a consumer contract, the most common situations fall outside the 
scope of the aforementioned Section. The result is hat other provisions of the 
Regulation will certainly be needed to respond to the question about the competent 
court to judge a dispute on an international contract.  
 Article 15 lays down the conditions under which thejurisdiction will be defined 
by the Section on consumer contracts. It defines consumer as the person “which can be 
regarded as being outside his trade or profession”, not excluding the possibility of the 
consumer being a legal person. Nevertheless, it will be difficult to find a situation where 
a legal person acts outside his trade. In practical erms, a legal person cannot be a 
consumer in the terms of the Brussels Convention and the Rome Convention as well. 
Besides, the rationale of the exclusion of legal persons is that they tend to be stronger 
than the natural persons who act outside their job or profession are. Furthermore, one 
must acknowledge the consumer-friendly intention of the Rome and the Brussels 
Conventions, repeated in the Regulation. Notwithstanding, the definition of “consumer” 
needs to be widened to embrace the provisions on the “recipient of the service” 
established by the e-commerce Directive, in order to include as many as possible in the 
net of access to justice as care. 
  
                                                
83 See the discussion on the involvement and troubles of the VSV (Verbraucherschutzverein) in the 
Kaffeefahrten disputes in Germany in the following III.2 subsection. 
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Article 13 says also that a contract will be considere  a consumer contract if it 
is: “-a contract for the sale of goods on instalment credit terms; or –a contract for a loan 
repayable, or for any other form of credit, made to finance the sale of goods; or –in all 
other cases, the contract has been concluded with a person who pursues commercial of 
professional activities in the Member State of the consumer’s domicile or, by any 
means, directs such activities to that Member States including that Member State, and 
the contract falls within the scope of such activities.” 
 The Regulation has changed nothing regarding the definition of “consumer”. 
Moreover, one must acknowledge the inclusion in the Regulation of active (or quasi-
active) consumers in the scope of its protective jurisdiction enshrined for passive ones. 
It means that the protective jurisdiction “applies to contracts concluded in a State other 
than the consumer’s domicile [and] concluded via an interactive website accessible in 
the State of the consumer’s domicile [provided] (…) the contract is concluded with a 
person pursuing commercial or professional activities n the State of the consumer 
domicile directing such activities towards that State, provided the contract in question 
falls within the scope of such activities.” (page 16)84 In view of such a restriction, it is 
advisable to consider “quasi-active” consumer the on protected by the Regulation.85 
The contracts concluded by telephone, fax or other similar way are in the same 
situation.  The proposal includes time-share contracts nd those of package tours.  
 Furthermore, this wording excludes the contracts enter d into by the consumer 
after he has been “navigating” through the Internet, let alone the contracts entered into 
during a trip abroad. It is necessary, then, that te professional directs his commercial 
action or advertising towards that State where the consumer is. 
 In cases where consumers entered into a contract with a supplier not domiciled 
in the Member State, but that has a branch, agency or establishment in one of the 
Member States and the dispute arises out of any activity of one of the mentioned 
agency, branch or establishment, the supplier is deemed to be domiciled in that State.  
 Finally, Article 15 excludes, from the scope of the consumer contracts section, 
the contracts of transport other than a contract which, for an inclusive price, provides for 
a combination of travel and accommodation. 
 After the definition of what a consumer contract is under the provisions of 
Article 15, Article 16 defines the jurisdiction over the restricted number of contracts so 
considered and its protection depends on the provisions of Article 14 and its three 
                                                
84 The page refers to the Commission Communication COM (97) 609 final. Stuyck informs that this 
initiative of the Commission “has led to a fierce opp sition from the Europe’s employer’s federation, but
the Commission is backed by European consumer groups. For the Commission, the change is needed to 
encourage e-commerce and to give to consumers the confidence that their rights will be respected if they 
purchase products online.” (2000:396) 
85 It falls outside the limits of this thesis to explore the situation of the active, passive, quasi-active 
consumer regarding e-commerce. See Stuyck (2000:396) for further references. 
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paragraphs. The first establishes two possibilities of jurisdictions for the consumer to 
sue the supplier “either in the courts of the Member State in which that party is 
domiciled or in the courts for the place where the consumer is domiciled.” The second 
determines that the consumer can only be sued in the courts of the Member State of his 
own domicile. The third allows for the counter-claim to be brought “in the court in 
which (…) the original claim is pending.” 
 Article 17 establishes that the protection enshrined in Article 16 can be departed 
from by agreement in three hypothetical situations: -if the agreement is settled after the 
dispute has arisen; - if the agreement permits the consumer to sue the supplier in 
different jurisdictions than the ones established in the Section on jurisdiction over 
consumer contracts; -and if the agreement confers the jurisdiction on the Member State 
in which both parties are domicile or habitually resident at the moment of the 
conclusion of the contract, provided that such an agreement is lawful in that State. 
 However, the special provisions on consumer contracts inserted in the above-
analysed Section 4 cannot prejudice the provisions of Articles 4 and 5.5. Article 4 lays 
down rules in cases involving defendants not domiciled in a Member State, saying that 
the jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State will be defined by the laws of that 
State, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction enshrined in Articles 22 and 23. Against that 
defendant, says the same Article, a person domiciled in a Member State, whatever her 
nationality, can avail herself of the rules of jurisdiction of that State, in the same way as 
the nationals of that State. 
 Article 5 (5) establishes that “a person domiciled in a Member State may, in 
another Member State, be sued, as regards a dispute arising out of the operations of a 
branch, agency or other establishment (…)”. The competent court will be where the 
branch, agency or other establishment is situated. This provision annuls both benefits of 
Article 16, which confers to the consumer the privilege of bringing proceedings and for 
being sued only in the courts of the Member State in which he is himself domiciled.  
 Article 22 establishes five hypotheses of exclusive jurisdiction regardless of the 
domicile, which are theoretically restrictions to the benefits enshrined in Article 16. 
Practically only the provisions of paragraphs 1(a) and 5 are of interest in cases of 
consumer contracts. Paragraph 1(a) restricts the mention d protection when it 
establishes the jurisdiction of the court of the Memb r State in which the property is 
situated for contracts involving in rem in tenancies of immovable property. Paragraph 5 
determines that the court of the Member State in which a judgment should be enforced 
is the one competent for the proceedings concerned with its enforcement. These will 
most probably happen abroad, which would make any lw er confident enough of the 
success of the claim sue the defendant in the same court with jurisdiction over the 
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proceedings for enforcement in order to avoid the ex quatur or registration procedure, 
regardless of its degree of formality. 
 The Regulation offers, in slightly different hypotheses from the ones  
The complexity of the law itself was mentioned befor  as a factor that promotes 
the weakness of the consumer vis-à-vis professionals and the market itself. Regarding 
consumer law, it is a truism that it “is reaching a degree of sophistication and 
specialization which threatens to make the field inaccessible to the non-specialist.” 
(Erauw, 1990:71) The complexity of law and of the proceedings of access to justice 
makes the enterprise highly expensive. However, following the first part of the thesis, 
the complexity of the law responds to a very determined pattern of rationality based on 
separation, on competition and on the lack of togetherness and dialogue. The 
complexity of the law and its rationality has a very specific language and morality 
which we called morality of rights. Moreover, the gap in its second configuration is 
revealed by the impossibility for consumers in cross-border disputes to seek redress in 
the way the current legal system allows in view of its complexity. The establishment of 
the language of rights and its adversarial model of redress suppress a possible 
alternative model based on care for Others and responsibility in relationships. The 
problems for redress in normal proceedings of law for consumers in domestic realms are 
insurmountable in a common market with the proportions of the European one. 
The gap consists of that sort of situation, which is highly inconsistent with the 
politics of an internal market that wants to flourish, one based on the ever-increasing 
confidence of the active consumer. This confidence, however, demands that the active 
consumer should be properly protected. Moreover, one may agree that “the traditional 
enforcement mechanisms have so far been unable to provide adequate remedies for 
cross-border complaints which will occur with more regularity the closer the internal 
market of the EC comes to completion.” (Micklitz, 1993:411) The work of the 
European Commission has been somewhat responsive86 to two voices in the movement 
for the expansion of consumer protection through better access to justice: one that asks 
for harmonisation of consumer law within the EU and another stressing the urgency of 
community action to facilitate access to justice for c nsumers, especially in cross-border 
disputes. By analysing the movement of communitarisation, or harmonisation or 
Europeanisation of private law, one may see whether the gap diagnosed persists or not.  
                                                
86 The responsiveness of the European Commission is, without doubt, a very aware answer to the 
necessity for the internal market that the consumers become confident by means of the facilities for 
redress and access to justice for cross-border dispute . Research carried out “by Eurobarometer and 
published in July 1991 revealed that difficulties in exchanging products or getting them repaired and in 
settling disputes are the main reason cited by consumers for not buying in another Member State. (…) 
The lack of suitable mechanisms to deal with cross-border disputes means that many are deprived of any 
effective means of asserting their rights.” (Gibson, 1992:409) 
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The gap persists despite the availability of the natio l order whose jurisdiction 
and law applicable is regulated by the Rome Convention and the Regulation. The 
procedural gap resists the legislative effort due to the special quality of consumer 
disputes, which also demands a special quality of justice; ultimately it is turned into a 
moral gap. It is true especially with the establishment of the single currency and the 
expansion of the financial market, bearing in mind that the Rome Convention excludes 
credit contracts from the category of consumer contracts. Another inconsistency can be 
noted between the desire for a single currency for the internal market and the 
fragmentation in and absence of European institutions involved with consumer policy, 
specifically, justice for consumers in cross-border isputes. 
The gap relates to both national and community shortcomings in tackling the 
challenge to guarantee access to justice for consumers in cross-border disputes on 
consumers’ own terms since the application of the Rome Convention and the 
Regulation, if it does not leave, from a stricly technical view point, a proper procedural 
gap, fails to offer a feasible system to respond to consumers’ needs.  
It seems appropriate that after this exposition of the Rome Convention and 
Regulation no. 44/2001, concerning their dispositions n consumer contracts, at least 
one example should be discussed in order to make clear the gap in the EU access to 
justice for consumers in cross-border disputes. TheCommunity gap is by no means 
bridged by national law as one can see from concrete cases where the extraterritorial 
applicability of national laws, derived from community Directives, cannot be surely 
asserted. This was the experience with the so-called “‘Kaffeefahrten (coffee 
excursions)’ [in Germany], which first started in Spain (and therefore are also called 
‘Spanish Excursions’)”. (Micklitz, 1993:412) 
The cases happened in Spain, Italy, and Turkey and they have the same plot, 
varying in minor details. The cases involved German tourists on holiday in Spain. They 
travelled to Spain by their own means. Once in Spain they were approached directly or 
by advertising which invited them to go on an excursion, paying nothing or very little 
for it. During the excursion, the promoters, whilst entertaining the tourists with drinks, 
buffet and a lot of sightseeing approached them to offer goods for sale at very high 
prices. The ultimate aim of the excursion was obvious the selling of the goods (highly 
expensive) to cover the expenses of the excursion (usually free or very cheap to attract 
as many as possible).  
The goods were bought on the excursion in Spain for late  delivery in Germany 
where the tourists were domiciled. Another fact to be added to the story is that the seller 
or supplier was a German-based firm working with a Sp nish/reseller. Problems started 
to come up once the goods were received and the buyrs, if initially not happy with the 
purchase, were thoroughly upset by the whole story. The first problem for the buyers 
 159
was where to go to complain. The institution chosen was the VSV- 
Verbraucherschutzverein or the Consumer Association who would have to deal with 
legal and practical problems upon the standing of consumer organisations to represent 
consumers abroad if Spanish jurisdiction to judge the court cases were verified. In the 
concrete case, the German Association was representing Germans in a German court 
against a German supplier. Notwithstanding, in one f two decisions by the German 
Federal Court on the Spanish excursions87, in its “short obiter dictum at the end of the 
decision it makes clear that VSV’s standing would not automatically cover the 
competence to refer to the applicability of foreign law under the group action.” (Ibid., 
414)88 The commercial connections between the German supplier and the Spanish 
reseller were a quite difficult factual point to beproved and this difficulty was left for 
the Consumer Association, despite the fact that the German supplier would sue the 
consumer in the event of non-payment of the goods or ered in Spain. 
The case was brought to the knowledge of and for judgment by German courts. 
Nevertheless, the latter did not reach a common solution about the application of 
German law on doorstep sales to resolve claims about c ntracts closed in Spain by 
German tourists in holiday with a Spanish reseller, even with a German supplier behind 
the scenes. It is worth noting that the Rome Convention is part of German international 
private law and that the transposition happened awkwardly. The contract, based on the 
Rome Convention, had established a choice of law on Spanish law, which did not allow 
the consumer to withdraw from the contract since th EEC Directive 85/577 of 20 
December 1985 had not yet been transformed into nati nal law.  
Firstly, which court will be the competent court to hear the case? Based on 
Regulation no. 44/2001 the domicile of the defendant is the appropriate one since the 
contract is not understood as a consumer contract. But then, which is the defendant? 
This definition is important for the knowledge of which is the domicile of the counter-
part. Taking the supplier as the defendant, Germany would be the country whose courts 
would be the competent ones. But the plaintiffs hada contract with the Spanish reseller. 
Therefore, it seemed that the right answer is that t e defendant is Spanish and one had 
to go to a Spanish court. 
The law applicable is the one of the choice expressed in the contract, which was 
not favourable to the consumers/plaintiffs. Therefor , the invalidation of the choice of 
the law was a goal to be pursued and it could be under either Spanish or German law 
                                                
87 BGHZ 112, 204 = EuZW (1990), 546 = ZIP 1990, 1348 = RIW 1990, 546 on the AGBG, and BGHZ 
113, 18 = NJW 1991, 1054 on the UWG. (in Micklitz, 1993: 431) 
88 The Directive 98/27, OJ L 166/51, 11/5/98, on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests, 
deals with the problem. Nevertheless, one point would remain because the Directive covers the protection 
of collective interests of consumers, which nature can be largely discussed and highly possibly denied i  
legal proceedings in courts of law. Another point wi h Directives is the very diverse way of domestic 
transposition into national legal orders especially when the Directive offers only a framework for national 
legal treatment of the issue. 
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which allows for correction of the choice of law when the consumer has not been really 
willing to bind himself to what he agreed during a tourist tour maybe after a couple of 
drinks. In case of success of this argument, German law could be applicable if one 
considers that the goods bought in Spain were to be delivered later in Germany. Thus, 
the contract was not “concluded” in Spain but in Germany. However, this is not the 
most acceptable interpretation and the case, for the application of the German law, does 
not fall within the scope of Article 5 of the Rome Convention since no relevant 
connection with Germany could be established. “The Federal Court recognized Spain as 
the country in which the advertisement was effectiv, because the contracts were 
concluded in Spain.” (Ibid., 415) 
 On the other hand, the German courts could have been competent to hear the 
case since the supplier was a German-based firm, whose address unfortunately neither 
the contracts stated nor was known by the consumers. Yet, the residence of the 
consumers could determine the competent court under the Rome Convention if the 
consumers had been taken to Spain by the sellers with the sole purpose of persuading 
them to buy their products. But this was not the case. They were taken on a simple 
excursion, which was not abroad –they were already in Spain and had reached there by 
themselves- when the purchase was offered and contracted. 
The points of doubt in resolving the Spanish Excursion cases judicially were 
very complex and uncountable. Nevertheless, the German courts, after having accepted 
their competence to judge the cases, established a l gal debate on the applicability of 
German Law on Doorstep Sales to them. The German Federal Court had been seized in 
two different opportunities. 89 “Preparatory measures as well as the delivery of the 
goods, both definitely undertaken in Germany did not –according to [the German 
Federal] Court – justify the applicability of the German Law.” (Ibid., 415)  In the 
second case judged by the same German Court, it was decided to “set aside the 
extensive discussion undertaken by the Landgericht (LG – regional court) and the 
Oberlandsgericht (OLG – appellate court), as to whether German law or Spanish law 
applies. [To the despair and desolation of the VSV and the consumers represented by 
this Association,] the Federal Court simply decided that the German firm which 
supplied the products ordered in Spain could not be regarded as being responsible for 
the unfair contract terms which were used by the Spanish tour operator.” (Ibidem) 
One does not need to explore any further the legal and judicial development of 
the cases to have a clear idea of where the gap in EC access to justice lies for consumers 
in cross-border disputes and of its configuration or architecture. Firstly and more 
essentially, in national legal proceedings the cross-border aspect of the dispute is 
pulverised to a point that the claim is alienated from its very meaning. AS with most 
                                                
89 See footnote no. 20. 
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legal proceedings of law, the decisions are not able ny longer to respond to the real 
needs of the parties. Secondly and more concretely, the level of complexity of the legal 
questions is immense for the individual redress of mall economic complaints. Thanks 
to the collective aspect of the cases accepted by the VSV and not contested by the courts 
in Germany, the German consumers cheated in Spain had their day in various courts 
(Landgericht, Oberlandsgericht and Bundesgerichthof), but one may wonder whether 
their problems were handled in the way the parties had firstly suffered and understood 
them. Suffice to say that in 1992, the cases had been in the courts for almost 2 years, 
which is not a long time if one compares it to more extreme cases.90  
 
III.3 – The Rome and the Brussels Conventions on Consumer Protection and the 
Gap in the Light of the Europeanisation of Conflict Rules and Private Law – A 
Modest Account 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty brought an important change in the structure of the EU 
which is traditionally viewed as a three-pillared construct. This Treaty promoted the 
transfer from the third pillar (intergovernmental) to the first pillar (European 
Community) of the responsibility for legislation concerning judicial co-operation in 
civil matters. In other words, it furnished the legal basis for a communitarisation of the 
responsibility for civil legal justice.  
Thus, the Brussels Convention became one of the targets of the new 
Community’s responsibilities under the provisions of the new article 293(4). One may 
hazard an opinion that the reason for this is precisely because justice, or access to 
justice, is seen as a procedural matter, understood as the way a person can assert her 
rights before the courts.   
The first important document for our discussion is the Commission 
Communication COM (97) 609 final, already mentioned above. This proposal to change 
the Brussels Convention was based on the former art. 220(4) but already with the view 
of the Union structural change enshrined within the Tr aty of Amsterdam. “The major 
objective of the new treaty [-Amsterdam-] is to develop and maintain the Union as an 
‘area of freedom, security and justice’. In order to create such an area, civil judicial 
cooperation has been transferred to a new chapter of he EC Treaty relating to policies 
pursuant to this objective and appears in art. 73M.” (page 9) The referred 
Communication is important to understand the next step the Commission took based 
then on the Amsterdam Treaty in order to propose that the Brussels Convention should 
be replaced by legally binding Community statute, namely a Regulation. This intention 
is clearly stated: “The Commission reserves its position to take new, complementary 
                                                
90 See the end of sub-section III.4 for a 9 years-long case. 
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initiatives (…) within the framework of the new Treaty, consistent with transforming 
the Convention into a Community instrument (…).” (page 10) 
The Communication reminds us that the Commission had “already highlighted 
the lack of suitable legal framework in connection with the proper functioning of the 
single market.” (page 16) (My emphasis) This affirmation expresses, in a very 
appropriate way, the Community movement towards communitarisation or the 
Europeanisation of the rules necessary to establish a more coherent acquis 
communitaire. This considers also the minimum social integration as a fundament for 
the consolidation of the integral market. The role f access to justice for consumers in 
this process is central or even overriding. Notwithstanding, the gap will persist insofar 
as the procedural gap has another face regarding consumer matters. This consists in the 
non-involvement of any of the Community’s institutions in the establishment of access 
to justice for EC consumers in cross-border disputes.  
 The enactment of a European legal instrument to substit te the Brussels 
Convention aimed to promote the enhancement of the free movement of judgments 
throughout the EU in order to furnish a more suitable procedural framework for “the 
sound operation of the internal market”. This would, theoretically, allow litigants to 
enjoy, in any Member State, the judicial protection they have in their own countries. In 
addition, the communitarisation of the Brussels Convention provides the opportunity to 
“introduce uniform modern standards for jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters; 
and simplify the formalities governing the rapid and automatic recognition and 
enforcement of the relevant judgments by a simple and uniform procedure.” (page 6) 
The emphasis on procedure as a measure of justice i l ar and does not approach the 
gap in any of its configuration regarding consumer disputes.  
  The major improvement of the Regulation was on the widening of this 
protection to include the quasi-active consumer. Nonetheless, the complexity of the law 
persists despite a clear improvement of the EU consumer law as a step towards 
overcoming, even if in a minimalist way, “the economic law of the ‘passive’ European 
citizen.” (Reich, 1995:285) Therefore, the gap remains and seems to be unbridgeable 
through the communitarisation of the rules of  PIL, despite their much heralded utility, 
(Reich, 1992:46) if their complexity could not be surmounted. Basedow has recently 
defended the concentration of the responsibility for c nflicts of law at the Community 
level as a new approach able to remedy the shortcomings of PIL. 
Another point of importance is the divergence betwen the Regulation with its 
inclusion of the quasi-active consumers into its protective jurisdiction, and the Rome 
Convention, whose communitarisation has not been proposed. It appears that the 
harmonisation of the private law by Directives seems to be the way through which the 
Rome Convention will become useless. Once all private l w becomes harmonised, in 
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principle, the choice of the law applicable to a specific contract will not alter the final 
result since all Member States are supposed to transport Directives into their national 
legal systems. However, one has to take into account that Directives, in a great number 
of cases, are mere framework or indication of how a Member State should regulate 
matters in view of national diversity. The English problem regarding the application of 
the good faith concept from the Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts is one 
very good example of how harmonisation through Direct v s has problems concerning 
national accommodation of alien legal conceptions both in the legislative and judicial 
legal apparatus. It is also an example of how troublesome it is to import legal concepts 
from diverse cultures. Some diversity is therefore possible to happen due to the freedom 
and domestic peculiarities of the national transposition of Directives. Therefore, the 
normative labyrinth is likely to persist, leaving it unclear whether consumers in small 
cross-border disputes will benefit from such communitarisation of the Rome 
Convention through Directives with work on the Europeanisation of private law. 
(Weatherill, 1995) 91 
 This is relevant to the view that the Rome Convention was elaborated to increase 
legal certainty in the international adjudication of disputes. It was deemed to work 
together with the Brussels Convention, which was not able to respond to all questions a 
cross-border dispute might raise. The Rome Convention was designed to prevent forum 
shopping bringing security to international contractu l relations. Article 18 of the Rome 
Convention lays down the obligation of the Contracting Parties to achieve uniformity in 
the interpretation and application of the rules of the Convention. “Thus the Rome 
Convention is linked to the Brussels Convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of 
judgments. At one point it appeared that together t two conventions would constitute 
the core of a future European conflict law.” (Sarcevi , 1990:38)92 The reality, 
nevertheless, is of another sort and it supports the argument in favour of a different 
practice of justice for EU consumers in cross-border disputes. 
As said above, it seems that this necessary communitarisation will be performed 
through the harmonisation of private substantive European law. The recent Directive 
1999/4493, on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods an  associated guarantees, 
is an example of that, since it tries to overcome the shortcomings of the abandonment of 
the active consumer by the Rome and Brussels Conventions. “The Directive aims at 
protecting the European consumer irrespective of the place where he makes a 
                                                
91 “(…) Notamment en matière de protection des consommateurs(…) [L]a diversité, voire 
l’incompatibilité, des règles de conflit nationales adoptées en exécution des directives communautaires va 
directement à l’encontre de l’objective principal de la convention de Rome, et on se demande comment 
tant les opérateur économiques que les consommateurs vont sortir du ‘labyrinthe’ normatif (…) que en 
résulte.” (Kohler, 1999:30) 
92 In the same line see Lando, 1987. 
93 OJ 1999, L 171/12. 
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purchase.” (Stuyck, 2000:395) Paragraph 2 of Article 7 of the aforementioned Directive 
establishes the mandatory feature of the guarantees and protection afforded to the 
consumers by the Directive. Therefore, the law applicab e to the contract by choice or 
by the application of the rules of PIL, under the provision of Article 20 of the Rome 
Convention, which establishes the precedence of the Community legal order over its 
own rules, will be disregarded in benefit of the protection afforded by the Directive. 
This Directive greatly enlarges the protective provisions of both the Rome and Brussels 
Conventions against “the assumption that an active onsumer who is shopping around 
in the Community expects the applicability of the law of another Member State and may 
thus be bound by that law (on the basis of the choice f the parties or the closest 
connection with the country of the seller) even if it gives him less protection than the 
law of the Member State of his residence.” (Ibid. 395-6)  
The communitarisation of PIL involves a political challenge since it is based on 
the provisions of Title IV of the Treaty, which is not binding on Denmark, Ireland and 
the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the generally accepted opinion is that the Protocols 
for Ireland and the United Kingdom contain a loophole for the inclusion of the two 
countries in future conflict legislation. The problem will remain for Denmark. 
(Basedow, 2000:695) The Regulation confirmed this po nt.  
Regarding consumer protection, some benefit is achieved due to the fact that the 
normative labyrinth can become a bit less complicated. It nevertheless remains 
problematic to transpose Directives in view of national diversity. It appears that the 
criticism that PIL is basically consumer hostile will not be overcome by means of 
harmonisation.94 (Koch, 1995:333)  
It seems certain that integration through harmonisation and the free movement 
of judgements will benefit a notion of formal justice thereby resolving in part the 
procedure gap regarding access to justice in the EU for consumers in cross-border 
disputes. Nevertheless, as already said, the gap consists of, in its procedural 
configuration, the complexity of law, which can be overcome only partially through 
harmonisation. Regarding the substantive configuration of the gap, the special nature of 
consumer disputes remains inaccessible in formal proceedings of law.  
Moreover, the process of harmonisation or Europeanisation of private law and 
the one of the communitarisation of PIL express a process of rationalisation of law 
deemed to offer security and certainty for the standards and criteria of justice that law 
must furnish. Joerges describes this process specifically as happening through the 
Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts95. Harmonisation responds to the needs 
                                                
94 Regarding europeanisation of private law, “it should be remembered that, in the area of insurance 
contract law, the Community law-maker has explicitly rejected harmonisation of contract law, and has 
enacted quite stringent conflict rules.” (Reich, 1995:303) 
95 OJ L95/29, 1993. 
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of the formalisation of law whilst promoting a change in the patterns of legal justice for 
consumers when, for instance, it widens protection t  include the quasi-active 
consumer. In the same vein, it improves market conditi s for the confident consumer 
to enjoy the benefits of the internal market more eff ctively than he has done so far. 
Harmonisation responds to the demands of formalism, procedural justice and the 
prerequisites of the establishment of an internal market governed by the rule of law. 
The gap discussed will, however, require another app oach since harmonisation 
had so far96 appeared unable to resolve the inaccessibility of justice for consumers in 
cross-border disputes, especially in small claims. Furthermore, PIL will retain its 
importance in trans-frontier disputes insofar as the domestic transposition of Directives 
can assure neither equalisation of the standards nor the application of law. In this 
respect, harmonisation is not a seamless process. 
 The field of the Europeanisation of law is rather wide and fertile. Its full 
discussion would exceed the limits of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is appropriate to see 
that as the process has happened so far, the gap discussed retains its problematic feature 
for EU consumers in cross-border disputes even within t e extreme proposal for “a 
single system for judicial resolution of disputes” in the internal market, following the 
Storme Approximation of Judiciary Law in the European Union.97  
The Storme Report on the Approximation of Judiciary Law in the European 
Union emphasises what Professor Storme calls a “negativ  attitude” to procedural law 
in EC law, apart from access to the European Court f Justice which can only be 
indirectly accessed by individuals, through national courts. The aim of the Maastricht 
Treaty, reaffirmed in Amsterdam, was to bring the Union as close as possible to its 
citizens. Nevertheless, one can note a great lack of effective measures to turn such 
proximity into reality. Access to justice for consumers in cross-border disputes is 
certainly one of the points that shows that failure. However, the gap this thesis aims to 
bridge is of a different nature than a mere lack of pr cedural rules in consumer law; it 
refers to a special quality of justice that law or the rule of law alone cannot supply; it 
might also be characterised as a “gaping hole in the coherence and legitimacy of the 
Community’s enterprise”. (Himsworth, 1997:311) 
Curtin and Mortelman’s study of the evolution of European case law, for 
instance, shows to a certain extent a failure in the Community’s legal and institutional 
framework to ensure compliance with Community law. They identify three generations 
of decisions from negative integration to an indirect integration, based on reliance upon 
                                                
96 The next chapter explains the necessity of Community-wide hard law through Regulation, enacting 
general principles for consumer protection as a whole and creating a European system of redress and 
access to justice for consumers in the EU, departing from mere and detailed harmonisation which can be 
called rationalisation of law.  
97 Quoted by Himsworth, 1997: 302-3. The Storme Report was published in 1994. 
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national orders for the development of the soul of the Community, to a more complex 
approach, which is about Community legal power breaking “into the national rules of 
the Member States themselves”. (1994:434) Such evolution is likely to suggest as well a 
sort of incapability of Community law to deal with t e soul of the European Union, as it 
has to resort progressively to national orders. Moreover, this incapability refers to a 
difficulty in converting the negative integration approach, which works as a shield 
preventing national orders from obstructing the progress of the internal market, into a 
positive one, whose function resembles to a great extent a sword necessary to clear 
space in the national sovereignties for the European r lity. (Ibid., 446)   
An initial idea to frame the bridging of the gap could be offered by a position on 
the applicability of PIL to employment contracts: “Ultimately a ‘labour law’ approach 
to the solution of many transnational employment problems proves preferable to the 
techniques adopted by a private international lawyer.” (Morse, 1992:21) 
 
III.4 – The Cost of Legal Proceedings and of Their Barriers in the EU and its 
Weight in the Configuration of the Gap for European Consumers in Cross-Border 
Disputes 
 
 The discourse on the costs of legal proceedings deserv s a separate subsection 
since it influences substantially in the composition of the gap especially regarding its 
procedural configuration. The conclusions of two studies elaborated for the European 
Commission in 1995 and 1998 will illuminate the discu sion as their numbers are 
impressive even if only for exemplification. 
 The importance of these studies is their focus on “situations of minor everyday 
cross-border disputes. The typical everyday dispute is a consumer claim (…).” (page 
6)98  
The general conclusion of the first study on the costs and duration of judicial 
proceedings in EU Member States is: “A rational actor would not pursue a cross-border 
consumer claim within Europe in court”. (page 125 of CJB)  
 The reasons for this are to be found in the cost and duration of legal 
proceedings in the EU. Table four on page 4 of the first annex on microanalysis offers 
the following numbers: For a procedure in the defendant State the minimum cost is 980 
ECU, the maximum is 6,600 ECU and the average 2,489 ECU; the minimum duration is 
13 months, the maximum 48 and the average 23,5 months.  In the plaintiff State the 
minimum cost is 950 ECU, the maximum 5,850 ECU and the average 2,437 ECU; the 
minimum duration is 12 months, the maximum 72 and the average 29,2 months. These 
                                                
98 Von Freyhold/Gessner/Vial/Wagner (eds.), (1995), The Cost of Judicial Barriers for Consumers in the 
Single Market – A Report for the European Commission (CJB). 
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numbers were collected just for standards procedure under the Brussels Convention, 
including enforcement. No counterclaim, no extraordinary procedures, nor appeals were 
considered. (page 17 of CJB)  
Among all conclusions one sounds very important because it denounces the role 
of lawyers in raising the costs of the procedures since in many courts the procedures are 
very cheap or even free. (page 122 of CJB) In countries like Germany, where the fees of 
lawyers are strictly connected with the value of the claim, regardless of the amount of 
work, to blame lawyers for the fees might not be fair. However, one could wonder 
whether a lawyer would agree to work on a cross-border dispute, as he/she has to travel 
abroad, work in a different judicial system and use a foreign language, for fees that 
would not really be rewarding. It is perfectly reasonable that the professional should 
take the cases she/he wants and gets paid properly for the work done. Nevertheless, it is 
true that the lawyer factor in the composition of the costs of the claims is an indication 
that justice for consumers in cross-border disputes might happen without lawyers, 
especially in view of the reduced value of the claims. Lawyers could also be identified 
as the cause of the delays observed in cross-border claims. The presence of lawyers is 
justified by the complexity of law and because the system needs faithful translators of 
the feelings, expectations and anxiety of the parties into the rules of the proceedings of 
law. Lawyers, who are trained to respect and follow rules, help in the process of the 
continuity of the system and to improve levels of legal certainty. This leads the system 
to a dilemma or paradox, since the more perfect the dispensation of justice is the more 
denials of justice one can perceive. 
Interesting situations may be found by considering each Member State, 
individually. For example, in Greece, one will find the cheapest place for claims at 
defendant’s domicile but the longest duration. By contrast, Finland is one of the 
quickest but the most expensive places to litigate.  
The study also covered a macroeconomic analysis of the cost of “legal 
uncertainty”, indicating that direct costs for consumers in the EU are “in the range of 
7.230 to 73.790 million ECU with a weighted mean of about 28 billion ECU.” (page 
421 of CJB) The analysis also stresses that indirect costs are higher and they relates to 
lower rates of return of transborder transactions and a lower permanent potential growth 
rate of the European economies,  which negatively inf uences the growth of the internal 
market.  
A second study in 1998 examined the cross-border appellate proceedings to re-
evaluate “the question if a rational actor would pursue” a cross-border claim, based on a 
general result of the first study which diagnosed a “non-existent single legal market”. 
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(page 1 of CLO)99 In truth, the first study was based on the assumption that the costs of 
judicial barriers in the single market would be better formulated as “The Costs of Legal 
Uncertainty” or “The Costs of Non-Europe in Litigation” (page 5 of CJB). It appears 
that, for a professional lawyer not familiar with international litigation, the variety of 
courts, rules, languages, and so on is ultimately “a jungle of justice”. (page 2 of CLO) 
According to the first study, “most lawyers would avise their clients to initiate cross-
border legal proceedings in case of a dispute value of 50,000 ECU.” (Ibidem) Of course, 
consumer’s everyday problems are likely to be far below this value.  
One case can illustrate the difficult situation of cross-border consumer disputes 
in the EU and it is worth mentioning despite not being about consumer contracts in 
either the Regulation or Rome Convention’s sense. It is about a German national who 
raised a loan to buy a summerhouse in Spain and lost 50,000 ECU to a dubious real 
estate enterprise. If the claim goes through the thr e possible instances of appeal of the 
German civil procedure system, the plaintiff will be “left with a debt of additional total 
lawyers’ and court fees in excess of 30.000 ECU, as a minimum, after several years of 
litigation. These amounts are increased by other costs related to the procedures, such as 
expert witness fees, translation costs, bank fees for cross-border payments, costs for 
address location, for gathering information abroad, for service of documents abroad and 
for requests for assistance in evidence and discovery abroad.” (page 166/7 of CLO) 
The second study has a section called “Real World”, where the report on the use 
of the Conventions, especially the European Convention on the Transmission of 
Applications for Legal Aid of 27.01.1977, should have been placed for the absurdity 
and inadequacy of the situations described. The 21 cases summarily reported were 
furnished by the Legal Aid Board of England and Wales and they reveal much more 
than any numbers. Here are three of them: 
 
“Receiving country: 1-Portugal: Delay from February 1995 to January 1996 at 
which point an amended application form was sent for completion. Again this included 
confusion over the receiving authority and includes correspondence indicating that the 
Portuguese authorities had had a meeting to decide who was to deal with such 
applications to Portugal! 
2- Spain: Delay from June 1994 to June 1995 when a lawyer was appointed. In 
September 1995 the English solicitor complained that t e Spanish lawyer nominated in 
June had not contacted him or his client and that he had been unable to obtain a 
response from them. 
                                                
99 Von Freyhold, Vial and Partner Consultants, (1998), The Cost of Legal Obstacles to the Disadvantage 
of Consumers in the Single Market – A Report for the European Commission (CLO), available at the 
website: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/health_consumer/library/pub/pub03.pdf. 
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3-Belgium: Application transmitted 31 December 1992. Acknowledgement and 
enquiry letter dated 16 March 1993 followed by a notification dated 8 July 1993 that it 
had been forwarded to the relevant geographical area followed by a letter dated 22 
November 1993 indicating that the enclosures had becom  separated and the application 
could not be processed. The application was re-sent on 17 December 1993 and 
acknowledged on 27 April 1994. It was only on 7 February 1995 that Belgium indicated 
that a lawyer had actually been nominated in July 1993 and had done work on behalf of 
the assisted person. It appears that this was done without legal aid ever being granted 
and after correspondence with the solicitors we informed Belgium that they could c ose 
their file.”(pages 182/3 of CLO) 
The study had collected positive opinions regarding the Brussels Convention 
from public authorities such as Ministers of Justice. However, it calls for caution in 
reading these positive opinions from authorities who never really deal with the reality of 
courts, proceedings of law and litigation, especially cross-border ones. (page 190 of 
CLO)  
Before finishing this section, it is necessary to give an answer to the question 
that informed this presentation of the gap in access to justice for consumers in cross-
border disputes. The question was whether the mere reliance on the rules of PIL would 
be enough to guarantee the high level of protection for consumers enshrined in the 
provision of Article 153 of the Treaty. Following the examples reported by the Legal 
Aid Board of England and Wales and their capacity to reveal more than any analysis, 
statistic or numbers, here is one report of a judicial ase that happened in Germany 
involving a cross-border dispute. The case is quoted despite not having a consumer as a 
plaintiff because, as seen, it would be very unlikely to find one example of a consumer 
claim in courts, given the high costs and long duration of the proceedings.100 
Nevertheless, the case furnishes strong grounds to jus ify a negative answer to the 
aforementioned question. 
“In 1985 the German Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof) decided a case which, 
up to that time, had gone on for about nine years and was heard before 8 different courts 
and instances. (…) The matter in dispute was the reimbursement of a loan debt by an 
Italian borrower who was sued by the German creditor in 1976. The issue was filed to 
the District Court of Munich which declared to have no international jurisdiction over 
the case. The plaintiff raised appeal to the Munich Court of Appeal which confirmed the 
first instance judgment. The creditor raised a cassation to the German Supreme Court 
                                                
100 “If lawyers do normally not represent consumers in cross-border cases it is no surprise that these cases 
are rarely found in court files (in the year 1988 there were 4 cases filed in the Landgerichte Bremen and 
Hamburg and 1 case in the Tribunale in Milan). The Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction a d the 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgements does not seem to have any positive influence as regards the access to 
court for consumers or the enforcement of judgments (i  neither of the mentioned German or Italian 
district courts an international consumer claim filed in 1988 was enforced).” (pages 419/20 of CJB) 
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which, in the year 1979, filed a request for preliminary ruling to the ECJ. Ten months 
later, due to its interpretation of art. 5 no. 1 Brussels Convention, the ECJ affirmed the 
international competence of German court. Accordingly, the case had to be returned to 
the District Court of Munich. Now the Court refused its jurisdiction with reference to 
art. 21 Brussels Convention. Again, the decision was appealed to the Court of Appeal 
which, in the year 1983, submitted a question on the interpretation of art. 21 Brussels 
Convention to the ECJ. This time the ECJ decided to the disadvantage of the creditor 
and the Court of Appeal finally dismissed the case because of not having jurisdiction 
under art. 21 Brussels Convention. The creditor filed cassation to the Supreme Court 
arguing that the decision of the Court of Appeal would refer him to the Italian 
jurisdiction, where the case due to formal reasons would not be heard any more. 
Accordingly, the decision would leave him without any legal protection. The Supreme 
Court denied a lack of legal protection and the filwas finally closed in the year 1985 
without ever having been heard on the merits.” (page 172 of CLO)101 
To sum up: the present discussion about the gap in  EC consumer law and policy 
had the special aim to disqualify the PIL as a sufficient tool to assure the high level of 
protection required by Articles 95 and 153 and to improve the level of confidence of the 
European consumer to explore and benefit from the expansion and consolidation of the 
internal market, supporting in this way the market in its development. As already said 
by Howells and Weatherill: “(…) the most damning criti isms of private law as a 
method of consumer protection relate to the inability of legal institutions to deal with 
consumer complaints” (1995:527). Moreover, it has been a characteristic of Community 
action in this regard. The special sort of justice required by consumers, developed in the 
first part of the thesis, tackles exactly that inablity.  
 
IV – The Out-of-Court Project: The Gap Persists 
 
 The sixth chapter shows the evolution of the theme of access to justice for 
consumers in EC consumer law and policy, indicating hat the presence of the out-of-
court project for consumers in the Community agenda is not new. The main 
characteristic of consumer disputes, which demands a pecial sort of justice, is 
recognised as the reason for the idea of providing the internal market with justice out-
of-court justice for consumers. The draft agenda for the Tampere European Council102, 
by exposing the objectives for the development of a European judicial area, 
nevertheless, establishes only one priority out of 10 that is not connected with justice in 
courts. Despite the age of the inclusion of out-of-c urt justice in the consumerist agenda 
                                                
101 A footnote of this passage says: “Zelger/Salinitri, a summary of the case is provided by: Rauscher, 
Ausländische Rechthängigkeit und Rechtsschutzeinwand, I Prax 1986, p. 275-277.” 
102 http://presidency.finland.fi/netcomm/News/ShowArticle.asp?i…/199. 
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of the EC, when justice is the issue, the priority is to develop the action of courts as 
privileged bodies able to provide it.  
 
The following assertion about the cross-border characte  of the international 
market that automation can accrue appears also to be rue in the case of the increasingly 
fragile position of national borders regarding inter ational trade: “The appropriateness 
of out-of-court dispute settlement for issues relating to international data interchange 
was already felt in 1995. Recent developments in automation, like EDI, have resulted in 
a shift in trading patterns, making the traditional legal instruments appear to be 
increasingly inadequate. This raises the question of whether national laws are sufficient 
to provide the conditions necessary for this development (…). Thus it was expected a 
shift from an intervening (national) court adjudicat on to a more autonomously 
operating (international) business adjudication in which rules are drafted on the basis of 
which conflict solving decisions will be made.”103 
 The gap in this respect is twofold: first, the project is not yet reality, despite 
being a long time under discussion, at both national a d Community levels. The project 
has gained some substance in  few pilot-areas, like the well-established and successful 
Arbitration Centre in Lisbon, on Communication104 and two Commission 
Recommendation105 that established the EJJ-NET.106 The second dimension of the gap 
consists of the lack of legal and institutional framework, or of its soft-law basis. It lends 
to the project general principles for the work of national out-of-court bodies which lack 
institutional and legal force and, paradoxically, show aspects of out-of-court dispute 
settlement schemes that should be nourished for the ac ievement of satisfaction and 
happiness of the parties. The creation of clearinghouses which, inter alia, provide 
support and information to consumers, especially in cross-border disputes, by passing 
complaints onto the competent bodies to undertake the settlement of the dispute, just 
resembles a cosmetic strategy that entails more money a d is time consuming for both 
public budgets and private citizens in a dispute. Surprisingly, something that was 
thought of as a facilitator of an already very confusing process is turned into a scheme 
whose effectiveness is highly uncertain. The question could be: why one does not 
simply transform national powerful bodies like, for instance, the British OFT, into 
clearinghouses and, at the same time endow the competent bodies with tools to settle 
disputes and seek settlement abroad on behalf of consumers? This question will lead us 
                                                
103 Wilikens, Marc, et alli., (2000), Out-of-court dispute settlement systems for e-commerce. The parties 
to the dispute. Joint Research Centre, Ispra (VA)-Italy. This report can be downloaded from: http://dsa-
isis.jrc.it/ADR/. Page 4. 
104 COM (1998) 198 final. 
105 Commission Recommendation 98/257/EC, OJ L 115/31, 1998, and 2001/310/EC, OJ L 109/56, 2001. 
106 A FIN-NET was also launched to tackle complaint in he financial services through e-commerce. See 
COM (2001) 161 final. 
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to a second aspect of the out-of-court project which as availability to be transformed 
into something effective and efficient to provide justice for consumers in their own 
terms.  
 
IV.1- Directive no. 1999/44 
 
The Directive on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated 
guarantees107 is a good example of the extension of the gap under consideration. Its 
recital no. 25 mentions the Commission Recommendation of 30/03/98108, on the 
principles applicable to the bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer 
disputes109, and the national “possibility” of creating “bodies to ensure impartial and 
efficient handling of complaints in national nd cross-border contexts and which 
consumers can use as mediators.” (Emphasis added) The verb “can” indicates no 
national obligation to create the mentioned bodies. Furthermore, the exigency about an 
impartial handling of the complaint is somewhat problematic when one thinks about the 
protection necessary for the weaker party to a contract of consumption. The first part of 
the thesis attempted to elaborate a special kind of justice that could respond to needs, 
happiness and satisfaction instead of legal principles and rule of law, and could 
overcome vicious notion of love that prevents it from integrating legal or non-intimate 
relationships. The aim was to place love in the core of institutional action, by having 
understood love as “institutional will” or “institutional interesse”.    
Article 2, items 2 and 3, regulate situations that show with great appropriateness 
the reasons why consumers need a special sort of justice in the terms just described. 
Item 2 sets up rules about when a consumer good is presumed to be in conformity with 
the contract. Item 3, in its turn, builds a legal presumption about the impossibility or 
disproportionality of the consumer requirement of repair or replacement of the goods by 
the seller. Article 1, item 2f, establishes that any repair required is to be performed in 
order to bring “consumer goods into conformity with the contract of sale”. In cases 
which lack a contract or in exceptional circumstances that make the observance of the 
contract impossible or disproportionate, the law must furnish the rule to save the 
process from personalism or particularism in the resolution of any dispute. These legal 
dispositions cancel out the possibility of a justice of care that could operate to attend 
needs, happiness and satisfaction. One may wonder about the problems any justice 
based on impartiality would confront, if it would settle disputes by trying to bring the 
                                                
107 Directive no. 1999/44/EC, OJ l 17/12. 
108 See footnote 36. 
109 The principles deemed to provide minimum guarantees for the parties are: independence, transparency, 
respect of the adversarial principle, effectiveness, legality, liberty and representation. The Commission 
enacted a new Recommendation on the principles for out-of-court bodies involved in consensual 
resolution of consumer disputes: OJ L 109/56, 19/4/2001. 
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consumer goods into conformity with the needs, happiness and sense of justice of the 
parties. This does not mean general clauses (good faith, honest business practices, 
reasonable expectations, fairness and the like) that, accordingly to Stuyck, appear to be 
preferred by the principle of proportionality in order to protect consumers. (2000: 400) 
It is not denied, equally, that those clauses can certainly have a positive role in a 
relational justice where the mediator, conciliator, arbitrator or judge directs the 
settlement of the dispute towards the consideration of the needs of the parties.  
Articles 4 and 7 establish the application of national law to resolve cross-border 
disputes. In practice, PIL will be applied in disputes between the final seller, liable to 
the consumer, and the previous sellers in the chain of contracts; and in disputes 
involving a non-member state.   
 
IV.2- Directive no. 2000/31 
 
The Directive on certain legal aspects of electronic commerce in the internal 
market110, is another EC legal document that tries to respond to both sides of the 
completion of the internal market: business and consumer. The gap is confirmed 
because, by trying to respond to realities which are very different with the same tools, 
law forgets two points: the relational character of any consumption relationship and the 
particularities/special needs that it involves, especially from the point of view of the 
weaker party to the relationship. The gap widens and the objective of implementation of 
the internal market is hampered because consumer confidence remains low and no 
acknowledgement of the necessity to pay heed to the relational side of contracts can be 
effective. So, it is impossible to nourish a more eff ctive and stable market growth. The 
relational side of a contract, as discussed in the first part of the thesis, is characterised 
by the aim of the parties to save their contractual rel tionship even at the expense of law 
or legalistic readings of the contract as a formal framework of rules. In order to preserve 
the relationship, the parties should acknowledge their needs and happiness, by finding a 
way to settle the dispute despite laws and rules.  
Article 12 establishes the responsibility of the Member States regarding the 
implementation of “adequate and effective complaints and redress procedures for the 
settlement of disputes between suppliers and consumers.”  
Article 16 elects codes-of-conduct as the sort of soft-law to be encouraged to 
regulate e-commerce and inform dispute resolution. 
 The provisions inserted in Article 17 about out-of-c urt dispute settlement 
confirm the national duty of providing this benefit, while excluding Community’s 
responsibilities. The Community shall be informed of the decisions reached by the out-
                                                
110 Directive 2000/31, OJ L 178/1, 17.7.2000. This Directive has 65 recitals against 24 articles. 
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of-court bodies, but it will not be involved in any part of the process of dispute 
settlement. The principles of the Recommendation on the functioning of bodies 
responsible for out-of-court settlement are repeated without substantial changes or any 
further care. 
 Article 19 regulates the cooperation between natiol authorities, which should 
provide assistance to the parties of a dispute. The gap here is about the lack of a central 
regulatory authority at Community level to co-ordinate the formation of a European 
network for the protection of the consumer and national harmonisation of dispute 
settlement. 
The Directive on e-commerce “approximates (…) national provisions on 
Information Society services relating to (…) liability of intermediaries, codes of 
conduct, out-of-court dispute settlements, court actions (…).”   In so doing, this 
Community legal document repeats various inconveniences of EC consumer policy and 
law in general: its fragmentation, lack of hard law, inappropriate allocation of 
responsibility to national orders in cases of cross-border disputes, lack of suitable 
discourse to make out-of-court dispute resolution work for the protection of consumers 
in their own terms, legal justice to be delivered ultimately by courts.  
 
IV.3- Further Improvements 
 
Consumer protection requires a proper language, a language of care. Therefore, 
it demands an overall legal framework to encompass all the internal market activities 
that involve consumption relationships at all levels: territorial (Community-wide), 
substantial (general rights regarding all the sectors of the economy) and procedural 
(access to a special sort of justice).  
 On the one hand, the institutional and legal current situation do not offer 
room for hope that individual consumers in small disputes will risk themselves in legal 
proceedings. On the other, the same lack of hope can be asserted regarding the 
possibility that an individual consumer will, for example, explore the internal market for 
financial services without quick, effective and protective mechanisms for redress or, in a 
word, without justice. Bourgoignie asserts “the modesty and lack of effectiv  autonomy 
of (…) consumer law (…) in (…) the Community (…)”, and highlights the remarkably 
poor development of areas like access to justice which is due to the “inability of the 
Community authorities to obtain (…) tangible result” addressing policies reputedly 
essential for the transparency of the market but with a language different from that of 
the market (1992:313). The lack of autonomy and the fragmented character of EC 
consumer law “suggests that any gains for European consumers will be achieved on a 
strictly incremental basis – a laborious accumulation of ‘add-on’ rights, rather than a 
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coherent policy motivated by clearly identified consumer principles.” (Gibson, 
1993:329) This has been acutely true for access to jus ice for consumers. Furthermore, it 
characterises one of the aspects of the gap discussed so far, and offers a possible avenue 
to create at the Community level availability for the effectiveness of a framework 
regarding access to justice that suits European consumers while allowing them to 
benefit fully from an integral internal market.  
The establishment of out-of-court settlement of cross-border disputes is always 
reputed to be problematic due to the lack of legal framework or even the complexity of 
the rules of PIL. “Main issues concerning cross-border dispute settlement systems 
include: a set of rules applicable to cross-border isputes, the recognition of the 
settlement and its enforceability in a different country.”111 Since the rules of PIL are not 
applicable and are far too complicated, the involvement of the Community through the 
enactment of a Regulation covering the gap in all its aspects will be the solution 
required. Moreover, hard law, public authorities and European involvement in the 
implementation of the project would guarantee clarity and would respond effectively to 
the needs of the EU consumer who, while exploring the internal market, finds himself in 
a cross-border dispute. Such involvement would alsoremove the burden of having to 
decide which system best suits a plaintiff. It represents an avenue for the attainment of 
happiness and satisfaction in the parties’ terms through justice as care in an environment 






















                                                
111 Wilikens, Marc, et alli., (2000), Out-of-court dispute settlement systems for e-commerce. Report of an 
exploratory study, Joint Research Centre, Ispra (VA)-Italy. This report can be downloaded from: 




Enquiring about Availability 
 
This chapter will build a more systematised expositi n with the general aim at 
checking the availability of the EC legal and institutional system against a range of 
necessities identified for a project embracing a special justice for consumers in disputes 
across borders. This will be done through the dissection of Article 153 of the Treaty 
introduced by Maastricht and amended in the Amsterdam Treaty. 
It appears worthwhile, firstly, to sum up the general characteristics of a justice 
for consumers informed by the ethics of care. The most basic points to be translated into 
the European context are: 1-Wide constitutional provisi ns to promote consumer 
protection. These would also include the derived an complementary legislation to the 
constitutional basis. 2- A hard principled law to function as regulatory provisions for 
punishing unfair trading, through civil or criminal penalties. This would require strong 
institutional apparatus to perform a responsive justice for consumers in cross-border 
disputes. 3- A lack of procedural law able to constrain a contextual practice of justice 
given the specificity of different disputes to be settled and particular needs to be cared 
for. This entails the need to overcome formalism with a special ability to adopt, with 
legitimacy and effectiveness, a practice of justice as care. 4- A strong public body 
responsible for mediating and promoting the settlement of disputes involving consumers 
and professionals and with the power to promote criminal and civil court procedures for 
the defence of consumers, in conjunction with them or their organisations.  
This chapter will not undertake the task of pasting all the above requirements of 
our redefinition of justice onto EC consumer law and policy for one needs firstly an 
analysis of the European institutional and legal relity regarding access to justice for 
consumers. This is the aim of chapter seven. 
The four requirements are all instrumental and they r quire a greater 
involvement of European institutions in promoting justice for consumers as a European 
endeavour. The gap verified by the use of PIL is aggr vated by the absence of that 
involvement, which reinforces the moral aspect of the gap. The Tampere Summit112, 
whilst setting up conditions for the fulfilment of the objectives of the Amsterdam Treaty 
concerning the establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice, does not fulfil 
the political call of Amsterdam, because it has delimited the effort of European 
institutions to the development of a network system of national legal orders. The 
network relies on the transformation and/or adaptation of national orders to offer easy 
                                                
112 President Romano Prodi. http://www.europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guest 
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access to justice rather than on the development of a genuine European area of justice 
with particular features to attend to the necessities of cross-border consumer disputes. 
The Amsterdam Treaty strengthened the first Community pillar in prejudice of the third 
inter-governmental one, by endowing the Union with more effective tools to implement 
a European area of justice. Justice, then, left the “legal sandstone” quality of the third 
pillar in order to integrate a more substantial realm of the “solid legal granite” of the 
first pillar (Müller-Graff, 1994:495). Thus, justice is reputed to have started a process of 
contamination between the Community and the intergovernmental areas of competence. 
It betrays, to a certain extent, a traditional compromise about keeping a clear separation 
between the two areas despite the bridge from the third to the first pillar established by 
Articles K9 and K14. The maintenance of clear lines between the pillars was a 
safeguard of national powers against ever-growing Community powers, which were 
strengthened. 
The rhetoric of the Amsterdam Treaty is towards equipping the Union to 
respond to the aspirations of its citizens, despite the clear limitation of the great majority 
of European policies in attending inclusively to the exigencies of the Union as a 
common rather than internal market. The rhetoric of a supposed European citizenship 
certainly requires a special quality with which theinternal market can furnish the Union, 
but which a common market cannot. The common market can grow through the mere 
adaptation of national legal systems. By contrast, n internal market will demand an 
internal legal order and its corresponding system of justice and will push forth the limits 
of responsibility at the European level thereby undermining national orders. Justice for 
cross-border disputes, especially for consumers, requir s a European environment in 
order to achieve effective protection.  
Access to justice has been transformed in a genuine Community responsibility beyond 
any limit set up by the exclusivity of the economic concern of European policies and 
law. Access to justice at the European level, after Amsterdam, is a constitutional 
responsibility of the Union and not necessarily relat d to the removal of trade barriers. 
In fact, this trend was already in Maastricht. Lane points out that many of the 
programmatic norms of Article 3 of Maastricht do not have an immediate or primary 
economic focus (1993:944). The exclusivity of the Community competence to act in 
trade matters was extended by Maastricht and more strongly in Amsterdam in the sense 
that the Community can act with a different aim from the mere economic one. The 
growth of Community responsibilities especially in Amsterdam provides ammunition 
for Weatherill’s plea for the development of the Community into a state.113 Consumers 
have been playing a fundamental role in the transformation of the common market into 
                                                
113 Weatherill wonders: “How long must we wait until the Community becomes a state not just a 
market?” (1994:33) 
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an internal one, the Community into a Union and maybe into a state. Consumer 
protection has been urging the adoption of a new post-n rmative model that can guide 
EC legal and institutional framework into post-modernity, beyond the widest citizen 
charter of individual rights.  
The preparatory documents for the Dublin II conference of the representatives of 
the governments of the Member States assert that the Intergovernmental Conference 
“equip[s] the Union (…) to respond imaginatively to the aspirations of its citizens”.114 
The term “imaginatively” is very meaningful; it indicates the enormous proportions of 
the challenge of developing a Union, which considers the human beings in their 
specificity and particular needs along with peace, stability and prosperity. The entrance 
of social and individual responsibilities in the European legal framework and political 
discourse is an appeal for imagination beyond disputes among jealous national systems, 
given the major European challenge to respect diversity while harmonising common 
values.  
 This task will be developed in five sections all related to Article 153 concerning 
access to justice for consumers in EC consumer law and policy.  The following section 
briefly reviews the specific context of the development of EC consumer policy and law 
as negative law and its relation to the implementation of the referred Article. The third 
section looks into the meaning of policy based on sft law and its use in the 
development of justice for consumers in the internal market. The fourth section 
considers both the theme of subsidiarity in its positive aspect and the responsibilities of 
European institutions regarding the development andeffectiveness of justice for 
European consumers involved in cross-border dispute.  These three sections intend to 
show the challenges negative law, soft law and subsdiarity represent for Article 153. 
  The two last sections undertakes a more dogmatic sort of exposition concerning 
the analysis of Article 153 in itself and its relationship to Articles 2, 10, 94, 95 and 308 
in turn, in order to tentatively explain any gap in EU consumer policy and law as a lack 
of political will rather than as “an essential insttutional [or legal] problem" (Dahl, 
1993:70).   
 
I - Article 153 and the Policy of Negative Law 
 
 Article 153 is seen as the constitutional base of EC consumer law and policy, 
whose implementation has been underway since before the introduction of the Article in 
the EEC Treaty by Maastricht Treaty. Thus, despite the constitutional vacuum of the 
Treaty with regard to any sort of consumer protection at the market level, its 
development has taken place, since 1972, with the Paris Summit.  
                                                
114 CONF. 2500/96, Brussels on the 5th December 1996, page 8. 
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 Paragraph 1 of article 153 establishes that the Community, in order to promote 
the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer protection, shall 
contribute to protect the health, safety and economic interests of consumers and 
promote their right to information, education and organisation in view of safeguarding 
their interests. Access to justice appears to be connected with the economic interests of 
consumer. In this regard, the Treaty uses a very weak v rb (to contribute) to assert the 
commitment of the Community to the defence of the economic interests of consumers. 
At the same time, the verbs “to promote” and “to ensure” suggest the intention of 
creating an obligation for the Community regarding consumer protection.  
 Paragraph 3 repeats the verb “to contribute” while enumerating the ways through 
which the Community will implement the contribution e shrined in paragraph 1. The 
measures would have two distinct characteristics: -they have to be adopted in the 
context of the completion of the internal market; -and, the measures available for 
adoption by the Community have to “support, supplement and monitor the policy 
pursued by the Member States”. 
Paragraph 5 concedes to the Member States the authorisa ion to maintain or 
introduce more severe measures to protect consumers, of which the Commission should 
be notified, in order to verify their compatibility with the Treaty.  
Despite the understanding that Article 153 represents “an important breakthrough for 
Community consumer policy at the formal legal level” (Weatherill, 1994:57-8), it 
appears that the constitutional base offered by its wording is quite narrow, especially if 
one analyses it in its political context, which is rather hostile to the uncontrolled growth 
of Community competences.  
However, there are others who think of Article 153 as an example of an 
undefined provision or a typically wide constitutional authorisation and understand its 
wording as doing “little more than state that there is a need for a Community consumer 
policy. This does not define an objective, but rather an area of competence” (Bernard, 
1996:650). 
The evolution of EC consumer law and policy is profoundly similar to the 
development of access to justice for consumers. One ca  see how consumer protection 
has been to a lesser or greater extent contained by negative law, soft-law and/or 
subsidiarity. 
Negative law could be understood as the prohibition of ational constraints that, 
while aiming at protecting the consumer, hinder the development of the internal market, 
by boosting the process of national markets interpenetration (Weatheril, 1997:36). 
Negative law, mainly through European case law, has emptied rights discourse for 
consumers, patching together instead a discourse of consumer choice. The protection of 
the market under Articles 28 and 49 has provided EC law with a set of prohibitions 
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against hostile actions that could prevent the internal market from flourishing through 
its four fundamental freedoms. This is the basic mehanism of negative law. 
The developing market would expand towards an enviro ment of enlarged 
choice for consumers at the expense of a more positive perspective that would entail a 
practice of observance of and/or compliance with rig ts. On the one hand, negative law 
aims at the development of the internal market by re-shaping consumer protection in 
general and access to justice for consumers in particular. On the other, negative law as a 
background for the imposition of choice discourse ov r a discourse of rights entails an 
evolution in consumer policy, from the realm of protected consumers to that of 
informed ones. Informed consumers will not need protection in many respects since 
they will not be misled. Access to justice in such an environment is likely to be deemed 
unnecessary. Furthermore, for many economists, consumer protection is just a question 
of information, not of rights or regulations. (von H. u.d. Lasa, 1991:399) This is clearly 
a dispute between free trading and consumer protecti n, between deregulatory and 
regulatory strategies.  
The Cassis de Dijon doctrine, for instance, essentially deregulatory, aims at 
assisting the implementation of free trading, by indirectly lending attention to consumer 
protection through information and labelling. The Court’s positions in Cassis di Dijon 
and in the elaboration of negative law reveal the fundamental problem as the common 
market evolves into a Union, namely the difficult co-existence between free-trade and 
consumer protection. From a narrower perspective, informed consumers are not 
confident and confidence is necessary for the growth of the market and also for the 
consolidation of the political process known by “European integration”.  
The use of the rhetoric of choice in detriment of the rhetoric of right is a double-
edged tool because the opening of the market without the corresponding protection, 
especially in the area of access to justice, undermin s the enjoyment of that choice 
whereas trying to offer a wider possibility of choice. Consumers who are not confident 
enough to exercise that choice will turn their back on the market. Thus, this approach 
appears contra-productive and demands a more responsive consumer policy. It has 
become increasingly clear that the benefits of the common market, which the consumer 
has the right to enjoy, are also potentially dangerous. Well-informed consumers, 
without the security that would protect them in case of dispute, will not perceive the 
market as a benefit but a burden which they will avoid. The consolidation of the internal 
market depends then on the capacity of the European institutions of developing and 
supporting a very solid European area of justice for consumers in cross-border disputes. 
This requires the development of positive law in order to rescue consumers from the 
position of mere passive beneficiaries of the wider choice promoted by the expansion of 
the internal market, which in truth needs active consumers. Weatherill corroborates this 
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analysis when he posits that the development of conident consumers depends on two 
basic elements: access to justice connected with public enforcement and minimum 
community-wide rules (1995:319/326). National negative law requires positive law at 
the Union level if consumers are to be active, confident and able to treat the market as 
one. 
  Thus, Article 153 can be thought of as a tool to seclude or remove the effects of 
negative law from the development of consumer protection.  “[T]he insertion into the 
Treaty of Article 129a [now 153] liberates pursuit of the consumer interest from the 
constraints of enforced linkage to internal market policy. This holds the potential at 
formal, legal level to clear the way for a significant increase in the level of Community 
consumer policy making, whether connected with substantive law or with procedural 
matters such as access to justice” (Micklitz&Weatherill, 1993:17). 
Another effect of negative law on consumer policy and law in general is 
identified by its patchy development, which, especially before Maastricht, was not 
directed by clearly issued positive law or supported by a strong constitutional basis. 
This evolution was rather informed by the contingenci s brought about by the 
expansion and peculiarities of the internal market. 
The insertion of Article 153 into the Treaty shows the contradictions with which 
the internal market is surrounded. If on the one hand informed consumers, promoted by 
negative law, do not need protection, on the other hand the market needs confident 
consumers to act and support its development. Consequently negative law needs to 
recede if positive law has to respond to the demands of a market, which cannot survive 
without informed, protected and confident consumers.  
“Rights rhetoric has been reinstated by the objectiv  of creating a Europe of 
citizens. Citizens need more than open markets to satisfy their needs. The more active 
the consumer her/himself becomes, the more he/she moves across borders (…), the 
more he/she uses transborder communication to shop around for goods and services, the 
more the Community must harmonize (and not simply coordinate) legal standards of 
protection” (Reich, 1992:26). 
Negative law in the specific realm of access to justice will provoke self-
regulation which has been very much encouraged in the EC law, regarding consumer-
producer dialogue. “Consumers may rightly fear a loss f power under self-regulatory 
schemes. Indeed, ‘any scheme of self-regulation must be viewed in the context of the 
general bargaining process implicit in such regulation. (…).’ For this reason, consumers 
would prefer to have at least some kind of controlling framework for self-regulation” 
(Kye, 1995:50). The self-regulation approach calls into question issues of responsibility 
and democratic accountability, which are of paramount importance for building public 
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confidence necessary for the prosperity of the market and also for the special sort of 
justice for consumers informed by the ethics of care (McGee&Weatherill, 1990).  
Article 81 of the Treaty limits self-regulation regarding exclusively market 
problems; it does not affect or constrain self-regulatory power regarding the settlement 
of disputes, for instance.  
This section has dealt with one of the problems in EC consumer law and policy 
and has stressed that Article 153 certainly offers l gal basis for its equalisation toward 
the reality of active and confident consumers. Negative law does not work in favour of 
creating confident European consumers. 
To sum up, the change from negative to positive law means a change from 
neglectful actions, which might harm the progress of the internal market, toward 
concrete actions to promote it. In this view, Article 153 is a strong enough legal basis 
for positive law in EC consumer law and policy, since it imposes this obligation on the 
Community. Article 153 is then both a landmark for a better systematisation of 
consumer law and policy and also in regard to overcoming the highly patchy and 
fragmented quality of this area of EC Law.  
 
II - Article 153 and the Policy of Soft Law 
 
Article 153 is theoretically a watershed that marks an end to the string of soft 
law that had characterised EC consumer law and policy due to the lack of legal basis. 
Nevertheless, Article 153, introduced by Maastricht, had to bear the tradition of the 
practice of soft-law for the regulation of matters judged out of the context of the 
completion of the internal market. In truth, consumer policy in general, even after 
Maastricht, has been struggling to prove that it belongs to the heart of the development 
of the internal market.    
The concept of soft law in PIL sheds light on the use of this instrument in 
Community law, regardless of the differences between th se two fields of law. Soft law 
is related to the sources of PIL, to the essence of international legal obligation and to the 
role PIL plays in international affairs (Wellens&Borchardt, 1989:267-8). Soft law is 
understood as non-conventional and non-binding; as h ving insufficiently precise 
content and vague scope; as more programmatic than normative; as “law that cannot be 
enforced but has to be observed. Soft law therefore c ncerns rules of conduct that find 
themselves on the legally non-binding level (…) but which in accordance with the 
intention of its authors indeed do possess a leg l scope, which has to be defined further 
in each case” (Ibid., 271-2/274). In PIL, soft law presents itself as: resolutions, codes of 
conduct, joint communiqués or declarations and gentlemen’s agreements, when 
disguised as hard law (Ibid., 274-6). 
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Soft law in Community law “concerns the rules of conduct which find 
themselves on the legally non-binding level (…) butwhich according to their drafters 
have to be awarded a legal scope, but (…) they influe ce the conduct of Member States, 
institutions, undertakings and individuals without containing Community rights or 
obligations. (…) In this light there can already now be stated that regulations, directives 
and decisions belong to Community hard law by nature, while recommendations and 
opinions, likewise by nature, form part of the Community soft law (…)” (Ibid., 
285/289). 
Soft law has also a special connection with the policy of consumer choice 
represented by the understanding established by the European Court of Justice in the 
Casis de Dijon case, which generated the Commission Communication on the 
consequences of this judgement. After that, on the on  hand hard national law that 
hindered the free movement of goods in the internal market should be contested. On the 
other hand, the strategy of harmonisation of nationl law recedes in favour of localised 
litigation and use of soft-law (Snyder: 1993a:3). 
For the Commission, soft law is a very comfortable way to express its position 
about a certain matter without submitting a formal document of hard law for 
consideration by the Council, Parliament, and Economic and Social Committee. 
Besides, soft law minimises the erosion of Commission powers to submit and 
implement legislation imposed by Maastricht (Ibid, 4). Another advantage is that any 
soft law can be transformed into hard law if the circumstances will so demand. This 
transformation will always benefit from all the information about the appropriateness 
and legitimacy of the positions advanced by the soft law document.  
Moreover, the political meaning of soft law is very important since through it, it 
is possible to agree on practical unacceptable forms of regulation to be put in non-
binding documents as a desirable horizon for certain practices. Besides, soft law gives 
to its subjects the possibility to postpone forever the adoption of what it suggests, 
indefinitely delaying “the creation of formal Community rules within a true Single 
Market” (McGee&Weatherill, 1990:591). 
Soft law does not create rights and obligations enforceable by legal proceedings; 
it lacks legally binding force as its most important characteristic. By contrast, self-
regulatory agreements with contractual force are endowed with this characteristic. 
“These contractual relations however are difficult to achieve, since at Community level 
no legal framework to bargaining, or mechanisms to solve legal disputes exist” 
(Steyger, 1993:174). Thus, the effectiveness of self-regulatory agreements will have to 
rely upon national law and will be valid only for the parties involved. In case of cross-
border disputes, the gap is insurmountable.  
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After Maastricht, soft law must be the bet choice since Article 153 is taken as a 
fragile constitutional base for action. Soft law inthis context “comprises such 
techniques as (diminishing in ‘hardness’) model laws for voluntary incorporation, 
voluntary agreements with branches of industry, recommendations, resolutions and 
declarations, pilot projects, grants for research, etc” (Close, 1983:234). “EC consumer 
policy reflects such trends. It is characterized by a network of non-binding instruments” 
(Wheatheril, 1997:34). 
 It clearly appears that this form of law pleases dlights companies expected to 
push forth the market and to drum up business, leaving consumers without protection. 
So, soft law is meant not to upset traders and yet giv s to consumers the impression that 
something has been done. Confident and active consumer  require more positive and 
hard legal action in order to behave as a real leverage for the market, to shop around as 
if they were in their own country, as if the market were one. Furthermore, soft law as a 
strategy to tackle consumer protection in the internal market undermines the effort of 
establishing a European system of out-of-court justice hrough harmonisation and 
communitarisation which requires hard law, especially in critical sectors such as 
financial services and e-commerce. Soft law leads to a watered down European 
legislation, and fails to improve consumer confidence. Soft law, whilst allowing more 
flexibility and swifter implementation, should not replace the legal binding force of hard 
law.  
  Issues like access to justice, understood as situated away from the core of the 
internal market, have been asking for a radically novel approach to the role of 
consumers as levers of the market. The recent developm nt of the theme of access to 
justice for consumers in the EU appears to indicate that this understanding cannot be 
turned into reality unless it takes the form of soft law.  
A recent example of the adoption of codes of conduct to regulate e-commerce is 
the Directive on certain legal aspects of electronic commerce in the Internal Market115. 
The Directive is itself written in soft law language when it says, for example, -in Article 
16- that Member States and the Commission hall encourage. There is also an attempt 
to lend a contractual characteristic to the codes of conduct, by establishing that these 
codes shall be drawn-up by trade, professional and co sumer associations, “in so far as 
they may be concerned”.  This Article goes very far when it relegates public matters for 
the care of codes of conduct drawn-up without enough le itimation, by establishing that 
these codes of conduct should include the protection of minors and human dignity. A 
possible solution would require each user or recipint of a service to electronically 
“sign” the respective code of conduct each time he starts his shopping. It would, then, 
function as a contract between that particular recipi nt and the trader. Nevertheless, one 
                                                
115 OJ L 178/1, 17.7.2000. 
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could never assume that each point was individually negotiated, which is the basic 
characteristic of any fair contract. Article 18 requires that Member States ensure quick 
and effective court actions to avoid any “impairment of the interests involved”. 
Codes of conduct must work together with trustmarks. The former should be 
endorsed and the latter issued by accredited bodies with national jurisdiction and set up 
by the respective Member State. The codes should be judged against a common set of 
principles established by the Commission, traders and consumers in conjunction. One 
can find these details in a speech of Commissioner David Byrne.116 He adds that codes 
of conduct are very appropriate for out-of-court setlements, which is the object of 
Article 17 of the Directive. 
The Directive is very complex and it mainly aims at creating an internal market 
for the Information Society by guaranteeing that Memb r States do not create obstacles, 
as states Article 3. Article 22 imposes restrictions  national authorities in their duties 
to regulate and set up limits to the market or specifically for e-commerce. Thus, the 
Directive does not intend to protect consumers despite doing that indirectly to a certain 
extent, but aimed at opening space in the internal market for e-commerce. Consumer 
protection and access to justice are relegated to sof  law and a just incipient out-of-court 
system.  
The case of e-commerce shows the lack of political will of the Commission to 
take on the constitutional authorisation of Article 153 and responsibilities for a 
European area of security and justice in order to take one step further in the direction of 
clear and harmonic Community-wide rules. The understanding that confident 
consumers will not endeavour to explore the internal m rket as if it were one is a 
legitimate argument to place access to justice for consumers in cross-border disputes at 
the core of the internal market. The defence of consumers and the establishment of 
effective access to justice would then be the main poi t of a hard law as a European 
legal document, like a regulation.   
The interest in soft law as an instrument to integrate EC consumer law and policy is 
remarkable. The adoption of this form of regulation n the Directive was brought about 
following a study117 on “normes douces” undertaken for the Commission, which did not 
express its official position.  It stresses that soft law consists of rules formulated by 
persons directly concerned in or with them (page 52). Soft law is regarded as consensual 
or ‘not imposed’ despite difficulties in assuring legitimacy to them especially when one 
intends their general application throughout such a diverse and complex market as the 
                                                
116 Speech delivered on the 18th September 2000 by Commission D. Byrne at the “Cyberspace and 
Consumer Confidence” to the Annual Conference of the Kangaroo Group of MEP’s”. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consum…/policy_speech. 
117 “La meilleure pratique dans le recours à des normes juridiques “douces” et son application aux 
consommateurs au sein de l’Union Europenne”. (2000), Lex Fori – Groupement Européen d’intérêt 
économique”. Study gentlement forward to the author by the European Commission.  
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European one. The study criticises the use of the term “soft law”, by saying that “soft” 
is not a happy adjective since it already shows a certain weakness or lack of efficacy. 
The term “law”, says the study, is also inappropriate, because soft law works more as a 
norm in a very wide sense than as a positive legal instrument (page 53). The study 
identifies four sorts of soft law: l’autoréglementation, les accords volontaires, la co-
réglementation, and la quasi-régulation. Self-regulation is drawn-up by the traders 
alone. Agreements are characterised by the participa on of other groups. Co-regulation 
is done with the participation of public authorities and quasi-regulation is produced only 
by public authorities, although its implementation s left to the traders concerned. 
The Commission has developed its own classification, as noted by the study 
mentioned: “les codes de bonne conduite, les accords de co-réglementation, les 
recommandations, les codes de bonnes pratiques, les déclarations communes 
d’intention, les normes de qualité et les procédures d  recours. Elle a réparti ces 
instruments en deux grandes catégories: -l’autoréglementation: ce sont les normes 
juridiques douces élaborées par et pour l’entrepris; -la réglementation volontaire: il 
s’agit des normes juridiques douces encouragées par les pouvoirs publics et élaborées 
en coopération avec les acteurs concernés ou par la coopération entre ces derniers” 
(pages 62-3). 
The study recognises the ethical value of soft law while deprived of legally 
binding force and indicates that institutional apparatus is necessary to lend more 
effectiveness to soft law (page 74). It also suggests that out-of-court procedur s are ideal 
for the use of soft law. It is so insofar as soft law promotes a detached solution from 
public power and safeguards that such as equality, certainty, impartiality and due 
process of law. Soft law does not demand the legitimation of any of safeguards 
mentioned and can work based on the legitimation lent to it by the satisfaction of the 
parties promoted by its effective and quick outcomes. Soft law can provide faster 
“justice” in terms of case resolution since it is free from the constraints imposed by the 
exigencies of the due process of law.  
It is also possible that soft law imposes sanctions which demand institutional 
mechanisms to promote their c ystallisation into hard law (Bonnor, 2000). In this 
respect, the study explains that the involvement of the Commission in the 
implementation and adoption of soft law as the solemechanism of consumer protection 
in the EC has been criticised by national authorities and seen with reservation by 
consumer representatives such as BEUC (Ibid., 267-8). About the role of the 
Commission, says M. David Gallina, an Italian authority from the area of 
Communication, fears that the Commission institutionalises a discretionary power, 
while growing in a way to cause conflict of competenc  among other European 
institutions and puts into question its own legitimacy. A Belgian authority has criticised 
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the adoption of soft law for the protection of consumers and posits that better results can 
only be attained by harmonisation. The plan is alsoencountering resistance in Germany, 
which indicates a cultural difficulty in welcoming soft law, but has been well received 
in Great Britain and in the Netherlands (Ibid., 267-8/272). 
 The essential features of soft law indicate that its use calls for caution. It is very 
easy to imagine the insecurity of consumers when dealing with professionals or traders 
who have established their own code of conduct and disputes settlement body without 
any public scrutiny or regulation. It is difficult to improve confidence for consumers in 
a context of high levels of freedom for traders but high degrees of uncaring 
subservience for consumers.  
In turn, one must analyse Article 153 vis-à-vis thesoft law recourse, regarding 
the verb “to contribute” which is used twice. The vrb itself does not really imply a 
preference for the use of soft law instruments as recommendations or opinions; rather it 
suggests that the Community will act in co-operation and that its actions do not have the 
purpose of exhausting the problem while offering a definite solution or excluding help 
from Member States. Such action is a contribution and has supported the decision to 
avoid regulations, in consumer policy in general, in favour of directives precisely 
because they do not have an exhaustive nature.  
As already discussed, soft law is an instrument appreciated by economists 
preoccupied with guaranteeing maximum freedom and minimum regulation and 
interference in markets. Thus, soft law in the Community’s legal structure is a 
combination of the delicate task of convening sovereignties and of operating in such a 
highly sophisticated context as the European Internal Market. Consequently, the 
protection promised by Article 153 when confronted with jealous sovereignties and 
supremacy of economic power is quite reduced. Soft law as an instrument of the 
subsidiarity principle, as it is understood in the Community’s balance of power, can be 
seen as the reaction against the “centralization of regulatory power which seems to be 
the ‘iron law’ of federalism” (Reich, 1992:866). 
Soft-law has to evolve into hard-law in the name of effectiveness, efficacy and 
efficiency which all demand strong institutional will. A strong legal framework is 
necessary, especially for the out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes.  
 
III- Article 153 and the Principle of Subsidiarity 
 
 The principle of subsidiarity is the third constraint upon Article 153 that 
Community law and practice offer. Subsidiarity functions as a double-edged sword 
concerning the case of the gap in access to justice in cross-border disputes for 
consumers in the EU (Dehousse, 1994a:6). As such, sbsidiarity will be considered in 
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both its positive and negative side. Firstly, subsidiar ty will be considered negatively in 
order to characterise its positive effect in building and maintaining the gap described in 
the last chapter. The second approach is about highlighting subsidiarity as a tool to 
dismantle the gap acting negatively on it.  
 
III.1- Subsidiarity as a Hurdle 
 
The principle of subsidiarity, enshrined within the EC constitutional order, can 
have a devastating effect upon EC consumer policy and l w. It provides a good excuse 
for national orders to be burdened with caring for their consumers, who are expected to 
explore the market without internal frontiers. In this sense, “subsidiarity cloaks a failure 
to act with the respectability of a principled stand” (Gibson, 1993:55). Ultimately, 
subsidiarity can be identified as one of the causes of the gap discussed here, together 
with the understanding that access to justice for consumers does not have an immediate 
connection with the progress of the internal market. Consequently, consumer redress 
remains mainly a national matter whereas that reliance amounts to denial of justice in 
cross-border disputes. 
 The origins of subsidiarity can be found in “Catholic social doctrine and federal 
political thought” and particularly in the case of the European Community, it was firstly 
referred to in the Tindemans Report in 1975 in the following way: “… the European 
Union is not to give birth to a centralising super-state. Consequently, and in accordance 
with the principe de subsidiarité, the Union will be given responsibility only for those 
matters which the Member States are no longer capable of dealing with efficiently” (In 
Duff, 1997:100). 
 The principle of subsidiarity, introduced by the SEA in a mitigated form and 
substantially improved in Maastricht, gained momentum in the environment of 
uncertainty and political difficulties surrounding the ratification of Maastricht at the 
European Council summit in Edinburgh in December 1992. Subsidiarity has the role of 
safeguarding national powers and competence vis-à-v the threat of an overwhelming 
increase of power of a Community managed by bureaucats from Brussels.  
 In terms of political equilibrium between Member States and Community, 
subsidiarity has been understood as a reaction agaist the effects provoked by the SEA, 
which reduced Member States´ ability to contain the Community ever-growing 
influence. Subsidiarity re-established part of the power lost after SEA.  
The Commission’s document on subsidiarity prepared t the Edinburgh Summit 
delimits the Community’s legislative jurisdiction towards a clear preference for soft law 
documents. It elects soft law as the “legal” tool cmpatible with subsidiarity. “[A]ll 
things being equal, directives should be preferred over regulations and framework 
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directives to detailed measures; non-binding measurs such as recommendations should 
be preferred where appropriate” (In Reich, 1995:299). This is one of the rules furnished 
by the principle of subsidiarity understood in its constitutional status in EC legal order 
(Schilling, 1994). 
 Subsidiarity, as a way of determining or dividing competence between local and 
central authorities or, in the EU, between Member States and Union, is ultimately a way 
to avoid the over-centralisation of power (de Búrca, 1996:367). It is a political principle 
understood in the context of a redistribution of power, and functions as a limit. Article 5 
establishes conditions for the Community’s role in situations which do not exclusively 
fall within its competence. This action is justified “only if and insofar as the objectives 
of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can, 
therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by 
the Community” (Article 5). This legal formula entails two tests: one of effectiveness 
and another of necessity.  
 Two conditions must be observed, under the subsidiarity principle in order to 
justify Community action in cases which do not fall within its exclusive competence: 
efficiency/effectiveness and the cross border nature or effect of the action. The criteria 
could be named: “the more effective attainment test” and “the cross-boundary 
dimension effect”. Community authorities, in accordance with the German recipe, will 
have a subsidiary power to act only in cases where local authorities cannot perform it in 
the most effective and efficient way possible. The G rman maxim reads: “as much 
central government as necessary, as little central government as possible” (Schilling, 
1994). 
 Micklitz has developed another dichotomous way of seeing and applying 
subsidiarity. He identifies ‘subsidiarity from without’ as related to delimiting and 
defining competences and ‘subsidiarity from within’ as linked to what has to be done, 
by whom and how, once connected with defining structures. ‘Subsidiarity from without’ 
calls for a political approach can establish a dangerous rivalry and lead to paralysis or 
ultimately destruction.  
‘Subsidiarity from within’, whilst still representing the negative approach of the 
principle, has a more dynamic expression and suggests that this dichotomy furnishes “a 
new and prospective reading of the principle” which upholds the action of the 
Community towards the repayment of the fundamental debt of economic integration, 
expressed in “a minimum of social integration” and the definition of the role of 
individuals in the market without frontiers (Micklitz, 1993:513/511/523). This sort of 
subsidiarity, as opposed to the focus on competence, is also connected to the analysis of 
institutional and organisational patterns and reveals how much better certain 
institutional bodies may perform.  
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‘Subsidiarity from without’ denies the existence of the aforementioned 
Community debt as ancillary to the theory of the economic constitution of the European 
Community. “The idea is to have a European market and European rules to guarantee 
market integration, but to leave social regulation  the Member States” (Ibid., 522).  
‘Subsidiarity from within’ seems to call for responsibility, especially from 
national authorities in the furtherance of Community principles, under the provisions of 
Article 10 of the Treaty, which establishes the duty of fidelity of Member States to the 
Community. It re-states the division of competence in terms of shared-responsibility, of 
solidarity in implementing the responsibilities of the internal market and ultimately, the 
obligation of national governments in “develop[ing] a more supportive, communitaire 
attitude” (Weatherill, 1994:69). 
 The principle of subsidiarity (enshrined in Article 5) can also be understood in 
two ways. Firstly, it may be an administrative principle or subsidiarity from within, 
whereby the administration or the application of principles and legal regulations 
centrally decided is a local responsibility. The political side of the principle, or 
subsidiarity from without, is more radical and demands that the legal making process be 
dislocated or devolved to the local context (In Micklitz&Weatherill, 1993:305). The 
latter is devastating to the effectiveness of Article 153 and would turn it into a dead 
letter. In order to avoid this, one must take the verb “to contribute”, used twice in 
Article 153, to suggest an understanding of the subsidiarity principle as “a model of 
shared responsibility” for consumer protection. Otherwise, subsidiarity could lead EC 
consumer policy and ultimately the market to total stagnation or partial sclerosis 
through the adoption of soft law and self-regulation.  
In the case of consumer law and policy, subsidiarity has been acting “as a brake 
on consumer policymaking” and there are warnings that subsidiarity might be abused 
and might jeopardise any EC initiatives for consumer interests. Rather than a principle 
to enhance democracy and openness of decision-making, which should be take as close 
as possible to the citizens, “[s]ubsidiarity sounds (…) like a behind-closed-doors 
excuse” (Weatherill, 1994:58). 
 “Currently, the principle of subsidiarity is being referred to in very many 
discussions of issues (…) such as (…) access to jusice (…). The consequences of (…) 
this reference are twofold: On the one hand, the application of the principle (…) is often 
likely to imply abstention from any action at EC level; on the other hand, it may lead to 
a watered down EC legislation or to the use of self-regulation” (Goyens, 1993a:379).  
Goyens attributes the adoption of self-regulation to the negative use of 
subsidiarity in EC consumer law and policy. She adds that subsidiarity “constitutes a 
genuine danger for EC consumer protection, as in areas (…) such as crossborder 
litigation. Some will push forward (…) subsidiarity o prevent Community action” 
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(1995:36). In the same vein, Gibson calls attention o the Community’s resistance to 
establishing access to justice for consumers in cross-border disputes, and to the fact that 
national action is rather limited due to the cross-boundary nature of the problem.  
 “Legal uncertainty and multiple compliance create, (…) unnecessary duplication 
of legal costs for EU financial institutions when egaging into cross-border provision or 
investment services. It is very likely that these costs will be rolled over to clients and 
may, in turn, offset some of the benefits that investors derive from the drive towards an 
integrated market in financial services”  (Avgouleas, 2000:87).  
 He shows how the negative dimension of subsidiarity has devastating effects on 
financial services in the internal market. For example, it impedes the process of 
rationalisation of the regulatory framework that harmonisation would install and 
hampers, consequently, the progress of the market (Ibidem). This conclusion could be 
extended to include the market as a whole118. 
  
III.2- Subsidiarity as a Duty to Act 
 
 The negative side of subsidiarity, regarding consumer policy, needs to be 
abandoned in favour of a more positive role of the principle in EC political and legal 
organisation in promoting confident and active consumers as levers of the market. 
Among the political and social advantages of subsidiarity, one can emphasise its 
capacity for fostering diversity in all areas. Another view highlights its inability to 
further common values. The latter position looks at subsidiarity from above and the 
former from the bottom up.  
 Concerning the first one, diversity in legal systems, like the EU, can be, 
nevertheless, a problem especially for legal certainty and in the view of the four 
freedoms enshrined by the Treaty. Diversity is a very difficult element to be equalised 
in a framework for justice in cross-border disputes. Furthermore, a centralised approach 
to the problem can protect diversity whilst a local approach to the issue can isolate such 
diversity, reinforce its problems and fail in spreading its lessons. This point is 
particularly important for a project on setting up access to justice for cross-border 
disputes at the Community level, especially regarding the furtherance of common 
values.  
 The second position argues that subsidiarity is by no means a way to settle 
conflicts about values which deserve general codification in organisations such as the 
EC.   
                                                
118 Avgouleas argues for the creation at the Community level of a financial market regulatory body that 
could certainly work for the protection of consumers and lend to cross-border financial services certainty 
and security (2000:92), not provided by “the situation institutionalised in the European System of Central 
Banks” (Usher, 1998:97).  
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 Community consumer policy, in general, under Article 153 and in view of the 
subsidiarity principle, will consist of actions to c ntribute to national consumer policies 
with the challenge of respecting diversity, converging common values and promoting 
consumer confidence in the name of market expansion. 
 The Commission stated in its 1990-three-year action plan, under the heading 
‘Subsidiarity Principle’ that “[p]ractical consumer policy must be effectively managed 
in the Member States on an ongoing basis with the management (…) of redress being 
adapted in each instance to local needs. It would be unrealistic to undertake such task 
continuously at a Community level” (Micklitz&Weatherill, 1993:305)119.  
 Concerning access to justice for consumers in cross b rder disputes, subsidiarity 
will not however have such drastic effect, since thcross-boundary dimension is 
essential and will respond positively to the test of necessity. Besides, the test of 
efficiency and effectiveness also does not impinge on the constraints of subsidiarity 
upon the Community duty of providing this kind of consumer protection, since 
practically the whole EC institutional and legal framework will need further 
improvement in order to tackle the task. Another challenge is the exigencies of 
respecting diversity and promoting convergence of common values, regarding access to 
justice in cross-border disputes, once subsidiarity furnishes a duty to act.  
 In turn, subsidiarity, perhaps even in consumer protection in general, entails a 
question of how to act rather than who acts. More radically, subsidiarity obliges a 
process of building consumer confidence in the Community’s programme of market 
integration, “ensuring that EC legislation is the most appropriate means of achieving a 
high level of consumer protection” (Gibson, 1993:323). 
 This understanding is at the core of the positive sid  of subsidiarity, which acts 
negatively upon the gap in the access to justice for consumers in cross-border disputes 
in the internal market, dismantling it. This positive approach of subsidiarity is urgently 
required in view of the progressive stagnation of the market caused by the timid actions 
of sceptical consumers. The future of the market today seems to lie in the hands of 
consumers. National fiscal and legal barriers to trade cannot easily resist the experience 
of 50 years of improvement of Community mechanisms developed with the specific aim 
of fighting them. Thus, the expansion of the market increasingly demanded by 
threatening rates of unemployment requires more aggressive, purposive and confident 
consumers. In this trend, access to justice lies at the core of any policy that has such an 
objective. 
                                                
119 The negative action of subsidiarity upon EC consumer law and policy, which creates and maintains the 
gap in access to justice for cross-border disputes, can be seen in the preoccupation of the Council “with 
minimising financial and administrative burdens, protecting ‘well-established national arrangements and
the organisation and working of Member States’ legal systems’ and preserving broad discretionary 
decision-making powers at national level. This suggests a desire to maintain the status quo, warts and all, 
rather than actively to pursue efficiency.” (Gibson, 1993:332) 
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 The positive approach of the principle of subsidiar ty, regarding access to justice 
for consumers in the EC, is a necessary requirement for the integral compliance with the 
exigencies of Article 153, understood as a constitutional obligation of the internal 
market towards the establishment of a high level of c nsumer protection. Thus, 
subsidiarity and access to justice, especially in the case for consumers, appears not to 
have very much to do with who acts, as with the action chosen and the method used. 
The quality of justice is of paramount importance in the equalisation of the gap in 
access to justice for consumers in the internal market. 
 T. Bourgoignie who discusses the positive approach of subsidiarity, regarding 
consumer protection, says that this approach entails that “une action de la Communauté 
est donc justifiée dès lors que les mesures prises par les Etats membres ne permettent 
pas de garantir aux consommateurs résidant dans la Communauté un niveau élevé de 
protection” (In Reich, 1995:299-300). 
 Weatherill says that “the creation of a confident consumer could provide a 
rationale for the legislative development of a wide range of minimum rights for the 
consumer in the market. If the internal market cannot be completed without such a 
legislative commitment, then the subsidiarity principle in Article 3b [5] EC must point 
in favour of Community action” (1995:315).  
 De Burca also suggests that subsidiarity should work for the Commission more 
as a legitimazing principle than as a restricting or limiting one, especially in areas which 
call “simultaneously for the strengthening and expansion of Union policies (…) such as 
environmental policy, consumer rights and tourism, which necessarily would involve 
increased powers for the EU institutions” (1996:366-7).  
 In the financial market, especially after the completion of single currency 
policies and given the facilities and danger of e-commerce, access to justice integrates 
the core of market responsibilities, and subsidiarity must then be understood in its 
positive aspect. Subsidiarity in this case is demanding full responsibility and 
interference from the Community powers to offer protection for consumers attracted by 
facilities and new products available in a financial m rket unified by the single currency 
and more easily accessible by electronic means. 
 Some academic discussion has understood consumer prot ction, environmental 
policies and workplace regulations as areas difficult to control by the EC since they are 
characterised as “market without government” (In Reich, 1992:889). This argument is 
based on the understanding that they are areas of social policy control and regulation, 
which are very complex and delicate in the EC political context. By contrast, Koch 
seems to argue that the Europeanisation of basic norms f European social public policy 
would not conflict with the subsidiarity principle, despite claims to the contrary.  The 
core of his argument is that “mandatory substantive community laws operate as 
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independently enforceable norms, because they rank higher than national laws in a 
supra-national system”, when one does not have a way to opt-out (1995a:338). The 
argument progresses to establish that “if we regard mandatory European economic law 
as forming part of public policy, as it often does, then provisions like Articles 85 and 86 
EC Treaty would be viewed as public policy principles, and could even be enforced 
against national laws” (Ibidem). Thus, consumer protection as a social debt of economic 
activities cannot be relegated to national law. This radical national surrender of powers 
in the area of economic and financial policies in favour of the Community has to 
include consumer protection. Koch defends the development of a distinctively European 
concept of public policy whose contours are better defined than national ones and can 
be more broadly harmonised and implemented. In this respect, the same argument 
applies to the implementation and inclusion of consumer protection in the concept 
mentioned and practice beyond the traditional minimum protection policy imposed by 
the principle of subsidiarity. The minimum protection policy is defended on the basis 
that it allows concurrence among different and more st ingent legal orders, thereby 
augmenting the possibility of protection. Nevertheless, for consumers in the EC market, 
especially in cross-border disputes the concurrence mentioned amounts to a denial of 
justice, lack of protection and problems for the market at the end of the day. 
 Weatherill defends the positive side of subsidiarity and says that “if access to 
justice and information provision is left to Member States, yet they are unable 
effectively to develop it, it may then be the case that the matter is shown to be more 
effectively achieved by Community action. In that sen e, Article 3b [now 5], the 
subsidiarity principle, would be seen to empower the Community to act, doubtless via 
Article 129a [now 153], perhaps even by Article 100a [now 95]” (1994:69). 
 The Community project on out-of-court justice for consumers is cloaked in 
ambiguity. This is so since the intervention of theCommunity does not lend any legal 
security to the project, due to the lack of hard law. Rather soft law deepens the 
problematic view of the negative approach of subsidiarity regarding access to justice for 
consumers. Furthermore, it leaves Community responsibilities to be implemented by 
national authorities, which, due to their particularities, do not give uniformity to the 
process. The project has, however, its positive sid. The ambiguity of the situation 
suggests the “paradox of subsidiarity” formulated by Snyder, which refers to the 
legitimation crisis, that justified the introduction, in the SEA, and widening, in 
Maastricht, of the subsidiarity principle and the lack of legitimation provoked by its 
unwise or even wrong application (1993a:7).  
 The next section will explore further the progressive change towards another 
understanding of the involvement of the Community in the resolution of the problem of 
access to justice. The change, if not toward asserting Community responsibility on 
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consumer access to justice, especially in cross-border disputes, is, at least, towards the 
awareness that courts are not the most reliable institutions to produce confident 
consumers the market needs in order to flourish. The c ange does not acknowledge, 
however, that confident consumers are not bearers of rights; they are above all bearers 
of needs, searching for happiness and satisfaction. This would entail a totally different 
conception of legal justice as care. The change that is needed, one could hazard an 
opinion, follows the comment made by the Commission in its 1993 report: “subsidiarity 
cannot be reduced to a set of procedural rules; it is primarily a state of mind” (In 
Weatherill, 1994:33).  
 In accordance with a different state of mind, another viewpoint on the problem 
of access to justice for consumers has started to claim for room in the institutional 
approach to the theme. The first impact will be the acceptance that “[t]he concept of 
consumers’ access to justice is not restricted to the problems of access to the courts 
(…)”, says the Commission in an informative document called “Consumer Disputes 
Labyrinthian Thread”.120 The question that follows is on whose state of mind does the 
approach to subsidiarity depend? À la limite, one could also ask: whose state of mind 
has to change in order to give subsidiarity its most appropriate application? 
 The new state of mind should, above all, find a new way to bridge the gap as 
discussed in the present chapter, in order to actualise the potential availability of 
Community legal order for developing a special justice for consumers in cross-border 
disputes outside the frames of PIL and given the even partial repayment of the immense 
debt of economic integration to the individual through voicing consumers’ neglected 
needs and distress caused to them by the market.  
 
IV – The Out-of-Court Project as a Solution? 
 
 The discussion of the out-of-court project as gap in chapter four intended to 
leave open a possibility from where one could start to weave a sort of availability in this 
project for the implementation of the framework forjustice as care.  The aim of this 
section is, then, to explore the recent discussions of the out-of-court justice project 
expressed by the EEJ-NET (European Extra-Judicial Network) and the features of the 
bill especially conceived for e-commerce in the EC regulated by Directive no. 2000/31. 
  
IV.1- The Case for e-Commerce 
 
The first pillar of the discussion on e-commerce as a pecial case of the EEJ-
NET project is the formulation of codes-of-conduct, based on core principles, discussed 
                                                
120 http:www.europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/policy/developments/acce-just/acce-just05_en.html, at 7. 
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among traders, consumer groups under the supervision of the Commission, that intends 
to “endorse these principles, probably through a Recommendation”, said Commissioner 
Byrne121. The Commission reached the understanding that codes- f-conduct are suitable 
for out-of-court settlement of disputes. Nevertheless, consumer justice needs to 
acknowledge the power imbalance in consumer relationships, which makes hard law 
necessary to guide negotiation and inform any imposed outcome in case of failure of the 
mediation process.  
 Availability in this case could be created through using the discussion about 
principles in order to initiate a collection of best practices in consumer transactions in 
general, and to resume a more systematic writing of a code for the protection of 
consumers in the European internal market. On the one hand, this would simplify the 
initial thought of accreditation bodies set up in each Member State to endorse the codes-
of-conduct vis-à-vis principles, by eliminating the n cessity of both codes and the 
mentioned bodies.  On the other hand, it would guarantee uniformity throughout the 
internal market, which could be adapted to or respond t  diversity in terms of national 
or regional customs and habits at moments of dispute with regard to the needs of the 
parties. 
 The second pillar of the out-of-court project is the creation at national level of 
“clearinghouses” which will be responsible for information and support, working as 
point of contact between consumers and suppliers in case of cross-border dispute. The 
availability represented by this mechanism could provide each clearinghouse with a 
European link through the Commission as the body responsible for the implementation 
of internal market policies and law. The clearinghouse would be nationally organised 
but attached to the Commission supervision to impleent a European model of justice 
for consumers. The clearinghouse should be endowed with the necessary material tools, 
legal power and, above all, “institutional will” topromote justice between the parties to 
a dispute, following the example of the Centre for Arbitration of Consumer Disputes of 
Lisbon.  
 The out-of-court project relies heavily upon the technique of soft-law called “co-
regulation or self-regulation”. The model is deemed to reflect a co-operative enterprise 
to be undertaken by all groups involved, thereby assuring a high level of “democracy” 
and transparency. Nonetheless, an effective protecti n of consumers needs to re-place 
the co-operative mood in the last part of the process, especially in disputes. In the 
background, business and consumers need a clear, hard leg l apparatus with a language 
that empowers an enforcement body that is competent to settle disputes and to 
endeavour prosecution in criminal and civil judicial and administrative instance as well 
if necessary. Especially in e-commerce, consumers can be victims of crime consistent of 
                                                
121 See footnote no. 6. 
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tortuous behaviour from traders. The prosecution would need European and national 
law and it could be an element of negotiation to be waived in case where traders repair 
the damage and mend the web of relationship with consumers, while re-establishing 
confidence in the market.  
 The involvement of public authorities at national and European level alike 
cannot be effective without hard law and this involvement should be established to 
happen at the moment of settling a dispute.  
 In another speech122, Commissioner Byrne asks the question whether Europe 
could have consumer protection and trade liberalisation at the same time. The present 
analysis of the availability of the European legal and institutional framework seems to 
suggest a positive answer with conditions. The condition for both to happen together is 
the establishment of a language of care that could hear both consumers and traders 
requests not as excluding clauses but as strands of the same web that needs to be 
mended. The language of trade liberalisation -used in a more powerful way in the 
current discussion of access to justice, as a way to build consumer confidence in the 
internal market, especially for e-commerce- clearly does not suit the special features of 
consumer disputes. Neither an exclusive protective language will encourage traders to 
cross frontiers in order to win new markets. Thus, a language of co-operation and 
dialogue, which entails a strong ability to hear and respond in the terms of the Other, is 
needed, but not at the moment of setting up the system itself. Hard law has to prepare 
the field for this quality of justice to happen and has to provide a strong institutional 
framework to guide the process of dialogue and co-operation toward happiness and 
satisfaction, through settling a dispute. A system hat has soft law at its heart and courts 
at its top level sounds extremely cumbersome. It istoo soft for the beginning and too 
hard for the end or for resolution of possible damage to the web of relationships or 
relational contracts of consumption. The ethical impl cations, mentioned in the referred 
speech as a concern to be tackled in consumer protection, is a rich field for 
improvement in EC consumer law and policy, especially n access to justice in an out-
of-court system. This is said with regard to the framework necessary for a practice of 
justice as care, since the latter demands another eical conception. The ethics of rights 
and contractualist readings of disputes are unhelpful. By contrast, the ethics of care, 
expressed as care for Others and responsibility in relationship, and known as a feminine 
expression of justice, finds a fertile field for application in consumer disputes in the EC.  
In this resides the availability of the out-of-court p oject, which cannot be taken 
as out-of-law, but beyond law as offering mere legalistic and contractualist solutions for 
disputes. Law would embrace the project by offering an institutional space for the 
                                                
122 Speech delivered at the Centre for European Reform, Breakfast Seminar, London, 21/07/2000. See 
footnote no. 6. 
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resolution of disputes according to the understanding of the ethics of care, which is one 
prepared to listen and respond to needs. Law is the forc , which has the responsibility, 
through hard legal instruments and powerful institutions, for mediating the 
aforementioned institutional will. Law is the way to overcome the Unmittelbarkeit of 
will and supply a legitimating stream to the process. Law as the tension between these 
two apparently contradictory terms -“institutional” and “will”- can offer justice when 
applied from the ethical perspective of care. Law must function as a background net of 
protection indicating possible ways to frame shared outcomes, and also as a last resort 
in case care fails.  In this respect, the present discussion refuses the Commission policy 
or “strategy”, of placing soft law at the beginning of the process and courts at the end, 
since there is no possibility of mediation between these two poles of the process. In fact, 
the process needs three elements or terms: 1- Community-wide hard law, in order to 
eliminate the inconveniences of soft law and PIL in cross-border disputes; 2- out-of-
court justice endowed with institutional will or justice informed by the ethics of care 
and the needs of the parties to the dispute to be settled; 3- public enforcement 
authorities with relation to courts and competence for criminal, civil and administrative 
prosecution, for cases that are more serious or fail in the amicable process of  
“adjustment of behaviour”.    
 
IV.2- The Case for the EEJ-NET 
 
The European Extra-Judicial Network (EEJ-NET) 123, launched in 1998 with the 
adoption of the Communication 198124, is composed of national bodies responsible for 
settlement of consumer disputes. They are supposed t  work for cross-border matters by 
the intermediation of clearinghouses and in line with the principles established by 
Recommendations 98/257 and 2001/310, in order to be credited by the respective 
Member States and then to be able to integrate the European network. Consumers and 
trades alike could rely, theoretically, on a body in that position if they need justice to be 
achieved with independence, transparency, respect of adversarial principles, 
effectiveness, legality, representation and fairness -as principles enshrined by the 
aforementioned Recommendations.  
 The gap in this formulation can be seen in the natio l character of the project, 
based on clearinghouses; in the lack of a justice abl  to respond to needs in accordance 
with the nature of consumer disputes; and in a still complicated process for consumers 
with small claims. The tasks of the clearinghouse are: “-determine, upon receipt of a 
complaint, whether an extra-judicial body would deal with the complaint, whether a 
                                                
123 Commission Recommendation 98/257/EC, OJ L 115/31, 1998. 
124 COM (1998) 198 final  
 199
small claim procedure would be more appropriate or if other types of consumer 
resolution schemes, such as conciliation, may be helpful; -provide information on the 
appropriate out-of-court dispute resolution bodies in the jurisdiction of consumers and 
pass appropriate complaints onto those bodies; -provide information on national small 
claims procedures; -provide assistance to consumers in formatting and filing complaints 
for both national and cross-border disputes; - provide support in cross-border disputes 
by identifying and then sending the complaint to the appropriate extra-judicial body in 
the other member state; - monitor and store information about the level and nature of 
complaints for future policy development”125 (24-25). The role of clearinghouses seems 
to complicate the process by making it even longer than it could normally be, in cross-
border disputes. It is time-consuming for consumers to go first to a clearinghouse, 
which will contact another clearinghouse in the supplier’s country, which will contact 
the out-of-court body to contact the supplier. Besid , this process will certainly take 
away the force of their claims in the bureaucratic ways through which their complaints 
will have to be. It would make all the difference if consumers could count on the 
“institutional will “of a body which would contact the supplier immediately in order to 
try to settle disputes. Consumer confidence would increase if the body were a European 
agency for their protection and defence with the European flag in its logo. Confidence 
would increase even more if this body were a public ody with power to prosecute 
using criminal, civil and administrative instances alike, at national, international 
(foreign) and supranational levels, in the defence of consumers. This process of building 
up consumer confidence is of paramount importance for financial services in the 
internal market, in order to publicise, as in most Scandinavian countries, the suspicious 
justice delivered by private ombudsmen or in-house private schemes. Another 
inappropriateness that could be avoided by the establi hment of unique European public 
agencies is the competition between different methods and bodies for dispute 
settlement. 
 The lack of hard law is again the problem. The new Recommendation126, for 
instance, on principles to cover less formal ADR mechanism such as mediation does not 
overcome the need for a more complex legal expedient, such as a regulation to set up a 
general European code for the protection of consumers, giving especial emphasis to or 
even centring it on access to justice. This is in line with Commissioner Byrne’s 
declaration on the Community policy on working toward a “more long-term solution 
[which] would pursue convergence of basic principles of national consumer protection 
                                                
125 Wilikens, Marc, et alli, (2000), Out-of-court dispute settlement systems for e-commerce. Report of an 
exploratory study, Joint Research Centre, Ispra (VA)-Italy. This report can be downloaded from: 
http://dsa-isis.jrc.it/ADR/.  
126 OJ L 109/56, 19.4.2001. 
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laws”127. Nevertheless, it sounds contradictory to pursue protection through soft law 
what would deepen the fragmentation of EC consumer law and policy. An umbrella 
regulation to unify and harmonise consumer protection, under the title of access to 
justice in the internal market, seems to be the way to guarantee a strong background for 
producing confident consumers through whom the market can overcome stagnation and 
flourish as desired.  
 The availability that the EEJ-NET project brings about is the possibility of 
adopting and adapting national bodies under the co-ordination of the EC legal and 
institutional framework. The adaptation would respond to European parameters founded 
upon justice out-of-court, through the framework of the ethics of care as an ethic of 
virtues128 implemented by a strong public body able to enforce hard law. 
 
V – Analysis of Article 153  
 
 After having analysed Article 153 in the context of s ft law, subsidiarity and 
before its analysis against some articles of EC Treaty, let us take a closer look at its 
wording. 
 
1. In order to promote the interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer 
protection… 
 
 Article 153, as said earlier, was inserted into the TEC by the TEU and enhanced 
by Amsterdam on the basis of Finnish, Danish and Belgian proposals but left untouched 
by Nice. It did not inaugurate consumer concerns into EC consumer law and policy 
since they were originally mentioned in other provisions: Articles 39(I)(e), 40(3), 85(3), 
86(now 33(I)(e), 34(2), 81(3) and 82). Nevertheless, Article 153 is the first specialised 
constitutional basis for EC consumer protection in an environment of soft law and 
subsidiarity as a hurdle.  
The first words of the article should be taken as its caput since they are certainly 
the most important ones for they oblige the Community to promote the interests of 
consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer protection. As affirmed by 
Weatherrill (Church&Phinnemore, 2002:341), the provision has been rather underused 
                                                
127 See footnote no. 6.  
128 It is interesting to mention the title of a conference in Dublin, on 03/03/00: “Making the virtual 
virtuous – towards a new approach to e-Consumers”. The aim at praising virtues should be a public policy 
for the whole EC consumer law and not only for e-consumers. It seems a good opportunity to unify EC 
consumer law and policy under the aim of virtue andof a justice informed by the ethics of care or the 
ethics of virtue. In the same way, one could use the title of another conference (in Nijenrode, Breukelen, 




since subsidiarity became really a hurdle to EC consumer protection -not to protect 
national interests but those of national traders. While national consumers must be 
converted into EC consumers, national traders keep fighting for their own national 
markets without renouncing access facilities to their n ighbours. 
 Restrictions which any EC consumer protection might impose are indeed 
problems for traders seeking profits both domestically and in the common market. The 
caput of the article does not leave any doubt regarding the Community’s duty to 
promote consumer protection although the following words try to restrict the ways the 
Community shall comply with it.  
 
…the Community shall contribute to protecting the halth, safety and economic 
interests of consumers…  
 
 The verb “contribute” reinstalls EC consumer protection as subjugated to 
national jealousy. The words elect three areas of consumer protection for the 
entrenchment of Community’s duty regarding the promotion of consumer interests and 
high level of protection. Constitutional norms must be interpreted as widely as possible 
in order to protect public interests and as narrowly as possible when they restrict 
individual rights. Consumer law has increasingly imposed its public nature as it 
abandons the principles of contractual law given the relevance of health, safety and 
economic interests of consumers for public policies and public budgets. In fact, the 
weaker condition of consumers plays a secondary role when one considers the impact of 
health problems caused by BSE in public deficit of countries such as Germany. 
 Another relevant point is to include access to justice for EC consumers in the 
context of soft law initiatives of EC consumer policy, which will be analysed in the next 
chapter.  
 
…as well as to promoting their right to information, education and to organise 
themselves in order to safeguard their interests. 
 
 The selective focus on information, education and organisation as areas of EC 
action harks back to early consumer policies and the positions of the ECJ, which praised 
the informed and educated consumer and overlooked th  need to protect consumers. 
“Well-informed and educated consumers will dispense with protection” was then the 
basic principle that guided EC consumer law and policy and ECJ decisions. Information 
and education were then behind the necessity of labelling products, for example. 
Consumer associations were deemed to speak with the silenced voice of weak 
consumers in an environment of soft law and judicial decisions unable to protect. The 
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last chapter will describe the action of effective access to justice for EC consumers as a 
way to educate traders through dialogue and relation l concerns vis-à-vis needs and 
human quality present in consumer claims. The action of public authorities as the 
Danish Consumer Ombudsman will be analysed as a way of chieving EC consumer 
protection and approximating satisfaction. Access to justice is then characterised as the 
most important tool to fulfil both the aspirations of the market and the Union expressed 
by Jean Monet words in 1952: “We are not bringing to ether states, we are uniting 
people”129: 
 
2. Consumer protection requirements shall be taken into account in defining and 
implementing other Community policies and activities. 
 
  Paragraph 2 heeds the classical requirements of constitutional legal theory. It is 
pitched at a general level while giving a precise dir ction. The EC market should no 
longer be implemented at the expense of human needs an  quality expressed more 
urgently through the Otherness of consumers and their pleadings. In fact, Paragraph 2 
should be the first paragraph and should be the caput of Article 153. The restrictions 
that will follow in paragraph 3 would be more approriate when read after paragraph 1 
since it is mentioned in the caput of paragraph 3. Paragraph 2 is the general rule since it 
informs and expresses the background of EC consumer policy and law.   
 
3.The Community shall contribute to the attainment of the objectives referred to in 
paragraph 1 through: 
(a) measures adopted pursuant to Article 95 in the context of the completion of the 
internal market; 
 
 The apparent restrictions the above words might entail reflect the contention of 
the ever-growing Community actions in favour of national jealousy. EC consumer 
protection must be entrenched into the limits of Community policies and activities. The 
market, which normally was growing to become the irr vocable Union, found itself in 
need of deterrence. Subsidiarity-as-hurdle to contain the Union and adjust it to traders’ 
specific abilities. Weatherill’s clairvoyance may be recalled to support the argument this 
chapter has defended: consumer protection is a necessity for the market to grow and it is 
intrinsically connected with access to justice for c nsumers. This thesis, especially the 
two last chapters, attempts to show how justice as c re through public European 
authorities is not beyond the context of the completion of the internal market. Quite the 
contrary, justice as care is both a moral duty of the market and the irrevocable aspiration 
                                                
129 See http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/index9_en.htm 
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of its founding fathers. In truth, justice as care for EU consumers could foster consumer 
protection within the limits imposed by paragraph 3(a) of Article. 153.     
 The above section V has analysed Article 95 to ident fy one added facilitator of 
EC consumer protection through Article 153 and the subsidiarity principle as a duty to 
act.  
 
(b) measures which support, supplement and monitor the policy pursued by the Member 
States. 
 
 In truth, the comments of item (a) could be generally pplied to item (b). 
Nonetheless, it seems helpful to look at the breadth of its specification of the co-
operative nature of Community measures as supporting, supplementing and monitoring 
domestic actions. It is remarkable how these verbs xpress a commitment of political 
will towards consumer protection and entail a great deal of action. These verbs oblige 
Community measures to surpass the politics of the informed and educated consumers in 
order to pursue the politics of bringing into line all commercial communications in the 
way the last chapter shows. It is about overcoming the liberal modernist faith in the 
autonomous self to accept responsibility in relationships in the way justice as care 
suggests.  
 
4-The Council, acting in accordance with the procedur  referred to in Article 251 and 
after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt the measure referred 
in paragraph 3(b). 
 
 Paragraph 4 specifies the Council as the European institution to adopt the 
measures referred in paragraph 3(b). On the one hand, it pulls back again towards 
subsidiarity-as-hurdle. The Commission would give more dynamism to the process. On 
the other, it mentions the Article 251 which endows the policy with more democratic 
features in comparison to Commission interventions. The role of the European and 
Social Committee as a bridge between Europe and organised civil society is beyond 
dispute and shows how consumer protection dwells public fields of law. Nevertheless, 
the urgency of the dictate placed on the Community to support, supplement, monitor, 
and above all, intervene is seriously compromised as showed by the analysis of next 
chapter. 
 
5-Measures adopted pursuant to paragraph 4 shall not prevent any Member State from 
maintaining or introducing more stringent protective measures. Such measures must be 
compatible with this Treaty. The Commission shall be notified of them. 
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 Paragraph 5 encourages more stringent national consumer protection insofar as it 
is not incompatible with the attainments of the market and its founding Treaty. It was 
done in order to safeguard Danish remarkable tradition of protecting consumers, citizens 
and individuals. The Commission must be notified of potentially more stringent 
measures of national consumer protection in order to xercise its duty of supervision of 
national respect of the rules of the Treaty regarding market implementation.   
 
VI- Article 153 and Articles 2, 10, 94, 95 and 308, as Legal Availability   
 
The last sections demonstrated the potential availability that would be created if 
Article 153 were implemented with positive law, hard law, the positive edge of 
subsidiarity and a European approach and involvement in the implementation of the 
out-of-court project. Now it is necessary to verify to which extent Articles 2, 10, 94, 95 
and 308 would increase the readiness of Article 153, as the EC legal-constitutional base, 
for EC consumer law and policy in general and access to justice for consumers in 
particular. 
Article 2 establishes, inter alia, the raising of the standard of living and quality 
of life, as a task of the European Community, which is usually related to the aims of any 
consumer policy, in a quite direct way, since the condition of being a consumer in a 
market society marks a great majority of the population. Policies directed to the 
protection of consumers certainly affect both living standard and quality of life. Article 
2, before the introduction of Article 153 by Maastricht, was used as a legal basis for 
Community consumer policy. Thus, Article 2 and Article 153 are closely related in the 
sense that the former functions as the moral-constitutional background for the latter. 
Article 153 is, from the substantive point of view, the specialisation of Article 2 in the 
general framework of the social compromise of the EU.    
Article 10 sets out the founding principle of solidarity that governs the 
application of Community law. Moreover, it codifies a set of moral or ethical values 
that informs the life of the Community as a whole  (Lang, 1990). In addition, it lends 
soul to the body of the European Community. It commits Member States to “take all 
appropriate measures (…) to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this 
Treaty (…).  They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks [and] 
abstain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this 
Treaty.” This wording creates for Member States a special set of duties regarding co-
operation with the Union and its institutions. “These include, inter alia, duties to give 
full effect to Community law and clarify national position, to comply with fundamental 
rights rules and general principles developed by the European Court as well as to 
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enforce Community law and implement Community objectiv s, and consequently has 
the effect to strengthening Community control” (Cass, 1992:1131).  What Article 10 
entails for all Member States in respect of Article 153 is their duty to ensure the 
achievement of Community consumer policy for the realisation of the highest level of 
consumer protection. In this sense, Article 10 is apromising lever for the expansion of 
EC consumer law and policy based on Article 153 (Micklitz&Weatherill, 1993:303). 
Furthermore, it entails that national institutions and legal frameworks are, truly, 
committed to the implementation of Community policies. 
Article 94 enabled the Community to develop its consumer policy as its legal 
base, although not without lengthy discussion about its lawfulness. In truth, Article 94 
was used as the legal basis for harmonisation regarding consumer protection through 
Directives whose essential aim was to communitarise protective policies, with the 
understanding that nationally isolated policies could hamper market integration. It 
establishes that the Council, when acting unanimously, can issue Directives to 
harmonise or to approximate national provisions that directly affect the internal market 
in any respect.  
The contention around Article 94 concerns its approriateness solely for the 
establishment of the internal market. The main argument was that consumer policy and 
environment measures alike do not possess any link to the finality of the Article.  The 
discussion ended with the realisation that in fact consumer and environment measures 
do influence the market. However, as the Article is exclusively dedicated to the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market, prior to Maastricht and Article 
153, the development of Community consumer policy and law had to bear the 
limitations of the priorities of the establishment of the market, by having Article 94 as 
the only legal basis possible for consumer protection in Community law. Consumer 
policy and law under Article 94 did not have a lifeof its own. Article 153 offers a legal 
basis for changing this situation whilst Article 94complements Article 153, thereby 
functioning as authorisation for harmonisation of national legal systems through 
proposals of Directives by the Commission to the Council. Article 153 gives substantive 
authorisation for the adoption of measures on consumer protection and Article 94 acts at 
two levels: firstly as a political mechanism that allows legislation for harmonisation, 
and secondly at an instrumental level determining the procedures to be observed. In this 
respect, Article 94 is an essential source of availbil ty of EC legal framework for the 
work of Article 153 to the benefit of EC consumer law and policy.  
Article 95, introduced by the Single European Act, is known as the great 
breakthrough for the development of the European Community by the adoption of the 
qualified majority vote in the Council under the so called “co-operation procedure” with 
the European Parliament and the Social and Economic Committee. The legal base for 
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Community consumer policy has changed somewhat since the Single European Act. 
Because Article 153 was introduced only at Maastricht, Article 95 “must be interpreted 
parallel to the paradigm shift in consumer policy from rights rhetoric to consumer 
choice” (Reich, 1995:290). Article 153 with Article 95 -especially under its paragraph 
3- created a real possibility for the involution of the latter in favour of the former and 
consequently the establishment of an independent Community consumer policy of its 
own.  
Whereas Article 94 is limited to the enactment of Directives for the 
approximation of laws of Member States, Article 95 refers to “measures”, and so 
widens the scope of its provisions and improves the pot ntial availability of Article 153. 
Article 95, like Article 94, provides the necessary p ocedural tools for the enactment of 
measures concerning consumer protection. In terms of procedure, Article 95 allows for 
legislation to be enacted by a qualified majority, whilst Article 94 demands unanimity 
for the adoption of Council Directives. Article 94 adopts the procedure of Article 251, 
which establishes greater involvement by the European Parliament, while endowing the 
process with more democratic requirements.  
As Weatherill points out, Article 95 cannot be confined to merely removing 
barriers to trade. It has the vital challenge “of breeding confidence among both 
consumers and traders in the viability of the integrated market” (1999:718). In this way, 
Article 95 is an essential buttress to Article 153 without taking away its coherence and 
autonomy. Thus “besides cooperation between enforcement agencies, access to justice 
seemed an ideal candidate for elaboration under Article 153” (Stuyck, 2000:380). 
Article 308 has been understood as a gap-filling provision (Toth, 1992:1082). 
Nonetheless, it can only be used when specific powers for determined action are absent, 
because the Treaty has not provided the necessary powers. This is not the case for 
Article 94, with which Article 308 is reputed to be twinned. “[W]hilst Article 100 
[94now] may well overlap with a more specific power, Article 235 [308now] by 
definition can only be used where there is no specific power” (Usher, 1992:147).  
Article 308 requires, like Article 94, the Council to act unanimously. However, 
by contrast with the latter, it allows for the adopti n of any legally appropriate measure, 
rather than being limited to Directives.  
Furthermore, Article 308 cannot be used to enlarge the scope of the Treaty and 
provides the Community with the power to act beyond its provisions, since it would 
then function as a Treaty amendment by unauthorised procedure (Usher, 1998:97-98). It 
is meant to be an exceptional measure, although practice has shown that “the exception 
may have become the rule” (Ibid., 82).  
Regarding Community consumer policy or Article 153, it may be wondered 
whether the creation of subsidiary powers under Article 308 is possible. A first tentative 
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answer would be that “subsidiary powers would only be created under Article 235 [now 
308] in respect of matters directly connected with the policy that lies at the very core of 
the Community” (Dashwood, 1996:123). Thus, most probably consumer policy will not 
be considered. Nonetheless, the centrality of consumer issues in general and specifically 
of access to justice for consumers is fundamental for the functioning of the internal 
market.130 Furthermore, since the Treaty has obliged the Union to improve working 
conditions, to raise living standards, and to provide European consumers with a high 
level of protection. Article 308 can be used to supply the powers otherwise still absent 
for the undertaking of such tasks. So, Article 308 may well be the necessary legal basis 
for creating a new body under Community Law, without needing any Treaty 
amendment, and responsible for the implementation of justice out-of-court for 
consumers in cross-border disputes. It follows the examples of the creation of the 
European Drug Agency (Usher, 1998) and the European Environment Agency 
(Lenaerts, 1993:27), to name a few.  
  It has been said that Article 153 only states the ne d for a Community consumer 
policy and, in this sense, it “does not define an objective, but rather an area of 
competence” (Bernard, 1996:650). It may be posited that, especially concerning the 
creation of a new body, the substantive limits of Article 308 must be observed. One may 
also argue that, in this case, Article 308 would not extend the Community’s competence 
but instead just specify competence or duties already generally imposed on the 
Community by Articles 153 and 95. This general duty could also be expressed by the 
fundamental aim of developing both the internal market, through building consumer 
confidence, and the Union for its citizens, by considering their needs as consumers. 
Furthermore, this body would not alter the institutional structure of the Union. The 
central idea behind this section is the understanding that the legal basis for action is to a 
great extent essentially an institutional problem, ainly because the principle of 
subsidiarity has been politically understood through formulas like the British 
understanding of “minimum interference”. However, sub idiarity has an institutional 
side which stresses the “how” rather than the “who” approach in deciding about 
concurrent competencies.   
The position of the institutional in relation to the legal is that the institution is 
law in practice or a practice formally and legally established. Be that as it may, the 
institutional is closer to law than to politics but has a special challenge of 
instrumentalising law, in other words, to bring law to life, by making it capable of 
                                                
130 Close (1983:224-5) develops a quite systematic argument to demonstrate the link between the market 
and the role that consumers play in it. The argument recalls the argument about the moral compromise of 
the Community with consumers considered as an equally essential element of any market relationship. 
Reich says that “[c]ommunity consumer law, including its private law components, has now become a 
legitimate heir, not only an illegitimate offspring, of economic law” (1995:305):  
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overcoming difficulties and able to find solutions for problems that may arise. In this 
sense, to keep institutions alive, one needs some plasticity in the application of law, by 
forcing specific relationship between law and politics and law and morals. Access to 
justice, especially for consumers, recalls these themes and this thesis, especially in its 
first part, had the specific task of considering this view and discussing a different 
paradigm for justice for consumers, one that adopts a feminine moral framework. 
Reich concludes that “the Community enjoys an almost unlimited jurisdiction 
[and power] in order to protect [inter alia] the economic interest of European 
consumers” (1992a:30)131. Weatherill states that the Maastricht Treaty was, legally, “a 
breakthrough for consumer policy” (1994:57), and corroborates this conclusion with the 
official position recently expressed by Commissioner Byrne who affirmed the “quasi-
constitutional” nature of Article 153.132 Such words unveil the lack of political and 
institutional will. 
Further support for this claim is provided by an information sheet issued by the 
DG-XXIV upon the use of consumer complaint forms, prepared by the “services of the 
European Commission”, in order “to improve communication between consumers and 
professionals, with a view to helping them reach amic ble solutions to problems which 
they may encounter in their various transactions”133: The Commission says: “if you 
decide to use the form, please do not send it to the European Commission. The 
Commission has no powers to intervene in the settlement of disputes between 
consumers and professionals and cannot be held responsible for the consequences of 
using the form” (Ibid., page 1). 
The question which immediately arises is: what is the legal basis for the 
Commission action on very helpful services it provides for citizens to sort out problems 
they encounter in the exercise of their Community rights? The services involve direct 
action by the Commission such as entering into contact with governmental bodies to 
search for quick solutions in cases frequently connected with one of the four freedoms 
enshrined by the Treaty. What prevents the Commission from handling the complaint 
form to one of the bodies responsible for settling the dispute, and choosing the most 
appropriate in cross-border disputes? It is a lack of legal basis or of institutional 






                                                
131 Dehousse (1994a:108) links the growth of the negative side of subsidiarity to the indiscriminate use of 
Article 308, which has steadily increased “incursion  into fields where the Community had not been 
granted an explicit competence”, thereby expanding the activities of the Community.  
132 See footnote no. 6. 




Looking at Evolution 
 
  This chapter aims to describe the patchy evolution of access to justice for 
consumers in cross-border disputes in EC consumer law and policy, in order to qualify 
the gap defined in the fourth chapter and fleshed out in the last one.  
Since its earliest undertakings, EC consumer policy and law for access to justice 
has been mainly conceived around out-of-court solutions. Nonetheless, the European 
approach on the matter does not respond to the true nature of the problem and its 
centrality for the market to flourish. It will be emphasised that, throughout more than 
twenty-five years of discussion, the gap is still the product of a lack of political will 
rather than a lack of legal or institutional bases for further developments of effective 
solutions at the market level where problems are ultimately created. It will be 
demonstrated that access to justice for consumers in the European internal market has 
been promoted almost entirely through documents like programmes, action plans, 
resolutions and recommendations. This can be explained by the legal-constitutional 
vacuum present until Maastricht and by the lack of p litical will to establish more 
concrete measures placed at the market level. Furthermore, one may observe “a 
thematic insistence that the EC shall possess a consumer policy, but that its elaboration 
shall occur in the context of more constitutionally favoured activities, permeates the 
string of soft-law instruments that mark the EC’s continuing political commitment to 
the inclusion of consumer policy within its sphere of activities” (Weatherill, 1999:694). 
The analysis of the evolution of access to justice for consumers in the EC 
context can reveal a remarkable continuity in the sense of avoiding as much as possible 
EU responsibility for the establishment of a framework to tackle the gap identified134.  
This chapter will be developed in five sections which, while following a 
chronological criterion until 2001, will not obey the political and constitutional 
watersheds of the Treaty of Rome, SEA and subsequent treaties. This is so due to the 
conclusions so far reached in previous chapters, which show two quite general and 
common truths regarding EC consumer policy and law:firstly, its development despite 
the constitutional vacuum existing until Maastricht; secondly, the sufficient legal basis 
currently supplied by the European legal order for action on consumer protection and 
access to justice at the European level. One must consider, nevertheless, that law in 
                                                
134 “The evolution of the integration theory in the last 40 years in part mirrors that of the European Union. 
Neo-functionalist theories in the late 1950s and early 1960s predicted the gradual transfer of functional 
responsibilities from the nation state to supranational bodies (…)” (Monar et all.: 1996: 145). EC 
consumer policy, nonetheless, reflects more “the resilience of the nation state, (…) the continued defence 
of national interests, (…) the Gaullist vision of a Europe des patries and 1970s Euro-sclerosis.” (Ibidem)     
 210
consumer affairs seems to influence very little the way things are resolved at both micro 
and macro levels. This is the already mentioned “symbolic legislation”. The following 
sections will describe relevant legal instruments enacted within the period of the four 
Three-Year Action Plans, which will be the watersheds for each section.    
 
I- Until the First Three-Year Action Plan for Consumer Policy in the EC 
 
 The Maastricht Treaty is traditionally quoted as the most important watershed in 
the evolution of EC consumer policy and law since it introduced in the constitutional 
armoury of the Union one title dedicated to the protection of consumers in the internal 
market. Maastricht did not inaugurate the theme in the European context and it must be 
seen as a conquest or an imposition (Sola&Jeuniaux, 1992). 
 Until Maastricht, consumer protection is the product of a “politique 
d’accompagnement” of the implementation and completion of the internal market and 
reveals, nevertheless, a major emphasis on consumer education and information. By 
contrast, one can perceive that dispositions regarding the protection of consumer 
economic interests were rather rare. Access to justice policies aim to protect consumer 
economic interests, and they were outside the scope of the declarations made at the 
Paris Summit in 1972 concerning the necessity to lend a human dimension to the 
European Community (Ibid., 68). This is probably a common phenomenon of affluent 
societies where economic interests seem to be hypocritically denied. A consumer 
charter will not mobilise as much effort as the discussion on a Convention on human 
rights for the European Union. Therefore, this first stage of EC consumer policy will be 
marked by very soft references to the theme of access to justice.  
 The earliest embryonic stage can be perceived in the First Preliminary 
Programme of the European Economic Community for a Consumer Protection and 
Information Policy.135  
Article 2 of the Treaty was the legal basis of this Programme, which was 
founded on the conclusions of the Paris Summit/1972 and adopted the five basic rights 
of consumers, among which was enshrined the right of redress, the closest one to access 
to justice.  
The right of redress is generally taken to mean onef the “objectives of 
community policy towards consumers”. “Advice” and “help” were then added. The 
resolution states that “to secure adequate facilities for advice, help and redress is one of 
the aims of the policy proposed therein. The resolution establishes the entitlement of 
consumers to “advice and help (…) [and] proper redress for (…) injury or damage 
                                                
135 OJ C 92/1, 1975. 
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[resulting from purchase or use of defective goods r unsatisfactory services] by means 
of swift, effective and inexpensive procedures” (page 8).  
 The Commission should “submit (…) appropriate proposals for improving the 
existing systems” to put “them to better use”.  Among the actions proposed for the 
Commission is the study of “systems of redress, arbitr tion and the amicable settlement 
of disputes existing in the Member States” (page 8). 
 So the possibility of justice out-of-court for consumers was stated as early as the 
first preliminary programme on consumer protection in EC consumer policy. 
Nonetheless, the action to be taken at European level did not indicate European 
responsibility for the implementation of such a purpose. The action has been mostly 
concerned with studies, analysis of the situation and proposals to put the system already 
in force to better use. The gap has its origins in this starting point, in which the political 
will to create a body or a European agency responsible for co-ordinating and 
implementing a practice of dispute resolution able to produce confident consumers at 
the outset of the formation of EC consumer policy was absent.  At that point, it was 
difficult to embody “new problems and values scarcely mentioned by the Treaties.”136  
The first programme intended to widen the understanding of what a consumer is, 
thereby refusing to qualify him as merely a “purchaser or user of goods and services 
(…) but also as a person concerned with the various facets of society which affect him 
either directly or indirectly as a consumer” (page 2). On the one hand, this vague 
statement endows the consumer with a position in social and economic life with 
importance beyond the simple action of buying goods and contracting services. On the 
other hand, the importance of certain aspects of social life (buying and contracting) are 
elevated to a very high level in a market that aims at becoming one before a wide range 
of diversity. 
 The next document where access to justice is mentioned as a priority of EC 
consumer policy is the Second Programme of the European Economic Community for a 
Consumer Protection and Information Policy.137 This document reaffirms the five basic 
rights conferred to consumers by the First Programme, including the right of redress. 
Once again one can notice that “access to justice” is not in the language of the 
Programme. Nevertheless, among the aims planned in its implementation is the 
“improvement of the consumer’s legal position (help, advice, the right to seek legal 
remedy)” (page 3). The Second Programme repeats the principles that support the action 
towards the improvement of consumer’s legal position, and it informed a symposium 
held after the First Programme, where the various actions proposed therein were 
discussed.  
                                                
136 Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 1/76. Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans, Prime 
Minister of Belgium, to the European Council, page 1. 
137 OJ C 133/1, 1981. 
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From that discussion, a number of proposals were submitted and the Second 
Programme mentions them: “1-the need to improve consumer information and 
education; 2- the need to set up conciliation bodies either to take preventive action to 
put an end to certain reprehensible practices by amicable arrangement, or settle by 
mutual agreement disputes between consumers and tradesmen or suppliers of services; 
3- the setting of arbitration bodies; 4- the simplification of legal procedures for settling 
disputes over small sums of money; 5-assigning responsibility for consumer protection 
to consumer groups, public authorities or institutions like the ombudsman.” (page 10) 
 The Programme assigns the Commission to the task of tudying the measures proposed 
by the symposium and encouraging national and local s hemes. No concrete action in 
the ambit of the Community where asserted.  
 The Programme does mention the priority of seeking “out-of-court justice” for 
consumers, through the involvement of public authori ies or institutions like the 
ombudsman. However, practical consequences did not foll w the rhetoric and it became 
a dead letter in terms of market realities, and left untouched its inability to nourish 
consumer confidence. 
 In 1984, the Commission enacted the Green Paper on Consumer Redress.138 The 
language of this document aims at embracing alternative solutions to the problem of 
handling disputes involving unhappy consumers. With regard to the Community 
dimension of the problem in its political and legal diversity, the Green Paper states that 
“[d]uring recent years there has been widespread concern about the inadequacy of 
traditional legal systems to deal with minor claims” (page v). This wording supports 
remarkably this thesis, since it mentions the nature of disputes involving consumers and 
recognises the necessity of a very special sort of justice, one which is able to respond 
sympathetically to both consumer disputes of low economic significance and needs, 
satisfaction and happiness that characterize every consumer dispute. From the market 
perspective, one has to acknowledge the relational aspect of consumer contracts without 
which business cannot survive and prosper. Traders who do not care for their clients are 
ultimately doomed to bankruptcy. The market cannot concretise its full potential if it 
forgets any of these special characteristics while pursuing justice for consumers.  
 The Green Paper mentions the discussion on consumer acc ss to justice as 
access to courts that took place at the Ghent Colloquium in 1982. The necessity of a 
Directive on consumer injunctions is firmly asserted, and it was enacted in 1998. In this 
context of very low responsiveness, the Green Paper calls attention to the possibility for 
action and refuses the introduction of a “Community wide small claims procedure”, 
thereby arguing that, despite the international nature of the principles of access to 
justice, they are seeds to be planted in national soils, “the way in which they [the 
                                                
138 COM (84) 692 final, 12/12/84. 
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principles or seeds] develop (…) is strongly influenc d by the local soil and climate” 
(page xv). Consumer redress is not tackled as a Community problem, which prevented 
the development of effective solutions at the market level. National systems were not 
brought together under a unique and European co-ordination until the Recommendation 
on settlement of disputes by out-of-court bodies of 30/3/98.139    
The third programme140 was enacted on the basis of a Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, from 1985.141 The Communication recognises the failure of 
the Community in effectively achieving consumer protection because it sees this as the 
“business of individual governments” (page 4). Nonetheless, the document states that 
“the promotion of consumer protection must (…) be seen as an integral part of 
Community policy for citizens’ welfare” (page 8). This is justified by the general aim of 
the Community, enshrined in the Treaty, to constantly improve citizens’ living 
standards, while developing the “People’s Europe” for the Peoples of Europe.  
Moreover, consumer policy has a role to play in the establishment and operation of the 
“Common Market”, says the document (page 9).   
The Communication, for the first time since the First Programme, uses the term 
“access to justice”, apart from the programme for advice and help. Redress now is 
directly connected with access to justice and it isclearly stated that “traditional legal 
procedures are slow and often very expensive in relation to the amounts at issue in 
consumer cases” (page 20). Nonetheless, the action proposed is still in the field of co-
operation with national pilot projects on “simplified access to justice” (page 20). Access 
to justice is mentioned in a very inspiring and rhetorical way. Firstly, the theme is 
identified with redress and advice and its implementation affirmed to be attempted 
through “a fuller and more coherent policy which is commensurate with consumers’ 
needs” (page 20). Unfortunately, this is, indeed, a road to nowhere due to the lack of 
both understanding of the peculiarities of access to justice for consumers and of the 
political will to pursue such understanding and its concretisation.  
 The European Parliament issued a Resolution142 on consumer redress regarding 
the Green Paper on the same theme. The remarkable point in this document is the 
reference to a “motion for a Resolution (…) on the need for a European Legal Clearing 
House System for small claims and exchanges of information”. The Commission in 
another Supplementary Communication on Consumer Redess welcomed this point143. 
The Commission embraces “a new and enlarged Community dimension to the problem 
of consumer redress (…). Consequently, the Commission is about to engage a 
                                                
139 OJ L 115/31, 17/4/98. 
140 OJ C 167/1, 1986. 
141 COM (85) 3114 final. 
142 OJ C 99/203, 1987. 
143 COM (87) 210 final, 7.5.87. 
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feasibility study on the establishment of such an agency as wished for by Parliament. 
Even if the idea of setting up a genuine ‘Community agency’ would seem, for the time 
being, rather ambitious, it should be possible, (…) to establish a flexible network of 
cooperation on a permanent basis of existing organisations (…).” The idea of a 
Community body changed into a system for the exchange of information to promote 
access to legal systems between Member States involved in minor cross-border 
disputes, in the Council Resolution of 9/11/89144. This was the definitive death of the 
proposal for a European agency responsible on promoting access to justice for 
consumers. 
 Firstly, the Council Resolution on Consumer Redress145 considered consumer 
redress as “an integral part of the European Community’s programmes to help 
consumers” (page 2). Secondly, the Resolution clearly mentions the growing 
importance in the Community of “activities across frontiers” as sources of complaints 
from consumers, which requires special attention from EC consumer policy. By the 
same token, the Council invited the Commission to supplement its efforts for the 
enlargement of the Community by implementing the policy regarding consumer redress, 
whilst examining whether a European initiative would be recommendable in this area. 
 The Council Resolution on Future Priorities for Relaunching Consumer 
Protection Policy146 encourages of Member States to promote access to legal redress for 
consumers. The Council establishes three actions to be performed at the Community 
level, by the Commission: the completion of the studies to identify consumer 
organisations and public bodies responsible for acting in consumer redress at the 
national level; encouraging Member States to establi h judicial and extra-judicial means 
for minor disputes involving consumers which are swift, inexpensive and effective; and 
the study “together with Member States, [on] the feasibility of a system for the 
exchange of information to promote access to the legal system of another Member State 
in minor disputes involving more than one country” (page 3).  
The constitutional background -changed by the Single European Act- came into 
force on 1st of July 1987. The SEA was conceived with the important aim of preventing 
the internal market from the stagnation of the previous decade. Article 100a introduced 
a qualified majority vote for the harmonisation of dispositions regarding the completion 
of the internal market. Paragraph 3 of Article 100a established the market’s obligation 
of to promote a high level of protection concerning health, security, environment and 
consumer. At this point, one may affirm the lifting of consumer matters to the level of 
internal market’s responsibilities, despite the absence of action in accordance with this 
understanding. In this context, the First Three-Year Action Plan came about. 
                                                
144 OJ C 294/01, 1989. 
145 OJ C 176/02, 1987. 
146OJ C 294/1, 1989. 
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II – Under the Aegis of the First Three-Year Action Plan  
 
 Consumer policy at this point has clearly abandoned access to justice as a 
priority and embraced another avenue of development, which consisted of regulating the 
market to prevent unfair trading and subsequent complaints. This attitude was 
profoundly determined by the subsidiarity principle, which was lauded in the 
introduction of the First Three-Year Action Plan of Consumer Policy in the EC (1990-
1992).147 
 “With the imminence of 1992 there is pressure for accelerated activity on 
consumer issues. In preparing this action plan therefore, the Commission has restricted 
its proposals to those areas where its involvement is essential to the success of the 
Internal Market. (…) Practical consumer policy must be effectively managed in the 
Member States on an ongoing basis with the management and control of safety, 
information and redress being adapted in each instance to local needs. It would be 
unrealistic to undertake such tasks continuously at a Community level” (page 3) (My 
emphasis). 
 Consequently, the space lent to “access to justice and redress” was minimum, 
not more than a paragraph on page 15 and two lines o  page 19.  The document 
recognised, in very general terms, the inadequacy of national schemes of access to 
justice and redress for consumers, due to their cost, mplexity and time-consuming 
character.  In addition, it asserted the negative influence this has over the market, 
“inhibiting consumer purchasing” (page 15). Furthermo e, the paragraph dedicated to 
the theme reproduced the new tendency in consumer protection by emphasising the 
regulatory armoury of the Community to prevent complaints.   
 On page 19, the Plan mentions the “consideration of means of improving 
consumer access to justice and redress”, but fails to offer a more concrete set of 
measures, in accordance with the current understanding of the subsidiarity principle.  
The opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on Consumer Protection and 
Completion of the Internal Market148 upon access to justice stresses the diversity of 
judicial-legal systems for hearing a consumer dispute, while urging unification at the 
Community level. “More fundamentally, the problems of access to the courts which the 
creation of a European area will pose are far from having been resolved. If there is a 
dispute, the single market will be replaced by twelve -or even more- legal systems, all 
jealous of their independence and sovereignty. European political leaders will have to 
address the problem of the settlement of cross-frontier disputes if they are not to 
produce an imperfect, inconsistent economic system” (item 5.4.2). The grounds for that 
                                                
147 COM (90), 98 final. 
148 OJ C 339/8, 1991. 
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opinion lie in item 2.1.3, which is in harmony with is thesis. It says that “it is 
unrealistic to want to construct an internal market and, beyond that, a European Social 
Area without a specific policy to take account of the legitimate expectations of one of 
the partners necessary to its success: the consumer.”  
 In item 5.4.3, the Opinion “regrets the failure to turn to good account the pilot 
schemes launched by the Commission with a view to fostering the introduction of 
simplified settlement and arbitration procedures for consumer disputes.”  
 The Council Resolution on Future Priorities for the Development of Consumer 
Protection Policy149 praises the subsidiarity principle and therefore simply encourages 
Member States to facilitate legal redress by simplifying the procedures for settlement of 
consumer complaints and offering legal aid for consumers in courts. The Resolution 
confines the implementation of access to justice for cross-border disputes to the 
development of transfrontier information centres, while limiting Community 
responsibilities on the matter thereto.  
A group chaired by Peter Sutherland produced the Sutherland Report for The 
European Commission. It was concluded on 26th October 1992 and its central aim was 
to analyse “the problems that the Community will face in managing an area without 
frontiers” (page 2). The Commission issued a Communication150 to the Council and the 
European Parliament entitled The Operation of the Community’s Internal Market, and 
this was based on the 38 recommendations set out in the report. Among those 
recommendations is one that mentions the necessity to overcome “doubts about the 
effective protection of consumers’ rights”, through “rapid consideration by the 
Community” (Recommendation 22, page 10). Recommendation 23 points out the 
limitation of the Brussels Convention with regard to the plurality and diversity of legal 
orders especially in the case of execution, in one jurisdiction, of judgements enacted in 
another (page 11). The response of the Commission regarding access to justice was very 
limited and shaped by the constraints of the subsidiarity principle. About the removal of 
uncertainties regarding consumer rights, there was no more than a wide compromise to 
“proceed to the analyses which such recommendation requires” (page 11). On judicial 
co-operation, the Commission asserted the utility of the Brussels Convention to 
consumers especially concerning the execution of civil orders in cross-border disputes. 
But it also agreed to undertake analysis with Member States to see “to what extent it 
would be possible to improve its operation further” (page 12). However, EC consumer 
protection, especially regarding access to justice, has the challenge of overcoming not 
only the “insuffisances des mécanismes du droit international privé pour régler les 
conflicts de lois et des juridictions dans un marché qui ne connaît pas de frontières” 
                                                
149 OJ C 186/1, 1992. 
150 SEC (92) 2277 final, 2/12/92. 
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(Kohler, 1999:11) but also the problems of a morality of rights in courts of justice, in 
the task of dispensing justice as required by consumer disputes, marked by their needs 
and aspiration to satisfaction and happiness. 
Therefore, the position of the Commission concerning the Sutherland Report’s 
recommendations left unfulfilled the goal of the First Three-Year Action Plan regarding 
the improvement of access to justice for consumers in the internal market.  
 
III– Under the Aegis of the Second Three-Year Action Plan 
  
The Second Commission Three-Year Action Plan151 was formulated under the 
spirit of Maastricht, which presented the Community with a new title in the Treaty and 
raised “consumer protection to the rank of a genuine Community policy” (page 6). The 
Plan acknowledges that “in numerous specific domains, such as access to justice, 
notably in the case of ‘minor disputes’ involving consumers, (…) Europe of the 
consumer has not yet been realised” (page 5). 
The Plan admits that a number of measures need to be implemented in order to 
comply with the new constitutional order established by Maastricht. The Plan seems to 
express only the positive gains brought by Maastricht to EC consumer policy and law, 
without reflecting that the subsidiarity principle plays the role as “the word that would 
save Maastricht” and prevents the implementation of c nsumer protection as a 
Community responsibility.  
 The Second Action Plan acknowledged that the Commission “has encouraged 
the creation of pilot projects (…), at national level, of simplified procedures for settling 
consumer disputes” (page 11).  
However, access to justice was clearly stated as a selective priority for raising 
the level of consumer protection, while highlighting two priorities: “consumer 
information and improved concertation” (page 15). Informed consumers would then be 
in the spotlight. Besides, the Plan added more areas of consumer protection in position 
of receiving attention: “access to justice and financi l services”. This was clearly a very 
inspiring combination, especially in times of a single currency and diminished 
consumer confidence. The Plan mentioned the Sutherland Report and its 
recommendation regarding action toward the dissipation of consumer uncertainty (page 
16) and affirmed “the importance of access to justice for the operation of an internal 
market that is responsive to consumers’ and producers’ needs” (page 22). The Plan 
mentions the Report recommendation regarding an examination of the conditions for the 
establishment of access to justice in the Community, through out-of-court conciliation 
procedures, without engaging Community power.   
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The Second Plan, unfortunately, disrespected the spirit of the Report, while 
offering no concrete action for the adoption of the R port’s conclusions, despite 
referring in the Annex to the subsidiarity principle in its positive configuration. 
However, regarding access to justice, it timidly affirmed that the Commission would 
explore the avenues of out-of-court system for handling consumers’ disputes, and 
announced a Green Paper on consumer access to justice for 1993. 
The Commission enacted another Communication on reinforcing the 
effectiveness of the internal market.152. Access to justice was one of the items discussed, 
but without considering it as a consumer problem. Consumers were considered 
differently from earlier EC consumer policy after the 1972 Paris Summit and reaffirmed 
by the Sutherland Report: they were very central figures in an internal market that seeks 
completion. The theme was treated as a problem of individuals in general and their 
difficulties regarding the Community legal order. The emphasis was strongly on the role 
of national courts, of the Rome and Brussels Conventions and legal professionals, 
especially officers applying Community law in national context. The Communication 
established the necessity of promoting training courses for judges and other law 
officers. 
The announced Green Paper on Access to Justice153 came to life in due course 
and aimed, firstly, “to start a discussion which, without prejudicing competences 
(national, intergovernmental, Community), could give all interested parties food for 
thought” (page 6). 
The Green Paper is a long detailed document formulated in five parts. The first 
part offers an approach to the problem, summarises th  evolution of the theme in EC 
consumer policy, highlights the dimension of the problem with the completion of the 
“Single Market”, and offers to a great extent the conclusions and strategy of the 
Sutherland Report. The second part of the document is dedicated to the situation in each 
12 Member States. The third part explores the Community dimension of the problem 
while the fourth part suggests themes for discussion. Finally, the fifth part is dedicated 
to conclusions in six areas but without any concrete measure to offer access to justice 
for consumers in any kind of dispute within Community legal and institutional orders. 
The introductory paragraph of the Green Paper is the formulation, in very basic 
and general terms, of the positivist criteria of justice in accordance to law. It is said that 
to “render justice” is a necessity created by the br ach of one of the norms which 
recognises or creates rights and duties. In the first footnote, it is added that this leads to 
the difference between “legal” and “moral” norms which “lies precisely in the coercive 
force of the former: the penalty for infringement is just an (coercive) application of the 
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general norm to the concrete case” (page 5). The Pap r is at odds with the understanding 
that any special sort of justice would necessarily be founded upon a different approach 
to the separation of law from morals.  
The rhetoric of the Paper moves toward the identification of access to justice 
with the application of principles especially the principle of equality (page 5). This 
thesis has argued for the necessity that any legal order, especially regarding consumer 
matters, considers needs, satisfaction and happiness from the perspective of the ethics of 
care, against the Green Paper’s argument on the princi le of equality but in accordance 
with the Paper when it affirms: “making access to justice work poses very particular and 
unprecedented problems.” Access to justice as consumer protection is wisely 
understood as the way to fill in “the gap between law and reality” (page 5). 
The Paper asserts the national responsibility to offer effective access to justice 
also through the application of Community law while recognising that the Community 
level is put in jeopardy when national orders fail. Moreover, one does note a 
Community failure and the development of the theme increasingly indicates the 
necessity of a truly European involvement, as asserted by the Sutherland Report. 
The second part of the Paper describes five different possibilities for access to 
justice for consumers: simplified court procedures, out-of-court procedures, 
administrative authorities, representative actions a d pilot projects. It considers the 
particular situation of each of them in the 12 Membr States without the purpose of 
discovering a unifying factor in this great range of diversity -the only reason that could 
possibly justify this kind of work. Consequently, the articulation of the various national 
systems under a unique European agency is not attempted; neither does it propose a 
unified system for handling cross-border disputes proposed that could be adopted 
throughout the Union and adapted to local particularities, in order to equalise the many 
disparities among different systems.  
The most common characteristic among the various national systems is that the 
body responsible is private, unlike what is stated in the European Parliament Resolution 
of 1987.154 Furthermore, the Paper wonders how, whether, and to what extent   “the 
guarantees of independence (or at least impartiality), which in rule-of-law states are 
invested in the judiciary, can be assured by the new ‘judges’ who are increasingly being 
called on to settle disputes outside the framework of the courts proper” (page 58). 
Access to justice informed by the ethics of care equalises differently the problem of 
legitimacy of the system, raised by the Paper, since t aims at responding to the needs of 
the parties to a dispute in their own terms with care while promoting responsibility for 
the Other in a relationship, which is ultimately its criteria of legitimacy.  
                                                
154OJ C 99/203, 1987.  
 220
The Paper disqualifies small claims tribunals or procedures as a promising 
avenue to resolve the problem, since this will demand that one of the parties agrees to 
engage in a dispute far from home. The conclusion is clear and states that “[t]he 
complexity of the treatment of intra-Community disputes is partly due to the (legal and 
judicial) frontiers which still exist” (page 63). Although this seems to propose that 
harmonisation would be the solution, the argument progresses in the opposite direction, 
namely towards ensuring national responsibility for c nsumer justice. The remedies of 
the Community law lie at the level of substantive rights and conventions to resolve 
conflicts of law and jurisdiction, whilst leaving to Member States the responsibility of 
easy access to justice.  
The fourth part proposes themes for discussion and cknowledges that the 
Community is in a good position to offer substantive remedies so that the gap would be 
at the procedural level. To this end, EC consumer law requires “a Community 
regulator” (page 77). Three solutions are listed: “either there is a Community 
“regulator”, who applies a Community procedure, (…) [after] [t]he Sutherland Report 
considered a similar solution by proposing the establishment of an ‘ombudsman 
responsible for examining problems raised by consumers’;- or a Community procedure 
is made available to the national regulators (harmonisation of actions for an injunction); 
-or one simply allows the existing national procedures (without harmonising them) to 
exercise the effects for which they were designed (mutual recognition of the ‘locus 
standi’)” (pages 78/79). This solution seems to sit betwen the second and the third 
possibility, due to the subsidiarity principle. Indeed, the first position was refused in few 
words and the analysis of the second and the third ones proceeded exactly against the 
moral demand for a European system to respond to consumer needs in cases of cross-
border disputes. The idea of training legal professionals in Member States is again 
defended and there is reference to the creation of “a European judicial space” (page 82). 
The Paper considers self-regulation and codes of conduct as having a very 
important role to play in providing justice in consumer disputes, while acknowledging, 
however, that “consumers still place little trust in ‘self-regulatory’ bodies and schemes” 
(pages 82-83).  
Six points were offered as conclusions that should be implemented by “taking 
into account the principle of subsidiarity” (page 86). These were quite generic and 
included studies, allocation of recourses for legal aid, follow-up mechanisms in 
transfrontier complaints, closer contacts between different consumer arbitration bodies, 
the consolidation of existing transfrontier co-operation, private ombudsman schemes 
and codes of conduct.  
Despite the abstract character of the Green Paper, especially regarding its 
conclusions, it was very well received. In the summary of the results of the 
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consultations on the Green Paper, one reads interesting positions for the involvement of 
the Community on the equalisation of the problem rega ding access to justice for 
consumers, especially when it has a transfrontier dimension.  
The European Parliament enacted a Resolution on the Green Paper155 and called 
on the Commission to take into consideration the possibility of the three following 
measures: -harmonisation “to a certain extent [of] the rules governing legal proceedings 
in the Member States, in order to establish a Community procedure for claims up to a 
certain amount, for the rapid settlement of individual transfrontier consumer disputes in 
the internal market (…)” (item 9); –“establishment of a European Union arbitration 
board to settle transfrontier legal disputes” (item 16); –“establishment of a network of 
regional bodies, including transfrontier bodies, which should be as accessible as 
possible to the public and which should comprise independent, competent and 
responsible professional lawyers (…)” (item 18).  
The Economic and Social Committee offered its opinion156 in a section called 
“the principles and their limitations”, thereby suggesting a criticism similar to that 
which this thesis puts forth. Unfortunately, the argument loses force and the conclusion 
does not do justice to its title, as with other occasions when the conclusion of an 
argument seems to deny its own grounds (page 9). Secondly, the Opinion regretted “that 
the Commission ha[d] not (…) used [that] opportunity to submit concrete proposals for 
action within the scope of its specific powers, particularly for exploring the potential 
offered by Article 129a [now 153] of the Treaty of Rome” (page 3). Thirdly, the 
Opinion affirmed the inability of PIL “to achieve the effective, swift settlement of 
international consumer disputes”, while arguing for a progressive harmonisation and the 
up-grading of the Conventions to the level of Community law independent of national 
procedure to integrate it into its legal order, which came to reality recently through the 
adoption of the Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil and commercial matters157 (page 13). 
The Commission assessed of the achievement of the targ ts set by the second 
action plan and the result was positive158. The emphasis was on the substantive 
harmonisation of consumer rights. Nonetheless, progress in securing access to justice is 
limited to the discussion in the Paper. No concrete ac ion was taken except the proposal 
made on January 1996 on injunctions for the protection of consumer interests159 and, the 
enactment of an action plan.160 
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 The conclusions, presented in 1994, of the study requested by the Commission 
in 1990 to a group of experts chaired by Professor Marcel Storme, on “the 
approximation of the laws of procedure in the twelve Member States”, integrate the 
Second Action Plan.  The most important conclusion is that “[t]he idea of a single 
‘internal market’ requires for its complete realisat on a single system for the judicial 
resolution of disputes” (in Himsworth, 1997:303). Indeed, this thesis defends the 
harmonisation of access to justice for consumers under a single European agency which 
could co-ordinate the activity of its national branches while respecting national 
peculiarities.  
 Professor Storme diagnosed what he called the “negative attitude” to procedural 
law in EC law (Ibidem). This thesis reads things from a different perspective. The 
problem appears to consist of an excessive and misconceived appraisal of principles and 
rules, to the detriment of needs, satisfaction, happiness and care in relational contracts in 
the configuration of a more suitable access to justice that realises those targets. This 
thesis places the problem within the framework of the morality of rights that 
understands principles and rules as ways to secure justice and to legitimate its 
dispensation as expressions of the rule of law. This t esis has argued that such a view 
needs to be reconsidered vis-à-vis the values of the e ics of care and the conception of 
consumer contracts as relational entities on whose continuity depends the 
implementation of the market. The problem with Storme’s position is his view of justice 
as legal proceedings in courts of law. He claims that citizens confidence cannot be 
canvassed without an equal, analogous and/or equivalent system of EC procedural law 
or judicial procedures (in Ibid, 304). This thesis agrees with the call for harmonisation, 
but disagrees about the judicial or procedural nature of the enterprise regarding 
consumer disputes.  
 
IV – Under the Aegis of the Third Three-Year Action Plan 
 
 The third three-year action plan was named Priorities for Consumer Policy161, 
and was to be implemented between 1996-1998. The Plan just enumerated priorities vis-
à-vis both the wide range of concerns in EC consumer policy and law which Maastricht 
brought about and limited resources available. The Commission Work Programmes 
should decide which action might be undertaken due to the novelty of some problems 
which demanded a change in priorities.  
These priorities were classified in three areas of the internal market thought to 
influence consumer rights: -public services, financi l services and food safety in respect 
to which the policy to be adopted would be about improving consumer information to 
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enhance consumers ability to “self protection”; -Information Society; -and the 
achievement of the European Monetary Union. The ten priorities for action selected 
with respect to these three areas did not mention access to justice. 
Despite this omission, the theme was considered in the terms established by the 
Green Paper of 1993 and the Sutherland Report of 1994. Thus, in January 1996, the 
Commission sent to the Council and the European Parliament a proposal on injunctions 
for the protection of consumer interests.162 The intention was to facilitate access to 
justice for consumers in the internal market through legal proceedings and courts of 
law. However, the question of consumer associations standing for judicial claims refers 
more to collective and diffuse interests than individual ones since the framework of 
justice as care is more suitable for the settlement of individual disputes, without 
excluding collective ones. The judicial proceedings fall outside the frames of the 
redefined justice in accordance to the ethics of care and the parameters of relational 
contract theory. The point is to know to what extent a consumer organisation can 
compromise and decide about the needs of individuals. The ethics of care and the 
relational contract parameters demand personal invovement in handling a dispute. This 
fact implies problems for legitimation involving representation by impersonal agents 
even before administrative authorities (page 8). 
Another interesting provision is about “a pre-litigation procedure” which 
requires notification of the defendant to spontaneously terminate the infringement in 
order to avoid judicial proceedings.  
In February 1996, the Commission launched an Action Plan on consumer access 
to justice and the settlement of consumer disputes in the internal market163 as a follow-
up to the Green Paper on access to justice for consumers. The foreword of the Action 
Plan clearly states that “in view of the cross-border imension of the problem, certain 
objectives can only be realised at Community level” (page 3). The paper also affirms 
respect for the subsidiarity principle; thereby limit ng action to what is strictly necessary 
for the achievement of “the objectives set out in Article 129a of the Treaty” (page 3). In 
addition, it says that “they are not of an exhaustive nature” and demands, consequently, 
a concerted action between Community and national orders (page 3). 
The constitutional background of the third Consumer Action Plan was the 
Amsterdam Treaty. Nevertheless, one can observe a gre t asymmetry between the 
emphasis on consumer protection in order to approximate the Union to the citizen and 
the low-profile rhetoric of the Plan, which is notable by its negative approach to 
subsidiarity. 
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  The Action Plan is structured in three parts. The first part states the problem 
about consumer disputes in general, out-of-court procedures in Member States, and 
national initiatives concerning access to court procedures.  
In the second part, the problem is looked at from the Community perspective, 
while analysing the costs of judicial frontiers and the results of the consultation on the 
Green Paper on access to justice for consumers.   
The third part analyses the initiatives proposed, whilst considering the 
promotion of out-of-court procedures and simplified access to court procedures. There 
are then three annexes. The first one concerns the timetable regarding measures to be 
taken by the end of May 2000 for the promotion of out- f-court schemes and until 
September 2000 for access to court procedures.  
Annex II outlines six criteria of the out-of-court procedures applicable to 
consumer disputes as the following: impartiality, effectiveness, transparency, language 
of the country of residence of parties, supremacy of the law of the country over any 
code of conduct in conformity with the Rome Conventio , and prohibition of terms not 
individually negotiated to prevent consumers from bringing an action before the 
competent court to hear and decide the dispute.  
The last annex contains two forms for claiming and its reply. The use of these 
forms was surveyed by the Commission between May and Ju e 1999 in Austria, Spain, 
Finland, France, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. It 
demonstrated that the form was rarely used for cross-b rder disputes (around 0,5%)164, 
which supports two conclusions: either no dispute was requiring it, which shows that 
the market was not working to its full potential; or that EC consumers are lumping their 
complaints as a sign of a denial of justice. This corroborates the necessity to assure 
consumers that a suitable system awaits them in cases of transfrontier disputes. 
In general, the action plan on consumer justice repats the general assumptions 
described in the Green Paper. Basically, access to jus ice is understood as access to law 
despite the reference to differences between them without showing practical 
consequence.  The specificity of consumer claims is asserted as their low economic 
significance and by the fact that consumers tend to be remarkably weaker than traders or 
professionals. The Action Plan acknowledges the gap in access to justice for consumers 
in the EU as a legal gap (not as a justice deficit) and so it urges the establishment of 
appropriate procedures (page 8). The interdependence between justice for consumers 
and the smooth functioning of the internal market is recognised. This interdependence 
supports “the necessity for as well as the urgency of a Community initiative” (page 11). 
It mentions a document called “Memorandum for an Active Consumer Policy”, dated 
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22 December 1994 from the French government to the Council, “in which it emphasised 
that the problems of access to justice have not been resolved and jeopardise the creation 
of a genuine European area” (page 12).  
The Action Plan enumerates the three most important objectives of the 
Community initiative regarding the consultation process carried out after the Green 
Paper. Among them, is “the promotion of an environme t favourable to the out-of-court 
settlement of consumer disputes”, which came from the Resolution of the European 
Parliament165. Another objective was drawn from the same source but was slightly and 
prejudicially changed. It regards the creation of a Community network of regional 
bodies (Parliament’s suggestion) or mechanism (the language of the Action Plan) for 
assisting or promoting (Parliament) or for monitoring and co-ordinating cross-border 
proceedings (Action Plan). A footnote clearly states hat the European Parliament 
Resolution is “a lot more far-reaching than the pers ctives described in this 
Communication” (page 12). 
The European Parliament enacted a Resolution166 on the Commission action 
plan on consumer access to justice. Two points are wo thy of consideration. First, there 
is the suggestion that national bodies should be set up and operate under official 
supervision (item 10). Second, the European Parliament recognizes the restricted utility 
of PIL for handling transfrontier consumer disputes, pecially the Rome and Brussels 
Conventions (page 11), which supports the discussion in chapter four.  
On 30.03.1998, the Commission adopted another Communication on the out-of-
court settlement of consumer disputes and on the princi les applicable to the bodies 
responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes.167 This Communication 
followed the Green Paper adopted in 1993 and the Action Plan on consumer access to 
justice of 1996.  
The Communication establishes that “for the purpose f this communication 
‘consumer access to justice’ means the opportunity to exercise one’s rights in practice, 
not access to justice in the stricter sense, i.e. to the courts” (page 1). The inspiring point 
in the Communication is precisely on the opposition between “justice in practice” and 
“justice in courts”. This thesis opposes justice and law and aims at reconciling “justice 
in practice” (using the Communication language) with law, because the former 
encounters insurmountable difficulties to realise itself through justice in courts where 
legal proceedings take place.  
The Communication mentions that Member States are primarily responsible for 
consumer protection and reveals once more the difficulty in accepting this as a basic 
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market responsibility, the achievement of which requires unlimited national co-
operation. 
The Communication repeats the arguments used in previous official documents, 
recognises that the judicial protection of rights for consumers in the EC is a very 
troublesome avenue and offers three “fully complementary approaches” to tackle the 
gap in this area: “simplification and improvement of legal procedures, improvement of 
communication between professionals and consumers, and out-of-court procedures” 
(page 6). The intention of improving a “conciliation culture” in the internal market is 
underscored also because it is of interest for professionals who might avoid court 
proceedings and work to keep and please their clients ven in the event of problems. It 
is the relational character of the market that is recognised. In this sense, law as an 
institution that regulates discrete transactions is challenged to adapt itself in order to 
serve the aspiration of relational contracts.  
The Communication sees no responsibility for overcoming linguistic and other 
cultural barriers which are common in the internal market. Language diversity is of 
immense importance for consumers who try to overcome their problems without help in 
cases of cross-border disputes. So is cultural diversity. To sue abroad entails dealing 
with ways of thinking, habits, and costumes with which one might not be familiar. 
Subsidiarity is again used in order to justify the Commission’s omission in acting 
accordingly in order to set up a European system of access to justice discussed in so 
many earlier documents. 
  The Commission says: “In order to ensure a level of transparency and 
dissemination of information on out-of-court procedures in line with the principles set 
out in the Recommendation, (…) the Commission intends to create a database of the 
out-of-court bodies responsible for resolving consumer disputes that offer these 
safeguards. In keeping with the principle of subsidiar ty, the database will contain 
particulars communicated to the Commission by the Mmber States that wish to 
participate in this initiative” 168 (page 11). 
 The Recommendation on the principles applicable to the bodies responsible for 
out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes is a soft law instrument and, as affirmed 
above, will suffer from the constraints of the subsidiarity principle or, as concluded in 
the last chapter, from a lack of institutional and political will.  In its introduction, the 
Recommendation repeats known arguments used in earler documents and reaffirms the 
responsibility of Member States to provide consumer protection, the role of the 
Community in co-operating with national institutions in this respect, and the necessity 
to act under the restraints of the subsidiarity principle understood in its negative aspect. 
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The Recommendation endorses 7 principles: independence, transparency, adversarial 
principle, effectiveness, legality, liberty and repr sentation.  
In 1997 the Commission adopted a Communication “towards greater efficiency 
in obtaining and enforcing judgments in the European Union”169, in order to improve 
the role of courts in the EU and to communitarise the Brussels Convention, based on the 
Amsterdam Treaty, which was analysed in the fourth chapter of the thesis. 
 
V – Under the Aegis of the Fourth Three-Year Action Plan170 
 
The introduction of the document claims that consumer policy will be coming of 
age during the three years of validity of the Fourth Action Plan. It also states the need 
for “a new maturity on the part of consumers and their representatives” in order to 
acknowledge their rights and also their responsibilities. The uneven terms quoted are 
blind to the incomplete development of consumer policy in the EU in general and 
specifically to access to justice for consumers. Consequently, the aforementioned 
rhetoric cannot be imposed since the gap is immense and its resolution must be 
achieved before one can speak a language of reciprocity in a market that prioritises the 
growth of business and turns its back to consumers.  
The plan considers the effects of the EMU, the growth in the movement of 
services in the internal market and especially the benefits and drawbacks of the 
information society in EU consumer policy and law. These effects, says the plan, have 
to be understood in view of the fact that “whilst consumers have a responsibility to 
promote their own interests, they heavily depend on public authorities to promote their 
health and safety, on their behalf” (page 4). Is there any contradiction here? The plan 
rests upon the tension between a liberal-individualistic approach to the problem of 
consumer protection and its own imposition as a public social policy in the EU political, 
legal and institutional arenas. The plan asserts that policies cannot be based only upon 
consumer rights or consumer protection but also on the interaction between consumer 
and stakeholder interests. A few lines further on, the plan argues for the importance of 
“a closer, more cooperative relationship between cosumers and business, acting as 
equal partners (…). The goal is a balanced partnership between successful businesses 
and satisfied consumers. (…) Consumer confidence is vital for successful businesses” 
(page 4). This argument is very interesting because it r produces in broad terms the 
arguments of relational contract theory. However, it is fallacious since it argues for the 
exclusion of something that does not exist yet, namely, a coherent and fully-fledged EC 
consumer rights policy and/or law. Furthermore, given the power imbalance between 
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consumers and traders, a free, spontaneous and voluntarist inter-relationship is not 
recommended. This surely requires leadership and supervision by public bodies. 
Such rhetoric becomes stronger as the plan progresses and its discourse claims 
for “a more powerful voice for the consumer throughout the EU” through a sort of “self-
help strategy” (page 8). On the one hand, a strong consumer voice is related to 
independent and mature consumers. On the other hand, a background for de-regulatory 
policies that negative law, soft law and self-regulatory scheme propose is needed. The 
idea of a powerful voice for consumers is very welcome but it should be placed in a 
public European agency composed of powerful national political agents (public 
prosecutors) responsible for promoting out-of-court justice for EU consumers, 
especially regarding financial services and e-commerce. This would re-shape the 
following assertion: “The Commission will create a network of expertise in Europe on 
consumer affairs, for its own use and that of consumer associations. Finally, the 
Commission will launch a feasibility study on how such a network might also act as a 
think-tank and clearing house for ideas for the Commission, Member States and 
consumer associations” (page 9). This thesis has a lot to offer to the mentioned “think-
tank and clearing house for ideas” towards overcoming the armoury of the contested 
morality of rights.  
The plan establishes the necessity of “better enforcement and monitoring” 
(pages 15/17) in order to tackle the priority of “full respect for the economic interests of 
EU consumers”. Nevertheless, the primary responsibility is left at the national level, 
while EU authority only has to “add value to national efforts  (…) through facilitating 
and encouraging administrative cooperation within and between the Member States, the 
Commission and consumer associations (…) [and] encouraging the coordination of 
enforcement by national agencies” (page 17). The gap is recognised but the action 
proposed does not work for the improvement of the level of confidence of EU 
consumers.  
The Council Resolution171 on the Action Plan reiterates the necessity to respect 
the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and defends more stringent national 
provisions on consumer protection. It is based on the Community duty to support and 
supplement national policies given the emphasis a high level of consumer protection 
enshrined in the Treaty. This sounds as a cautious alert against the somewhat consumer 
unfriendly terms of the Action Plan. The Resolution is nevertheless excessively 
economic about access to justice for consumers. It calls on the Commission to “continue 
(…) to work on the protection of the legal interests of consumers including in particular 
their easy access to redress procedures” (item II). 
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The Economic and Social Committee offered an opinion172 about the Action 
Plan and applauded the exclusion of the term “protection” from the title of the Action 
Plan since this “suggests a rather patronising approach and does not do sufficient justice 
to the consumers’ position as a full and equal member of our socio-economic order and 
to the active role which consumers themselves may play” (item 2.4). The opinion claims 
for a policy with a “global instead of a national or purely EU approach” (item 2.5). 
These two items sound slightly out of focus because they deprive European consumers 
of something that they do not enjoy yet, namely: protection and European consumer 
policy especially on access to justice. The Committee lends support to the de-regulatory 
policy of the Plan in item 3.3 based on “dialogue/self-regulation”. Nonetheless, it 
requires a mechanism that could ensure sanctions vis-à- s non-satisfactory agreements 
or failure to comply with such agreements, or a third party able to conduct the handling 
of disputes in order to smooth away the power imbalance between consumers and 
traders. The conclusion is toward the necessity of “the ‘big stick’ to bring the parties 
into line” (item 3.3.2). 
The European Parliament adopted a Resolution173 on the Action Plan based on 
the understanding that the Amsterdam Treaty had brought additional emphasis and 
scope for EC consumer policy in dissonance with the general background on which the 
Action Plan seems to have been elaborated. The Parliament requested the Commission 
to promote respect for the basic consumer rights adopte  by the World Trade 
Organisation. These are: safety, information, choice, representation, redress, education, 
satisfaction and clean environment (item 4). The Parliament also called on EU 
institutions to “implement the Treaty obligation for a high level of consumer protection 
(…) and to employ Article 153 (…) more consistently as legal basis in the development 
of the policy in the European Union” (items 8/10). The Parliament then called on the 
Commission to ensure the development of consumer confidence through access to 
redress and implement the Communication on the out-of-court settlement of consumer 
disputes. Unfortunately, the European Parliament Resolution is timid and does not 
advance any critique or more sophisticated idea to implement a more responsive 
consumer policy on access to justice. 
The Commission adopted on 28.7.99, a Green Paper on liability for defective 
products174 with the aim of discussing Directive 85/374/EEC175as amended by Directive 
99/34/EC176. The section on access to justice investigates the suitability of the out-of-
court justice scheme in cases of liability for defective products. The Green Paper asserts 
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the necessity of “class action suits” for cases involving diffuse and collective rights, 
thereby suggesting the necessity of a powerful body f r protecting consumers in a 
Europe endeavouring to become “a global civil power at the service of sustainable 
global development”177 (page 2). 
The conclusions of the Tampere Council178 about a genuine European area of 
justice as an area where “individuals and business should not be prevented or 
discouraged from exercising their rights by the incompatibility or complexity of legal 
and administrative system in the Member States” constitute a very inspiring background 
for access to justice for consumers (page 5). Neverthel ss, the primacy of national 
responsibility on the matter is reaffirmed and the Council of Europe invited the 
European Council to establish minimum standards for Members States.  
The Communication on a Council and European Parliament Directive on 
certain legal aspects of electronic commerce in the Int rnal Market179 establishes the 
need to improve consumer confidence in e-commerce through improving access to 
justice. A legal framework is requested and the solution proposed is based upon self-
regulatory codes of conduct. This approach and access to justice based on soft law were 
criticised in the previous chapter.  
The Directive on certain aspects of electronic commerce in the internal 
market180 was adopted using the 1999-2001 Action Plan as a support for its strong 
emphasis on soft law. There was no advance regarding access to justice.  
 On 5 May 2000 in Lisbon, the European Commission launched the European 
Extra-Judicial Network for Out-of-Court Settlement of Consumer Disputes (EEJ-net)181. 
The network aimed to function “without heavy regulatory procedures” but with the help 
of clearing houses. The project was based on the Communication on out-of-court 
settlement of disputes182 and on the Recommendation on the principles applicable to the 
bodies responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes183. 
 The Commission Working Document re-affirms national competence for 
implementing the network, and to set up clearing houses. It enumerates a number of 
problems which are mostly related to the fact that e network has to rely upon national 
bodies and schemes already functioning without any co-ordination. The problems 
consist of differences between national bodies which can be so characterized: structural 
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Creation of a European Extra-Judicial Network is the SEC (2000) 405 final. 
182 See footnote no. 39. 
183 OJ L 115/31, 1998. The pagination used on the Recommendation on principles applicable to the 
bodies that are responsible for out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes refers to the internet version 
available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1998/en_398X0257.html. 
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(each national order has its own geographical and sectoral organisation; status (some are 
public, others private, some can only give information, others can handle the dispute 
straight away); inexperience (the great majority deals only with national or local 
complaints); resources (the bodies usually do not have the resources to expand their 
operational capacity, such as computers, fax, telephones, more specialised staff). These 
problems are serious but another serious problem includes the question about the quality 
of justice such bodies can offer regardless of the observance of established principles. 
Clearly, a European agency to harmonise the wide range of national bodies is required. 
Instead of this, the decision was to create “central contact points in each Member State” 
or “clearing houses”184. 
 Consumers in need of help to settle a dispute havefour options: 1- direct contact 
with the extra-judicial body in the foreign country; 2- contact the clearing house in the 
foreign country; 3- contact an extra-judicial body in his own country; or 4-contact the 
clearing house in his own country (page 8). The Commission has a list185 of the notified 
bodies, including merely arbitration and ombudsman schemes, in each Member State. 
The difficulties with harmonising them are overwhelming when one notes that Germany 
has 203 notified bodies whilst Sweden has only one. The previous chapter discussed 
how inconvenient and time-consuming the role of clearing houses could be vis-à-vis a 
simpler solution of a European agency for settling cross-border consumer disputes.  
 The network would be initially set up only with bodies prepared to “impose or 
propose a solution”, thereby excluding any conciliation bodies, despite the fact that out-
of-court bodies, as in Portugal and Spain, promote c nciliation before the arbitration. 
The Working Document proposes the widening of the network in order to include this 
type of out-of-court body. Another Recommendation on the principles for out-of-bodies 
involved in the consensual resolution of consumer disputes186, which is based on the 
Commission Communication on widening consumer access to alterna ive dispute 
resolution187, has been enacted. 
 The Communication establishes the difference between disputes settled by 
means of consensus or imposed outcomes and calls for principles in the former in order 
to foster consumer confidence and turn “national consumers into active cross border 
consumers”, in times of a single currency and e-commerce (pages 1/3). The intention is 
to widen the range of more flexible possibilities for consumers to settle cross-border 
disputes.  The Communication mentions the creation of the FIN-NET to settle 
complaints in the financial services sector.  
                                                
184 The pages quoted refer to the internet version (footnote no. 48) 
185 http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg24/policy/…/acce_just07_over_en.htm. For further information on the 
notified bodies: http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg24/policy/developments/acce_just/acce_jus.  
186 OJ L 109/56, 19/4/2001. 
187 COM (2001) 161 final, 4.4.2001. 
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 In turn, the Recommendation 2001/310 identifies four principles to be observed 
by national bodies that are responsible for settling consumer disputes in a consensual 
way: impartiality, transparency, effectiveness and fairness.  
 Among them, fairness is of great interest for this t esis and the framework it 
develops. The Recommendation outlines four criteria that fairness should meet and two 
of them recall the discussion about fairness in Gilligan’s findings upon a feminine moral 
reasoning.  
The Recommendation says that the fairness of the procedure should guarantee 
that: -“both parties should be able to freely and easily submit any argument, information 
or evidence relevant to their case” (page 60). 
Gilligan, through interviewing girls, discovered tha  for them fairness is the 
ability to hear and the chance to be heard. This understanding entails that parties should 
be able to argue freely and to be answered in their own terms. Unfortunately, the 
Recommendation betrays that logic by limiting argumentation to its relevancy to the 
dispute, because it follows very much the judge’s po ition in adjudication procedures. 
This recalls the relational character of consumer disputes and the difficulty for relational 
litigants to come through with their story in legal proceedings. 
The Recommendation also characterises “fairness” by saying: “both parties 
should be encouraged to fully cooperate with the procedure, in particular by providing 
any information necessary for a fair resolution of the dispute” (page 60). 
In another study, Gilligan relates the doubts of a female lawyer who had found a 
document that would help the counter-party and prejudice her own client. Fairness for 
this lawyer turns into her own capacity to be true to herself and to respond with care in 
relation to the Other. The Recommendation touches tn on troubles that fairness, in a 
feminine conception, amounts to legal proceedings.   
In 1/2/2001, the Commission launched the FIN-NET188, an out-of-court 
complaints network for financial services, in order to further the development of a 
single market in retail financial services vis-à-vis the improvements brought about by 
the growth of e-commerce. The basis of the project can be seen in a Memorandum189 on 
the theme. The bodies should be accredited nationally for being able to meet the 
requirements of the 1998 and 2001 Recommendations on the principles for settlement 
of consumer complaints. The system for financial servic s intends to explore national 
private and sectorised Ombudsman schemes connected to clearing houses. Once more, 
one does not see any European involvement in the imple entation of the NET.  
Recently, the Commission enacted a Communication on e-commerce and 
financial services190 and established consumer confidence in redress and Internet 
                                                
188 http//europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/ onsumer/index.htm. 
189 http//europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/ onsumer/ mou-en.pdf. 
190 http//europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/finances/genaral/ecom.htm. 
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payment systems as a policy area to be tackled. The syst m proposed relies on the EEJ-
NET and FIN-NET.   
 Finally, a Council Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgements in civil and commercial mtters191 was also adopted under 
the guidance of the 1999-2001 Action Plan. The discus ion of this Regulation is in 
chapter four of the thesis.  
 To sum up, this chapter has basically shown the dominant position of soft law in 
EC consumer policy and law regarding access to justice. Furthermore, the patchy and 
fragmentary evolution of the theme is clear; the early ppearance of out-of-court 
solutions for access to justice for consumers in EU; the inadequacy of both out-of-court 
and simplified court procedures in providing the special sort of justice consumers 
require in a common market such as the European one, that counts, at the same time, 
with diversity of legal and judicial systems and single currency; the lack or gap in the 
consideration of satisfaction, happiness and needs of and care for individuals entrapped 
by the facilities of the market; and how law has, indeed, very little influence on the field 
of consumer protection since the constitutional and political background of both 
Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaty hardly changed the situation of effective and proper 
access to justice for consumers in the European internal market; the presence of a 
























                                                




Translating Legal Justice as 
Care into the EU Context 
  
 This chapter is a re-collection of the thoughts and rguments advanced so far and 
whose brief recall may help the reader.  
The European part of the thesis intended to characterise the EU market as the 
environment for the adoption of a re-defined justice in order to bridge the gap in access 
to justice for consumers in cross border disputes. The fourth chapter described this gap 
through four general ideas: the centrality of the consumer charter for European 
integration, which happens basically through the idology of market economy; the 
symbolic character of legislation in the consumer fi ld; the inappropriateness of national 
environment to promote consumer protection concerning access to justice in an 
integrated market, and finally the role of courts or of adjudication in providing justice 
for consumers. The gap was characterised as twofold: irstly, the adoption of the 
morality of rights, rules and principles for a framework for adversarial justice; secondly, 
the fact that access to justice for consumers in the EU is a national responsibility, based 
on courts or private out-of-court bodies and PIL. The EJJ-NET project was then 
criticised for failing to tackle the two fundamental features of the gap in access to 
justice for consumers.     
The fifth chapter analysed the possibility of European legal and institutional 
orders to embrace the sort of justice delineated as a market responsibility in the first part 
of the thesis. Negative law and soft law were described as hurdles to and subsidiarity as 
a facilitator of a European project of justice for consumers. Article 153 EC was 
characterised as a strong legal provision, in conjunction with Articles 2, 10, 94, 95 and 
308, to encourage the market to comply with its moral duty regarding consumer 
protection. The EJJ-NET project launched by the European Commission was described 
as a valuable opportunity to group together national bodies under a European umbrella 
or agency which would have to equip the system withan institutional framework able to 
bridge the twofold gap. 
The sixth chapter discussed the evolution of access to justice for EU consumers 
and re-approached the gap to show inter alia that out-of-court solutions have permeated 
the earliest policies suggested on the problem, without however their being able to 
bridge the gap. 
 The current chapter will work upon a practice of justice as a feminine virtue 
defended to be the framework for a solution of the European gap in access to justice for 
EU consumers. 
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The first chapter dealt with the post-modern pitfalls of justice and law in 
modernist legal theory and defended the new paradigm found in the writings of Carol 
Gilligan as discussed in chapter two. 
Chapter III concluded the first part of the thesis by exploring a practice to settle 
consumer disputes according to the ethics of care. Justice as care was shown as the 
practice of promoting justice in the parties’ terms for their needs, satisfaction, happiness 
and consequently confidence in the mechanisms of the market that invite them to act. 
The process seemed to require a strong institutional engagement, which was called love 
as institutional will or interesse. Moreover, the body responsible for advancing such 
practice needs to be public and to undertake the challenge of bringing the private, 
nature, the domestic, the personal, the “kitchen”, where dwells the silenced feminine 
voice, into the public, reason, the social, the political, the “living room”, wherein the 
male voice rules and speaks.  
The present chapter aims at translating the experience reported and analysed in 
the third chapter into the European scene where the gap was identified. The chapter will 
be developed in two sections. The first will discuss the theme of “transferability” in 
view of the immense cultural, political, social and economic gap between Brazilian and 
European societies and markets. This will be done in four subsections on European 
diversity; need-oriented theory; the demands of legitimacy; and the so-called German 
problem. The second section will discuss the elements of the framework, in five 
different sub-sections:  the guidelines of the body (a European agency or a European 
Consumer Ombudsman); the practice, its tools and legitimacy; legality as safety net; the 
case of financial services and e-commerce; and the role of criminalising of certain 
marketing practices.  
 
I- The Challenge of Transferability as “Translation” 
 
 The question of transferability has two basic aspects. The negative one is the 
incommensurability between Brazilian and European societies at various levels. 
Nevertheless, the practice of justice as care may be able to overcome the apparent non-
transferability of the Brazilian experience to the European market context. The 
“punctual”192 character of the practice warrants the possibility of translation of the 
Brazilian practice into European context. In principle, a practice of dispute resolution, 
which elects the parties as sources of its reflexiveness, substantive elements, legitimacy 
and effectiveness, may generate a wide range of possible adaptations. The argument is 
not that care is a universal human faculty, general enough to be applied everywhere, for 
this would betray the post-modernist character or the punctuality of the practice. On the 
                                                
192 See footnote 1 in Chapter III for clarification onthe use of this word. 
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contrary, it suggests a radicalisation of post-modernism in two directions. Firstly, it 
values the petit récits. Secondly, it calls the Otherness of the South into question as a 
source of inspiration (Santos, 1995a: 580), geographic lly (Brazil) and sexually (the 
feminine) alike, since “the South was feminised” (Coombe, 1995:605). To refuse the 
feminine is to refuse the South, and thus the Otherness of both. 
 Friedman, while discussing the theme, speculates how much harder it would be 
to transfer a new family law code elaborated upon culturally diverse practices compared 
to the imposition of a banking code elaborated under th  same conditions. He attributes 
this to the fact that the banking code would not influence personal lives (1978:30). 
Nevertheless, banking codes, in an integrated market unified by a common currency, 
will certainly influence personal lives. Furthermore, this thesis aspires to influence 
personal lives through defending consumer confidence i  and relationships with the 
market since this fulfils market’s moral responsibilities for satisfaction and happiness. 
The ease of the transferability of a practice of justice as care has precisely this 
explanation.  
 Furthermore, the challenge of the translation here proposed is to go beyond a 
recasting of the South in Northern terms, or the conformation of the feminine with male 
patterns in order to attempt displaying the logic of the South, of the feminine, in and 
into locations and locutions of the North, of the male. This translation proposes the 
reshaping of male and Northern categories in order to locate the feminine and the South 
through a process of recognition of affinities and differences (Geertz, 1983:10/12). 
  
I.1- Diversity as the European Peculiarity 
 
 The first point to be considered is European legal and cultural diversity as one of 
the main concerns of the discussion upon the harmonisation of private law in EU legal 
order. Harmonisation in private law threatens cultural identity since it bears deep moral 
values and social practices that are legalised by rules and principles thereof (Colins, 
1995). Harmonisation is also reputedly problematic for it seems to be forged at the 
expense of national integrity (Wilhelmsson, 1995b). Furthermore, diversity is also a 
point of concern for consumers needing access to jus ice in the EU.  
In this sense, one of the first advantages of justice as care for consumers, as a European 
project, is the requirement to hear and respond in the terms of the Other as a practice 
that entails care and responsibility in relationship . This framework is basically against 
the Weberian process of rationalisation (formalisation, abstraction, precise definitions 
and proceduralisation) of the legal system that lies b hind any effort of harmonisation. 
The European challenge has a deeply post-modern chaacter which consists of: hearing 
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all voices and giving them particular answers in their own terms, broadening and 
securing the effectiveness of local practices, personal moral intuition and preferences. 
 Moreover, it is crucial to understand that consumer law, as argued in the fourth 
chapter, is no longer private law. Nevertheless, its consideration in public policies and 
in public realms requires the equalisation of the public and the private, in the sense that 
even mandatory rules of consumer protection must allow the effective consideration of 
particularities whilst strengthening the unity of the market. The harmony and unity that 
the practice seeks is not based upon the rationalisation process that the legal 
systematisation expressed by PIL or harmonisation requi es. Furthermore, the 
punctuality of harmony in the practice of justice as care is against bureaucracy that can 
alienate the administrative activity from the person in need of it. The Tinderman 
Report193 says that nobody wants a technocratic Europe, since Europe must be 
experienced by the citizen in his daily life.  
The European patterns of communication adopted will not foster consensus but 
will preserve diversity in the pursuit of particular satisfaction and happiness by 
responding to Other’s needs in his own terms. The goal is to furnish confidence for the 
market to function as one: a peculiar European aim.Moreover, the practice of justice as 
care will not be proceduralised by a harmonisation that has been described as 
“practically inconceivable and normatively unsound”, de-humanised and which 
rationalises differences regarding cultural and moral personal intuitions, as a think-tank 
of abstract ideas and general formulas (Joerges, 1995: 0).  
  
I.2- Need-Oriented Theory: a Framework to Inform Translation? 
 
 Wilhelmsson has elaborated need-rational theory in modern private law. One 
must hint at this theme in order to gather support for he argument upon the feasibility 
of the translation of a feminine experience of justice into the European locus. The 
framework of need-rational principles aims to comprehend the entire field of private law 
and it is formulated to attend to the demands of less privileged people, thereby 
tempering the blind application of law. The theory is formulated upon the 
Finnish/Norwegian experience of contract law, and its transferability to the whole of 
Europe is deemed to be problematic precisely becaus the theory has a strong material 
character and is meant to be applied in adjudication. The question of transferability here 
is equated with the constraints that a Civil Code or a Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch imposes 
upon a judge who has to decide a court case, since non  of these codes would be able to 
confidently rule upon every single particular human necessity. These codes select and 
generalise a set of precise necessities and recognise that satisfaction is accidental and 
                                                
193 Bulletin of the European Communities-Supplement 1/76. 
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law must be certain. Problems of transferability of a practice of adjudication, which 
takes into consideration the particular needs of a specific party in order to ease the 
commands of law, reside in the modernist feature of law and its principles (generality, 
universality, equality). They entail problems because they cannot encompass the 
particular needs of particular persons since they cannot be generalised. The justice of 
courts and principles of law derogates the justice of needs, since the former demands 
general and previous law for security and certainty while the latter stresses the 
particular, contextual, and punctual. Wilhelmsson des not offer a convincing solution 
for this problem, whose discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Needs, in Wilhelmsson’s formulation, represent an avenue for the socialisation 
or publicisation of modern contract law in general, including consumer law. 
Nonetheless, the publicisation of consumer law would require a more daring ground in 
both poor and affluent societies. The needs-rational approach responds to social 
demands upon contract law and creates a promising framework for the conclusion that a 
theory and practice of justice as care is indeed transferable and necessary in 
underdeveloped and sophisticated markets alike.  A practice of justice as care in dispute 
resolution would dispense with the claim, also postulated by Reich (1995), for the 
elaboration of needs concepts in Community law for c nsumer protection. The 
consideration of consumers as economic subjects who need help and protection, or as 
subjects of love and institutional will could temper the language of market and enable it 
to encompass the integration of consumers as persons, as Others. Needs concepts are 
already present in the reality of the market, and the ethics of care, while shaping a 
feminine practice of law, translates them into satisf ction and happiness. The example 
here is consumers and language barriers in a multi-cultural market that work as one, 
especially for financial services through the technological facilities of e-commerce, for 
instance. The challenge is the translation of a practice of justice implied or required by 
the needs approach in socialised private law which must recognise not only social needs 
of a specific class of persons but also the generalis d fragility of consumers as Others in 
a market characterised by diversity and particular demands of happiness and 
satisfaction. Need-oriented private law changes radically the force of the pacta sunt 
servanta and delineates another profile for the theory of contract law, which may help 
advance justice as care.  
Need-oriented private law calls itself person-oriented and criticises European 
private law for its static approach which could be changed by the Nordic view of 
contract law: “more flexible and dynamic –one is tempted to say post-modern- (...)” 
(Wilhelmsson, 1995a: 212). Furthermore, together with consumer law, it opens the 
possibility for a humanisation of contract law which is the one really most adequate for 
expressing human necessities. This expression does not happen in a general way in the 
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context of welfare states, but in a particular and contextual approach which supports the 
therapeutic culture of the self as the Other which cannot be socialised, for it is acutely 
particular. The realm of the therapeutic is at the same time at odds with the market 
society and the welfare state because it is associated with the particular necessities of 
the self, especially when it becomes the Other. These necessities might be identified 
with patterns of hedonism and self-centredness not in the hands of welfare states and 
normally falsely promised by the market (Rose, 1992:149).  Justice as care demands a 
particular therapeutic approach when it goes beyond the consideration of local, national 
or social needs, customs or habits, to furnish the consideration and public care of 
individual needs, satisfaction, and happiness in a m rket society driven by the 
confidence of consumers.  
Need-oriented theory widens the field of access to justice in a different way 
from the one proposed once by Cappelletti’s project to take from the hands of 
psychologists, anthropologists and sociologist the theme in order to place it in the legal 
arena of lawyers, courts and judges. The affluent society, which is required to respond 
to needs in its consideration of private relationship , especially the ones generated by 
market impulses, must provide the institutional means for a psychological approach as a 
therapeutic market, here understood as a market re-installed and rethought again and 
again against moral boundaries. The therapeutic market considers the person as a more 
vigorous concept than the idea of individuals, citizens or even consumers. 
Consequently, lawyers alone cannot give a full account of the challenge of needs in 
private law or satisfaction, happiness and confidence i  consumer law which puts forth 
the protection of particularities as public policy. Lawyers can be however retrained to 
think relationally and along the lines of the morality of care and legal officials in the 
practice of love and interesse as institutional will. Need approach requires that.  
The understanding of consumer needs as consumerism and/or superfluous can 
be overcome by a care-reading and care-practice of the need-oriented theory or by its 
translation into the realm of the moral consideration of the Other in access to justice for 
consumers.  
Another effect of need-oriented theory, which consumer law welcomes, is the 
disintegration of private law through its publicisat on since consumer law, through the 
care approach, demands the public context of its practice and installs the private into the 
public, the feminine into the male. Finally, that theory paves the way beyond the social 





I.3- The Legitimacy of the Market as a Facilitator for Translation 
 
 The transferability discussion finds another facilitator in the question of the 
necessity of the legitimacy of the market. This deficit of legitimacy is one expression of 
the major political legitimacy deficit of the EU as whole and is, ultimately, a deficit of 
justice in the consumer’s eyes. Nevertheless, one must concentrate on the problem of 
the market in view of its moral duty to offer protection and support not only to its 
business side but also to its consumer dimension. The question of legitimacy develops 
into a question of the survival and further development of the European market as one, 
since it foresees its own stagnation as it reaches levels of productivity, inflation and 
unemployment which cannot be substantially improved anymore.  The growth of the 
market is re-asserted as the way to overcome such problems. Furthermore, the moral 
responsibility and legitimacy of the internal market is based on the “awareness that the 
consumer can make or break” it (Weatherill, 1994:45). 
 The legitimacy deficit of the EU market is expressed in the persistent gap 
concerning access to justice for consumers in cross-b rder disputes which is 
increasingly asking for the abandonment of traditional discourses supported by the force 
of subsidiarity and the rule of law, especially when identified with the due process of 
law in courts of law. Consumer law as l’enfant terrible is also forcing the revision of 
those discourses. The moral responsibility of the market regarding access to justice for 
consumers requires a revision of subsidiarity for the involvement of the Union in the 
equation of the problem and the consideration of mechanisms of out-of-court justice.  
 People do not claim rights, they claim satisfaction, argues Heller (1992). This 
seems to support the argument that the discourse of courts and rights requires 
improvement in order to encompass peoples’ claims of atisfaction. Satisfaction and 
happiness appear to be promising ways of legitimising the market and the justice it 
could offer its subjects, in contrast with the limited scope of good faith, reasonableness 
and legitimate expectations as normative patterns of European consumer law. 
Satisfaction is said to furnish a weak criterion for legitimacy especially when compared 
to normative criteria, in the same way that the feminine is considered the weaker sex 
compared to the force of the male. This tug of war s already mentioned and it will, as 
in the case of the legitimacy of the market, offer the tension upon which the question of 
a legitimate translation of justice as a feminine virtue will rest.  
The normative criteria for justice as care suffers the same problems pointed out 
by Wilhelmsson about the legitimacy of the Nordic adjudication of private problems 
when it attends to needs. However, the tension in the market requires a different 
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solution from the Scandinavian legal realism, which legitimates the aforementioned 
adjudication through the judicial construction of general principles. The legitimacy of 
the market, based on satisfaction and happiness of confident consumers, requires the 
punctuality of justice as care at odds with general p inciples of legal proceedings that 
overlook particularities. The tension will require an external normative safety net for the 
practice of justice as care expressed by hard law that will protect consumers if the 
softness of the care approach fails. Hard law requis a more coherent policy to 
encompass a general regulation of consumer relationsh ps in the market at the European 
level, and offers the safety net of clearly identified principles for consumer protection. 
The intention, however, is to make care effective through avoiding the application of 
any hard law which will have the aim of pushing forth care. Hard law will only be a 
safety net rather than the routine in the settlement of consumer disputes. Good faith, 
reasonableness and legitimate expectation194 are too abstract and not punctual enough 
for justice as care, which needs a tougher legal apparatus in the EU in order to compose 
the safety net to strengthen the legitimacy of the market that embraces a care approach 
of justice for both consumers and business. On the one hand, legitimate expectation and 
reasonableness are related to established positive law.195 On the other hand, care 
demands the construction of a different rationality in legal theory.  
The cultural background of the principles stated, especially of good faith, could 
be overcome by the punctuality of a process of dispute resolution that aims at particular 
satisfaction and happiness in the terms of the parties involved. It might resolve the 
problem of market legitimacy because through justice as care the market promotes the 
closest interests of consumers in a very particular level and in a public way. Another 
problem for legitimacy based on a normative criterion is the troublesome national 
transposition of Directives and “the Court’s insistence that unimplemented (…) 
[Directives] are incapable of horizontal direct effect” (Wheatherill, 1999:717).  
The legitimacy of the market is also dependent on the breakdown of the odd 
distinction between active and passive consumers, in order to embrace all of them in a 
purposive institutional practice of care, moved by will, interesse and love.  This 
differentiation reduces the problem of justice in the EU to problems of freedom of 
                                                
194 A line must be drawn here to avoid a dogmatic explanation of the principles mentioned and also the 
principles elected by the Commission Recommendations 98/257/EC, (principle of independence, 
transparency, effectiveness, legality and adversarial principle) and 2001/310/EC (impartiality, 
transparency, effectiveness and fairness) which are all very much related to traditional principles of law 
and adjudication. They are also refused as criteria fo  legitimacy, as much as the ones elected by Lord 
Woolf’s Report, especially the demands of being the system just, fair and certain, because they are non-
discussed assumptions as characteristics of any system of civil adjudication. They express principles of a 
high level of abstraction, which neither attend the demand of punctuality of justice as care nor respond t  
particularities. The Report elected also more pragmatic values to be fulfilled by civil adjudication that one 
must surely embrace: cost and speed reasonability, understandableness, responsiveness and effectiveness 
(Lord Woolf’s Report, 1995:3).   
195 See Weatherill, 1995:324 upon the problematic English understanding of good faith. 
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movement. Moreover, the current discussion on justice in the EU is restricted to the 
discussion on rights, duties and rules for the exercis  of the freedoms enshrined by the 
Treaty. In this sense, market legitimacy depends (especially regarding justice for 
consumers) on spaces for competing or joint conceptions and practices of justice196 
(Graver, 1995:198). Nevertheless, their co-existence would create a tension necessary 
for the recognition and operationalisation of a different morality, rationality and practice 
of justice.  
The adoption of a European agency to promote justice as care for consumers 
through such a practice would also tackle the exclusion of the citizens’ voice in 
European inter-institutional dialogue/communication.  
 
I.4- Gibt es ein deutsches Problem damit?  
 
 So far, the question of transferability has been discussed, firstly, through the 
necessity of respect for the most valuable European characteristic of “diversity”; 
secondly, in terms of the publicisation of private law, especially consumer law, as 
promoted by the considerations of need-oriented theory. This was done in order to 
defend the idea that the transferability of justice as care is indeed less problematic than 
the aforementioned theory in view of its legitimacy requirements in close intimacy with 
the ones of the market itself, as discussed above. Nevertheless, the transferability of 
justice as care must respond to the German voice, which s already known for its vigour 
in the shaping of Europe.  
The consideration of possible German resistance to justice as care in the EU 
sounds acutely important for at least two basic reasons: firstly, because this voice has 
claimed relentlessly the unmistakable “German’s (…) ‘mistaken’ but unshakeable faith 
in Teutonic ordo-liberal thought” (Everson, 1998:391). This voice has been h ard in 
many small areas of economic, political and monetary European integration, which 
reached a very delicate position in “the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s by now infamous 
Brunner judgement” (Ibid., 390); secondly, precisely because of the mentioned 
‘mistaken’ faith and its connection to the traumatic German and international Nazi 
experience.  
The Brunner judgement is mentioned only to assert that the German voice 
behind it is, to a certain extent, the same one hears in the Teutonic resistance to 
welcoming alternative ways to promote legal justice especially if they come to dwell in 
the public domains of the German Länder.197  
                                                
196 They are not related to the dimensions of justice as social, formal and technical principles, which lack 
the punctuality of justice as care (Reifner, 1995:389). 
197 Plett (1988) had concluded that German lawyers negotiate less than Americans do in public spaces, 
especially in courts. The former try to reach settlement in private conversations before suing and do not 
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In addition, one must consider that German consumer law is much closer to 
traditional private law and its pacta sunt servanda principle than, for instance, the 
similar French law, whose approach is clearly more publicist.198 Udo Reifner (1981), 
while analysing the conditions of transferability of American innovations in the field of 
ADR, calls West Germany “the conservative case”.  
Apart from the known effectiveness of German courts, the resistance to ADR 
systems finds a stronger and more convincing reason therefore in the German trauma 
with the Nazi appropriation of the “peace-under-the-law” movement, which was set up 
at the end of the nineteenth century in order to settle disputes caused by the 
industrialisation process. Reifner calls this model of settlement the “legalization of 
social disputes by free legal advice” (1981: 228). This model, in the words of Radbruch, 
did not have “the task of applying the law but to make peace (…)” (In ibid., 236).  The 
Nazi take over is called “National socialist legal care” and led, about 1934, to the 
practice “of special courts for particular types of people and the exclusion of ordinary 
courts and attorneys, and even of the law, for certain social groups (…) [such as] Jews, 
communists, and socialists” (Ibid., 237-8). In order to prevent avoidable disputes, the 
client’s rights (seine Rechte) were substituted by the law (das Recht) (Ibid., 239). These 
practices are seen as strong components of the horror of Nazi Germany.  
Gessner and Plett have developed the analysis further and succeeded in 
explaining the difficulties for the growth of informal justice in the German legal order. 
They add that the Nazi take over led to “a deprivation of parties’ rights in civil 
proceedings in favor of a judge independent of the petitions of the parties and (from 
1941) even of the possibility of intervention by the public prosecutor (…)” (1991:150). 
The role of public prosecutors in special proceedings in special courts to apply the 
“law” of the Führer against special groups of people can lead to a gret d al of 
resistance against the experience of justice as care as explored in the third chapter of the 
thesis.  
Informal Nazi justice was based on “deformalization f substantive law, a 
deprofessionalization of the judicial profession and the setting-up of non-judicial 
procedures for conflict-solving and social control” most often against Jews, communists 
and socialists. The attack against the formalism of civil proceedings was defended by 
academics (Carl Schmidt, Karl Larenz and Wolfang Siebert) and the object of the 
indoctrination of judges and officials and constant matter of Nazi legal journals because 
                                                                                                                                    
consider doing so before a Judge as much as Americans do. German resistance to accept alternative ways
to settle disputes is attributable to the relatively high degree of trust of the population in courts due to 
their reasonable cost (due to the Armenrecht), speed and effectiveness. See Blackenburg (1994).     
198 See Stuyck, 2000, Hondius, 1997, Collins, 1997, and Wilhelmsson, 1993a: 30-34. 
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old formal law was impeding “the ‘welfare and future of the German racial community’ 
and the application of the Führer’s orders” (Ibid., 151)199. 
“In view of this inheritance, it can easily be assumed that (…) Germany is not a 
place where informal justice can flourish” (Ibid., 155). Nonetheless, the authors see a 
possibility of informal justice in Germany if the agencies responsible for that ultimately 
do not aim at replacing formal law or at excluding of the possibility of the 
judicialization of the dispute (Ibid., 158). The German problem can also be understood 
as resistance to the fragmentation of law which threatens the most important principle of 
universal law as the rational-legitimate model of legality upon which every legal order 
should rest. It obviously excludes the value of particularities and rejects the punctual 
character of justice as care.  
Nevertheless, the authors appropriately argue that Germans again get it wrong 
when they base their resistance against particularities, the fragmentation of law and its 
punctual practice upon the regrettable Nazi legal theory and practice, since it cannot be 
called legal particularism nor fragmentation nor punct ality. It was rather “the 
ideologically organized centralism [that] cannot be equated with universalism either, 
without doing violence to the intentions of the universalist legal concept which aims at 
individual freedom” (Ibid., 165). The justice of care praises individual freedom but 
cannot be equated with universality in its practice. However, it puts forth the search for 
satisfaction and happiness in relationships forged in encounters among strangers. 
Official intervention, based on love or interesse as institutional will, is the moral duty of 
the market not to enforce orders or law but to help people to find their ways towards 
satisfaction and happiness, through a caring practice which fosters care and 
responsibility in relationships. 
 
II- The Framework 
 
“…as a feminist trusting (…) I (…) learn to love myself 
well enough to love you (whoever you are), 
well enough so that you will love me 
well enough so that we will know, 
exactly, where is the love.”200 
 
 The framework to provide access to justice for consumers in cross-border 
disputes in the EU can finally be systematised in five subsections. Three of them will 
deal with the components and substance of the framework: -its institutional body; 
                                                
199See Wilhelmsson 1993:346.  
9 Lugones, 1991:37. 
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institutional practice; and institutional legitimacy. The fourth subsection will discuss 
financial services and e-commerce as the two areas where the framework has the 
greatest relevance. The last subsection proposes a further discussion on the need for the 
criminalisation of certain conducts to strengthen the safety net for both the practice of 
justice as care and for consumers.  
 
II.1- A European Agency  
 
 The idea of having a centralised European agency for handling consumer 
disputes is not at all new. This idea, as mentioned i  chapter six, was the object of 
proposals from the European Parliament. It was never seriously discussed in formal 
documents of the Commission on consumer protection or on access to justice for 
consumers. The idea has been hinted at by some authors but never exhaustively 
discussed. On the contrary, it has almost invariably een quickly dismissed as 
politically unsound and unfeasible in practice, since it would be more than a formal co-
ordination of national bodies like the current EEJ-NET and FIN-NET201 . 
Nevertheless, the creation of a European body as an umbrella to pull together 
and to co-ordinate national bodies is a requirement of this framework. This requirement 
arises from the deficit of legitimacy and justice of the market and its unattended moral 
duty to promote happiness and satisfaction for parties involved in cross-border disputes.  
A market that crosses frontiers should be able to accept trans-frontiers responsibilities. 
Consequently, the framework for justice as care demands a more purposive role of a 
centralised agency that would have to unify attitudes, purposes and promote moral 
enthusiasm for a practice of justice as a feminine virtue. The publicisation of national 
initiatives such as the Portuguese Centre of Arbitration for Consumers of Lisbon, to 
quote the most famous one, seems to be the first feature of national bodies being 
embraced by the European umbrella. This is vitally important for disputes in cross-
border financial services. 
 The current FIN-NET, which is based on national independent third party as 
private Ombudsmen or in-house procedures to handle consumer complaints, will not 
fulfil the task of generating consumer confidence. Suffice it to say that the demand that 
consumers exhaust all national possibilities of resolving their complaints, before 
referring it to an Ombudsman, sounds neither impartial nor caring. 
 Financial stakeholders have contested the publicisat on of out-of-court bodies to 
settle consumer disputes202 and it is common sense that in financial services th  main 
strategy of business is to buy time203. 
                                                
201 Goyens & Vos, 1991:202 & Goyens, 1995:39. 
202 See http://econfidence.jcr.it. 
203 See http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg24/library/speeches/sp ech08_en.html. 
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 The publicisation of a net of national bodies under European co-ordination is 
necessary because the framework needs the presence of enforcement authorities as such 
the British Office of Fair Trading (OFT), which is responsible not only for the 
settlement of individual disputes but also for mechanisms of deterrence and prevention. 
The body would need to have power to investigate, apply administrative fines, constrain 
business and professionals to adjust their behaviour, take action in judicial forums, both 
nationally and abroad, in civil and criminal matters, “the ability to make 
recommendations and the moral if not the legal authority to secure redress” 
(Seneviratne, 1994:6). The body should also have a very proactive role. This wide range 
of competences should be concentrated on only one public enforcement authority which 
is essential to lend to the practice of justice as care credibility, respect and 
accountability. In this sense, a European Agency, as suggested by Thomas and 
Weatherill, should be a permanent body composed of public national enforcement 
authorities (1992:281).  
 Worthington and Mitchell (1993) have suggested the cr ation of a European 
independent Ombudsman, especially for financial servic s. The European Ombudsman 
is a promising model for the framework proposed here. “The European Ombudsman as 
a novel source of soft law in the European Union”, as described recently by Peter G. 
Bonnor (2000), offers, for this project, a model of a public authority with power and 
legitimacy to undertake a survey of acts of bad administration. The interesting points 
stressed by the aforementioned author are: 1-“the Ombudsman goes significantly 
beyond mere redress and mediation” (page 39). 2-He acts not only “as mere ‘protector 
of the little man in the street’ in individual disputes” but also as rule-maker, through 
producing the law of the parties and with a strong pedagogic sense in his interference 
(Ibidem). 3- His action is legitimated by the presenc  of parties before him while the 
pedagogical sense of his action does not mean that he rules from his own understanding 
but from the understanding of the parties. (Page 40). 4- In this sense, he does not judge 
but uses the law as guidance rather than as constraint. 5- “Thus, in the Ombudsman’s 
practice there is not only a deliberate division between legality and non-legality review; 
there is seemingly also a deliberate confusion betwe n the two” (page 43). This space of 
“confusion” or “grey area” is the site for the Ombudsman as rule maker to produce soft 
law in the language of the parties. 6-His soft law discourse and methods could be 
characterised as “a step-by-step processes and a shield against legalistic feedback” 
(page 45). This means that the Ombudsman would not approach any party 
straightforwardly but step-by-step, while adopting a soft-law discourse to avoid 
legalistic contra-arguments. 7-In the same vein, the Ombudsman works towards “a 
‘crystallisation’ of the soft norms into hard law (hich may happen via legislation or 
judicial case law, or even be attempted in the ombudsman’s practice itself)” (page 45). 
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7- The Ombudsman “can be said to attempt ‘relational contracting’, (…) [thereby 
having] the mission ‘to improve (…) relationship[s]’” (page 46, my emphasis). 
This confluence of characteristics is very meaningful for this framework since 
the sort of justice detailed in the third chapter has many points of similarity with it. It 
also seems promising that a board of public Ombudsmen in a centralised European body 
could align national bodies in terms of the daily practice of justice as care. A European 
Consumer Ombudsman would act as a market watchdog, guided by individual 
complaints. An authority like this would need independence and public power as much 
as flexibility for a punctual approach to cases following the Nordic Consumer 
Ombudsmen for instance (Wilhelmsson, 1993:335/38). Furthermore, the study on soft 
law done for the Commission204 stresses the necessity of creating une authorité 
régulatrice à travers l’Europe (page 400). The example of the European Ombudsman 
sounds promising and inspiring for delineating the role of public bodies in the 
implementation of justice for consumers in the EC. 
A centralised European body would dispense with clearing-houses205 since any 
complaint would be welcome from any part of the Union n order to be object of the 
institutional will of the body towards the resolution of the problem, thereby considering 
the satisfaction, happiness of the parties and the preservation of their relationships, 
which calls for responsibility from everyone involved in the dispute. The body would 
obviously find the most convenient way to address the other party and reach a solution, 
while avoiding the waste of time of a preliminary search for a clearing-house. This 
means that the body will function as a clearing-house, but not only this. It would also 
endow the process with more effectiveness, warrant quicker outcomes, promote a 
network of co-operation between national and European authorities and perform a 
model of shared regulatory, pacification and enforcement responsibilities. 
According to the example of the creation of the Consumer Consultative 
Committee by the Commission, the European Agency (here defended) does not need to 
be a Community institution (Maier, 1993:364). It is sufficient that the body be endowed 
with the power and competence to seek nationally or at the Union level, wherever more 
effective, enforcement measures if necessary. Another option is the creation by another 
Treaty of a body like the European Central Bank -a model for “executive agencies (…) 
for carrying out particular Community tasks”206 of enforcement nature; or like the 
EUROJUST207 created by the Nice Treaty.  One could also stay in the middle and 
                                                
204 See footnote no. 6 in the fifth chapter. 
205 This idea is at odds with recent developments of the theme in Commission and Council documents. 
See for example: OJ C 155/1, 2000. 
206 Editorial comments of CMLR 33:623-31, 1996. 
207 The EUROJUST is indeed a good example of a European “unit of seconded magistrates whose task it 
will be, within the framework of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, to contribute to proper 
coordination of national authorities responsible for criminal proceedings.” In consumer protection, it 
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propose the creation by Member States or the EU, through Article 308, of agencies 
which operate outside the hierarchical guidance and control by the central 
administration like, just to quote one example, the European Environmental Agency 
which would have the power, ability and moral authority described above.  
 
II.2- The Practice, its Tools and Legitimacy 
 
 This whole thesis is indeed about the practice of justice as care or a feminine 
virtue, summarised by Gilligan as care and responsibility in relationships. This sub-
section, related to the practice described in the third chapter, aims at explaining its 
translation into an institutional operationalisation that could handle cross-border 
consumer disputes in the EU.  
This proposed framework seeks to establish an avenue for the consideration of 
particularities in the context of the dispute itself, independently of whether the law 
acknowledges these as rights or not. The understanding is that, irrespective of what the 
law says regarding rights, the forces of the market can easily hamper them. In this 
respect, only access to a special justice for consumers can rescue the recognition of 
rights hindered by the process of implementing the market. The recognition of rights in 
an abstract way or through formal-legal instruments does not remedy the growing 
“enhancement of the impersonality of distribution systems, (…) contract standardization 
[and] (…) reduc[tion] [of] the negotiability of trading terms” (Ibid., 302). To fight these 
negative aspects of market expansion, one needs a special sort of justice for consumers, 
which could be characterised as personal, contextual and able to equate protection with 
care and responsibility in relationships.  
 The body above characterised would deal with complaints from parties in 
different Member States. This means that the physical encounter of the parties would 
most probably not be possible and that the parties would have linguistic, cultural and 
legal differences. These circumstances would requir, indeed, what is called “love or 
interesse as institutional will”. The authority would have to ake the complaint in his 
own hands and deal with it as if it were his own cause or the market’s own problem, 
viewed from both points of view: consumer’s and busine s’. The practice of love and 
care would hear and respond to needs with reasons of their own.  
 The capacity of hearing and responding is a very important feature of the 
practice of care and it is worth giving at least two examples of failure regarding such 
abilities.  
                                                                                                                                    
would be proposed a European agency composed of National Public Prosecutors or National Public 
Ombudsmen.  
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 “[O]ne woman complained to a company that made diapers that disintegrated in 
use. She asked that the company do something to guard against the risk that a child 
might swallow a piece of diaper and choke to death; she received in response a new box 
of diapers” (in Nader, 1979:998).  
First and foreign buyers entered into a contract of m rtgage. Simultaneously 
they contracted home insurance with the same Building Society. Three months later, the 
insurance contract was due for renewal but was refused by the buyers because they had 
found a better deal. The lender accepted the option and charged the buyers £25 for the 
change to cover administrative costs. The buyers did not accept the charge on the 
grounds of hidden costs not clearly negotiated. A first letter was written and the answer 
was a long explanation of the legal and practical rationale of the charge without 
responding to the basic and sole argument used by dissatisfied costumers. They wrote 
another two letters and the replies were more of the same, failing to respond to what 
was first said. The relationship that just started was obviously ill-fated and only the high 
redemption fees sustained it.   
 Authorities would have to conduct negotiations between the parties and use a 
rationality that privileges relationships and seeks outcomes in which satisfaction, 
happiness and confidence are nourished and nobody gets hurt. The practice of care aims 
to preserve and mend the web already broken by the dispute, which demands a high 
level of understanding of all elements of the web, its structure and function. The 
outcome would have to respect those elements in a practice that would praise the 
particularities involved and be highly punctual208.  
 No law would be the ideal position for this practice. Instead of soft law, the 
practice is about soft dialogue, soft negotiation. Nonetheless, when limits for 
negotiation are necessary soft or hard law would inform them rather than impose them. 
Law should shape not the outcome but the parties’ happiness and satisfaction, which 
demands punctuality. Law would only inform possible horizons for the parties. This 
means that the parties should “retain control over th  outcome of their dispute but there 
must be care that the integrity of the office is not c mpromised, and that settlements are 
not reached at the expense of a thorough investigation into procedures that are faulty” 
(Seneviratne, 1994:15). This could be done, if punct ality is observed, without 
preventing an agreement that could guarantee satisfaction and happiness for the parties. 
This would depend on the ability of the authority responsible to conduct the settlement 
process and to further any supplementary procedure to constrain illegal practices. Law 
would inform the parties of the limits to their efforts to reach agreement and mutual 
satisfaction. Law would help the authority in the process of settlement to overcome the 
inherent deficit of information upon the parties in order to forge a truer picture of them, 
                                                
208 To be punctual means to let people say what they ne d and do the best to satisfy them. 
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their needs and the dispute they are involved in. Nevertheless, law as a language that 
claims rights and is adversarial should be avoided. The authority would avoid hard law 
in order to prevent legalistic arguments able to frustrate settlement to the parties’ 
satisfaction. Care breaks the abstract character of law, especially private law with public 
elements for its realisation.  
 The practice should also be simple, informal, without bureaucracy, free of 
charge and speedy. The body should be ease to access by letter or Internet, and present 
in big economic centres. The European presence in nat onal bodies would be required 
for the concrete realisation of the settlement process.  
  Justice as care would dissolve the tension between th  market and consumer 
protection characterised by market mechanisms, legal, cultural and linguistic differences 
and “jungle of legal procedures” (Reifner, 1992:286). Furthermore, it would install an 
“integrated market nanny”, necessary in view of the sophistication of the market and its 
infinite capacity to hurt.  Care therapeutises the autonomous and choosing self and the 
market, heals the tension, which is a function of separation expressed by market’s denial 
of responsibility concerning consumer disputes, installed by the negative reading of 
subsidiarity. 
 The feminine practice of law would foster the transformation of the market and 
its subjects from being eminently transactional into relational entities for whom the 
encounters are more than mere economic transactions; hey comprehend the integrality 
of the subjects and the market. The encounters are relations that intend to be extended 
into the future, considering the present a preparation for it (Lindenberg&Vos, 
1985:561).  
Thus, the European Consumer Ombudsman through justice as care would be an 
emancipatory and creative public body responsible for combining individualism when 
fostering satisfaction and happiness with communitarism (solidarity), or when stressing 
that one’s satisfaction and happiness should not be at the expense of Others (Campbell, 
1990).  The practice of care should inspire trust expectations in the market as institution, 
ease the adversarial language of rights, promote effective protection through love and 
interesse as institutional will and foster care and responsibility in relationships. 
To rephrase Lahey, one might say that without care one will continue to practise 
life and law for the sake of power, rather than for the sake of love (1985:541). Due to 
the punctuality of justice as care, the triviality and invisibility of women’s experience in 
the social world, training209 for the skills requirements of imaginative thinking is of 
paramount importance (Hutchinson, 1988 & Arrigo, 1992). The training is also about 
learning how to love, not as feeling but as will, as a human ability that can be taught, 
                                                
209 The framework should use the institutional efforts already established in the EU for training legal 
officials and lawyers for the feminine practice of law. About training necessities regarding access to 
justice for consumers see Parliament Resolution OJ C 128/461, 1994, item 15, among many others. 
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learned the object of a purposive training which would include a feminine practice of 
law (justice as care), love as institutional will and imaginative thinking as the heuristics 
of the process.  
  
II.3- Legality as Safety Net 
 
“Thus, I begin to live with questions. 
With uncertainty. 
With an unknowingness”210 
 
 This section will explain how legality in the European environment would 
complete the necessity of legitimising the feminine practice of law, which demands 
male support as safety net.  
The practice characterised above would remedy the lack of institutional will or 
interesse in the Other. Its legitimacy will not be warranted by principles that have the 
aim of equalising cultural differences, or through imposing abstract and universal 
solutions for disputes in terms of substance and procedure. This is the normative 
approach to disputes by law. Therefore, the legitimacy of handling cross-border disputes 
by out-of-court procedures by bodies which work without official supervision based on 
general principles and/or criteria applicable to them and to procedure is unsound for this 
framework. It would be the same mechanism of dispenation of justice by courts of law. 
Nonetheless, justice as care is only possible as an institutional fact if it happens 
through some sort of relationship with law. The image, as stated in the third chapter, is 
of the trapeze artists “flying high in the air” with a safety net to ensure that they can go 
as high and beautifully as possible. In case of a fall, the net, despite being neither 
comfortable nor aesthetically-pleasing, will protect and save them from being hurt. The 
image appears apposite since it explains the position of law for justice as care. Law, as 
already said, must not be installed between the parties themselves or between them and 
authority. Law should not regulate the process of finding a solution that brings 
satisfaction and happiness. Law should show the limits whereabouts the parties and 
authority can, with care and responsibility, deal with the dispute but should not prevent 
them from a feasible win-win solution.  
 The insertion of a feminine practice of law into legality seems to be out of the 
reach of the various explanations for the legal buiding of Europe. Apart from ‘beyond 
sovereignty’, European legality, says Arnaud, could be understood as vague and 
uncertain or as a woolly legal order, a porous legality or legal porousness that imposes 
interlegality between the diverse legal orders, or the so-called ebb and flow of legal 
                                                
210 Lahey, 1985:541. 
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regulation (1995:160/161). The feminine, by contrast, does not fit in any of these frames 
yet maybe has a bit of all of them. It also cannot be called deviationist since feminine 
practice does not oppose fairness to contract or communitarian principles to freedom of 
contract (Wilhelmsson, 1992:32).  Clearly, its difficult configuration demands further 
effort.  
One might ask: is justice as care law? “Law is about institutional normative 
relations (…), about rights (…)” (MacCormick, 1993:11). Law is about rules, not about 
happiness and satisfaction. So, justice as care is not law in its modernist conception, 
since it is not about rules or rights; it does not c mply with the exigencies of 
universality, generality, equality and fairness. Nonetheless, justice as care can be a 
feminine institutional practice of law for disputes’ settlement. It can be institutionalised 
and legitimised by law. Justice as care is committed o post-modern law. It is law 
‘beyond’ sovereignty and ‘beyond’ modernism. With tis profile, it “can liberate 
jurisprudence and the law of European integration” (Ward, 1996a: 165). Besides, 
modernist law in this framework would create, beyond its modernist aporias, the 
institutional framework for the pursuit of satisfaction and happiness under or above -
using the image of the net- the distant and protectiv  eyes of law. This is another task 
for the legal imagination.  
 That special conviviality between the two practices of law lends legitimacy to 
the feminine model and also offers an opportunity for overcoming the modernist 
separation that marks legal theory. It is a way to insert morality into the institutional life 
of law without having, necessarily, to open the rule of recognition through inserting a 
moral principle, which would certainly betray the fminine, by quoting it in the 
preamble to legislation, or in judicial decisions (Sebok, 1998:288), or even worse in 
self-regulation and soft-law. 
 Law and courts are ultimately necessary regardless of their being welcome or 
not, says Galanter (In Plett, 1988:4). Furthermore, the advice of Marcel Storme 
regarding the strict necessity of hard law for the establishment of consumer protection 
in the market in order to boost consumer confidence should also be remembered 
(1992:206). The necessary tension between the two paradigms, male modernist legal 
theory and feminine justice as care cannot be created without hard law. Soft litigation or 
soft law is necessary for justice as care as practice but does not give enough support as a 
net in case of failure and as a limit to persuade the parties to negotiate with a minimum 
of reference when happiness and satisfaction, for any reason, lies beyond reasonable 
patterns. The safety net needs to have binding power since the authority will not hold 
adjudicatorial power. Hard law and public authority are necessary for the tension 
between the paradigms. This tension furnishes legitimacy to the practice of justice as a 
feminine virtue or as care. 
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 The safety net could be a European Consumer Code or R gulation, following the 
example of the communitarisation of the Brussels Convention of 1968. A General Code 
would, in good time, resolve the patchy, erratic development of EC consumer law. It 
could enshrine a whole set of rules applicable by natio al courts in response to actions 
taken by the European agency through national bodies placed under its co-ordination 
and supervision. Such a net of legality, which would guarantee institutional practices of 
justice as care, could support the understanding that access to justice for consumers in 
the EC internal market is a very inspiring environment. It would introduce the 
paradigmatic revolution discussed in the second chapter and also provoke a tension 
between the new and the old paradigm. Furthermore, th ough this tension one could 
articulate a feasible solution as punctually as possible.  
Finally, after the communitarisation of the Brussel Convention, the 
harmonisation of consumer substantive law, without prejudice of more protective 
national mandatory measures in harmony with the Treaties, would be a necessary 
undertaking. The suggested codification should follow the trend adopted for financial 
services and work only in the communitarisation of c re-marketing rules in order to 
avoid excessive and troublesome details of Directivs nvolving consumer protection211. 
However, it is also possible to foresee justice as care, functioning with non-harmonised 
national safety nets. The harmonisation of European consumer law would be the ideal 
solution for a more solid and reliable protection fr justice as care. Furthermore, this 
legal apparatus would furnish the legal imagination or the imaginative thinking required 
for the feminine practice of law with instructive parameters for possible solutions to 
warrant a pursuit of satisfaction and happiness based on the demands of justice as care. 
 
II.4- A Glance at the Suitability of the Framework for Financial Services and E-
Commerce 
 
 Financial services and e-commerce are today the two most promising areas for 
the growth and development of the market. They are also the most sensitive areas with 
regard to consumer trust and confidence. They both have an international character and 
can involve a large number of serious problems for consumers and authorities alike. In 
this sense, both can involve, for instance, behaviour that should be typified as crime in 
order to have better protection of private and public interests. E-commerce is a larger 
sector than financial services but its influence on the latter is of great importance given 
the well-known volatility character of money in general. They are so intimate that, 
following the Commission’s approach, one could talk of e-commerce in financial 
services. The number of cross-border disputes in an i tegrated financial market through 
                                                
211 See Directive 1999/44/EC, OJ C 171/12, 1999. 
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e-commerce justifies a more purposive European public policy as suggested by 
practices of justice as care. 
 The 1998 Green Paper on financial services of 1996212 based this sector of the 
market on the principle of home country control and mutual recognition, resting upon 
the implementation of agreed minimum standards of prudential supervision. It reaffirms 
the national responsibility of providing means of redress to consumers. Moreover, the 
commitment of the industry to set up or complete scheme for handling consumer 
grievances was established. In 1997, a communication213 from the Commission on 
boosting consumer confidence in electronic payments dedicated two lines to the theme 
of access to justice and it was to invite MS to act in this direction. This is the rule today 
in areas such as financial services and e-commerce. Furthermore, the tendency is to base 
regulation on codes of conduct and private bodies for out-of-court dispute resolution, 
including the recently launched FIN-NET project. The analysis of this tendency, given 
the framework discussed here, would press for urgent and more responsive measures to 
ensure confidence and trust in the financial servics market, which are both to be 
nourished in consumers and fundamental for the progress of e-commerce and the single 
currency.  
 The Financial Services Action Plan of 1999 on implementing the framework for 
financial market214 recognises that it does not exist in the EU; that it is the foremost 
sector for EU market growth; that consumers have decisive power to implement this 
market, and that it is necessary to work towards increasing their confidence. 
Nevertheless, the Plan highlights five imperatives for action without mentioning 
consumer protection as a way to improve the cross-brder financial market. Moreover, 
while approaching consumer redress, it defends the adoption of the principles of the 
EEJ-NET and the necessity of paving the way to e-commerce.   
 The e-Directive established the country of origin clause and this alone will 
demand change and derogation of the host-country control clause, adopted for some 
areas of financial services like investment funds (UCITS) and insurance.  
The project is to harmonise core-marketing rules, to ensure the convergence of 
sector/service-specific rules and to minimise differences in national rules applying to 
financial services. This rationalisation is surely important to reduce costs and improve 
legal certainty. Nonetheless, one may wonder whether i  will ensure confidence and 
trust in consumers.  
Access to justice for consumers in e-commerce shows the ame fragility since it 
is based on codes of conduct and private bodies for dispute settlement. The principles 
adopted and the accreditation bodies (which can be public or private) do not seem to 
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213 COM (1997) 353 final. 
214 COM (1999) 232 final. 
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lend the necessary legitimacy to improve consumer confidence in such problematic 
areas as financial services and e-commerce.  
A more purposive scheme of dispute settlement towards satisfaction and 
happiness appears necessary in these areas of market activity in order to remedy the 
insecurity inherent in them and the fragmentation of regulations on financial services. A 
European Agency to co-ordinate and implement access to justice for consumers 
especially in financial services, e-commerce and e-commerce on financial services is of 
utmost urgency and necessity.  The national approach and the private responsibility for 
offering dispute settlement; especially in these areas, are of great moral fragility, unjust, 
political and strategically unsound for the goal of establishing by 2005 the most 
integrated and developed financial market in the world. The aim was set by the Lisbon 
European Council. The national private Ombudsman schemes in the case of financial 
services and the private bodies for ADR in e-commerce must be Europeanised and 
publicised for the effectiveness of a justice of care committed to the nourishment of 
consumer confidence and trust in a market which is morally engaged in the pursuit of 
satisfaction and happiness.  Furthermore, as said above and mentioned in the Lord 
Woolf’s Report (1995:146), “the relationship between ombudsmen and the courts 
should be broadened, enabling issues to be referred by the ombudsman to the courts” 
and vice-versa, thereby strengthening also the safety net for justice as care. This will 
demand the endowment of the Ombudsman with public power. 
  
II.5- Is There any Necessity for Criminalisation? 
 
This topic is wide but is relevant here in order to justify the development of a 
European Consumer Agency with enforcement powers in sensitive areas of consumer 
protection like defective products, financial services and e-commerce. The Agency 
would be a body composed of public prosecutors withpower to refer issues, to sue and 
prosecute in national, European and international courts. It would promote the local 
practice of justice as care, performing a formal and material European co-ordination. 
The Nordic Consumer Ombudsman could be mentioned as a model because of his legal 
power to conduct a moral conversation with business and consumers alike, since he 
would endowed with legal force to sue, prosecute and apply fines. The moral power of 
such authority to establish an ethical dialogue that calls for responsibility and care needs 
a strong material rationality, or safety net given by power to prosecute criminals, and to 
stop behaviours deemed dangerous or inconvenient by application of such measure as 
fines. This should not be done by national authorities who do not hold the necessary 
knowledge of and feeling for the market and the rolof consumers.  
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To sum up: 1- The European Agency should be a public body formed by national public 
authorities to promote the feminine practice of law or justice as care. The authorities 
should be present in courts and have power to prosecute, to sue in case of public, 
diffuse, collective and individual homogenous (with social relevance) rights and to 
assist consumers in purely individual/private ones.  
 
2-The practice of dispute settlement in particular and of consumer protection in general 
should be conducted with the aim of promoting care and responsibility in relationships 
and informed by love and interesse as institutional will. Soft law should be transformed 
into soft negotiation with the main goal of achieving satisfaction and happiness. In case 
of failure, the courts should be close at hand of the authority to purse justice as rights, 
through hard litigation, in the name of consumers, public legal orders or to assist 
individual consumers. 
 
3- A safety net based on material rationality or had l w should strengthen the weak 
legitimacy of the practice. The communitarisation of the Brussels Convention would be 
already a step towards establishing certainty about the national order which is 
competent to sue. The next step would be a European Code for the europeanisation of 
the core marketing rules regarding consumer protecti n without harming more 
protective national provisions in harmony with the purpose of the integrated market. 
This code would ban both other codes of conduct and a consumer policy of “laborious 
accumulation of ‘add-on’ rights” (Gibson, 1993:329). Moreover, justice as a feminine 
practice through public authorities supported by hard law promises the re-conciliation of 
law and morals without opening the rule of recognitio , and through a feminine 





















Two European Experiences of 
Out-of-Court Justice in the 
EU: A Brief Description 
 
   „Strangers are friends we have not yet met“215  
 
The theoretical arguments of part I of this thesis were carefully woven in order 
to articulate the practical conditions for the ethics of care to become reality in legal 
institutional spaces. A gap in EU consumer policy was diagnosed and a solution was 
conceived in accordance with a special theoretical background which was unfolded in 
three interconnected steps, namely: the challenged male, patriarchal and modernist faith 
in general rules and principles vis-à-vis the punctal216 necessities of the Other; 
feminine moral reasoning as the bridge between male institutional violence and the 
Other, and finally the empirical and concrete possibility of the ethics of care. The ethics 
of care is, in truth, the core of this thesis and since chapter II it has been reiterated in 
every possible ways. The policy material, especially in the two last chapters, is an 
emphatic defence of the appropriation of the ethics of care by EU consumer policy in 
regard to access to justice.        
Nevertheless, it would certainly be good to explore another two European 
empirical examples of possible practices to be adapte  in order to work informed by the 
ethics of care. Then this last chapter will describe more closely two different European 
experiences of consumer out-of-court justice, thereby responding to legitimate 
criticisms to which this thesis might give rise. 
 The Lisbon Arbitration Centre (LAC) and the Danish Consumer Ombudsman 
(DCO) were both mentioned throughout the second part of the thesis, especially in the 
last chapter, as two promising national experiences which are good examples for and 
parts of the defended European Network of national authorities. However, a closer look 
here will examine whether and how certain practices of dispensing out-of-court justice 
for consumers in Europe really entail reflexive law nd/or justice as care. 
 The practice described in chapter III is essential for this thesis in general and its 
two last chapters in particular because it corroborates the central argument of part I 
about the difficulties for female virtues to be established as valid parameters of both 
policies and political, legal and moral practices in male environments. No political 
reasons made justice as care fail in Brazil, rather t  overwhelming masculine voice of 
law as principles and general rules as tools of the modern autonomous self. Thus, the 
material of Chapter III has its value for the whole argument of this thesis, especially 
because it represents the seed of imagination which was defended in chapter I as a 
cognitive tool to forge the conditions for justice as care. One starts by imagining and 
soon one can make it come through. Feminine moral re soning is not simply the 
postconventional stage of human general moral development as suggested by 
Habermas. It is also the hidden part of human development that must be recovered and 
reconciled with conventional male patterns in order to help humanity towards 
postconventional human conviviality.  
 The present analysis of legitimate European long-term experiences takes the 
Brazilian experience as a model against which they will be compared. 
                                                
215 From a BENETON advert on a hoarding at Frankfurt’s airport. 
216 Please see footnote 1 of chapter III. 
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I-The Lisbon Arbitration Centre (LAC) 
 
 This section will be developed throughout five subsections about the LAC’s 
history, its characteristics and structure, its procedures and principles, some analysis and 
criticisms and, finally the presentation of a few interesting and more representative 
cases. 
 
I.1-The Centre’s History  
 
 The LAC was inaugurated in 1989 and it has joined the list of very successful 
initiatives financed by the EU Commission with a view to improving the resolution of 
national and cross border consumer conflicts. David Bayrne, European Commissioner 
responsible for Health and Consumer Protection, on the celebration of the 10th 
anniversary of the Centre, stated that the success of the Centre was ideal “to reflect on 
promoting such procedures on a European wide basis”.217 
 The Centre functioned firstly as a pilot project based on the Portuguese 
Arbitration Act no. 31/86, as a joint initiative ofthe Lisbon Parliament, the Portuguese 
Association for Consumer Protection, the Consumer Institute and the Union of Traders’ 
Associations.  
 Consumer protection has had constitutional status in Portugal since 1989 and the 
institutionalisation of the LAC responds to this.  
 
I.2- Characteristics and Structure of the Centre 
 
  The Centre provides consumers with simplified access to justice through 
information, mediation, conciliation and arbitration for claims less than 3.500 Euros. 
The Portuguese authorities have chosen a model based on procedures of extra-judicial 
conflict resolution, especially the ones identified with arbitration.   
 The LAC has two sectors: the juridical service and the Arbitral Tribunal. The 
former acts before arbitration by informing the parties, receiving the claims, examining 
and classifying the latter and collecting the necessary information for conciliation and 
arbitration. The Tribunal has one arbiter nominated from among the judges of Lisbon, in 
order to endow its activities with trust and credibility.  The judge listens to the parties 
and their witnesses, offers another opportunity for conciliation, examines all documents 
and evidence brought before him and then passes a vrdict which normally follows his 
professional background of judge. Normally, he accesses his own background as judge, 
since such judgments tend to preferentially address the legal exigencies applicable to 
judicial cases. The arbiter trusts the law and willoverlook relational claims of justice as 
care as noted through the analysis of few sentences and, especially, during the 
observation of one session of the Arbitral Tribunal. The law regulates the matter in its 
procedural aspects and, somehow, it frustrates any opportunity for reflexivity and 
rematerialisation which demand legal self-restraint nd the legal incorporation of moral 
imperatives, which represents the requirement that no one gets hurt and that the Other 
may be heard and answered in his own terms in order to perform justice as care.  
   
 
 
                                                
217Speech/99/186 by David Byrne (http://europa.eu.int). 
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I.3- Procedures and Principles of the Centre  
 
The Tribunal respects equality, representation, theadversarial principle, 
impartiality, transparency, independence, and above all legality.218 Its decisions are 
enforceable in any competent court of justice of Lisbon. The aim of the LAC is to offer 
a quick, simple, efficient, cost-free conflict resolution for consumers and traders alike. 
Public authorities and private staff work together to solve consumer claims while 
adjusting the behaviour of the parties and educating both consumers and traders. 
 The Centre has in practice derogated the problems around international 
competence regulated by PIL, especially in regard to ac ive and passive consumers. The 
position of the LAC is to help as much as possible when Lisbon was the place of 
purchase regardless of the consumer’s domicile and/or the circumstances and nature of 
the contract. The rule is to help and find the quickest and cheapest way to solve the 
problem. At that point one could identify the withdrawal of procedural elements of law 
in favour of substantive goals which could be feasibly equate with the demands of 
justice as care. The LAC would surely fulfil more effectively its vocation if it 
incorporates those elements outlined in chapter VII, especially a more consistent 
presence of Europe and proper training of all ways of handling a case in order to 
exercise justice as a feminine virtue. The LAC has the vocation to integrate as a model 
and even to start a network of European cooperation for resolving consumer conflicts 
across European borders (EEB-NET: “The European Extra-Judicial Bodies 
Network”)219. 
The literature available is almost unanimous on LAC’s success in helping 
consumers through quick, efficient and free services. The data collected through visiting 
the Centre, talking to its staff (especially the judge who functions as arbiter and 
Director, a very activity and enthusiastic lady), reading about a few cases, attending to 
one session of the Arbitral Tribunal and interviewing its Director show the effort to 
ground the Centre’s activities on hard law. It is very difficult to identify substantial 
elements of reflexivity and/or rematerialisation of law in procedures of the Centre 
through helping consumers. Basically, the Centre does not properly explore its potential 
to be a powerful educative institution for relational consumers and traders. The faith in 
the autonomous modernist self can still be observed. The LAC is defined by its natural 
vocation to be informative, conciliatory and arbitral, but not educative or protective. 
The strategy is to avoid patronizing discourse and/or attitudes as much as possible in 
order to sound attractive to traders. The greatest advantage here is to solve conflicts to 
which judicial forums are normally denied because of their nature or value. Moreover, 
the LAC has been offering “innovative juridical solutions” for the totality of Portuguese 
legal order. At that point one could see a possibility for reflexivity, rematerialisation and 
the derogation of PIL. 
 
I.4- Analysis and Criticism about the Centre 
 
 Despite the meritorious good reputation of the LAC, one can see both the 
vocation of the practice of settling consumer conflicts to justice as care and the 
difficulties of making it happen. 
 The brochure which aims to sell the LAC to both consumers and traders visually 
explores very well the motto of “justice through peac ”, but fails when it uses words 
which are not appropriate in terms of justice as care. The front page shows two 
                                                
218 Principles recommended by the European Commission. See footnote 2. 
219 Mentioned by David Byrne. See footnote 2. 
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gentlemen holding behind them a big knife and an enormous hammer.  The words are: 
“Do not lose your “reason” (in the sense of rights, moral standpoint and also clear 
thinking) or do justice with your own hands, come to us”. Peace obviously belongs to 
the background of the defended feminine morality as Gilligan has described it but is not 
the aim. The privileged goal in feminine moral reasoning is to avoid pain, and it 
changes completely the way one promotes or “sells” out-of-court justice. Justice for 
peace is surely the goal of any form of moral and lega  reasoning. But through 
masculine and patriarchal moral standards of law, peace is unique and justifies all 
means, especially when law has legalised them. This position has driven humanity into 
many painful wars because peace is the only goal one “fights” for. The words suggest 
giving up weapons, while hiding them back, in order to keep reason or rights, to fight 
with different tools. This represents the old modernist rhetoric of the autonomous self. 
The monist and symmetric Kantian morality of the Enlightenment certainly established 
the basis of better and more democratic societies. However, it could not help much the 
community of friends to flourish. The human aspiration to live in peace is now 
equalized as the aspiration to live as friends. This way has found its philosophical soil in 
post-modernity which aims to overcome modernist pitfalls, for example, the works of 
Levinas and his ethics of alterity around asymmetrical moral reasoning and the 
displacement of the autonomous self. The moral self i  moral only insofar as he is able 
to forget himself to serve and hear the Other and to respond to the Other’s needs in the 
Other’s terms.  The philosophy of alterity certainly has its consistency but its practice 
would find its conditions of realization only in feminine moral reasoning. A brochure 
presenting justice as care would indeed suggest or offe the same as the LAC does 
(namely justice through peace), but in the name of keeping or even nourishing 
friendship. The language of rights or even reasons would need to be equalised with the 
practice of hearing and responding through learning how to act without hurting anyone, 
through responsibility in relationship and towards friendship. This language cannot be 
installed within modernist rhetoric which established the ruled adversarial language of 
law (criticised in this thesis). The different voice heard by Gilligan, mostly through 
interviewing women, supports both the asymmetrical parameters of post-modernity and 
the practice of the justice as care.   
 The Director of the LAC has responded gently to the questions in the Annex of 
this thesis. The interview has showed basically the difficulty of reconciling a language 
of consumer protection with a more legalist approach which both serves traders better 
and facilitates their submission to the Arbitral Tribunal. How can consumers be helped 
to come through with their aspirations of respect, satisfaction and even love and 
happiness and at the same time to show a face of impartiality and legality to traders? 
The question was not formulated in this way to the Dir ctor, but her answers throughout 
the interview indicated the tendency to be legalist without being formalist: “claims 
without legal basis are not accepted” but “claims out f the value and territorial 
competence can be accepted but only for mediation”. “Documents can be initially 
brought to the Centre in copies and/or fax”. Thus, one can notice the evolution from 
protection and anti-formalism towards a more legalist way of handling cases and 
settling conflicts. 
 The analysis of LAC practice is also based on one session of the Arbitral 
Tribunal, which had a professional judge as its arbite . The session did not show, as 
dramatically as did the interview, the dilemma above described. The arbiter as a good 
judge tried to educate the parties but he was absolutely clear about the law to apply and 
in which direction he should conduct the session. The parties were in conflict when the 
session began and they were even more distant with eac other at the end. The verdict 
 261
brought silence (understood as peace) and lost the opportunity to help people to hear 
and respond towards friendship: this means being nice to each other.  
 Few phone calls were also observed and, despite the willingness of the assistant, 
it was clear the legal syntaxes of stabilising expectations to a point that unsure 
consumers/clients would be quickly discouraged to pursue a solution to their claims.     
 The legitimacy of the LAC, apart from its legal foundation, is based on the 
respect of the principles and the presence of a Judge as the Arbiter.  
 The interview and the audience in the Arbitral Tribunal showed a very different 
practice from the one described in Chapter III.    
 
I.5- Two Cases Revisited 
 
 The data was issued by the LAC and the method of analysis used is not 
sociological through which one wants to prove the exist nce of a pattern through a large 
empirical data. Anthropological analysis is more appro riate since its evidence is not 
based on numbers; rather tendencies or vocations are suggested by the analysis of 
specific cases. While quantity is not important, specific elements in at least one case can 
challenge established beliefs as defended by Gilligan. “No data is independent of theory 
and no observation not made form a perspective.  Data alone do not tell us anything; 
they do not speak but are interpreted by people.” (1986, 328) 
 So, among 61 cross-border cases handled by the LAC between 1991 and 2001, 
41 was resolved by mediation, 10 by arbitration and10 by different methods.  
Mediation, in terms of cross border conflicts, mostly meant intervention. The LAC was 
acting on behalf of foreign consumers. This aspect c rtainly suggests the foundations of 
justice as care because institutional will is necessary for the efficacy of care. 
Nevertheless, the average time to resolve a case is over a year precisely because 
institutional will has failed. The practice described in chapter three made it possible to 
resolve many conflicts with a phone call, precisely due to institutional will which is 
really difficult to be developed in a private out-of-court body guided by modernist 
principles and without enough power to bring things to a conclusion that might 
guarantee happiness and satisfaction.  
Two cases are important to corroborate the necessity of justice as care (endowed 
with institutional will) for consumers in conflicts across frontiers because of the 
unnecessary anguish of someone abroad who has to overcome language and cultural 
barriers in order to be heard in his own terms. 
 
Case 1: On 1/8/1998, a Spanish consumer in Portugal bought a card with credit to be 
spent in Portugal. She returned to Spain without having spent all the credit and tried to 
have her money back for almost two years. On 19/6/2000 she contacted the LAC. On 
8/8/2000 the Centre contacted the bank who on the same day informed the LAC that the 
consumer has been called to go to the bank in order to r ceive her money.  
 
Case 2: On September 1998, a French consumer in Lisbon bought an airplane ticket 
which she could not use for health reasons. She askd for a refund without success. On 
30/6/2000, she contacted the Centre who one month later contacted the trader, who 




 The LAC has been very important in helping consumers both locally and in 
cross border conflicts and is ready to join the European EEB-NET220. What remains 
necessary is to understand the demands of justice as care and lend the characteristics 
described in chapter seven to the NET.  
  
II- The Danish Consumer Ombudsman (DCO)221 
 
 The experience in Brazil, described in Chapter III, remains invaluable for the 
arguments this thesis defends. It represents a model of justice as care which has been 
silenced in favour of modernist, male and patriarchl principles. It was not abandoned 
for essentially political reasons. As already said the practice could not resist the force 
and violence of patriarchal law.  
 The use of European data is not necessary to inform the framework suggested 
but only to corroborate its feasibility in the EU, since justice as care demands a 
complete change in handling human relationships andconflicts. This change is 
necessary not only in Brazil or Europe but in any place where patriarchal law still has 
the last voice. 
 So, the Danish Consumer Ombudsman (DCO) deserves consideration for being 
a pubic authority who works similarly to the Brazilian MP in terms of institution will to 
protect consumers. It is also a very good example because on the one hand, its practice 
establishes clear patterns of rematerialisation of law through the absorption of ethics and 
morals in the application of law. On the other, the absorption happens much more in the 
daily practice of an Ombudsman informed by ethical/moral aspirations than by Acts of 
Parliament or of Government in general. Certainly law plays its role but reflexivity is 
undoubtedly the strongest characteristic of the DCO, which works to bring “commercial 
communications in the broadest sense” into line, and to adjust commercial 
communications’ behaviour in regard to the interests of consumers, society and traders. 
The law is not the central element of adjustments or of actions by the DCO. He knows 
very well that the law does not say everything thatsociety and consumers need and that 
he needs to go beyond law to reach justice.  He acts based on “an average law”. In fact, 
he considers the law as a horizon and calls much more to ethical patterns to bring 
“business affairs” into line. 
 The DCO does not settle consumer conflicts but, as a watchdog, he uses them to 
find situations in need of behaviour adjustment through close cooperation with The 
Danish Consumer Complaint Board. The DCO acts without powers to make binding 
decisions but can go to courts against companies or public bodies that violate the law; 
can also intervene in civil actions to support indivi ual consumers, like Brazilian MP. 
Brazilian MP could settle individual conflicts before the victory of the male modernist 
principles of law and did it through justice as care. By contrast, the DCO can only claim 
restitution for individual consumers or for many with equal claims by means of a trial 
on illegal marketing practices, which is, nevertheless, an advantage against Brazilian 
MP who suits only public and homogeneous diffuse private rights. 
 In a speech for the European Commission in 1998222 the DCO criticised the 
hindrances of PIL while defending the establishment of European ethical guidelines. He 
attacked self-regulation or soft law as tools for consumer protection, as well as 
minimum directives. Moreover, he argued that subsidiarity should not justify the view 
                                                
220 The European Extra-Judicial Bodies Network. See footn te 2. 
221 The present section uses the information available t the following sites: www.forburg.dk and 
europa.eu.int/comm./dg24/library/speeches/speech08_en.html. 
222 See footnote 5. 
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that harmonization of consumer protection is unnecessary because, in fact, 
harmonization has been applied in favour of commercial interests, with traders only 
obliged to comply with the law of the country of origin. The harmonization defended is 
not procedural, through PIL, but substantial or materi l. Here are the marks of 
reflexivity and re-materialization. The Nordic Ombudsmen, especially the DCO, are 
very good examples of how certain institutional practices can lend to law more efficacy 
and efficiency while endowing it with substantial elements which allow it a larger moral 
reach. The analysis of the Ombudsman presented in chapter seven explains this 
movement.  
 Moreover, he considers private Bank Ombudsmen to be a problem for 
consumers firstly because they basically respond to the tendency of the financial sector 
to buy time and secondly because the specific public legislation is mostly about 
securing the solvency and liquidity of banks, insurance companies, and so on and not 
about the fairness of consumer contract terms and practices. Financial e-commerce, as 
already noted, is the most important sector of EU market and also the most suitable for 
practices of justice as care or ready to be under th  supervision of a public authority 
such as a European Consumer Ombudsman. The latter would also have the qualities of 
the DCO and the peculiarities of justice as care, which, as developed throughout the 
thesis (especially in Chapter III) differs from an office of ombudsmen more generally.  
The DCO defends that consumers need an independent public ombudsman, like that 
which exists in Denmark for nearly 30 years: a real person rather than an anonymous 
bureaucrat usually associate with legislation. He str s es the necessity of a practice of 
justice that encompasses the different and regional traditions, cultures and perceptions 
of justice, especially after the entry of the Eastern European countries in the EU. The 
DCO is a real person ready to understand human needs, r lationships and problems; he 
can overcome conflicts and make law reach moral/ethical standards. He can certainly 
lead negotiation to a win-win situation where no one gets hurt: the highest aim of 
feminine moral reasoning. He knows that courts have the final say but he will avoid 
them if ethical standards are observed and will suit traders in court only if negotiation 
fails. Transparency, confidence, dialogue, efficieny and efficacy are his goals and 
principles. This is why he establishes the existence of efficient law enforcement, as the 
background of his actions towards the call for ethical/moral standards, in the same way 
that this thesis defends hard law as the safety net of justice as care.    
 Finally, the DCO’s office suggests a promising experience in Europe to enforce 
love and to establish conflict resolution beyond the rather narrow trends of the law as 
condition for differents to deal to trade. He works towards changing the fact that “we 
are completely indifferent to one another. Except insofar as we have obligations and 
duties to each other under the rules, we do not have to care” (Bankowski, 1996e:19). 
His actions push forth interesse and love in commercial communications. He is 
absolutely aware that whether disputants “ignore their differences, negotiate, submit to 
mediation or arbitration, or retain lawyers to litigate is a matter of significant choice. 
How people dispute is, after all, a function of how (and whether) they relate” 
(Auerbach, 1983:7). Furthermore, his action anticipates the spirit of Nice towards 
transforming consumers into citizens and it is even ahead Nice when it calls on business 
communications to recognise the human in consumers and their needs within any 
conflict to be settled in an environment where all is deemed to be taken as commodities 
and equated in a simple relation between price and offer. Two last important points to 
be stressed are the long Nordic tradition of protecting citizens and the remarkable 
increase of transparency and democracy of EU institutions after the accession of the 
Nordic countries. These points certainly colour thebackground of the DCO’s actions 
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and strengths his position as a paradigm for the creation of an EC consumer 
ombudsman who as a person and not as an institution would become possible justice as 
care to be performed. Any office of any ombudsman as an institution to seek strictly the 
application of law is unworthy. The ethics of care would make the difference in any 



















































Keeping your mind in the light you will all be a source of refreshment 
to one another, both individually and together. 
So may the God of power 
and love maintain you all in power and love so that, 
instead of finding fault with one another, 
you will refresh one another 
in the unlimited love of God. 
For it is this love that enables you to be truly aware of one another, 
to read one another’s hearts. 
So being held together in this love you 
cannot be 
separated from it, or divided among yourselves” 
 
George Fox 
(300 years ago)223 
 
 
 This thesis started by arguing against male, modernist legal theory and its 
connected practice of law. The argument then was not against law but against “the 
mouths of law” (Gessner et alli, 1996:95) and their exclusiveness in imposing law 
through their verdicts, as unilateral decisions andrestrictions to voluntary, punctual and 
particular initiatives. The conclusion was built on a framework to support a more 
emancipatory practice of law, especially for cross-border consumer disputes in the EU. 
This emancipatory practice would rest upon a post-modern and feminine ethics of 
alterity and of care which are instrumentalised by legal practises. These practises were 
founded on rematerialisation and reflexiveness. So, emancipatory legal justice could be 
possible in a caring environment informed by love and interesse as institutional 
practices. Rematerialisation and reflexiveness were the concluding suggestions for 
easing the reductive features of law which informs regulatory problems, stabilises 
expectations, overlooks needs and the human of the O r and are the sole reason for 
justice deficit. Substantive and reflexive elements i  law were advanced as the way to 
operationalise the exigencies of both post-modern and feminine ethics, in terms of the 
                                                
223 On the notice board of Quakers meeting house of Edinburgh. 
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reality of Otherness, especially given European diversity, and the overcoming of 
separation as a legal, moral, institutional and social problem.  
 This thesis, despite its main theoretical characte, did not overlook or dismiss 
legal dogmatics. However, the character of this thesis appears to dispense with any 
further consideration of EU’s legal apparatus since the exercise of Chapter V is suffice 
to the point one can state: habemus lex.  Firstly, Chapter I challenged the established 
and dominant male legal rationality based on legal certainty and security while 
proposing a discussion about dispensing justice as care informed by a feminine moral 
reasoning. Secondly, Chapter VII awaited Chapter V’s discussion in depth of the two 
faces of EU readiness to welcome justice as care, namely, the substance or implicit 
commands of Art. 153 and the political principle of subsidiarity concerning its positive 
aspect. Furthermore, this thesis is a feminine analysis and so aspires to change one’s 
consciousness thereby responding to Mary Frug’s feminist criterion (1992:53) while 
disregarding male voices in law.  
 The tendency of EU consumer access to justice policy towards the ethics of care 
was identified as undoubtedly due to its earlier decision for an out-of-court system. This 
has nothing to do with the position of Art. 153 in the EU legal apparatus but to the 
incompatibility or difficult dialogue between justice as care and modernist legal 
principles which are articulated as guidelines for proceedings of law in courts of justice. 
Nevertheless, recent EU Commission documents have established the adoption of 
modernist principles in order to legitimate the out- f-court system for serving EU 
consumers. The said tendency can be understood as the only way to provide EU 
consumers with a suitable access to justice in view of the extreme difficulties to apply 
rules of PIL and to harmonise European civil and consumer laws.     
 If one considers the existence of legal constraints, one must understand that Art. 
153 is a programmatic constitutional rule which does not have any substance. It is a 
wide rule and expresses a program. That is why it can be used as a “joker” in the pack, 
that can cover almost any situation if the case demands a constitutional basis for acting 
or policy elaboration. This programmatic character of Art. 153 justifies its consideration 
vis-à-vis other constitutional norms (Articles 2,10, 94, 95 and 308) and EU policies 
regarding the gestation of its consumer legal framework (negative and soft law) as done 
extensively in Chapter V, which also analysed Art. 153 in itself.  
The use of subsidiarity to deny EU obligation to act in favour of consumer 
protection was challenged strongly in Chapter V because, in sum, as showed by 
Weatherill, it serves only traders’ interests in hampering the market to protect national 
privileges.  
This thesis should not be taken as naïve or destructive. Its possible weakness is 
to argue for the retention of the adjudication of disputes by the application of legal rules 
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in courts of law as a safety net if the ethics of care fails. Nevertheless, this weakness has 
to be understood against two facts. On the one hand, feminine “weakness” is inherent to 
the very nature of the feminine, which reveals its inability224 to impose itself, to reduce 
and "still" things. The feminine embraces the complexity deficit of law and tries to 
overcome it and to remedy it punctually, contextually, by acknowledging particularities 
and avoiding grand metanarratives and normative commands. On the other hand, 
feminine “weakness” is due to patriarchal social-human organization which demands a 
level of security and certainty more easily achieved by the reductiveness of law225. 
   Harmonization was obviously criticized as the only tool to serve EU consumers 
since, on the one hand, the basic male confidence in proceedings of law in courts of 
justice cannot praise the Other and his exigencies of being heard and answered in his 
own terms. On the other, harmonization is an important way to establish hard law and it 
surely integrates, as the safety net, the whole system of justice as care. It is fundamental 
to understand two points: firstly that “more particularised approaches” are exigencies of 
punctuality of justice as care when it responds to the call of the Other, a call which can 
be answered only when the law suffers rematerializalion and not necessarily 
particularisation. Secondly that justice as care is not a privilege of the resolution of 
cross-border disputes but they (cross-border dispute ) are where the Otherness of the 
foreign weighs the most (here the reason why this the is took cross-border disputes as 
its central problem)226. 
 The unequal position of consumers in disputes was tackled throughout Chapter 
IV, especially in its introduction. The latter argued for the strategic importance of the 
plight of consumers, including their economic weakness, for a discourse that intends to 
characterise justice as care, as the practice which is able to install the aspirations of 
Otherness in legal systems. Chapter I demonstrated how substantive justice can freeze 
criteria by making them formal patterns of legal reasoning. Then, it becomes unable to 
grasp particulars and to respond to their punctual needs in their own terms. Instead of 
praising the weakness of consumers, the thesis has benefited by the discussion about the 
Brazilian MP, in chapter III, and the role of the DCO which express how powerful 
public authorities, through strong institutional will can work towards responding the call 
of consumers both individual and collectively  weakr and, above all, different.   
 The example explored in Chapter III was implemented by a very powerful 
official body, constitutionally responsible for criminal prosecution at all levels of 
society, including the President of the country, and for civil suits to defend public and 
                                                
224 Or maybe the force of the feminine resides in being soft and working by including as much as possible 
in order to avoid anyone getting hurt. 
225 Nowadays, as patriarchalism goes to globalization, female moral reasoning appears to be the necessary 
remedy to include and equate differences in narrow patterns of equality.  
226 See Chapter IV. 
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diffuse interests. The same body with the competenc to settle disputes involving 
consumers issues could prosecute the perpetrators of related criminal aspects of the 
case. This practice revealed an institution eager to comply with its duty. The 
institutional context was conductive to the observance of the rule of law but from an 
institutional decision to settle disputes in a more sensible way, by helping the parties to 
come through with their stories to listen to each ot er, and to pay attention to their 
specificity or particularity.  This kind of atmosphere allowed the special justice for 
consumers to flourish even though no mandatory requi ments for it existed in any 
formal legal document. 
 The practice developed “standards of conduct” and called on ethical/moral 
patterns informed by general principles established in hard law, and these were sensibly 
imposed upon the parties with the aim of helping them to come through with their needs 
and reality and to reach agreement or justice in their own terms. The practice revealed 
itself to be profoundly pedagogical for both consumers and merchants or professionals 
called to meet in an atmosphere which would stress the necessity to rescue and improve 
a relationship of trust, common and shared profit and responsibility.  The presence of a 
member of the Ministére Public was very helpful in lending respectability rather than 
imposing, as much as the presence of a judge in the Arbitration Centre of Lisbon 
(Cabeçadas, 1993:308). 
 Thus, the Brazilian experience plays a fundamental role in this thesis both as an 
evidence of how justice as care can inform a practice of law and of how the feminine 
has been silenced in legal and institutional sites. 
 The shortcomings of the discourse of rights in encompassing the particularity of 
consumer disputes are usually an argument to disregard consumer law as a valuable area 
of study and attention, especially for philosophers and sociologists of law. The same 
situation is noted at Community level where, “[g]iven (…) [a] narrow and rather short-
sighted consumer perspective, ‘… consumer law and policy is marginalized (…) and 
plays, at best, an accessory role” (In Kye, 1995:40). Based upon an ethical quality of 
consumer protection, this thesis has claimed that justice for consumers and consumer 
policy in general does not only mean establishing fair-trading or repairing or preventing 
damages, but above all, acknowledging the human and responding to needs, satisfaction 
and happiness in markets where all is equate throug price and offer. These were the 
terms in which this thesis proposed the legitimacy of the practice, without forgetting the 
necessity of a hard legal apparatus to function as a safety net in case love and care fail. 
The European agency responsible for consumer protection will need to be endowed with 
the power to intervene before courts of law at national, international and supra-national 
levels, to propose or “promote” civil, administrative and criminal suits in consumer 
matters or assisting consumers in individual cases, just like the DCO does.  
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 A broader definition of the consumer, like the one offered by the Preliminary 
Programme of the European Economic Community for a Consumer Protection and 
Information Policy227, seemed to be needed for a practice of justice as care. The 
consumer is “also a person concerned with the various facts of society which may affect 
him either directly or indirectly as a consumer” (Page 2). This could be broadened even 
further to say “as a person”, since consumption is the way through which one 
experiences this world and one’s happiness and satisfaction nowadays. To disregard the 
consumerist aspect of modern society is to forget a gre t range of situations worthy of 
attention and qualitatively peculiar mostly because th y allow a more relational 
approach. To leave markets all alone with their own bli d equation between offer and 
price is to overlook the long way consumerism has to call attention to needs and human 
quality in the Other while challenging unwarranted assumptions. In this respect, the 
special nature of consumer problems reveals another paradigm to inform the settlement 
of disputes in the first instance and, more broadly, another way of reasoning towards 
justice in law. More concretely, consumer disputes can be used as a pedagogical 
process, where a different way of solving disputes can be nourished and stimulated. 
This new system elects the Other not as another self or a stranger who cannot be 
approached, but as the object of love, interesse and care, attitudes (or qualities) to be 
instrumentalised through substantive and reflexive elements in law.  
 The model of justice as a feminine practice responds to the patterns of care 
which contextually and personally can overcome the s ortcomings of the modernist, 
male legal theory and practice of law and push forth the process of giving “a little more 
soul”228 to the ever closer European Community. Furthermore, as stressed in Chapter I, 
justice as a feminine virtue does not instrumentalise equality before the law, legal 
certainty or the rule of law as internal qualities of the process. This process of achieving 
justice by the parties in their own terms is basically  model which abolishes 
adjudication from its own system. This does not mean that the value of the rule of law 
and of its principles is not recognised, only that they does not have a role to play in the 
making of justice informed by the ethics of care. The external characteristics of the 
system should certainly comply with the rule of law but will suspend the rest in the 
name of a personal justice achieved through a contextual approach to the particularities 
at stake. This stands in the context of the sceptical position already postulated regarding 
the usefulness of private law and abstract legal principles to regulate consumer 
contractual relationships and to protect consumers (Howells&Weatherill, 1995:121). 
Legal rules may function as external criteria of the legitimacy of the feminine practice 
of justice or as a safety net when such a practice fa ls in handling consumer disputes.  
                                                
227 OJ C 92/1, 1975. 
228Jacques Delors, speaking at Strasbourg, 17 January 1989, in McGee & Weatherill, 1990:596. 
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The rule of law is certainly conducive to justice as  male virtue but is 
suspended to function as a safety net for justice as c re. Male justice violates 
particularities but still must stay as a last resort when justice as care fails.   Given the 
peculiarities of justice for consumers, to keep both all legal remedies dear to the rule of 
law as the only possibility to settle disputes and a justice responsible for delivering 
“common sense solutions to consumer problems” sounds a contradiction in terminis and 
makes the system dangerously inconsistent (Ibid., 555). Thus, this thesis claims that a 
special justice for consumers has to happen outside the framework of the Judiciary 
Power responsible for the application of law in respect to the principles of equality, 
impartiality and rule of law. In addition, the justice which can acknowledge the Other 
and “think things through and through” could not be delivered or adjudicated; it would 
have to be negotiated, discussed, tailored to needs an  satisfaction. The apprehension of 
the Other with his needs and the attainment of his satisfaction and happiness seem to be 
impossible deeds for a third party regardless being partial or impartial. The justice, 
which thinks things through and through, is a personal conquest and in no way a 
feasible gift to be delivered or adjudicated by third parties. The figure of an adjudicator 
will inevitable imply an outer party who translates the Other’s necessities into his own 
system or into whichever system of law agreed for ruling the process of adjudication, 
whether publicly or privately codified. For justice as care, one does not need outer 
parties but only someone to facilitate or help parties o listen and respond to each other.   
 Then, the dialogue between postmodern irresolution and Gillligan’s cultural 
feminism were articulated. Initially, this thesis did not discuss any aspect of postmodern 
feminist thought since it appears difficult to recon ile it with Gilligan's somewhat 
essentialist cultural feminism. Any model of the feminine is totally at odds with a 
postmodern refusal of meta-narratives, let alone th resistance of radical-critical 
feminists against any constraint upon women and their expression. 
 Chapter I made a postmodern reading of the pitfalls of modernist legal 
rationality, which is based on separation and isolation (especially regarding the Other); 
it identified the problem of justice and law as postmodern in view of the increasing 
displacement of the self in favor of the centrality of the Other. Derrida was mentioned 
as the talented postmodern thinker who recalled in Force of Law the genius of Walter 
Benjamin and his "Critique of Violence". Derrida re-posited legal justice as a 
postmodern challenge beyond the force of law and this thesis takes this position as its 
own. Levinas inserted the Other and his inaccessibility without offering a feasible 
resolution for the moral problem of Otherness. Then the ethics of care disentangled the 
Other from the male fear of connection, from masculine separation and elaborated the 
path of accessing the Other in an ethic of relationships and responsibility. From Levinas 
the thesis took also asymmetric morality in oppositi n to Kantian unicist morality. 
 271
However, Levinas’ asymmetry was identified as a masculine resolution of the aporia of 
justice since it leaves the Other inaccessible. Precisely at this point the feminine and 
alterity were articulated in order to improve postmodernism. There is no "coincidence of 
resolution" since this thesis has articulated Gilligan's cultural feminism as the feminine 
resolution of the inaccessible postmodern Other. This resolution removes the Other 
from the realm of hermeneutics to deal with moral cl ims and even some binding legal 
behaviors as very concrete moral responsibilities in relationships. This moral 
responsibility obliges one to act with care and friendliness to guarantee that no one may 
be hurt or left behind.  
Certainly, Drucilla Cornell’s "postmodern feminist thought" does not "militate 
towards an  'ethics of care'". The deconstructionism that Cornell espouses is indeed 
inspiring for reflexive law and the feminine ethics of care but it fails in accepting the 
Other as accessible through a moral effort and places the access of the Other in the 
attempts of a deconstructivist hermeneutics. The problem is that it entails separation 
while a cultural feminine moral effort requires connection, reversibility, method of 
inclusion and responsibility in a web of relationships. Moral responsibility, for Gilligan, 
in regard to a feminine and different voice, has to be woven in both personal (friends 
and family) and impersonal (social encounters) relationships.   
Minow's legal criticism, which can hardly be seen as postmodern, works for the 
improvement of legal adjudication informed by difference and not by formal equality. 
Minow certainly shares with Gilligan the preoccupations of the feminism of difference 
but she works for legal justice informed by the ethics of rights. She is more comfortably 
characterized as a critical or radical feminist.  
This thesis has not argued for any coincidence but it has tried to articulate the 
claims of both Otherness and feminine moral reasoning as an ethics of care. There is no 
coincidence, but proper articulation which supports a dialogue between postmodern 
irresolution and aspiration and traditional feminism.          
This articulation strengthens the displacement of the “day in court” as the 
greatest modernist conquest. In truth, this conquest responds to the disintegration of 
traditional relationships, where the feminine could speak its truth and power, in favour 
of law as an institutional fact. Equality is parallel to that. Otherness deconstructs 
equality and consequently law as institutional fact. Gilligan helps this deconstruction 
while reconciling Otherness with the law thereby replacing in this male institutional 
locus of law in order to place the traditional value of the feminine as a different voice. 
The feminine voice represents a moral reasoning worth being applied in conflict 
resolution because it is able to consider and honor the Other in Other’s own terms. The 
ethics of alterity is postmodern because it displaces the modernist syntax of the centered 
and autonomous self but it fails to rebuild the dialogue and to install the Other in 
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political, legal and judicial arenas. The ethics of care is itself a new syntax, which is 
able both to install the Other and to legitimate thclaim that one may be nice all the 
time.  It may be recalled the discussion in Chapter I (footnote 41) on Honneth’s position 
about the necessary complementation between asymmetrical postmodern ethics and the 
ethics of care.  
When one understands the ethics of alterity within e exigency of the ethics of 
care then it becomes absolutely necessary that one ries to be always nice to all Others 
one meets and not only to the disabled, orphans and marginals (socially-excluded 
groups). Only in the context of the ethics of rights and the unicist, symmetric, Kantian 
morality of the autonomous and enlightened self,  “to be nice all the time” becomes 
impossible or loses its force as a moral, legal and social principle. 
 Can such a thing be at all institutionalised, especially in the EC context? This 
thesis has answered this question positively, arguing for the necessity of a European 
out-of-court system (European Consumer Ombudsman) to tackle the challenge of 
alterity and care as moral exigencies of an effectiv  consumer justice for a unified and 
diverse market. 
 This thesis has proposed the out-of-court nature of the justice here redefined. It 
is still necessary to say that this justice needs a public face endowed with the 
respectability, accountability and power to take action in regard to setting up civil, 
administrative and criminal procedures. If one looks into the European institutional 
framework, one may ask what is missing for the Commission to react responsively to 
consumer complaints in the internal market with the same willingness that it deals with 
complaints of citizens regarding problems with, forinstance, visas, passports, the 
recognition of degrees, through a service publicly offered? A first tentative answer is to 
do with the lack of institutional moral commitment. The market without consumers can 
no longer be morally or legally defended in view of, inter allia, what the Treaty spells 
out in its Articles 2, 95-para 3, and 153. The moral dimension of economic growth 
requires that it must be pursued as a means to enrich life, to improve the quality of life 
in all its respects, to responds to needs and acknowledge the human in the Other. Article 
10 could easily express this Community duty as much as a Member State duty, under 
the co-ordination of a European authority. A possible Community involvement in the 
practice of justice for consumers in cross-border disputes should use the resources 
already in operation in each Member State. The agents of the Community could work 
with national organs, transformed into Community bodies, in the name of the fulfilment 
of a moral duty consistent with providing justice and not only market progress. After the 
adoption of the single currency, the growth of financi l services across frontiers, 
facilitated by electronic means, the establishment at he Community level of a very 
effective system of justice will be of paramount importance for consumers in cross-
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border disputes. In addition, the level of integration that the single currency entails and 
requires will justify a much more profound involvemnt of the Community regarding 
access to justice for consumers since it is itself a part of integration.  
 Institutional will as love and interesse adopted as public policy together with the 
systematic retraining of legal professionals to act under the guidance of alterity and care 
are the key points in tackling access to justice for consumers in the European market. 
 This thesis has claimed that justice is a particular or punctual practice thereby 
deliberately avoiding furnishing a definition of justice in the hope of justifying the title 
of this thesis that says “redefining justice”. The intention is to express a process through 
which one performs justice again and again within particular relationships or 
encounters. “The task of legal thought is to retrieve friendship from the ruins of 
litigation” (In Der Walt, 2006: 224). “(I)n the cano ical texts, the allegedly universal 
man of public politics, with his forms of reasoning, rights, virtues, and constitutional 
associations, is defined in contrast to the private woman, with her contrasting qualities 
and associations” (In Tully, 1995:50). My own thesis has been an attempt to restore the 

































  The following questions were elaborated to guide th interviews with the 
Director of the Lisbon Arbitration Centre, six Public Prosecutors in Brasilia-Brazil, the 
representative of the body created to succeed the Office of the Public Prosecutor in 
charge of settling individual consumer claims in the Capital of Brazil. The questions 
were translated into Portuguese and delivered in advance. Nevertheless, in all interviews 
they were not more than guidelines, since the conversation greatly respected the 
different personal experiences and ways of reporting important facts and the position of 
law regarding official action. The great majority of the interviews were at least partially 
recorded, but a couple of them were not at all, for the personal convenience of the 
interviewee. The interviews were all in Portuguese. The questions were elaborated upon 
the works of Abel (1982) and Arno (1979) on informalism. 
 
1- Regarding the activity of the body or Office of the Public Prosecutor in charge of 
consumer protection, could you say that it increases state power by being purposive 
and proactive, while cultivating the appearance of being non-coercive? 
2- To what extent are/were the distinctions between private and public, state and civil 
society, illegal and legal (what is forbidden and what is allowed) blurred by your 
actions, when settling individual consumer complaints? 
3- To what extent did/does your action work extending the state control managing 
capital accumulation and defusing the resistance this engenders? Is the service 
mostly used by “the dominated categories of contemporary capitalism: workers, the 
poor, ethnic minorities and women”? (Abel, 1982:6) 
4- To which extent does the service individualise conflicts and establish “control by 
disorganizing grievants, trivializing grievances, frustrating collective responses (…) 
much more directly, by instructing each party that e can, and must, resolve the 
controversy alone”? (Ibid., 6-7) 
5- Does the service work with staff without much training, who operate with minimal 
supervision and few rules and is its effectiveness measured by the number of cases 
handled and levels of personal satisfaction? (Ibid., 7) 
6- Could you say that the process of settling consumer complaints offers an 
opportunity for parties to re-establish a good level of personal understanding, 
thereby mending relationships harmed by disputes?  
7- Is the service impartial when working for a compromise between the litigants?  
8- On the other hand, could you say that your actions are/were partial toward 
overcoming the conflictive and adversarial character of disputes brought before 
you? 
9- Do your actions avoid the complexity of disputes and “attempt to deal with the total 
relationships and the total social personalities of the parties, thereby admitting the 
unique nature of every case”? (Arno, 1979:44) 
10- Are there hard law, enough constitutional protection and lack of procedural rules 
informing your action of settling individual consumer disputes? 
11- How important is for your action the absence of adjudicatorial authority, lawyers but 
the presence of a powerful public authority competent o handle the grievances and 
promote the application of the law in private, administrative and criminal judicial 
instances? 
12- Is it possible to identify in your actions freedom for parties to establish dialogue, 
using at their discretion any arguments that they judge necessary to make their 
point, regardless of any logical or temporal relation with the dispute and its facts? 
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13- Do the parties have the freedom to set up the terms of the agreement to settle their 
dispute, in view of their needs, satisfaction and happiness, irrespective of what the 
law says? 
14- Could your actions be characterised as pragmatic, ad hoc and flexible enough to be 
adapted to every concrete case that you have to handle? 
15- To extent is your action educational or pedagogical, instructing parties to establish 
between them a language of co-operation, mutual understanding and willingness to 
compromise in the name of the re-establishment of mutual satisfaction and 
happiness? 
16- What for you legitimises your actions? 
17- Is there any general strategy for handling the disputes brought before the Office? 
18- Assuming a positive answer, does the strategy suffer periodical critical analysis and 
revision? Could you mention at least one example? 
19- Is it possible to identify any attempt by the parties to establish a relationship with 
the authority responsible for handling the dispute? 
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